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ABSTRACT 
Tax havens and Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) are seen as facilitating the 
avoidance and evasion of tax revenue that should rightly be paid to the country of the 
residence of the taxpayer. For example, it has been estimated that for the 2008 year 
the United States would have lost USD 100 billion in revenue and that over the past 
decade, USD 1.027 trillion.1 The problem of lost tax revenue due to the existence of 
tax havens and OFCs has been estimated as costing governments worldwide USD 
255 billion each year.2 Moreover, it is estimated that 15 percent of the world’s 
nations are tax havens and half of the world trade passes through them although they 
only account for 3 percent of the world’s GDP.3 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been 
very active for the past ten years trying to make tax havens and OFCs more 
transparent in their taxation arrangements with individuals and Multi-National 
Enterprises (MNEs) as well as amend their bank secrecy laws so that information 
about non-resident taxpayers can be made available to other countries. Recently, as a 
result of the ‘Global Financial Crisis’, the G20 nations have threatened to impose 
sanctions on tax havens and OFCs in order to require those nations to exchange 
information on foreign investors and MNEs and to amend their bank secrecy laws. 
As a result of this action, all tax havens have cooperated with the OECD in terms of 
exchanging tax information and reducing their bank secrecy laws. In fact, as at 1 
April 2010, the OECD was able to report that there were no countries that had not 
agreed to the ‘internationally agreed tax standard’ on exchange of information and 
transparency.4  
 
The main question raised in this thesis is whether tax havens and OFCs will survive 
in the new international legal environment. Chapter Ten of the thesis provides a 
                                               
1
 Timothy Addison, ‘Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens’, (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 703, 704. 
2
 Ibid, 708. 
3
 Ibid, 711. 
4
 OECD, ‘A progress report on the jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in implementing the 
internationally agreed tax standard’, (2010) OECD www.oecd.org at 12 April 2010. 
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conclusion that supports the contention that tax havens will survive, although with a 
reduced volume of business. The main reasons for this conclusion are that tax havens 
do provide many legitimate uses for their banking and financial services that are used 
by foreign governments as well as individuals and MNEs. The fact that all 
governments still have a great deal of difficulty in identifying their own resident 
taxpayers that use tax havens is also a strong reason for believing that tax havens and 
OFCs will still continue to provide banking services in the future. This reason still 
applies even though countries such as Australia, the US and the United Kingdom 
have strengthened their laws in order to detect and deter their residents from locating 
capital and business in tax havens and OFCs. 
 
The thesis then examines four subsidiary research questions that have a direct 
bearing on the survival of tax havens. The first question asks whether the 
international income of Australian residents should be taxed on a ‘worldwide’ or 
‘territorial’ basis. The simple basis for this question was that if it was so difficult for 
the Australian Taxation Office to detect Australian resident taxpayers that were using 
tax havens then why spend millions of dollars trying to achieve an almost impossible 
task. For example, ‘Project Wickenby’ has been provided with funding of more than 
$300 million and yet, has only collected about $160 million in actual cash.5 
Currently, Australia imposes income tax on its resident taxpayers on their worldwide 
income except for MNEs that generate active business income, which is exempt 
when repatriated to Australia. One of the main reasons for looking at this question 
was to see if it would be more equitable, efficient and simpler to adopt a territorial 
basis of taxation. Under a territorial basis only income generated within the state is 
subject to tax and all foreign income is not taxed in the home state. The research 
indicated that a territorial system of taxation was inherently inequitable as those 
taxpayers that could arrange their affairs in such a way that much of their income 
was generated in a foreign country paid very little income tax. Moreover, it appeared 
that both tax systems required complex anti-avoidance laws to combat tax avoidance 
by their resident taxpayers. Therefore, the conclusion contended that the current 
                                               
5
 Assistant Treasurer, The Honourable Nick Sherry, ‘Crackdown on Tax Crime’, Newsletter, 16 February 2010. 
The government and the ATO contend that they have been successful because they included the amount of 
almost $300 million as a ‘compliance’ dividend. In other words the $300 million represented an amount that 
would have been lost to revenue if Project Wickenby had not deterred taxpayers from using tax havens and 
OFCs. 
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Australian system was good in that it was equitable and yet exempted active foreign 
business income from further tax in Australia.  
 
The second subsidiary research question asked whether the OECD’s ‘harmful tax 
competition project’ was now part of the current international taxation law. In this 
context the issue was that if it is ‘soft’ international law is that one of the main 
reasons why many tax havens and OFCs were complying with the guidelines on 
transparency and exchange of information. The research examined the philosophical 
basis for international law and the concept of hard and soft international law. More 
importantly, it examined the concept of how international law became part of the 
domestic law of a country. This issue is important because many tax havens may not 
be able to convince their own Parliament to amend their bank secrecy laws even 
though the government has entered into an exchange of information agreement with 
another country. If the ban secrecy laws are not amended to allow for the exchange 
of information on non-resident taxpayers then tax havens and OFCs will continue to 
operate unfettered. 
 
The third subsidiary research question concerned the reason why the Australian 
government has deliberately blurred the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion; the former being a legal activity and the later being unlawful. The 
conclusion was that one of the main reasons for the blurring of the distinction was to 
overcome any concerns on the part of tax havens and OFCs that all banking and 
financial activities by Australian taxpayers constituted  criminal conduct and, 
therefore, should be disclosed to the ATO. The overwhelming desire to break down 
the bank secrecy requirements of tax havens has resulted in the Australian 
Government treating all measures to avoid income tax as amounting to tax evasion 
and, hence, a criminal offence and this aspect is examined in detail in the thesis. This 
issue has implications for the future of tax havens and taxpayers wishing to use 
foreign banking services. 
 
The fourth subsidiary research question focuses on the rights of taxpayers that use 
tax havens and OFCs to hold their wealth when these nations are now entering into 
tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). It became clear from the research that 
taxpayers are able to protect the confidentiality and privacy of their financial details 
x 
only if they are able to show that the information is protected by legal professional 
privilege. This privilege extends to legal advice obtained from a foreign lawyer. The 
future of tax havens and OFCs is arguably dependent upon them being able to protect 
the confidentiality of the financial details of non-resident taxpayers through their 
bank secrecy laws. If the tax havens and OFCs repeal their laws and allow requests 
for information to be complied with, then the rights of the non-resident taxpayers are 
severely affected. This in turn impacts on the survival of tax havens.
1 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of the thesis is to critically assess the future of tax havens and Offshore 
Financial Centres (OFCs) in face of the concerted effort of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the 
G20 Nations and the Australian Government to combat tax havens1 and harmful tax 
competition on the basis of perceived tax avoidance and tax evasion. As the 
movement of mobile capital between countries with different income tax rates 
increases, the ability of governments to impose tax on the earnings from that capital 
becomes harder. As developed countries impose high rates of income tax in order to 
sustain a welfare state with an ageing population2 and, more recently, to reduce 
budget deficits as a result of the global financial crisis, the activities against tax 
havens have increased.3 To put the role of tax havens and OFCs in context, it has 
been estimated that for the 2008 year the United States (US) would have lost USD 
100 billion in revenue and over the past decade, USD 1.027 trillion as a direct result 
of taxpayers using the banking and financial services being provided by tax havens.4 
The problem of lost tax revenue due to the existence of tax havens and OFCs has 
been estimated as costing governments worldwide USD 255 billion each year.5 
Moreover, it is estimated that 15 percent of the world’s nations are tax havens and 
half of the world trade passes through them although they only account for 3 percent 
of the world’s GDP.6 In the Oxfam report, Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden 
                                               
1
 The term ‘tax havens’ is a generic term used to describe a country with low or no income tax rates and is also 
commonly referred to as an ‘offshore financial centre’ (OFC). A ‘tax haven’ is defined in section 1.2 below.  
2
 Terry Dwyer, ‘The New Fiscal Imperialism’ (2002-03) 19 Policy 12. On page 12, the first page of the article, 
Terry Dwyer states that ‘it is not surprising that Japan, the most rapidly ageing OECD country instigated the 
OECD work against tax havens in 1995’. 
3
 The OECD and the EU have been mounting their campaign against tax havens since the mid 1990s and over the 
last few years Australia has been very outspoken against tax havens and has started to prosecute Australian 
taxpayers for ‘Defrauding the Commonwealth’. 
4
 Timothy Addison, ‘Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens’, (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 703, 704. 
5
 Ibid, 708. 
6
 Ibid, 711. 
2 
Billions for Poverty Eradication, Oxfam estimated that the loss of taxation revenue 
from taxpayers using tax havens amounted to at least US$50 billion a year.7  
 
According to the OECD report on Harmful Tax Competition - an Emerging Global 
Issue, which was published in 1998, there were six Pacific nations on a ‘black’ list of 
tax havens that were considered to have harmful tax practices. That list was used by 
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in its report on Tax Havens and Tax 
Administration, which was published in February 2004. Since then further work has 
been undertaken by the OECD in having many of the tax havens on the list agree to 
be less secretive and to provide transparency in terms of the details of the people and 
corporations using the financial services provided by the tax havens. The OECD was 
able to report that there were no countries that had not agreed to the ‘internationally 
agreed tax standard’ on exchange of information and transparency as at 1 April 
2010.8 At a meeting of the OECD member countries, which met in Melbourne 
Australia in November 2005, the delegates to the meeting discussed the ways in 
which tax havens could be convinced to act as de facto tax collectors for the 
wealthier and more powerful nations and, at the same time, provide details of those 
using tax havens so as to deter anyone from placing their capital in those countries.  
 
This thesis will consider the adequacy of the existing Australian law to impose 
income tax on a ‘worldwide’ basis on its citizens. It will then focus on the OECD and 
its role in the development of ‘soft’ international law that impacts on tax havens9 and 
whether or not tax havens can survive as separate sovereign states, which means 
having the ability to make their own taxation laws without interference from other 
countries. For centuries, countries have been competing with each other to attract 
investment capital by offering foreign investors and foreign businesses tax 
concessions in order to attract them to establish their business or to place their money 
within that particular country. This thesis will show that many OECD member 
nations provide tax concessions in order to attract mobile capital. For example, the 
                                               
7
 Oxfam, Tax havens: releasing the hidden billions for poverty eradication, (2000) <http://www.oxfam.org.uk> at 
24 July 2006. 
8
 OECD, ‘A progress report on the jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in implementing the 
internationally agreed tax standard’, (2010) OECD www.oecd.org at 12 April 2010. 
9
 The concept of international law and the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ international law will be 
discussed later in this thesis. 
3 
US does not impose income tax in the form of withholding tax on interest earned in 
bank accounts by foreign investors. In fact, the income earned is not reported to the 
US Internal Revenue Service. Moreover, the US allows the State of Delaware to 
provide foreign taxpayers the ability to incorporate a company that allows money to 
be channelled to another country without any tax implications in the US. The United 
Kingdom (UK) allows wealthy individuals to live in the UK as non-domiciled 
residents and pay no income tax on their worldwide income. Australia also allows 
temporary residents to live in Australia but pay no income tax on their worldwide 
income. 
 
Australia has a taxation system that imposes income tax on its residents on a 
worldwide basis.10 This means that if an Australian resident earns income anywhere 
else in the world they must disclose that income in Australia and be subject to 
income tax on that profit. However, some Australian taxpayers have realised that if 
they earn income in a low or no income tax country, such as a ‘tax haven’, then little 
or no income tax will be imposed on that income in the ‘source’ country and, if it is 
not disclosed in Australia, then no income tax is payable in Australia. The act of non-
disclosure can amount to either tax evasion or tax avoidance according to the existing 
Australian statutory taxation law.11 It is this exact problem that the Australian 
Government, the OECD, the G20 and the EU are trying to stop.  
 
The thesis will analyse whether recent reforms to the law, in both Australia12 and 
internationally, can curb the incidence of taxpayers using tax havens to eliminate 
income tax being paid in Australia and other OECD countries. The opening of a bank 
account in a tax haven by an Australian resident is not contrary to the law but the 
failure to account for the income derived from funds placed in the bank account in a 
tax haven is an offence under the existing taxation law. The recent actions by the 
Australian Government and the OECD to proscribe activities by taxpayers that may 
                                               
10
 Australia imposes income tax on a world-wide basis on those taxpayers considered to be residents of Australia 
for taxation purposes. Income tax is not based on the nationality of the taxpayer in the same way as the US 
imposes income tax on all of its nationals no matter where they live and work. 
11
 The Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 6-5 and s 6-10 imposes income tax on a world-wide basis on 
resident taxpayers.  
12
 The introduction of the Anti-money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) which is 
similar to the Patriot Act (USA) that was introduced in response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Centre on 11 September. 
4 
only constitute tax avoidance as amounting to tax evasion would appear to blur the 
distinction between tax avoidance and tax minimisation, which is considered to be 
legal, and tax evasion, which is illegal. The thesis will critically examine the reasons 
why the government is deliberately blurring the distinction.13  
 
The thesis will explore whether international criticism of tax havens is warranted and 
whether existing Australian taxation law is sufficient to impose income tax on 
Australian taxpayers investing in tax havens or conducting their business through a 
tax haven. In this respect the thesis will critically examine the current law and 
comment on its effectiveness in imposing income tax on Australian residents on their 
worldwide income.  
 
1.2 What is a Tax Haven? 
Tax havens are sometimes referred to as ‘Offshore Financial Centres’14 and the 
OECD describes countries that have little or no income tax as ‘engaging in harmful 
tax competition’.15 In this thesis, the generic term of ‘tax havens’ will be used to 
cover the range of taxation practices that are considered by the OECD and the G20 
nations, in particular, to not be in the best interests of most western countries that 
impose progressive rates of tax on income and that maintain a welfare system 
requiring substantial tax revenue.   
 
Tax havens take a variety of forms and, according to Kudrle and Eden,16 there are 
four types of tax havens. The first, a ‘production haven’ is where foreign investors 
actually produce goods or services as a result of low taxes and tax concessions being 
offered by the host country. Ireland was considered to be a ‘production haven’ 
because many multi-national companies set up operations in Ireland because of the 
tax regime. Singapore also offers very generous tax concessions for businesses to set 
up production facilities or service companies. The second category is a ‘headquarters 
haven’ where companies are encouraged to incorporate their company in the tax 
                                               
13
 For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Dwyer, Terry, (2002-2003)19(4) Policy 15. 
14
 Ibid 12. 
15
 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, An Emerging Global Issue, (1998). 
16
 Robert T. Kudrle and Lorraine Eden, ‘The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will it Last? Will it Work?’ (2003) 
9 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance, 37. 
5 
haven even if the shareholding is located elsewhere. Singapore and Belgium are 
offered as examples of headquarters havens. The third category is a ‘sham haven’ 
where the host country imposes little or no income tax on profits generated by the 
foreign investor and the offshore financial centre located in the sham haven provides 
banking and insurance products for the foreign entity. The best examples of ‘sham 
havens’ are the Pacific tax havens, such as Vanuatu, and the Caribbean tax havens, 
such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. The fourth category is a ‘secrecy haven’ 
which ensures that details of monetary transactions are kept secret from the 
taxpayer’s home country. The best examples of a ‘secrecy haven’ are Switzerland, 
Luxembourg, Austria and Singapore. In these countries tax rates are not as important 
as the ability to hide investments.  
 
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in its publication titled Tax Havens and Tax 
Administration’17 bases its definition of what a ‘tax haven’ is on the OECD criteria 
which are as follows: 
 
A country is considered to be a tax haven if it contains three factors, first; if the 
country imposes no or only nominal taxes, second; there is a lack of effective 
exchange of information between countries because of bank secrecy laws, and third; 
there is a lack of transparency in that special tax rates may be negotiated and not 
consistently between foreign enterprises.18  
 
The ATO goes on to state that: 
having no or nominal taxes is not sufficient by itself to characterise a jurisdiction as a 
tax haven. The OECD recognises that every jurisdiction has a right to determine 
whether to impose direct taxes and, if so, to determine the appropriate rate.’19 
It has been suggested that Australia could also regarded as a ‘tax haven’ because it 
provides foreign investors with tax concessions that are not available to Australian 
residents.20 A ‘temporary resident’ is exempt from income tax in Australia on any 
                                               
17
 Australian Taxation Office, Tax havens and tax administration’, 2004, 2. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Szekely, Les, IntaxMagazine, October (2006), 3. This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
6 
foreign income derived whilst living and working in Australia. Moreover, a foreign 
investor in Australian shares or units in a unit trust is exempt from income tax on any 
capital gain derived from the sale of the investment, whereas a resident Australian 
investor pays income tax on the capital gain. The capital gains tax regime has been 
further narrowed in relation to foreign residents to only include real property and 
business assets held within a permanent establishment.21 These issues are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
Tax havens and OFCs play an important role in providing a banking and financial 
environment for legitimate business activities such as insurance and reinsurance as 
well as management expertise for sovereign funds. Moreover, they provide a safe 
haven for the protection of assets that are owned by non-resident investors living in 
countries that persecute their citizens on religious, race or sexual grounds. These 
legitimate activities are discussed in detail in Chapter 9 of this thesis. If tax havens 
and OFCs ceased to exist then insurance cover for businesses and assets in non-tax 
havens may be either impossible to obtain or far too expensive for individuals and 
businesses. The impact on business, both global and national could be disastrous 
over time. Tax havens and OFCs employ many local people to provide financial and 
banking services to non-resident investors and if tax havens were not to survive then 
many small tax havens and OFCs would require the rest of the world to provide 
financial support to compensate for loss of business revenue and employment 
opportunities. These are but two reasons why this research is needed.  
 
1.3 Australia’s Approach to Tax Havens 
The Federal Treasurer, the Honourable Peter Costello, made the following 
observation on tax havens at the Insurance Council of Australia Conference in 2004: 
 
Tax havens undermine the revenue base, tax havens are not fair. And ordinary law-
abiding taxpayers are rightfully outraged by the use of off-shore tax havens to avoid 
paying Australian tax. This is why action against tax havens has been one of my top 
international priorities for many years. In June of 2000 when I was the Chairman of 
the OECD, we approved a strategy for advancing what was then called the Harmful 
                                               
21
 Explanatory Memorandum to the Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No. 4) Bill 2006 that was introduced 
into the Commonwealth Parliament on 22 June 2006.  
7 
Tax Practice Initiative against tax havens. …Unfortunately in September of 2003, 
Switzerland and three other OECD countries did not agree to the OECD agenda to 
remove bank secrecy laws. At the time I made this statement; “If you want to have a 
look at a weakness in the enforcement of taxation law we know where it stands: the 
secrecy of Swiss bank accounts.” … At my instruction, Treasury officials are 
attempting now to reinvigorate this work. We are asking for three commitments. 
One, we are asking countries to commit to making their tax systems more 
transparent. Two, we are asking for a commitment for the repeal of bank secrecy 
laws. Three, we are asking countries to enter into agreements for the exchange of 
information on tax matters.22 
 
In Tax Havens and Tax Administration,23 it is reported that in the 2001-02 financial 
year Australians transferred approximately $5 billion to five OECD identified tax 
havens, namely Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Jersey, Guernsey and Vanuatu. This 
information was provided to the ATO by the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). Since 2006, the Australian Government has instituted 
a concerted effort against Australian taxpayers that have been using tax havens. This 
has resulted in the establishment of ‘Project Wickenby’ and a number of Australian 
taxpayers are being charged with the crime of ‘defrauding the Commonwealth’. The 
Government expects up to 300 taxpayers to be eventually charged with taxation 
offences and estimates that the tax evasion may be in the vicinity of $1.3 billion.24 
These developments are examined throughout this thesis. 
 
1.4  Research Problem 
The OECD, the European Union (EU), the G20 nations, the US, the UK and the 
Australian government have all been critical of tax havens and OFCs for providing a 
tax free environment for mobile capital and Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) and 
ensuring through bank secrecy laws that the identity of the investor remains 
confidential. These two factors, no or low taxes and lack of transparency, support tax 
avoidance and tax evasion by non-resident investors and MNEs. As a result of the 
                                               
22
 Address by the Honourable, Peter Costello, Federal Treasurer, to the Insurance Council of Australia 
Conference, Canberra, 12 August 2004, <http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/speeches> at 8 August 2006 
23
 Australian Taxation Office, above n 17, 10. 
24
 Fleur Anderson and Fiona Buffini, ‘ATO targets business tax havens’, The Age Newspaper, Melbourne, 31 
August 2006, 1. 
8 
OECD’s harmful tax competition project and the introduction of ‘tax information 
exchange agreements’ (TIEAs) and the G20 threatening sanctions against tax havens, 
the major issue facing tax havens and OFCs is will they survive and in what form? 
Will they as sovereign nations being able to provide financial and banking services to 
non-resident taxpayers and investors in a tax free environment while keeping intact 
their domestic bank secrecy laws? Or will they be forced to abandon their current tax 
and secrecy approach and undertake less reliable productive activities in an 
increasingly complex and fragile global economic environment? These questions 
have not been asked, let alone answered publicaly in academia or practice. The 
research that is undertaken by this thesis is the first attempt to provide answers. Four 
subsidiary research questions are also examined in this thesis as each question adds 
to the body of new knowledge that is required to provide an answer to the main 
research problem. 
 
1.5  Research questions 
The term the ‘new international legal environment’ is used to describe the 
international environment that has been created by the OECD, the EU, the G20 
nations and countries such as the UK, US and Australia in their attempts to curtail 
the flow of mobile capital into banks situated in tax havens and OFCs that ultimately 
escapes the tax net in the country of residence of the investor or MNE. In Chapter 5 
of this thesis it is contended that the OECD makes international law through its 
guidelines and policies. Moreover, international agreements relating to the exchange 
of information also constitute international law. It is within this context of the new 
international legal environment that the survival of tax havens is being researched. 
 
1.5.1 Main research question - Will tax havens survive in the new international 
legal environment? 
The thesis will focus on the fact that tax havens and OFCs provide banking and 
financial services to high-net-worth individuals and multi-national enterprises 
(MNEs). A key feature of tax havens is that they have enacted very strong domestic 
bank secrecy laws that prevent bank details being disclosed unless relating to 
criminal activity. It is for this reason that many non-resident taxpayers feel confident 
about moving capital and investments to tax havens and OFCs. Moreover, many 
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people are employed in the banking and financial services industry in tax havens and 
OFCs and the economy of the country involved relies on income derived from 
providing these services. If tax havens were to disappear, many additional economies 
would be reliant on foreign financial aid and unemployment would increase in those 
states. 
 
The research will also discuss the many legitimate uses for tax havens, especially in 
the area of insurance and fund management, especially with sovereign wealth funds. 
Australia’s ‘Future Fund’ is invested through a tax haven. The beneficiaries of tax 
havens and OFCs are the established investment centres, such as the US and the UK, 
where the mobile capital that was initially deposited in the tax havens is eventually 
invested. Australia has been a beneficiary from tax havens in that it receives more 
money from tax havens in the form of foreign investment than the amount that flows 
out of Australia to tax havens; almost double the amount of money. 
 
From a practical perspective, it has always been very difficult for tax administrators 
to detect their own taxpayers using tax havens. The research will examine this issue 
in detail. From a negative perspective, tax havens and OFCs may continue to thrive 
simply because it is still too difficult for the OECD member states and the G20 
nations to detect their own resident taxpayers who use tax havens. The continued 
existence of bearer shares, nominee directors and investment trusts makes the task of 
finding the beneficial owner of investments particularly difficult. Even allowing for 
tax havens and OFCs entering into ‘Tax Information Exchange Agreements’ with 
OECD member countries and making some amendments to their bank secrecy laws, 
countries such as Australia are not permitted under current double taxation 
agreements and the tax information exchange agreements to engage in ‘fishing 
expeditions’ in an attempt to find Australian taxpayers using offshore banking 
services. The ATO must have specific information about a particular taxpayer and 
evidence of criminal activity before information will be provided by the tax haven or 
OFC.    
 
The thesis will also examine steps that are being taken by different governments to 
strengthen laws that may help in the detection of their taxpayers using tax havens and 
OFCs. The US is actively engaged in introducing new laws to try to deter and detect 
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US citizens with offshore bank accounts being used to hide assets. Australia has, 
arguably, had some success with ‘Project Wickenby’ in terms of the effect 
prosecutions have had on deterring taxpayers from hiding assets in tax havens. The 
government has claimed a ‘compliance dividend’ of nearly $300 million in saved 
income tax as a direct result of its aggressive approach to tax havens. The thesis will 
also critically examine the lack of a ‘level playing field’ with developed countries. 
Many developed economies provide special tax concessions that, in many instances, 
are not transparent to encourage investment in their own country. In some instances, 
these tax concessions are similar to those offered by tax havens and OFCs. For 
example, Australia encourages foreign investment by offering tax concessions not 
available to ordinary residents; the UK offers non-domiciled residents tax 
concessions and encourages those foreign residents to use tax havens that are British 
dependencies in which to invest their money; the US allows for the State of 
Delaware to provide a haven for corporations to transfer money globally as well as 
encouraging investment in the US without withholding tax being imposed; and, New 
Zealand facilitates the flow of money to tax havens through their foreign investment 
trusts and still has not introduced a tax on capital gains. The extent of tax hypocrisy 
that exists in the developed world arguably provides tax havens and OFCs with more 
than sufficient ammunition to counter any actions to force them out of business by 
the OECD or the G20.   
 
At the end of the research on this main question it will be possible to provide an 
answer as to whether tax havens will survive in the new international legal 
environment.  
 
There are also four subsidiary research questions that have been identified as being 
of importance for the thesis. These subsidiary research questions have a direct impact 
on the future of tax havens and their survival in the face of determined action by the 
international community including the OECD, the EU, the G20 nations, and the 
governments of the UK, the US and Australia, to name the countries that are relevant 
for this thesis.  
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1.5.2 First subsidiary research question - Should the international income of an 
Australian resident be taxed on a worldwide or territorial basis? 
The first subsidiary research question is whether the taxation law that imposes 
income tax on Australian residents on their worldwide income is sound law in terms 
of efficiency. As a result of the fact that it is very difficult for the ATO to ascertain 
the existence of income being generated by Australian taxpayers in a tax haven, 
should the Australian Government therefore adopt the ‘territorial approach’ to the 
imposition of income tax on foreign income?25 
 
The research will focus on the fact that it is very difficult for any government to 
detect and then deter resident taxpayers from using the financial services provided by 
tax havens, particularly as labour and capital becomes more mobile in a globalised 
world. This is a particular problem if the country of residence imposes income tax on 
their residents’ worldwide income. For example, in Australia, resident taxpayers 
must pay income tax on all income no matter where it is derived. This means that 
income generated in a foreign country must be subject to tax in Australia unless an 
exemption applies. Similarly, foreign tax paid on foreign income will result in a 
foreign tax credit when the income is subject to tax in Australia. However, the main 
problem for the Australian Government is how to detect foreign income generated in 
a tax haven or OFC. Given this issue, would it be better for Australia to only impose 
income tax on income generated in Australia and ignore foreign sourced income? 
This would be easier and cheaper than trying to detect Australian taxpayers using 
financial services in tax havens and OFCs to hide foreign income from being subject 
to income tax in Australia.  
 
The research will not simply focus on the practical problems of trying to detect and 
deter non-resident taxpayers from using tax havens. The research will also consider 
the philosophical issue of why governments have chosen to adopt a worldwide 
system in the first place and whether it would be more equitable, efficient and 
simpler to impose income tax on a country’s resident taxpayers on a worldwide or 
                                               
25
 The territorial basis of imposing income tax is to only tax income sourced within the country or territory. This 
means that income generated by a resident taxpayer out of the territory is not subject to income tax in the home 
country. This is the situation in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. 
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territorial basis. A worldwide tax system is seen by commentators as being more 
complex than a territorial system, however, a pure territorial system, such as the one 
that exists in Hong Kong, is inherently inequitable, even though it is simpler. In 
terms of efficiency, Australia has a hybrid worldwide system in that foreign active 
business income, foreign non-portfolio dividends and some foreign employment 
income is exempt from further income tax in Australia. This hybrid system ensures 
that MNEs are encouraged to expand and invest their business operations in foreign 
countries without being disadvantaged by higher taxes in their home country. At the 
conclusion of the research, it may be possible to provide an answer as to what system 
is best and why Australia, in particular, may be better placed to continue with its 
hybrid worldwide system.   
 
It is interesting to note that Australia allows ‘temporary residents’ to be taxed only 
on their income generated within Australia and allows foreign income to be exempt. 
Similarly, foreign investors only pay income tax on capital gains generated from real 
property and shares in land-rich companies situated in Australia; all other 
investments do not attract a tax on the capital gain. These two examples of Australia 
taxing foreign investors and temporary residents on a territorial basis can be 
explained as policy measures designed to maintain Australia as a competitive nation 
for foreign investment. New Zealand and the UK also provide tax concessions for 
new immigrants and non-domiciled residents. The research should provide answers 
as to why these measures should not be seen as advocating the adoption of a 
territorial system for all resident taxpayers. 
 
One of the key issues facing any tax system is tax avoidance and tax evasion. Hong 
Kong, with its simpler tax system, still has complex anti-avoidance tax laws that are 
designed to ensure their resident taxpayers pay the appropriate amount of income tax. 
Both Hong Kong and Australia appear to have difficulty in detecting and deterring 
their taxpayers from using financial services located in tax havens and OFCs.  
 
1.5.3 Second subsidiary research question - The OECD’s ‘Harmful Tax Project’: 
Is this international law? 
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Since the early 1990s, the OECD had been trying to ‘name and shame’ tax havens 
and eliminate competitive tax practices through its ‘harmful tax competition project’. 
The OEDC wanted to achieve a ‘level playing field’ with all nations. This was to be 
achieved by tax havens and OFCs eliminating their bank secrecy laws and by 
becoming more transparent in their dealings with other countries. The research in this 
area raises three questions; first, does the OECD make ‘soft’ international law and, if 
that is the case, has the ‘harmful tax competition project’ become part of the 
international taxation law? Second, if that is the situation, does this explain why 
many tax havens and OFCs are entering into tax information exchange agreements? 
The third question relates to the desirability of ‘soft’ international law being made by 
such organisations as the OECD. 
 
The research will commence with a critical examination of the philosophical basis of 
what is ‘law’ and, in particular, ‘international law’. The OECD’s guidelines on 
transfer pricing, the taxpayers’ charter, the non-deductibility of bribes to foreign 
officials and, anti-money laundering recommendations have initially been accepted 
as having the status of soft international law because these guidelines have ultimately 
been transformed into the domestic statutory law of most OECD member countries 
in one form or another. The research will also focus on tax havens and OFCs in terms 
of their sovereign right to self-determine tax policy including tax rates. Clearly, the 
sovereign rights of these small nations are being affected by the OECD and the G20 
but it is far too early to determine the economic and political outcome for tax havens 
and OFCs. Many of these nations are prepared to cooperate with the OECD member 
states and the G20 by entering into a number of TIEAs. It is the willingness of tax 
havens and OFCs to cooperate with the OECD by entering into TIEAs that is one of 
the main focuses of the research in this Chapter of the thesis.  
 
The thesis will examine the OECD’s harmful tax competition project in order to 
assess whether it has been adopted by OECD member states and tax havens as 
having the status of law. It is also arguable that soft international law is desirable in a 
global legal environment and organisations, such as the OECD, add value to 
international taxation law. However, it is important that the ‘rule of law’ is not 
threatened by laws that are not being made by elected representatives in a 
Parliamentary context. This aspect of soft law is also examined in detail in Chapter 5.   
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In terms of the likely future of tax havens and OFCs, there is current evidence that 
the OECD has been successful in bringing about a high level of cooperation with tax 
havens. As has already been stated, as at 1 April 2010 there are no tax havens on the 
list of uncooperative nations that have not agreed to the ‘internationally agreed 
standard’ on exchange of information. The research to be undertaken in Chapter 5 
should be able to assist in determining whether the OECD’s harmful tax competition 
project and the subsequent entering into TIEAs by tax havens has had a major impact 
on lessening the role of tax havens in the tax avoidance and tax evasion industry. 
 
1.5.4 Third subsidiary research question – Why has the distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion become blurred in Australia? 
The common law in Australia has always recognised the distinction between tax 
avoidance, a legal activity, and tax evasion, a criminal activity. Decisions that have 
been made in the Federal Court of Australia and the various Supreme Courts that 
support this contention are examined in detail in Chapter 7. However, the Australian 
Government has, for many years, been deliberatively blurring the distinction so that 
all forms of tax minimisation can be held to constitute tax evasion and, therefore, 
criminal activity.26 The research into this subsidiary research question will critically 
examine the Australian Government’s approach to the distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion in relation to the ‘anti-money laundering and counter 
terrorism financing legislation’; the legislation to ‘deter tax scheme promoters’; and, 
in the legislation used to establish ‘Project Wickenby’. It may be that one of the 
reasons why the distinction may have been deliberately blurred is so that tax 
avoidance and tax evasion are regarded by the government as constituting a criminal 
activity. If this is the case then tax havens and OFCs are required to report Australian 
taxpayers that are using the banking services in those countries under the ‘dual 
criminality’ principle. This may potentially impact on the future of tax havens and 
OFCs because it allows the tax authorities to access confidential financial and 
banking information from tax havens and OFCs, such as Switzerland. In order to 
overcome any reluctance on the part of tax havens and OFCs to disclose information 
                                               
26
 The blurring of the distinction is found in the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 
2006 (Cth), Division 290 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) relating to deterring tax scheme 
promoters and ‘Operation Wickenby’.  
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about the banking details on non-resident investors and MNEs, the ATO must show 
that the activities of an Australian resident constitute criminal conduct. Arguably, in 
the current economic and political environment in Australia, the collection of tax 
revenue appears to have taken priority over the rights of taxpayers, especially with 
the activities of ‘Project Wickenby’.  
 
1.5.5 Fourth subsidiary research question – How will the exchange of information 
agreements with tax havens affect the rights of non-resident taxpayers and 
investors? 
This subsidiary research question has a direct bearing on the future of tax havens and 
OFCs. Taxpayers have very few rights to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of 
their financial affairs both within their country of residence and any foreign 
jurisdiction that they may have chosen to hold their investments and from where to 
conduct their business. Traditionally, banks had a duty to maintain the confidentiality 
of their customer’s financial details. However, over time, that duty has been 
subjected to the rights of the taxation authority to obtain information relevant to the 
collection of taxes. The powers that are held by the ATO to obtain information from 
resident taxpayers and foreign visitors to Australia are so extensive and coercive that 
taxpayers have very little right to maintain the confidentiality of their financial 
information. The research will focus on the ATO’s powers to obtain information 
from foreign nations, especially tax havens and OFCs as a result of entering into a 
TIEA.  
 
The main source of protection from disclosure to taxation authorities is the right to 
claim that certain documents and communications are privileged because they are 
between the taxpayer and their lawyer. Under Australian common law, this right to 
claim legal professional privilege applies to both domestic and foreign legal advice. 
In some countries, such as New Zealand and the US, the privilege has been extended 
to include advice provided by the accountant and tax agent to their clients; at this 
stage, the Australian government has not introduced a similar law.  
 
The introduction of taxation information exchange agreements between tax havens 
and OFCs and OECD member nations is likely to impact on the rights of a non-
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resident taxpayer to maintain the confidentiality of their financial affairs in a foreign 
country. Even human rights declarations and human rights statutory provisions in 
Australia were found to be of limited use in the area of taxation law. The ATO is 
allowed to engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ in order to obtain confidential financial 
information about a taxpayer under Australian domestic law but it would appear that 
they are not permitted under the domestic laws of some tax havens and OFCs. With 
the introduction of TIEAs, non-resident taxpayers and MNEs face a greater 
possibility of having their financial details disclosed to the tax authorities in their 
country of residence. This impacts on the future of tax havens and OFCs because the 
greater the threat of disclosure, the less non-resident taxpayers are likely to use tax 
havens to invest their mobile capital or for MNEs to conduct their business from. 
 
1.6 Outline of Research Methodology and Legal Theory 
The thesis is a ‘legal thesis’ and, as such, is concerned about researching existing 
law. The starting point for any legal research is to discuss legal theory and its 
application to the examination of the existing law in Australia and internationally.  
 
Legal Positivism is an ‘approach to legal theory which is concerned with posited law 
– that is, law which has been laid down, or posited, by institutions like Parliament 
and the courts’.27 The law is a set of rules made by a sovereign power, Parliament or 
the courts, and backed up by sanctions.  This view of the law is also called ‘Black 
letter’ law, in that what is written in black ink is accepted as the law. From that 
perspective, the thesis will critically analyse the existing law in terms of how it 
operates, whether it is successful in its application, and if not, what could be done to 
improve the law. Moral values, social beliefs and religion, per se, have no place in 
the positivist theory of law. The thesis will examine the existing law from a 
‘positivist’ approach and disregard natural theory of law which includes 
consideration of personal value judgments. In other words, the law relating to money 
laundering, tax evasion, tax avoidance and the use of tax havens will be examined 
without consideration of whether it is good or bad from an ethical or moral 
perspective.  
 
                                               
27
 Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas, Legal Theories in Principle, (2004), 135. 
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The concept of ‘soft international law’ is examined in Chapter 5, in the context of 
whether the OECD makes ‘soft law’. By definition soft law is not posited law and 
this thesis is based on a legal positivist view of the law in analyzing the future of tax 
havens. The examination of the concept of ‘soft law’ is justified on the basis that the 
international soft law that is arguably made by the OECD has become ‘hard law’ or 
posited law once it has been transformed into the domestic law of the nation. In 
many of the instances discussed in Chapter 5, the OECD’s ‘soft law’ has eventually 
become part of the black letter law of the OECD member state. 
 
1.7  Scope of the research 
The thesis is not examining tax havens and OFCs from the perspective of the 
customer or those individuals or corporations located in tax havens and OFCs. This 
means that no attempt has been made to survey individuals and MNEs engaged in 
using the financial and banking services of a tax haven or OFC. Similarly, no attempt 
has been made to interview tax intermediaries and their employees engaged in 
providing banking and financial services located in tax havens and OFCs. The 
reasons for not adopting this approach to the research are as follows: 
 
1. It would have been almost impossible to obtain information from Australian 
taxpayers using tax havens given the fact that they may be engaged in 
unlawful activities and would understandably be reluctant to disclose their 
financial information; 
2. Dr Gregory Rawlings28 has already conducted face to face interviews with 
employees of tax intermediaries, such as banks, accounting and legal firms 
located in tax havens and OFCs as part of his research into mobile capital and 
its investment in OFCs; and 
3. Professor Jason Sharman29 has conducted extensive interviews with 
government and non-government individuals from a number of Pacific Island 
tax havens engaged in the provision of banking and financial services. 
                                               
28
 Rawlings, Gregory, ‘Mobile People, Mobile Capital and Tax Neutrality: Sustaining a Market for Offshore 
Finance Centres, (2005) 29 Accounting Forum. 
29
 Sharman, Jason, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Regulation (2006) and Sharman, Jason, ‘A study 
for the Pacific Islands Forum on Offshore Finance Centres in Forum Island Countries: assessing the Impact of 
the Proposed US “Stop Tax Haven Abuse” Act’, (2008) <forumsec.org.fj> 29 June 2010. 
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The thesis is looking at the future of tax havens from a whole of system perspective 
rather than through the lens of a particular element within the system and such a 
macro-perspective lends itself to investigations of big picture impacts on tax havens 
and OFCs. These impacts include the global financial crisis (GFC), the collective 
focus of the G20 during 2009 on trying to curb the activities of tax havens, and the 
introduction of TIEAs by the OECD. These developments support and reinforce the 
need for a systemic and overarching analysis of tax havens and OFCs and their role 
in the global economy, a need this thesis attempts to satisfy.  While it will take some 
time to work through the particular impacts of these recent developments, they can 
only be understood against the drivers behind the OECD and the developed country 
push against tax havens that has been under way now for over a decade, and whose 
effects will impact on the future direction for tax havens, not their existence.  
 
1.8  Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis to be advanced is developed in the following way: 
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction the main research question to be examined in the 
thesis and the four subsidiary research questions that assist in providing an answer to 
the main question raised in this thesis, namely whether tax havens will survive in the 
new international legal environment? 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the history and theory of taxation. The chapter utilises the three 
main principles of a tax system: equity, efficiency and simplicity. In this thesis these 
concepts are applied to the Australian tax system in order to see if the system itself is 
partly responsible for some Australian resident taxpayers locating assets in tax 
havens. 
 
Chapter 3 briefly examines the history of taxation in Australia and the structure of 
the tax system within a federal system of government. It is noteworthy that 
Australian taxpayers have been engaged in tax avoidance and tax evasion in a 
significant manner at various times over the last 60 years since the introduction of a 
Commonwealth income tax. 
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Chapter 4 briefly examines the history and theory of the international taxation 
system. It provides an overview of the international tax environment in which tax 
havens and OFCs operate and the way in which taxes are shared between nations. It 
also provides an explanation for the difficulty being experienced by nations in trying 
to impose income tax on mobile capital in a competitive global environment.     
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the first subsidiary research question and examines the work of 
the OECD in trying to eliminate harmful tax competition. The role of the OECD is 
discussed in the context of being a source of international tax law. This in turn leads 
to an examination of the philosophy of law; whether international law is in fact 
‘law’; and the ‘legal positivist’ concept of law. The chapter also examines the 
concept of ‘soft law’ and its desirability in the area of taxation law and its possible 
threat to the ‘rule of law’. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the second subsidiary research question and examines the 
philosophical basis for a worldwide tax system and a territorial tax system. Each 
system is then assessed against the criteria of equity, efficiency and simplicity in 
order to arrive at a conclusion as to what system should be adopted in Australia.   
 
Chapter 7 examines the third subsidiary hypothesis and examines the common law 
distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion. The perceived lack of distinction 
that is found in recent statutory provisions such as the anti-money laundering 
legislation is examined in terms of its objective to deter and detect resident taxpayers 
using tax havens and OFCs for tax minimization purposes.   
 
Chapter 8 discusses the fourth subsidiary research question by examining the rights 
that a taxpayer has to maintain the confidentiality of their financial and banking 
information both domestically and internationally. The examination of the non-
resident taxpayers rights to maintain the privacy of their banking and financial 
matters in relation to assets held in a tax haven or OFC is assessed in light of the fact 
that all tax havens and OFCs that were originally on a list of non-cooperative nations 
determined by the OECD, have now entered into an agreement to exchange 
information on tax matters. 
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Chapter 9 examines the various reasons why tax havens may or may not survive in 
the new international legal environment. After assessing the various reasons, and 
taking into account the new knowledge that has been gained by the research into the 
various subsidiary research questions, a conclusion is made as to the future of tax 
havens and OFCs. 
 
Chapter 10 provides a summary of the new knowledge that has been gained from the 
research into main question raised in this thesis together with the new knowledge 
derived from the four subsidiary research questions.  
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
TAXATION 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to examining the international and Australian responses to tax havens, it is 
necessary to examine the history of taxation and the theory behind the different types 
of taxes and the different rates at which taxes are imposed on the residents of a 
particular country. In its most simple form, taxation is often seen as the means by 
which governments raise funds to support their expenditure programs. The reality 
may be different in that many of the OECD member countries use other methods, 
such as public debt, foreign aid or even printing new money, in order to create 
revenue.1 It also follows that governments use taxes as a means of achieving policy 
goals beyond merely raising revenue. Governments have social and political goals 
that they wish to achieve through taxation and, especially, the expenditure side of 
taxation.2 However, there are three main issues that can be seen from a discussion of 
the theory of taxation. First, what should be taxed in an ideal tax system - income, 
consumption, wealth or a mixture; second, what should be the rates of tax applied to 
the various taxes in order to meet the objectives of the government in raising revenue 
and social equity; and third, how should the tax system be designed in order to create 
simplicity and certainty for taxpayers? 
 
The main focus of this chapter will be on income tax as that is the main form of tax 
that is avoided by taxpayers through the use of tax havens but, to some extent, 
indirect taxes, such as a tax on goods and services, may also be avoided by the use of 
tax havens. The ‘essential criteria for assessing a tax system are equity, efficiency 
                                               
1
 Graeme Cooper, An Optimal or Comprehensive Income Tax? (1993-1994) 22 Federal Law Review 414, 417. 
2
 While governments need to raise a particular level of revenue to fund services, they also raise revenue to 
distribute to the less wealthy in the form of benefits associated with social goals such as raising children and 
promoting the family unit. These tax transfers are an important aspect of vertical equity in any tax system and 
are discussed later in the chapter. However, tax transfers per se and their place in the theory of taxation will not 
be discussed in detail in this chapter. What is important for this thesis is to attempt to determine whether or not 
the current tax system and current thinking about the form and rates of taxation may have encouraged residents 
of a country to use tax havens to avoid or evade taxes.  
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and simplicity’.3 These three concepts are based on the seminal works of Adam 
Smith, J. S. Mill and a number of twentieth century economists such as Haig, Simons 
and Musgrave.4 These concepts encapsulate the notions of fairness, equality and the 
need for simplicity in any tax system and they will be examined separately in this 
chapter as they provide a useful basis on which to evaluate the tax system used by 
most OECD member countries as well as Australia. The Australian Government has 
commenced a review of the current tax and transfer system in response to the impact 
of globalisation and the need to remain internationally competitive as well as the 
impact on the government of an ageing population.5 The review will examine the 
‘comprehensive tax system’ that exists in Australia today and the theory behind the 
current system. The review discusses the impact that J. S. Mill, Haig and Simons, as 
well as many other economists and writers, have had on the design of tax systems 
over the past centuries and whether or not there is a need to make changes. One of 
the main concerns of the government is the fact that ‘there are 125 taxes paid by 
Australians every year … 99 levied by the Australian government, and 25 by the 
States and 1 by local government’.6 The review document will be examined in more 
detail later in this chapter where it is relevant to highlight some of the benefits and 
flaws in the current tax system in Australia. 
 
This chapter will also examine in detail the reason why a tax on income was 
introduced in the first place and the theory behind the alternative rates of income tax 
to be levied on the taxpayer. Following from this question is what amount of income 
tax should be paid by the poor and rich alike; a flat or proportional rate for all or a 
progressive rate that taxes the rich more than the poor?  The choice of rates to be 
imposed on income and wealth may be seen to be one of the main reasons why the 
rich try to avoid income tax. There is also some literature that suggests that an overly 
complex tax system is perceived to be unfair and the complexity will also lead to tax 
                                               
3
 Australian Government Printing Service, (1985), Reform of the Australian Tax System, Draft White Paper. 
4
 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations, (6th ed. 1961); John Stuart Mill, 
Utilitarianism, On liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, (3rd ed. 1972); H Simons, 
Personal Income Taxation (1938); Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice, (4th ed. 1984); R M Haig, (ed) The Federal Income Tax (1921). 
5
 Commonwealth of Australia, Architecture of Australia’s tax and transfer system, (2008) 
<www.treasury.gov.au> at 12 August 2008. 
6
 Ibid, xii. 
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avoidance by the wealthy.7  Does this help, then, to explain why the rich wish to 
minimise their income tax through the use of tax havens? The following detailed 
examination of the theory behind what is regarded as a ‘good tax system’ may also 
help to explain why the campaign against harmful tax competition and tax havens 
has been pursued by both the OECD and the Australian Government with such 
vigour, as the current tax systems used by most OECD member countries, including 
Australia, would appear to fail to meet the generally accepted criteria of being fair, 
efficient and simple to administer.8 These three maxims, namely ‘equity, efficiency 
and simplicity’ are discussed in detail in this chapter and throughout the thesis as 
representing what all tax systems strive to achieve. The following discussion may 
assist in explaining why taxpayers throughout the world, including Australia, wish to 
minimise their income tax through the use of tax havens and offshore financial 
centres; or it may simply raise more questions than answers.   
 
2.2 The History of Taxation 
A good starting point for an examination of the theory and history of taxation is to 
examine why taxes are collected by the state in the first place. This is the 
fundamental question asked by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah in his paper ‘The Three 
Goals of Taxation’.9 Professor Arvi-Yonah’s three goals of taxation create an 
excellent context in which to examine the evolution of taxation over many centuries 
and the theory behind the justification for imposing taxes in the first place. It will 
also provide an explanation of why progressive rates of taxation have now become a 
settled part of modern taxation systems. The three goals, as enunciated by Avi-
Yonah in his paper, can be summarised as follows. 
 
Need for government revenue 
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The first goal of any tax system is the need for governments to raise revenue for 
necessary functions such as defence, health and educational requirements of the 
people. Since the end of the second world war, the development of the ‘welfare state’ 
has lead to an increased demand for tax revenue to fund the ageing population of 
‘baby boomers’ and their need for health and pension requirements.10  
 
A good example of where the government provides public goods is in the provision 
of ‘a well organised legal system without which the private sector could not enforce 
contracts and enter into commercial agreements’.11 It is also stated by Professor Avi-
Yonah that the experience of governments with high rates of income tax has led to an 
increase in tax avoidance and tax evasion by taxpayers and, as a result of this, most 
OECD countries have reduced their marginal rates over the past 30 years by 
substituting income tax with a tax on consumption.12 Of the 30 OECD member 
countries, only one country, the Unites States of America, has no VAT or Goods and 
Services Tax.13  
 
Professor Krever contends that the reason why taxpayers comply with a ‘system that 
amounts to an appropriation of private property for public purposes’ can be answered 
at two separate levels and provides the following reasons for reaching that 
conclusion: 
 
To begin with, taxpayers realise that the power to tax is an essential tool for most 
government functions. While not all taxpayers would agree … for the most part 
those who bear the burden of taxation agree with the need for government to assume 
responsibility over certain economic and social functions. A second and more 
fundamental answer to that question is the ultimate realisation that in essence 
taxation can be seen as a means by which the state is merely appropriating its due 
reward. Private property would not exist if it was not for the state: taxes are simply 
part of the price we pay for having a political and economic system in which the 
acquisition and accumulation of private wealth is possible. While most taxpayers 
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would like to retain as much of their wealth as possible, they recognise the 
desirability and need for the public functions their tax dollars fund. 14 
 
Redistribution of wealth through taxation  
The second goal of taxation is to redistribute wealth from the rich to the less wealthy. 
The redistributive function of taxation in seen as being required with a market based 
economy where wealth can become too concentrated in a few and taxation assists in 
redistributing wealth between the rich and poor. The main tool that has been used 
over hundreds of years to achieve a redistribution of wealth has been through the use 
of progressive taxation. The rich pay more as a percentage of their income than the 
poor. The concept of progressivity is dealt with in detail later in this chapter but it is 
still seen as being central in achieving equity in society. The government is able to 
transfer revenue generated through taxation to the less wealthy in the form of transfer 
programs such as ‘family tax benefits’ as is the case in Australia.15 In fact in 
Australia, there are 40 separate cash transfers to citizens, including the family tax 
benefit, that cost the government over $70 billion in the 2006-2007 financial year.16 
It would appear that, as part of the ‘welfare state’, governments like to be seen to be 
helping the less fortunate in society and, at the same time, reducing the power and 
influence of the rich. 
 
Tax law as a means to regulate taxpayer behaviour such as investment and 
spending decisions   
Taxation is used by governments to direct both business and individual taxpayers in 
modifying their social and financial behaviour, such as choosing certain investment 
activities in particular areas due to the introduction of specific tax concessions. In 
Australia, a recent example of these types of policy can be seen in the exemption of 
fresh food from the Goods and Services Tax in an attempt to provide an incentive for 
individuals to eat a healthier diet. For business, depreciation on capital expenditure 
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can be claimed at 200% using the diminishing value method as an incentive for 
business to invest in capital equipment. 
 
If the above three criteria are used as the context in which to map the history of 
taxation, it can be seen from the following examination of the historical economic 
writers on taxation that the very early forms of taxation recognised the need for a tax 
system to achieve the above three goals. A review of taxes over the past centuries 
will confirm that the above three goals were just as relevant to governments during 
the Roman Empire, Greek Empire or the Egyptians as they are today and the range of 
taxes and the way in which they were levied are very similar to the modern system.17  
 
Adam Smith explains that, in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire, merchants 
in Europe would travel from town to town selling goods and that: 
 
… taxes would be levied upon the person and goods of the traveller as they passed 
through certain mannors, when they went over certain bridges, when they carried 
about their goods from place to place in a fair….18  
 
These different taxes were known in England by the names of ‘passage, pontage, 
lastage, and stallage’.19 Adam Smith also states that the Doomsday Book mentions 
taxes paid by burghers to the king or some great lord.20 The basis for the levying of 
taxes was payment for a level of protection provided by the king or lord.   
 
Historically, States raised revenue by imposing a tax on goods produced by 
landowners and farmers as well as goods produced by merchants or on property such 
as land and houses. Income tax was levied on agricultural production in France in the 
seventeenth century because the farmers produced wealth and since ‘those not in 
agricultural productions did not produce wealth then they should not be taxed’.21 
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John Kenneth Galbraith22 examines the ‘French’ approach to agriculture and 
ultimately the taxes that were levied on farmers. The ‘physiocrats or Les 
Economistes’ believed that agriculture was the source of all wealth of the State and 
that wealth originated in agriculture and, as such, was capable of being taxed.23 The 
theory was that the only group in society that produced wealth were the landowners 
and they should be the ones bearing the burden of taxes as they produced wealth. The 
merchants did not produce wealth and to impose taxes on them would only result in 
higher prices for the goods. 
 
The Romans demanded tributes from their colonies but this, according to Graeme 
Cooper, was designed not just to raise revenue but to reinforce the military 
subjugation of the people living in the colonies.24 It is also important to remember 
that income was not the main source of government revenue over the past few 
centuries. Up until 1913, customs duties were the main source of revenue for the US 
Federal Government. In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment to the US Constitution was 
passed by Parliament to allow for income tax to be levied on individuals and the 
Revenue Act was enacted to implement income tax.25 Income tax on individuals had 
been introduced into the US during the Civil War in 1861 but was discontinued in 
1872.26 
 
According to Krever, England first introduced income tax legislation in 1799 to raise 
revenue to fund the war against Napoleon.27 The income tax was introduced by 
Prime Minister William Pitt to fund the war but was repealed by Prime Minister 
Addington in 1802.28 The tax was repealed because the war had ended but also 
because it was very unpopular.29 Cooper contends that the purpose of taxation is 
more than just the State raising revenue to pay for its functions. Historically, States 
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and their Sovereign printed bank notes or borrowed money to fund their functions. 
At that time, the main reason for raising revenue was to fund a defence force or 
participation in a war. It has only been in recent times that the State provides a 
welfare system for its citizens and needs to fund that expense.30 
 
Joseph Schumpeter 31 discusses the ‘development of modern taxation in the fifteenth 
century in the Italian city-republics, Florence in particular and in the German free 
towns’. Taxation emanated from the need of the king to raise money to provide an 
army to fight wars. It is interesting to note that Schumpeter discusses the rise of 
indirect taxation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because the nobility did not 
pay direct taxes, namely, a tax on income but, due to having indirect taxes, namely, a 
tax on the production of goods from the land and merchants, at least the nobility and 
ruling classes paid some form of tax. The fact that an indirect tax was borne by the 
less wealthy and poor was justified on the basis that at least the wealthy paid some 
tax.32 As a result of the problems associated with imposing a range of indirect taxes 
on goods and the administration that grew in response to collecting those taxes, many 
economic writers, such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, discussed the merits of 
indirect taxes and a direct tax on income.33   
 
Schumpeter observed that the development in taxation theory during the period 1870 
to 1914 and later was influenced by social imperatives in that high direct taxation, 
including an inheritance tax, was introduced ‘that went beyond taxing for revenue 
and aimed at taxing in order to change (correct) income distribution’.34 This view 
conflicted with the policy of Prime Minister Gladstone and his Chancellors of the 
Exchequer in England at that time who adopted the approach that ‘taxation was for 
raising revenue only and was not to exert any other effects beyond what was 
inevitable; and in order to keep taxes as low as possible, expenditure was to be 
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confined to “necessary” purposes’.35 In 1909, the English Government introduced 
progressive income tax on the total income of individuals.36  
 
Another frequently used form of taxation was a ‘poll’ tax based on each adult at a set 
rate. Richard II in England introduced the tax in 1377, 1379, and 1380 to fund 
military campaigns. The tax was unpopular because it contradicted the three main 
tenets of a good taxation system, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The tax was 
imposed on all citizens at a flat rate at first and then a graduated tax in 1380 and was 
difficult to administer. It required a census first and then tax collectors to collect the 
tax.37 The tax was reintroduced by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1990 as a 
‘Community Charge’ and again it proved to be very unpopular.38 The imposition of 
some taxes has been responsible for wars and rebellions such as the American 
Revolution against the British in 1775 and the Eureka Stockade in Ballarat Australia 
in 1854.39 The imposition of unpopular taxes have been directly responsible for civil 
wars and uprisings in France, the US and Australia, to name just a few. 
 
2.3 Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill - Theory of a Tax System 
The writings of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill will be examined in detail as both 
had a great influence of the tax system that was developed in England in the late 
eighteenth century and the taxation system that exists today in Australia and most 
OECD member countries. 
 
Adam Smith, in his famous book titled An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, proposed four maxims with regard to taxes in general. The first 
maxim was: 
 
I. The subject ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly 
as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the 
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense 
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of government to the individuals of a great nation is like the expense of management 
to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to 
their respective interests in the estate... every tax …is necessarily unequal….40 
 
Adam Smith appears to be advocating a proportional rate of tax to be paid on the 
income of every resident of a state. This means that the rich and poor pay the same 
rate of tax but that the rich end up paying more than the poor because they have a 
greater amount of income and wealth. Smith is not advocating a progressive system 
of taxation where the rates of tax increase in proportion to the higher level of income 
or wealth. It should therefore be remembered that most OECD member countries 
have adopted a progressive, as opposed to a proportional, system of taxation. It 
supports the concept of vertical equity, namely, that the rich should pay more in tax 
than the poor and less wealthy, as discussed below.  
 
The second maxim emphasises the need for efficiency and simplicity in the design of 
a tax system as follows:  
 
II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not 
arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, 
ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. ...The 
uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of an 
order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor 
corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter 
of so great importance that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I 
believe from the experience of all nations, is not so great an evil as a very small 
degree of uncertainty. 41  
 
Adam Smith appears to be advocating the need for an efficient and simple tax system 
that does not create uncertainty in the minds of the taxpayers. It also advocates the 
need for horizontal equity, namely, that all taxpayers on the same level of income 
will pay the same amount of tax. However, as will be seen later in this chapter, this is 
one of the reasons why taxpayers in Australia sometimes use tax havens because they 
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believe the Australian tax system is too complex and has left the taxpayer with 
uncertainty.42 Large multi-national enterprises (MNEs) are able to take advantage of 
international tax benefits through tax havens and offshore financial centres because 
of the high level of complexity in the Australian taxation law.  
 
The third maxim discusses the merits of a tax on expenditure or consumption as 
opposed to a tax on income or wealth, as follows: 
 
III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most 
likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. ...Taxes upon such consumable 
goods as are articles of luxury are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a 
manner that is very convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has 
occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty, too, either to buy, or not to buy, as he 
pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconvenience 
from such taxes.43 
 
This maxim advocates support for a tax on expenditure or consumption by the 
citizens of a state and should be collected at the time of purchase of the goods. In 
most OECD member countries there is a consumption tax as well as a tax on income.  
 
The fourth maxim discusses the need for the collection of tax to be conducted 
efficiently by the tax collection agency so as not to discourage a person from 
engaging in paid work or seeking to increase wealth through savings because taxes 
are too great a burden on the citizen of the state. The maxim is as follows:  
 
IV. Every tax ought to be contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets 
of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public 
treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the 
people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in four following 
ways. First, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries 
may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may 
impose another additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the 
industry of the people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of 
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business which might give maintenance and unemployment to great multitudes. 
Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals 
incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it might frequently ruin them, and 
thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the 
employment of their capitals. Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the frequent 
visits and the odious examination of the tax gatherers, it may expose them to much 
unnecessary trouble, vexation and oppression… It is in some one or other of these 
four different ways that taxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people 
than they are beneficial to the sovereign.44 
 
This maxim questions the value of a tax if it costs more than the money that is raised 
to collect the tax in the first place. This issue has been identified in Australia45 and 
discussed below. It also questions the value of imposing taxes at too high a rate so as 
to discourage participation in income producing activity by the taxpayer. Again this 
issue is examined in detail below. Adam Smith appears to be supporting the need to 
have an efficient tax system in order for taxpayers to have confidence in the way in 
which taxes are administered by the government. 
 
These four maxims of how a taxation system should be designed have been 
condensed into three criteria, equity, efficiency and simplicity, and are seen by most 
writers on the theory of taxation as being the fundamental foundation stones of an 
ideal tax system.46 The difficulty is in achieving these fundamental goals and it may 
well be the reason why a failure by governments to meet these goals has encouraged 
the use of tax havens by individuals and MNEs.  
 
John Stuart Mill, in his famous work titled Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and 
Considerations on Representative Government, advocated a tax system where the 
rich paid more in taxes than the poor. Mill was an advocate of a ‘Utilitarian 
Philosophy’ of morals in that those actions that produce the greatest good are the 
ones that should be pursued by society. The definition of utilitarianism is as follows: 
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[u]tility or the Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness, is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure’.47  
 
Applying this philosophy to an ideal ‘utilitarian’ system of taxation, Mill makes the 
following statement:   
 
One opinion is, that payment to the State should be in numerical proportion to 
pecuniary means. Others think that justice dictates that they term graduated taxation; 
taking a higher percentage from those that have more to spare. In point of natural 
justice a strong case might be made for disregarding means altogether, and taking 
the same absolute sum (whenever it could be got) from everyone: as the subscribers 
to a mess, or to a club, all pay the same sum for the same privileges whether they 
can all equally afford it or not. Since the protection (it might be said) of law and 
government is afforded to, and is equally required by all, there is no injustice in 
making all buy it at the same price…This doctrine, as applied to taxation, finds no 
advocates, because it conflicts so strongly with man’s feelings of humanity and of 
social expediency; but the principle of justice which it invokes is as true and as 
binding as those which can be appealed to against it. Accordingly it exerts a tacit 
influence on the line of defence for other modes of assessing taxation. People feel 
obliged to argue that the State does more for the rich than for the poor, as a 
justification for its taking more from them: though this is in reality not true, for the 
rich would be far better able to protect themselves, in the absence of law or 
government, than the poor, and … From these confusions there is no other mode of 
extrication than the utilitarian.48   
 
Mill appears to be advocating a proportional system of taxation in that both rich and 
poor pay the same rate of tax even though it conflicts with principles of social justice 
and humanity. However, Mill is still a proponent of vertical equity because the rich 
pay more in tax than the poor but at the same rate of tax. He is not advocating a 
progressive system of taxation where the rich pay tax at a higher rate of tax than the 
poor.  
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2.4 Comprehensive or Optimal Tax System 
As has been discussed above, with the examination of the Adam Smith model of a 
taxation system, the following three criteria of an ideal tax system are regarded by 
tax academics and tax philosophers as being absolutely necessary:  
1. Equity – horizontal and vertical equity, the rich pay more in tax than the 
poor, vertical equity and those on the same income pay the same amount 
in tax, horizontal equity 
2.  Efficiency – economic neutrality and the need to have a system that does 
not act as a disincentive to engage in more work for reward or 
discouraging enterprise that will generate greater income 
3.  Simplicity – the lack of complexity in the calculation of the tax liability 
by the taxpayer and tax laws that should be relatively simple and easy to 
understand so as to avoid confusion. 
 
If an ideal tax system provides the taxpayer with equity, efficiency and simplicity 
then two issues need to be determined; first, what source of wealth or income should 
be subject to tax and, what rates of tax should be applied in order to achieve those 
objectives? In most OECD member countries, revenue is raised through a mixture of 
personal income tax, company tax and a tax on consumption such as a ‘value added 
tax’, VAT, or a ‘goods and services tax’, GST. There are also a number of other 
forms of taxes on property, inheritance, wealth and the stamping of documentation. 
As Cooper contends, the fundamental question facing every government when 
designing a taxation system is ‘how is the burden of taxation to be spread across 
society?’ 49 The ‘comprehensive tax base’ and the ‘optimal tax school’ each provide 
an insight into answering this fundamental question.50  
 
The ‘comprehensive tax system’, as championed by Professors Haig and Simons,51 
emphasises the need to place equity concerns at the forefront of any tax system. 
Equity, in this context, includes both vertical and horizontal issues. Basically this 
means that, through progressive rates of tax, the wealthy pay more in tax than the 
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poor, hence vertical equity and that the wealthy pay the same amount of tax on equal 
wealth, hence horizontal equity. These concepts were originally propounded by 
Adam Smith and J.S. Mill52 and are a major part of the Haig-Simons comprehensive 
tax system. These concepts of equity will be discussed in detail later in the chapter, 
especially the related Musgrave and Kaplow53 approaches, as well as their role in 
developing tax policy. One of the main criticisms of the comprehensive tax system is 
that it places the main emphasis on the need to achieve equity; vertical and 
horizontal.54 This means that within tax systems the pursuit of equity may lead to 
efficiency problems where taxpayers will choose leisure over paid work because of 
the imposition of taxes. This is particularly the case when the top rate of income tax 
under a progressive rate system is so high that the taxpayer will substitute leisure for 
paid work as the after tax return becomes very small.55 The optimal tax school tries 
to put a value on social welfare, such as the pursuit of leisure instead of paid work, so 
that it can be taken into account when designing an optimal tax system.56 If taxes are 
too high or discriminate against some taxpayers then there is a disincentive to pursue 
wealth and instead pursue leisure activities as a substitute. This would appear to 
create inefficiencies in the tax system, as is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The main difference between the comprehensive tax system and the optimal tax 
school is the emphasis on the concept of ‘efficiency’. Cooper states that: 
 
… the optimal tax approach explicitly included efficiency concerns and then went on 
to recognise the equity-efficiency trade off by making both equity concerns and 
efficiency costs elements in a single social welfare function.’ 57  
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The distinction between the two theories will be examined under the headings of 
‘Equity’ and ‘Efficiency’; the Haig-Simons comprehensive system under Equity, and 
the optimal tax system under Efficiency. 
 
2.5 Equity 
Under this heading, the concept of ‘equity’ raises the following questions relating to 
tax policy issues that have a major bearing on the design of a good tax system: 
1.  If income is to be taxed, what monetary and non-monetary measures 
should be included in the definition of income? What is the Haig-Simons 
definition of income and what is the ‘comprehensive income tax system’ 
that they played a major role in developing? 
2.  What are the merits of having tax rates based on a ‘progressive’ basis 
rather than a ‘proportional’ basis? Does equity require or need 
progressive rates of tax to be imposed on taxpayers?  Do progressive 
rates of tax support the redistributive goal of taxation?  
3.  What are the issues in trying to achieve vertical and horizontal equity in 
a tax system and are each part of the broader concept of equity? Is tax 
evasion and tax avoidance a by-product of the perceived lack of 
horizontal equity in the tax system?  
4.  Why do most governments have a tax on consumption as well as income 
and is there an argument for only a tax on consumption and not income? 
Is a tax on consumption regressive and in conflict with the concept of 
equity in taxation?  
 
The following discussion should provide answers to the above questions and assist in 
providing a conclusion as to what form an ideal tax system takes and, more 
important, whether the current tax system that exists in Australia and many of the 
OECD member countries encourage tax avoidance and tax evasion which results in 
the use of tax havens. 
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2.5.1 The Haig-Simons58 definition of income and the comprehensive tax 
system  
If the tax system intends to raise revenue through the imposition of tax on income, 
what is income for taxation purposes? Put simply, ‘[a] general income tax is an 
enforced sharing by the state of a person’s income, the states share being measured 
by the net income as computed after deducting the expenses incurred in producing 
the income’.59 Whilst this definition of income may be accurate from a practical 
perspective, it fails to define the term ‘income’ from a theoretical perspective. The 
definition of income for taxation purposes that has been widely accepted for a 
comprehensive tax system is the definition attributed to Professors Haig and Simons. 
Indeed, Graeme Cooper states that ‘[t]he Haig-Simons model is used primarily in 
most Western industrialised countries because it is regarded by governments, and 
possibly by the populace as well, as a satisfactory indicator of taxable capacity – 
ability to pay’.60 
 
Professors Robert Haig and Henry Simons worked independently on finding a 
definition of ‘income’ for taxation purposes. Haig provided a theoretical 
conceptualisation of income and contended that income was ‘a flow of satisfaction, 
of intangible psychological experiences’. 61 The analogy used to explain this concept 
is ‘if a person earns a dollar and spends it to buy dinner … income is neither the 
dollar nor the dinner. Income is the satisfaction obtained from eating the dinner.’62 
The problem with this approach is that it places too much emphasis on consumption 
and could then be used to define consumption and not income.63 However, Haig did 
acknowledge that, ultimately, income should have a practical connection with money 
and he arrived at the following definition: 
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…the definition of income which the economist offers is this: Income is the money 
value of the net accretion to one’s economic power between two points of time. 64 
 
Haig was also an advocate of including any increase in the value of the assets of a 
taxpayer as income and today this is the case in Australia and other OECD member 
countries where capital gains are subject to income tax, but only once they have been 
realised. However, New Zealand has still not introduced a tax on capital gains. Haig 
also thought that the imputed value of the potential rental income from taxpayers 
who owned their own homes should also be included in the definition of income as 
this would ‘add to the desire for equity in the tax system so that those taxpayers that 
did not own their own homes would be at an advantage to the wealthy’.65 Haig was 
not keen to include all gifts in his definition of income because he viewed most gifts 
being given between members of a family and he considered the family as a single 
tax unit—but only parents and dependant children as a separate tax unit. However, he 
was in favour of including gifts between parents and adult children or gifts from 
grandparents to children as falling within the definition of income.66 The Haig 
definition of income was found to be similar to that of Henry Simons and 
commentators such as Professor Richard Musgrave subsequently grouped the two 
definitions and similar approaches to the theory of income. The similar approach has 
now become known as the ‘Haig-Simons’ definition of income.  
 
The Haig-Simons definition of personal income has been distilled over many years to 
mean the following: 
 
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of 
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.67 
 
Professor Richard Vann 68 explains this definition with the following equation:  
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Income (or economic gain) = consumption + change in net savings 
 
The definition places a great deal of emphasis on consumption and accumulation but 
it is not a recipe for a definition of ‘consumption’ that could be used in a 
consumption tax. McCombs contends that ‘[b]ecause this definition finds income in 
consumption and in any increase in net worth, it will lead to a true income tax and 
not to a consumption tax’.69 The definition has been subject to some level of 
criticism because it only focuses on monetary or economic resources and ignores the 
value of leisure and self-provided services in consumption by the taxpayer.70  
 
Simons strongly advocated the need to include gifts and inheritances in the definition 
of income as well as an imputed value of rent when the taxpayer owned their own 
home. He made the following statement in relation to including the value of imputed 
rent: 
 
[W]hen property is employed directly in consumption uses, there is the strongest 
case for recognizing an addition to taxable income. This is widely recognized in 
criticism of our federal tax for its egregious discrimination between renters and 
homeowners, and perhaps more strikingly in the almost consistently different 
practice among income taxes abroad.71 
 
Simons also strongly advocated the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in his 
definition of income but if a government already has an inheritance tax then he 
acknowledged that the tax burden may become too great. The Simons definition has 
been criticised by McCombs on the grounds that it is blind as to source and equally 
blind as to use.72 In other words, the definition of income ignores the source of the 
income, especially income generated from savings and the use to which those 
savings have been put. Haig and Simons also included a tax on interest from savings 
in their comprehensive tax system. In effect, this means that the same income is 
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taxed twice, first; when the income has been saved after it is taxed, as principal, and 
second; when interest that has accumulated on the savings is taxed again. The 
taxation of interest on savings is generally regarded as being a regressive form of 
taxation as it acts as a strong disincentive to save capital.73 
 
J.S. Mill was adamant that ‘the only proper mode of assessing an income tax would 
be to only tax the part of income devoted to expenditure, exempting that which is 
saved’.74  The wealthy may have become wealthy through prudent investment and 
accumulation of after tax income but, according to the Haig-Simons approach, that 
accumulated wealth will then be subject to income tax when a capital gain is realised 
or that wealth is gifted to a family member. While this may satisfy the redistributive 
goal of a tax system, it may lead to inefficiencies. 
 
2.5.2 Progressive income tax and vertical and horizontal equity – the 
Musgrave approach 
Over the past centuries, different forms of taxation have been imposed on different 
sources of income and wealth at different rates and, in some cases, at higher rates for 
the wealthy than for the poor. As has been discussed above, one of the main aims of 
a tax system is to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor, hence the concept of 
vertical equity. If tax is imposed at the same rate on the rich and poor alike, then it is 
considered to be contrary to vertical equity because it impacts on the poor to a 
greater extent than the rich. Therefore, it can be seen that a progressive rate system is 
crucial in achieving vertical equity, namely, that different rates of tax are imposed on 
different amounts of income. Musgrave and Musgrave provide a clear definition of 
this distinction as ‘a tax is progressive if the ratio of tax to income rises when 
moving up the income scale, proportional if the ratio is constant, and regressive if the 
ratio declines’.75 In effect the ‘average tax rate rises with income levels’.76 As Peter 
Groenewegen states:  
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[A] proportional income tax is defined as a tax where average and marginal rates are 
equal for all levels of income, that is, no income is exempt, a condition necessary to 
distinguish it from the linear income tax with a single marginal rate for all income 
above the level of income exempted.77  
 
Modern progressive tax systems have a number of brackets at which higher marginal 
rates of tax apply to the amount of income within that particular bracket. For 
example, in Australia the top rate of income tax, namely 45 percent, applies to 
income over $150,000 and so the marginal rate of tax on any extra income over 
$150,000 is 45 percent. There are now five tax brackets in Australia as well as a low 
income rebate; a long way from the 29 marginal rates of forty years ago.78  
 
It is interesting to note that J.S. Mill was in favour of a proportional rate of tax and 
not a progressive rate system. He believed that a set rate was more easily applied and 
was based on an equal sacrifice principle.79 Proponents of a proportional rate of tax 
or a ‘flat rate’ of tax system believe that it still ensures that the wealthy pay more tax 
than the poor but also prevents wealthy people from entering into tax schemes that 
may amount to tax avoidance or tax evasion in order to reduce income so that it is 
taxed at a lower marginal rate of tax.80 It also does not act as a disincentive to engage 
in paid work as a result of moving into a higher tax bracket.81 Similarly, a great deal 
of effort by taxation professionals in Australia is placed upon the end of the financial 
year tax planning which, in effect, looks at accelerating tax deductions and delaying 
the recognition of income simply to take advantage of a lower tax bracket. With 
company tax having a flat rate in Australia and many OECD member countries, 
much of this type of effort is pointless.  
 
Peter Groenewegen describes the early history of the use of a progressive rate system 
of taxation and provides the following insight into its use: 
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[I]t appears that progressive taxation made its debut in Athens in the time of Solon 
around BC 596 … sporadic use of the principle of progression … is visible in the 
French and English graduated poll taxes of the middle ages … the first use of 
graduated scale for an income tax occurs in the Florentine Republic during the 
fifteenth century. For 1480, this rate scale varied in nine steps from 7 to 22 per 
cent.82 
 
As John Head and Richard Krever contend, ‘[t]he emergence of progressive-rate 
personal income taxation as a major instrument of revenue raising and of taxation 
policy has been one of the most important and remarkable fiscal phenomena of the 
20th century’.83  Professors Head and Krever are very strong advocates of progressive 
income tax rates on the basis that it is able to deliver a sense of fairness in taxation 
through vertical and horizontal equity as well as providing income redistribution and 
social policy.84 It is of interest to note that within the OECD member countries, since 
2000, the progressive rates of income have declined in the past seven years and are 
now less progressive than what they were in all countries except three out of thirty.85 
The three countries that have increased their tax brackets are Canada, Portugal and 
the United States.86 Studies have shown that when the top rates of tax have been cut 
this has resulted in an increase in income being reported to the taxation 
administrators.87 In the US in 1981 when the top rate of tax was cut from 70 percent 
to 50 percent’ the IRS88 received an increase in income that was reported by the top 1 
percent of the income distribution.89 
 
Put simply, the concept of equity in taxation is based on the perceived need to have 
taxpayers contributing to revenue based on their ‘ability to pay’, as enunciated by 
Adam Smith; or as expanded by J.S. Mill, the ‘equal sacrifice principle’. Those with 
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more income should pay more and those with less should pay less. The principle of 
vertical equity is found in Adam Smith’s first maxim of a good taxation system, as 
discussed above. What then is vertical equity and is this approach to taxation 
defensible? The best advocate of vertical and horizontal equity is Richard Musgrave. 
Musgrave states that Adam Smith ‘can be seen as an ability-to-pay theorist’ and with 
‘a mix of benefit components’.90 In other words, Smith viewed the payment of taxes 
as being in proportion to the benefits being obtained from the State. According to 
Musgrave: 
 
J.S. Mill then separated the analysis of tax equity from the expenditure side of the 
budget … Mill then translated equal ability into equal sacrifice terms. Fairness, 
according to Mill, required tax differentials which impose equal absolute sacrifice 
across unequal incomes.91  
 
Richard and Peggy Musgrave have taken these concepts further by arguing that 
horizontal equity was linked to vertical equity. The following statement by Richard 
Musgrave sums up the position perfectly: 
 
The call for equity in taxation is generally taken to include a rule of horizontal equity 
(HE), requiring equal treatment of equals, and one of vertical equity (VE), calling 
for an appropriate differentiation among unequals. HE appears non-controversial. 
Not only does it offer protection against arbitrary discrimination but it also reflects 
the basic principle of equal worth. The United States Constitution provides for 
‘equal protection under the law’.92 
 
Musgrave acknowledges that ‘vertical equity … is inherently controversial. An 
appropriate pattern of differentiation must be chosen but people will disagree on its 
shape’.93 He goes on to hold that ‘horizontal equity appears non-controversial’. This 
view is endorsed by Henry Simons, of the Haig-Simons definition of income, who 
states that ‘it is generally agreed that taxes should bear similarly upon all people in 
                                               
90
 Richard Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, (1990) 43 National Tax Journal, 113, 114. 
91
 Ibid, 115.  
92
 Ibid, 113. 
93
 Ibid. 
44 
similar circumstances’.94 Professor Miller raises the question as to whether it is 
possible to achieve equity in taxation and how can it be achieved?95 He contends that 
horizontal equity is only achieved if all people are treated alike and if this does not 
occur then people will cheat on their taxes.96 Could this be the reason why tax 
avoidance and tax evasion still occurs? 
 
From the above examination of the early theories of taxation and the ideal tax 
system, it can be seen that taxes should be equally imposed on those of equal means, 
horizontal equity, and that those of little means should be taxed less than those with 
greater means, vertical equity. Many OECD member countries have adopted a 
progressive rate of personal income tax which ensures vertical equity, although this 
has been the subject of criticism.97 
 
How should the burden of income tax be imposed on the taxpayer; a flat tax rate or a 
progressive rate of tax? The basic philosophy of taxation holds that those that have 
more income and wealth should pay more tax, vertical equity, and that taxpayers of 
equal wealth should pay the same amount of tax, horizontal equity. However, 
McDaniel and Repetti contend that:  
 
Theoretically vertical equity could apply to a tax system that is progressive, 
proportional or regressive. Which of these designs is chosen depends upon one’s 
underlying theory of justice and decisions about some key economic assumptions.98  
 
The authors then state that John Rawls, in his Theory of Justice99 advocates a flat tax 
rate on consumption as being the best tax system for his theory of justice. The Rawls 
theory of justice holds that:  
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… every person must have the largest political liberty compatible with a like liberty 
for all, and that inequalities in power, wealth, income, and other resources must not 
exist except in so far as they work to the absolute benefit of the worst-off members of 
society.100  
 
McDaniel and Repetti are critical of the Rawls approach to a tax system and argue 
that: 
… a tax on consumption only exempts capital income from tax and capital income is 
concentrated in the upper income levels. Economists commonly argue that, under 
certain assumptions such a tax is the equivalent of a tax on wage income only.101 
 
The other issue that has remained unresolved is that if vertical equity is to be 
accepted in a good tax system then how much tax should the rich pay? Should the 
rate of tax be calculated by taking a proportion of the income of the tax payer or 
calculated on progressive rates, so that as the level of income increases so does the 
rate of tax that is applied; in effect, a step arrangement. It could be argued that a truly 
equitable approach would be to levy every taxpayer income tax as a set proportion, 
say 30 percent, irrespective of the level of income and wealth of the taxpayer. That 
way all taxpayers believe that every individual is paying the same level of tax, such 
as the flat rate of tax for companies in Australia, namely 30 percent. A progressive 
system imposes more income tax on higher incomes with the result that the rich pay 
considerably more in tax than the poor. As Professor Krever contends, ‘a progressive 
taxation is used as a vehicle for income redistribution. More is taken from the rich 
for the government to spend on the poor’. On the other hand, Professor Sinclair 
Davidson states, ‘in a progressive tax system … just as low and middle income 
earners pay progressively less in tax, so too they receive progressively less in tax 
cuts’. This fact was confirmed by the OECD report on Taxing Wages 2006-2007 
where it was stated that: 
 
In Australia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland and Luxembourg (and to a lesser extent 
Canada and Norway) tax reforms tended to reduce the progressivity of the tax 
                                               
100
 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (1977), 150. 
101
 McDaniel and Repetti, above n 98, 610-611. 
46 
structure with high-earning employees benefiting from significantly higher tax 
reductions than those in the middle and bottom parts of the earnings range.102  
 
This may have been instigated as a result of two policy changes; first, the tax base 
was expanded to include consumption taxes and second, high tax rates had been 
‘shown to lead to increased tax evasion and avoidance’.103  
 
The OECD report discusses the reforms that have taken place in member countries in 
relation to income tax schedules in a progressive tax system. The report notes that 
during the period from 2000 to 2005 ‘income tax schedules have tended to become 
less progressive with fewer tax brackets and reduced tax rate differences between the 
bottom and top tax bracket’.104 It is interesting to note that Iceland and the Slovak 
Republic have a single ‘flat’ rate of tax for incomes.105 There are some non-OECD 
member countries that also have a flat rate or proportional rate of tax on income and, 
according to Lauchlan Chipman, ‘Russia has a flat rate of 13 per cent and Latvia 25 
per cent with no tax free threshold, and Estonia 26 per cent with a small tax free 
threshold.’106 All of these countries have a proportional system of taxation with a 
fixed rate for all taxpayers, similar to the tax rates imposed on companies in most 
OECD member countries. This fact is not that surprising given that consumption 
taxes, VAT and GST, are also levied at a flat or proportional rate. It has been 
generally regarded by governments that a flat tax on consumption is regressive 
because it has the same impact on the rich as well as the poor. However, GST could 
be imposed on a progressive rate system, if required, along similar lines to income 
tax. 
 
As was discussed above and reinforced by Sinclair Davidson,107 J. S. Mill advocated 
a strong case for real equality in taxation only being achieved if the same proportion 
of tax was taken from each person, irrespective of their means. He was advocating a 
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‘proportional’ system rather than a ‘progressive’ system. As evidence of this, 
Professor Sinclair Davidson states that because Australia had a progressive system of 
taxation in 2000-2001, 85 percent of Australians paid less than their fair share of 
taxes and the top 5 percent of income earners paid 158 percent of their fair share of 
net taxes. This statement is based on the fact that ‘the top 25 percent of income 
earners in Australia ‘voluntarily’ pay 64.1 percent of the net tax’.108 A proportional 
system would result in the top earners paying less tax and the middle to low income 
earners paying more. This would be getting closer to a system of real vertical equity. 
 
Horizontal inequities in Australia and elsewhere have led to disillusionment with the 
tax system.109 Taxpayers, being able to access loopholes in the law to pay less tax, 
have created an environment for tax avoidance and tax evasion. As Professor Krever 
asserts, ‘taxpayer disillusionment in the 1970s and 1980s can be traced to horizontal 
inequities: taxpayers knew that other taxpayers in a position to take advantage of 
preferences and loopholes were able to pay substantially less tax on the same amount 
of income’.110 
 
2.5.3 Expenditure or consumption tax as an alternative 
In recent years, a great deal of discussion has focused on the merit of imposing a tax 
on consumption as an alternative to a tax on income. Most OECD member countries, 
as well as Australia, have a mixture of taxes on income, and a consumption tax and 
Canada, Australia and Japan have adopted a consumption tax only quite recently.111 
According to Professor Alan Gunn, both the US Treasury Department and the Meade 
Committee in England are in favour of a progressive tax on personal consumption as 
an alternative to income tax. 112 However, Professor Gunn is strongly in favour of 
maintaining a tax on income and concedes that the current system has two main 
defects; first, it taxes savings twice113 and; second, it is administratively complex and 
                                               
108
 Ibid, 9. 
109
 Krever, above n 11, 12. 
110
 Ibid. 
111
 Avi-Yonah, above n 9, 1 and 2.  
112
 Alan Gunn, ‘The Case for an Income Tax’, (1978-1979) 46 University of Chicago Law Review 370, 370.  
113
 The argument that savings are taxed twice arises because savings are taxed first as income and then the 
interest earned on those savings is also taxed as income. There is a strong argument that interest on savings 
should be exempt from further taxation as income as this would act as an incentive to save. A consumption tax 
48 
costly, but he reaches the conclusion that income should remain to be taxed and not 
replaced completely by a tax on consumption.114 He does concede that a 
consumption tax does allow for inflation as the amount of tax increases as the value 
of goods and services increase,115 such as the present situation with the price of fuel 
and other products produced from oil. With the progressive income tax system, the 
effect of inflation is only adjusted when the tax brackets are adjusted for the 
inflationary effect on the price of labour. 
 
Professors Bankman and Weisbach advocate a consumption tax over an income tax 
on three grounds. First, a consumption tax is more efficient because it does not 
discriminate between current and future consumption; second, a consumption tax can 
satisfy vertical equity and satisfy redistributive policies; and third, a consumption tax 
is easier to administer.116 As a result of the rise of the ‘welfare state’, with an ageing 
population and more demands on health resources and retirement pensions, many 
OECD member countries needed to broaden the tax base and a tax on consumption 
achieved that goal. Also, a tax on consumption was seen as one way to restrict tax 
avoidance on income; however, even consumption tax is being evaded and avoided 
by consumers and businesses.117 Governments have reduced the high marginal rates 
of tax because high rates encouraged tax avoidance but, also, high VAT rates in 
Europe have also led to avoidance.118 The debate between those that favour a tax on 
consumption instead of a tax on income will continue without resolution. Both forms 
of taxation have merits and disadvantages. As Professor Avi-Yonah states, both 
forms of taxation achieve his three goals of taxation; revenue collection, 
redistribution in order to support the social safety net, and regulation and, for this 
reason, he advocates the adoption of both forms of taxation in the United States of 
America.119 Many OECD member countries collect taxes from income as well as 
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consumption and there is a strong argument that the combination of the two satisfies 
all of the goals of taxation.  
 
2.5.4 The Constitutional perspective – Buchanan and Brennan approach 
Having examined the comprehensive tax system developed by Haig and Simons, and 
later refined by Musgrave, and, in particular, their combined approach to the need for 
vertical and horizontal equity within an ideal tax system, it is important to examine 
the role of government in implementing the notions of equity and the redistribution 
of wealth as well as efficiency and simplicity. After all, it is the government that 
makes the ultimate decision on what is to be taxed and at what rates of tax. In the 
Haig-Simons model, it was assumed that the policy makers were driven by the desire 
to ‘do good’120 and completely ignored the political constraints. What factors does a 
government take into account when deciding on the choice of tax rates to be imposed 
and a particular tax system to be used and what are the constitution limitations on 
that choice and how does the ‘public choice’ approach apply to taxation? The 
constitution and the electorate have a major role in those decisions. 
 
The ‘public choice theory’ of taxation, as developed by Knut Wicksell121 and further 
refined by James Buchanan,  looks at the tax system and the rate of tax to be applied 
to taxpayers as having emanated from the political determinations of the government. 
The theory looked at a tax policy developed by a ‘revenue maximising Leviathan 
government’ and a body of taxpayers exercising some degree of control through 
elections and the constitution.122  
 
Professor James Buchanan was concerned about the limits on any government to 
impose taxes and viewed both the constitution of the country and the people through 
the election process as being the main forms of constraint on the government. 
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Professor Buchanan was critical of a government’s monopolistic power to tax and 
equates this power with the taking of property by coercion: 
 
One of the most familiar manifestations of the government’s coercive power lies in the 
government’s power to tax. This power to tax is the power which the government has 
to secure control over resources in which individuals hold nominal property rights. In 
itself, the power is held independently of taxpayer’s consent and independently of any 
obligation to use the resources so obtained for purposes of which those taxpayers 
approve. In this sense, the power to tax is inherently coercive. … In the absence of 
specific constitutional restrictions to the contrary, the power to tax is simply the power 
to take.123  
 
This view on the importance of the constitution is supported by Professor Cooper 
where he states that: 
 
the allocation of the burden of a tax is not entirely at the discretion of the government. 
In addition to substantive and political limitations, the constitutional framework of the 
state will often also dictate, at least in part, the procedural requirements which limit 
the powers of government.124  
 
The budgetary process is an extremely important part of the tax system in that it 
determines how and when the burden of taxation is to fall on members of the society.   
The government introduces a new budget each year to explain how the forecasted 
revenue for the year will be collected and how that revenue will be spent. Professor 
Head holds that: 
 
… the tax system has long been recognised by political scientists as one of the most 
important economic and political institutions in a liberal democracy. It has a quasi-
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constitutional character in that it remains in force, usually with only minor changes 
over a sequence of budgetary decision making periods.125   
 
Professor Buchanan was also concerned about tax law made by a majority 
government in a democracy and the need for a constitution to ‘constrain’ any 
potential discrimination.126 He makes the following observation of the effect of 
majority rule: 
 
Majority rule means what it says: rule by a majority coalition. And this fact alone 
guarantees that there must be discrimination in treatment between persons who are 
members of the majority coalition and those who are not unless discrimination is 
constitutionally constrained. This discrimination holds for the distribution of taxes as 
it does for all other activities under the authority of government.127 
 
Governments want to be re-elected and their tax policy decisions will be directed at 
their supporters. Without constitutional constraints, tax laws might discriminate 
against a portion of the population and the budget decisions might severely affect a 
particular group within society. It is within this environment of a public choice 
theory that tax law and policy is sometimes made. 
 
2.6 Efficiency – Economic Neutrality 
The optimal tax system is a structure with a variety of taxes imposed at a range of 
rates that maximise the welfare of the taxpayer. Ideally, any tax should be 
economically neutral for the taxpayer. In other words, the existence of a tax at a 
particular rate should have no effect on the behaviour of the taxpayer. The taxpayer 
should not change his or her behaviour as a result of taxation. Graeme Cooper 
provides the following definition of the ‘optimal tax system’ as defined by Mirrlees: 
 
                                               
125
 J Head, ‘Tax Fairness Principles: A Conceptual, Historical and Practical Review’, (1992) 9 Australian Tax 
Forum 65, 84.  
126
 Buchanan, James, ‘The Political Efficiency of General Taxation’, (1993) 46 National Tax Journal 401, 404. 
127
 Ibid. 
52 
[A]n individual’s welfare is determined exclusively by utility derived from two 
items – the amount that an individual consumes (C) and the amount of leisure the 
individual enjoys (L). The individual’s welfare (U) is thus defined: 
 U = u(C,L) … [A] person’s total utility is a function of the individual utility of each 
of C and L. Individuals will maximise their individual welfare by choosing the 
combination of leisure and consumption that yields the highest outcome.128  
 
Put simply, an individual can achieve their optimal happiness and welfare by either 
working for more money or working less and having more leisure. If tax rates are too 
high then the individual may choose to work less and enjoy more leisure. The 
problem with this scenario is that the amount of tax collected is less and the tax 
system had caused the individual to change their behaviour as a result of the tax 
rates. This is also referred to as the ‘substitution effect’ of taxation when higher taxes 
lead to more leisure.129 Joel Slemrod expresses his concern with any taxation that 
affects the behavioural response of individuals and businesses to the tax system.130 
He makes the following observation in support of the optimal tax system: 
 
[T]he more the tax system induces individuals and businesses to alter their 
behaviour, the greater is the social cost of raising revenue. While, traditionally, 
economists have focused on the behavioural response of labour supply, savings and 
investment – sometimes called ‘real’ responses – in recent years the public finance 
community has recognised that all the behavioural responses to taxation, including 
avoidance and evasion, are all symptoms of inefficiency. According to this view, it 
is the responsiveness, or elasticity, of taxable income that determines the social cost 
of collecting revenue. The social cost, in turn, sets the trade-off between fairness of 
the tax distribution and the efficiency consequences of taxation, the trade-off that 
frames the … appropriate level of tax progressivity.131 
 
The main issue between the two approaches to the design of a ‘good’ tax system 
appears to be how to provide an answer to the following question; how is the burden 
                                               
128
 Cooper, Graeme, above n 1, 434. 
129
 Sinclair Davidson, ‘Are There Any Good Arguments Against Cutting Income Taxes?’, (2005) 69 CIS Policy 
Monograph, The Centre for Independent Studies, 4.  
130
 Slemrod, above n 87, 73. 
131
 Ibid. 
53 
of taxation to be spread across society? Both the comprehensive and the optimal 
schools provide some insights into an answer.132 
 
The optimal tax system places emphasis on tax rates as opposed to the tax base.133 
The Haig-Simons approach placed emphasis on what was going to be included in the 
definition of income tax, the tax base, whereas the optimal tax school, based on the 
writings of Ramsey in 1927 and Mirrlees in 1971,134  places the emphasis on the 
rates of tax to be applied in order to maximise the utility of the taxpayer. The reason 
why this was considered to be so important was that if equity considerations were 
placed first then efficiency within the tax system is at risk. Efficiency within a tax 
system is usually ‘defined in terms of deadweight loss’.135 A good tax policy is one 
that causes less deadweight cost than another. Deadweight loss can best be described 
as the cost associated with raising revenue through taxation. As Sinclair Davidson 
observes in the following statement about deadweight losses: 
 
[T]axes have two effects; first, they exist to raise revenue, and second, they generate 
deadweight losses in the form of wealth that is not created as a result of the tax on 
outputs. High marginal tax rates may therefore impede the revenue raising effects 
while also imposing high deadweight losses on the economy. This means any 
changes in marginal tax rates need to be evaluated in terms of the change in revenue 
and changes in deadweight losses.136 
 
A further example of where tax policy has had an impact on efficiency is found in 
the study by the UK Open University Business School report, produced in 1998, on 
the behaviour of companies in Britain where it was found that 18 percent of 
businesses ‘avoided sales to stay below the £50,000 threshold for VAT’.137  
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As discussed above, achieving equity in taxation is one of the main goals of a well 
designed system and the issue of efficiency appears to come second.138 However, the 
‘pursuit of equity will inevitably reduce efficiency’139 and this is the main concern of 
those promoting an optimal tax approach. According to Graeme Cooper, the 
Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation (1966), known as the ‘Carter 
Commission’, stated that ‘equity issues were always to be given first priority, so that 
no trade-off between equity and efficiency was possible’.140 Cooper provides the 
following quote from the Carter Commission Report in support of this approach: 
 
[W]hen faced with these hard choices [between competing equity and efficiency 
goals] we have consistently given the greatest weight to the equity objectives … We 
are convinced that scrupulous fairness in taxation must override all other objectives 
where there is a conflict among objectives.141 
 
The current Australian Government review of the tax-transfer system would appear 
to endorse the Carter Commission view as it specifically discusses the need for 
horizontal and vertical equity and the acceptances of the Haig-Simons definition of 
income while at the same time acknowledging that efficiencies do merit some 
concern as trade-offs with equity issues.142 One of the main focuses of the ‘theory of 
optimal taxation can be seen as a recipe for minimising the costs of taxation’ and this 
is the focus of the following goal of taxation; the need for a simplicity and certainty 
which should, in turn, help to minimise the cost of administration.143  
 
2.7 The Need for Simplicity in a Tax System 
The third goal of an ideal tax system is that it should be simple in terms of an 
understanding of the law and compliance of the law by taxpayers and simple in terms 
of the collection of taxes and administration by the tax authority. This was one of the 
three criteria of a good tax system as enunciated by Adam Smith and discussed in 
                                               
138
 The Royal Commission on Taxation, Report (1966) ‘Carter Commission’, Canada. 
139
 Cooper, above n 1, 438. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Ibid, 438. The reference to the Carter Commission Report is Volume 1, 4. 
142
 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 5, 174, 179 and 312. 
143
 Agnar Sandmo, ‘The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View’, (2005) 58 National Tax Journal 643, 
644.  
55 
detail above.  A complex system is perceived to lead to tax evasion and tax 
avoidance because of the wealthy being able to obtain advice on how to take 
advantage of the complexities in the law.144 The current review of the Australian tax 
system has noted that the income tax law contained in the various statutes is now 
5,743 pages, up from 526 pages in 1975 when the ‘Asprey’145 report on the review of 
the tax system was produced.146 The Business Council of Australia and the Corporate 
Tax Association released a report in 2007 on measures to reduce compliance costs on 
business and found that those businesses had to deal with 21 Australian Government 
taxes, 33 State taxes and two Local Government taxes. It was noted that this was 
more than twice the number of taxes effecting businesses in the United Kingdom.147 
There are two issues that require examination under this heading; first, the actual cost 
of collecting taxes and the resources from both the public and private sectors that are 
involved in this process; and second, the implications for society when the law 
becomes extremely complex to understand and be applied by taxpayers which may 
lead to an erosion of the ‘rule of law’.  
 
2.7.1 The cost of compliance  
The first of the main implications of having a complex tax system is the cost of 
administration. These costs are incurred by both the Taxation Administration and the 
taxpayers in trying to comply with the complex tax law. For example, in the 2006-
2007 Annual Report of the Australian Taxation Office it was stated that they employ 
22,342 staff and had a budget of $2.662 billion.148 The number of staff would be far 
greater if the Australian tax system did not have self-assessment and that most of the 
tax is collected by businesses as employers or taxpayers. Many OECD member 
countries have adopted a self-assessment system for the preparation of tax returns 
which means that the assessment of any tax liability is the responsibility of the 
taxpayer, either individual or corporation, and the return is not scrutinised unless any 
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abnormality is detected at a later date. Similarly, more staff would be required if it 
was not for the employer collecting income tax from the employee during the year 
under the Australian ‘Pay-as-you-go Withholding’ system as well as the goods and 
services tax, fringe benefits tax and a variety of other taxes. In this way, the 
administrative costs of collecting taxes have been transferred to the private sector 
and these administrative costs are no longer being borne by the government. 
However, the government would argue that the administration – ATO – is now 
focusing on tax avoidance and tax evasion, the review and audit functions and 
education of the public.  
 
Agnar Sandmo is of the view that these administrative costs have an impact on the 
choices made by people and businesses. His following comments are important 
because they once again highlight the ‘deadweight costs’ of taxes: 
 
In the case of firms, a major cost to them is doing a significant part of the work of 
actually collecting the taxes for the government … If the private costs of tax 
compliance vary among branches of industry, modes of business organisation and 
personal occupation, there is every reason to believe that people’s choices will be 
affected by these differences in cost. Someone who is about to decide whether to set 
up his own business or accept a salaried position in a big company, may let his 
choice be influenced by the consideration that in the former case his costs of tax 
compliance – as well as the opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance – are likely 
to be much higher. So the costs of tax compliance on the part of the taxpayer, which 
form part of the economy-wide costs of the tax system, are likely to have effects on 
the structure of industry and occupations in a country, and in the next round on 
returns to investment and gross wages.149   
 
In the US, ‘78 percent of total personal income tax’ that is collected from labour is 
via the employer,  and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ‘correctly believes that it 
is much more efficient to collect and monitor taxes remitted by a smaller group of 
employers compared with taxes remitted by a hundred million or so employees’.150 
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This might be an efficient situation for the tax administrators in the US and Australia 
but what of the compliance costs for business?  
 
Economists in the US, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia have attempted to 
quantify the actual compliance cost to the individual and corporate taxpayer in those 
countries. For individuals in the US, compliance costs are ‘about seven percent of 
revenue’ raised.151 On the corporate side, compliance costs are over three percent of 
the total federal and state corporate income tax collections.152 The UK, Canadian and 
Australian research ‘suggests that compliance costs can range from two to twenty 
four percent’.153 These findings are also supported by Alex Robson who states that 
‘recent US studies indicate that the average cost of funds (ACF)154 for all forms of 
taxation lies somewhere between 18 per cent and 24 per cent of total government 
revenue’.155 He further states that ‘this means that on average each dollar that the US 
government collects in revenue from all forms of taxation costs the private sector 
between $1.18 and $1.24’.156  Australian studies have confirmed that the ‘Australian 
tax system imposes higher compliance costs on taxpayers than virtually any other 
income tax system in the world’.157 This may not be the type of statistic that any 
country should be proud of. The current review of the Australian tax system 
highlights some of the government’s concerns about complexity in the tax and 
transfer system and the government may ultimately address some of the obvious 
problems. However, the report still emphasises the necessity to take into account the 
need to balance equity and efficiency concerns with the complexity issues.158   
 
2.7.2 Does complexity lead to an erosion of the ‘rule of law’? 
The ‘Rule of Law’ is a principle contained in the English legal system and, as 
enunciated by Professor Dicey, holds that all men are equal under the law except the 
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Crown.159 It can also be expressed as the notion ‘that the people and the government 
should obey the law and be ruled by it’ but the legal concept of the ‘rule of law’ is 
not readily definable.160 What is important in this context is the fact that there is a 
‘strong correlation between economic growth and a strong rule of law’.161  In other 
words; a country that ensures that all of its citizens and the government obey the law 
will have a strong and vibrant economy. If that is the case then the law must be easy 
to understand and administered fairly, and the doctrine of separation of powers 
should also operate effectively. Parliament, consisting of the elected representatives, 
makes the law; the Executive administers the law; and, the Judiciary resolves any 
disputes arising from interpreting the law. In the context of an overly complex 
taxation system, the rule of law has relevance because of how the existing law is to 
be made and interpreted by Parliament, the Executive and administrators, and the 
Judiciary. Professor Walker is of the opinion that the rule of law is under threat due 
to the complexity of the legislation and provides the following statement to that 
effect: 
 
[T]he rule of law has all but collapsed under pressure of the sheer volume of often 
unintelligible legislation and the grant of wide discretions to the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) and the courts. The ATO, with its power to vary the incidence of tax 
and issue binding rulings, is increasingly becoming the final deciding authority. 
Legal advice leaves the taxpayer unmoved as ATO rulings become the only source 
of certainty for those seeking to plan their future activities. The separation of powers 
has also virtually broken down: the executive government exercises legislative and 
quasi-legislative powers, the judiciary exercises policy-making powers, rights 
effectively turn on opinions about a citizen’s purposes and in a variety of ways the 
law is changed at the point of application.162 
 
Some of the key issues that Professor Walker has identified as being conducive to an 
erosion of the rule of law are found in the ATO’s ruling system where in ‘perhaps 90 
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percent of cases these materials are consistent with enacted law, but in the remainder 
the ATO is effectively making its own rules’.163 In 1992, when the ruling system was 
being introduced into Parliament by the Minister assisting the Treasurer, it was stated 
that ‘the ruling system was touted as promoting certainty for taxpayers and thereby 
reduce their risk and opportunity cost’.164 However, a recent example of where an 
ATO ruling, TR 1999/5, was in conflict with the case law is found in the Federal 
Court decision in Essenbourne Pty Ltd v FCT (2002) 51 ATR 629. The ruling was 
subsequently withdrawn on 27 June 2007 after the Commissioner of Taxation had 
publicly disagreed with the decision of Kiefel J through an ATO media release165 and 
the Commissioner had brought three more cases before the Federal Court in an 
attempt to obtain a Federal Court decision in line with its public ruling, TR 1999/5. 
In the end, all of the Federal Court decisions166 held that there was no fringe benefit 
in the situation involving employee benefit trusts and non-complying superannuation 
funds. The major issue threatening the ‘rule of law’ in this situation was that the 
Commissioner of Taxation was adopting the position of the Parliament and the 
Judiciary in making new taxation law in relation to the fringe benefits tax. The stance 
taken by the ATO went far beyond what is required to administer the taxation law 
and would have added to the confusion facing tax professionals, business and 
individual taxpayers. Professor Walker provides other examples of situations where 
the discretion provided to the Commissioner of Taxation has led to the ATO 
adopting the role of law maker and, as such, threatening the rule of law.167 One 
example that has serious implications for tax administration is the bonus arrangement 
that ATO auditors are being paid for every extra dollar of revenue collected. As 
Professor Walker states, ‘the practice of remunerating tax officers according to the 
amount of revenue they collect recalls the 18th century tax-farming abuses that 
helped trigger the French Revolution’.168  
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2.7.3 Does complexity lead to tax avoidance and evasion? 
It could be argued that the tax accountants and lawyers are responsible for the 
complexity in the tax law because of the need by the government to close loopholes 
used to minimise tax developed by them. On the other hand, it can just as equally be 
argued that, as a result of complexity, loopholes are available to be taken advantage 
of for the purpose of tax minimisation.  
 
Professor Krever places the blame for tax advisers being able to exploit loopholes for 
their clients squarely on the complex legislation that exists in Australia. The 
following passage from Krever sums up the situation very well: 
 
There is no basis for blaming the tax adviser for their role in minimisation if the 
legislature decides to erect a tax system built upon the fragile façade of legal forms 
and taxpayers engage tax advisers to minimise their taxes by manipulating legal 
forms. It would be naïve at best to think a tax law based on legal distinctions with 
little or no underlying substance would not invite taxpayers to recast the form of 
transactions, and it is fanciful to think tax advisers assisting taxpayers to cross such 
artificial thresholds are the persons ultimately responsible for tax avoidance. The 
culprit is the legislature that introduced the thresholds, not the taxpayers who seek to 
cross them or the tax advisers whose job it is to assist taxpayers to achieve economic 
benefits.169 
 
Margaret McKercher conducted research on the effects of the complex tax laws on 
the compliance behaviour of taxpayers in Australia and concluded that complexity 
impacted on compliance and this, in turn, impacted on the perception of fairness of 
the tax system. Based on her research, McKercher was able to arrive at the following 
statement on the theory of the relationship of complexity to compliance: 
 
It was theorised that complexity and high levels of commitment caused taxpayers to 
experience high levels of compliance costs, which in turn reduced the perception of 
fairness of the income tax system. As the perception of fairness decreased, there was 
a decrease in commitment to compliance. If commitment to compliance was to not 
fall, then the most direct means to ensure that this did not occur was to reduce the 
                                               
169
 Krever, above n 7, 33. 
61 
cost of compliance. This could be achieved by reducing complexity, which would 
have the added positive effect of increasing the perception of fairness.170 
 
Research conducted by Ken Devos 171 on the effect of penalties and sanctions on 
non-compliance of the tax law found that the ‘level of taxpayer non-compliance with 
taxation law in Australia is not directly or solely affected by either the introduction 
of new tax offences or the imposition of heavier sanctions’.172 Devos goes on to 
explain that research in the US, conducted by Schwartz and Orleans, has shown that 
‘the threat of legal sanctions has an impact on compliance but not as great as an 
impact as appealing to the taxpayer’s consciences’.173 Unfortunately, this research 
was not directed at why taxpayers do not comply with the law but what effect 
sanctions and penalties have on compliance behaviour. 
 
A vast amount of research on taxpayer behaviour in relation to compliance with the 
tax law has been conducted over the past 20 years and the results of this research 
have been summarised by James Alm as follows: 
 
(1) An increase in tax complexity leads to greater use of a tax practitioner and the 
average level of non-compliance is higher for returns prepared with paid 
assistance (Erard, 1993) 
(2) A higher audit rate leads to more compliance, at least to a point, with an 
estimated reported income-audit rate elasticity ranging from 0.1 to 0.2 (Dubin 
and Wilde, 1988) 
(3) A higher fine rate leads to marginally more compliance, with an estimated 
reported income-fine rate elasticity less than 0.1 (Alm, Bahl and Murray, 1993) 
(4) A higher tax rate leads to less compliance, with an estimated reported income-tax 
rate elasticity ranging from -0.5 to -3.0 (Clotfelter, 1983) 
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(5) Audit rates are endogenous, in that they depend in part on the choices of 
taxpayers (Feinstein, 1991).174 
 
From the above analysis, it can be seen that complexity in the tax system leads to 
greater non-compliance and even greater tax avoidance and evasion. It is interesting 
to note that the use of tax professionals also leads to greater non-compliance and the 
use of tax schemes to minimise tax. This research is also important in the final 
question of whether or not tax havens will survive as the impact of tax accountants 
and lawyers, especially those located in tax havens, have had on generating non-
compliance with tax laws throughout the world. As well as tax professionals, 
international banks and financial institutions have been facilitating the flow of capital 
into tax havens and offshore financial centres.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
The three basic tenets of a good tax system require equity, efficiency and simplicity. 
These principles have been part of the philosophy of any tax system for hundreds of 
years. The comprehensive tax system, as developed by Haig-Simons and refined over 
the years, is now an established part of the tax systems in most OECD member 
countries as well as non-member states. The optimal tax theory proponents place 
more emphasis on the efficiency side of a tax system than the equity aspect of 
redistribution of wealth because of the dead-weight loss of certain taxes. The third 
principle of a good tax system, namely the need to have simplicity in its design and 
administration, has been found to be the cause of many of the problems facing both 
taxpayers and the tax collectors alike. 
 
In terms of the requirement for vertical equity in a tax system, studies have found 
that ‘participants increased the amount of taxes evaded when they perceived 
themselves to be victims of vertical inequity’ and this was particularly so in the case 
of tax scheme investors in Australia during the latter part of the 1990s where those 
participants viewed the tax system as an ‘unfair system’ compared with the highly 
educated and higher earning proportion of the population.175 Research has also 
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shown that higher rates of income tax in a highly progressive tax system will also 
lead to tax minimisation and the distortion of rational economic behaviour on the part 
of taxpayers and businesses. The finding of the research that has been conducted on 
the effect of complexity in a tax system also suggests that the existence of complex 
tax laws encourages tax minimisation.  
 
The ATO booklet on the ‘High Wealth’ taxpayers, published on 3 April 2008, shows 
that the ATO collects a large amount of tax from this group of Australian residents 
that control more than $30 million or more in net wealth.  During the period from 
May 1996 until June 2007, the ATO collected an extra $1.766 billion in revenue and, 
from the 1997-1998 financial year until the 2006-2007 financial year, the ATO 
disallowed $934 million in revenue losses and $777 million in capital losses.176  
Does this mean that the Australian tax system does not encourage compliance and, 
instead, encourages the wealthy in Australia to engage in tax avoidance and tax 
evasion? The Commissioner’s rationale for the need to comply with the tax law for 
the 1,200 individuals that were identified as falling within this category was that 
failure to do so breached the concept of ‘fairness’. 
 
The Australian tax system is currently being reviewed because the government has 
acknowledged that the level of complexity in the existing tax law is beyond what is 
reasonable in a fair and efficient tax system. If history can teach anything, then the 
early approaches by such renowned economists and philosophers as Adam Smith and 
John Stuart Mill should be revisited and much of what they advocated should now be 
adopted. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF 
TAXATION IN AUSTRALIA 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the current Australian 
taxation system. This will include a discussion of the evolution of income tax and 
indirect taxation from the early colonies leading up to their eventual Statehood. This 
will be followed with a brief overview of the taxation system that has been adopted 
by the Commonwealth of Australia. Many of the specific taxation issues relevant to 
Australian taxpayers and their use of tax havens and OFCs are examined in detail in 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis. Therefore, it is not intended to examine those 
areas of taxation law in this chapter but, rather, to provide an overview of the 
evolution of taxation in Australia starting with the early colonies through to the 
present day with the Commonwealth government having sole responsibility for the 
collection of income tax. 
 
Australia has a similar taxation system and similar taxation laws to about 60 
countries that are based on the income tax law of the United Kingdom.1 The United 
Kingdom has had a significant influence on the first the colonies and later the 
Commonwealth of Australia.2 Moreover, as Professor Walpole states, both countries 
have a common Head of State.3 It is against this background that the Australian tax 
system is discussed in this chapter. Australia only became a nation in Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act 1900, an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament which 
took effect from 1 January 1901. This required each of the six States and the 
Northern Territory to relinquish certain powers to the national government. A federal 
system was introduced with each State Government having specific powers with 
                                               
1
 Michael Walpole, and Chris Evans, ‘Whitehall to Wagga Wagga: The legacy of UK tax law in Australia’, 
(2008) 3 British Tax Review 205, 205. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. Queen Elizabeth II is the head of state for both the United Kingdom and Australia. 
65 
other powers reserved for the Commonwealth or Federal Parliament. However, the 
true sense of nationhood was not developed until the 1914-18 European war.4 The 
Commonwealth of Australia first introduced an income tax in 1915 to fund the war 
effort for the First World War. However, between the years of 1915 to 1942 the 
States and the Commonwealth levied income tax, which led to complexity and 
inequitable taxation across states.5   
 
3.2 Early History of Taxation in the Colonies 
The colonies operated as separate economies until Federation in 1901. The early 
colonies of Australia raised most of their revenue from indirect taxes such as customs 
and excise duties. Early customs and excise duties on tobacco and alcohol were 
intended not only to raise revenue but also to control the consumption of alcohol in 
the colonies.6 By 1840, these taxes were extended to not only luxury items but also to 
basic household goods such as sugar, flour, meal, rice, grain and pulses. This meant 
that the tax was being shouldered disproportionately by poorer households relative to 
their income.7 The colonies also introduced a range of indirect taxes in the form of 
fees and licenses; stamp duty, liquor retailing licence fees, auction licence fees, 
probate fees and stock taxes.8 The ‘gold rush’ of the 1850s in Victoria and New 
South Wales provided governments with an opportunity to impose gold licence fees 
but, when this led to a rebellion, namely the ‘Eureka Stockade’ in Victoria, the 
licence fee was replaced with an export tax on gold.9 
 
When this was not sufficient, the states generally imposed excise duty and sold land 
to raise sufficient funds to meet their requirements.10 Huge tracts of government land 
were sold at ridiculously low prices to private owners, even where Aboriginal 
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communities were located.11 Moreover, leasehold was converted to freehold by the 
legislatures that were dominated by the landowners.12 The first direct taxes, which 
were introduced in New South Wales in 1851 and Tasmania in 1865, were in the 
form of death duties on personal property and not real property.13 Victoria introduced 
a succession duty on real property in 1870, South Australia in 1876, Queensland in 
1886 and Western Australia in 1895.14 New South Wales extended its death duty to 
real property in 1870.15 According to Steve Gibson, the landowners ‘wailed and 
bleated’ about the introduction of the death duty but it ‘was increasingly clear that 
many had virtually stolen the land in the first place’.16 
 
Income tax was introduced into New South Wales in 1894.17 However, the New 
South Wales Labor government was indifferent to taxation as a source of revenue 
because they shared the view of European socialists that, in a socialist society, 
revenue was generated by the surplus from nationalised industries.18 The receipts 
from state owned enterprises fell in most states during the 1920s and, as Labor 
governments faced the prospect of imposing income tax, they adopted the rhetoric of 
equity.19 Governments imposed progressive rates of income tax based on the concept 
of ‘ability-to-pay’.20 By the 1930s and the period of the great depression, all states 
increased income taxes and most wage earners were required to pay tax for the first 
time.21 Queensland imposed the most severe progressive rates of tax with the highest 
income tax earners paying a rate of 117% on the highest marginal rate.22  
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The United Kingdom had a strong influence on the states through the adoption of the 
1842 Income Tax Act (UK).23 This act was to last for 75 years until replaced in 
1918.24 The United Kingdom income tax system is based on schedules; a different 
rate of tax for different types of income. The scheduler system was not generally 
adopted in Australia although the Tasmanian government introduced an Income Tax 
Bill in 1866, which contained various schedules, but, the Bill was defeated by the 
government of the day.25 When the government re-introduced an income tax bill in 
1873, it contained only one schedule which was intended to make the law simpler.26 
South Australia was the first state to introduce a proper broad based direct tax and it 
achieved this in 1884 with its Taxation Act. 27 The colony was granted self-
government in 1856 and became a State with a bicameral system of Parliament. 
South Australia, unlike other states, did not allow convict labour to be used.28 It was 
settled entirely by free persons from two groups; the first group were principally 
wealthy landowners and the second group ‘poor persons’ from Great Britain and 
Ireland. This Act contained a definition of ‘income from personal exertion’ and 
‘income from property’ and different rates applied to each type of income with 
income from property taxed at a higher rate.29 This particular feature was adopted by 
the Commonwealth government in its own income tax legislation. 
 
Neither Queensland nor Western Australia adopted a broad based income tax until 
after federation as they obtained sufficient revenue from land sales and mineral 
exploration.30 
 
3.3 Commonwealth Taxation 
The first imposition of direct taxation by the Commonwealth government was in 
1910 when a land tax was levied for both fiscal and social purposes.31 The 
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Commonwealth of Australia introduced income tax in 1915 as a result of an external 
crisis. The statute was the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) and it followed 
very closely the income tax legislation in force in the States. It comprised seven 
parts, sixty-five sections, and was only twenty-two pages in length.32 The first time 
income tax was introduced by the Commonwealth government was in 1915, during 
the First World War, and then in 1942, when the Commonwealth took over as being 
solely responsible for income tax during the Second World War.33 According to 
Simon Blount, the introduction of a federal income tax in 1915 and the maintenance 
of the sole taxing authority in Australia by the Commonwealth government were 
well received by the people. The following statement reinforces this point: 
 
In 1946 the government signalled its intention to retain the war-time income tax 
arrangements in the post-war era. During both wars, there was general support for 
the Commonwealth’s actions. In the First World War, government revenues from 
customs and excise had collapsed due to the disruption of trade, and the income tax 
measures were considered to be a ‘sensible move’. The Commonwealth’s actions in 
1942 were also politically well received, particularly since the changes to income tax 
arrangements were accompanied by a national scheme for widows’ pensions.34 
 
The 1915 Act was replaced by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth) and that 
statute was only forty-three pages in length.35 This Act was simply a taxing statute 
with social policy only evidenced by the graduating rates of tax payable and a higher 
rate on income from property than on income from personal exertion.36 In other 
words, it retained the scheduler approach to taxing different sources of income at 
different rates that existed in similar State legislation. Income from property and 
income from personal exertion continued to be taxed at different 37 progressive rates 
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that peaked at 60 pence in the pound.38 The dual rate structure continued to be 
imposed by the Commonwealth government until 1953 and then again, briefly, in 
1974-75. The United Kingdom still retains its scheduler approach to taxing income 
whereas Australia has adopted a more global approach to taxing income.39 According 
to Professor Krever, the reason for the distinction was as follows: 
 
The framers of the first Act believed that ability-to-pay corresponded not only to 
amount, but also to the sacrifice and effort of the taxpayer to earn that income. 
Income from labour or business was seen to involve a greater sacrifice while income 
from property was perceived as a passive gain.40 
 
The 1915 Act only imposed income tax on Australian-sourced income and not on the 
taxpayers’ world-wide income.41 In 1930, Australia moved to a residence based tax 
system but exempted income derived and taxed in the United Kingdom.42 However, 
in 1947, Australia exempted all foreign income from further tax in Australia if it had 
been subject to a comparable rate of tax in the foreign country.43 
 
By 1936, the Income Tax Assessment Act had grown to eighty-two pages and two-
hundred and sixty-six sections and provided an exemption for the income from 
savings banks and from gold mining.44 Surprisingly, the gold mining exemption, s 
23(o) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), remained in force until 1 
January 1991.  
 
Income tax on capital gains was not part of the United Kingdom legislation until 
1965 and Australia in 1985. Professor Walpole points out the fact that, in the US, 
capital profits had been part of its tax base since 1913 as well as many other western-
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developed economies.45 Yet surprisingly, the United Kingdom left it until the second 
half of the twentieth century before introducing a capital gains tax.46  
 
3.4 Tax Minimisation in Australia 
Australians have always had a propensity to try to minimise income tax. There are 
two main periods in recent times when tax avoidance schemes have become a major 
problem for the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The first period was in the 1970s 
with the ‘bottom of the harbour’ schemes in which company profits were stripped 
and paid to investors as tax free capital gains as part of a dividend stripping 
operation.47 The company records were then destroyed by being sent to the ‘bottom 
of the harbour’.48 The fact that the Australian taxation law was, at that time, very 
complex was, in part, suggested as one of the main reasons for the development of 
the ‘bottom of the harbour’ scheme.49 
 
The second period was in the late 1990s with mass marketed tax schemes involving 
employee benefit trusts, offshore superannuation schemes and arrangements such as 
the ‘budplan’ investment.50 The first of the arrangements involved employers and 
self-employed trying to reduce their tax liability by engaging in tax effective 
remuneration schemes and the budplan scheme involved the investment by 
individual taxpayers in an agricultural tax effective scheme. The ATO conducted at 
least twenty court challenges to the schemes and invoked its laws under the general 
anti-avoidance rules, namely Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). 
In all cases, the ATO was successful.51   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there are many reasons why taxpayers 
engage in tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes; the complexity of the tax law, the 
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rates of income tax that are applied to the top income earners, lack of efficiency in 
the tax law, and a number of other reasons associated with taxpayer attitude to 
paying tax. Whatever the reason, it appears that Australian taxpayers are similar to 
taxpayers the world over; they engage in tax minimisation whenever schemes are 
available. 
 
Australia is regarded as having a very adversarial tax culture; high tax planning costs 
on the side of the taxpayer and their adviser and significant auditing costs by the tax 
administrator, the ATO.52 Professor Binh et al., suggest that both the Government 
and the ATO should take more responsibility for improving the culture by making 
the tax system fairer and more transparent.53 What is apparent in Australia is that the 
rich pay more than their fair share of tax. According to Professor Sinclair, the top 25 
per cent of income earners in Australia ‘voluntarily’ pay 64.1 per cent of the net 
tax.54 This may be one of the reasons why wealthy Australian taxpayers may engage 
in tax minimisation activities, including holding assets in bank accounts and 
investments in tax havens and OFCs. 
 
3.5 Tax Reform Proposals 
Successive Australian governments have conducted a number of enquiries and 
reviews of the Commonwealth taxation system. The most current review being 
undertaken is formally known as Australia’s Future Tax System; informally referred 
to as the ‘Henry Review’. It is named after the Chairman, Ken Henry, the present 
Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Treasury.55 The review was 
commenced in 2008 and the report is due to be released in May 2010. The purpose of 
the review was to examine the current tax system in the context of future challenges 
presented by the 21st century as well as the tax transfer arrangements which involve 
providing welfare funding to eligible citizens.  
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One of the most successful reviews of the tax system was conducted by the ‘Asprey 
Committee’ which was commenced in 1972 and completed in 1975. Aspects of this 
report were examined in detail in the previous chapter, Chapter 2.  None of the 
recommendations of the committee were adopted in the decade following the report 
but many of the recommendations have ultimately been implemented by successive 
governments.56 In particular, the introduction of a tax on ‘fringe benefits’ that are 
provided to an employee in substitution for a cash salary, a tax on capital gains, and a 
goods and services tax were first recommended by the Asprey Committee. Professor 
Evans and Professor Krever contend that both the fringe benefit tax measures and the 
capital gains tax enhanced both the equity and efficiency of the income tax system.57  
 
The 1998-1999 Review of Business Taxation, known as the Ralph Review after its 
Chairman, provided a number of recommendations to the government of the day. 
However, the review has not been seen by business as having achieved its outcomes. 
The fact that the amount of income tax payable on capital gains has been halved for 
individuals in certain cases, the introduction of small business concessions, capital 
gains roll-over relief, and a reduced company tax rate to 30 per cent have been 
viewed as bringing about change but not reform.58 The Business Council of Australia 
have continued to voice their concerns over the substantial costs to business in 
complying with the business tax environment and detract from Australia being 
capable of providing a world-class environment for the business sector. 59 
 
It is interesting to note the observations of Professor Evans and Professor Krever 
that, based on past experience, tax reviews rarely lead to successful tax reform.60 
However, they contend that tax reform in Australia is overdue and that the Henry 
Review has the opportunity and the capability to establish the foundation for long 
term tax reform.61
                                               
56
 Ibid, 4. 
57
 Ibid, 7. 
58
 Ibid, 9. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. 
73 
CHAPTER 4 THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the history and development of international cooperation 
in the field of international taxation and the way in which each nation shares the tax 
revenue from income generated by mobile labour, mobile capital and multi-national 
enterprises (MNEs) involved in investment and business in more than one country. 
The basic approach to the taxation of foreign income is to impose income tax on the 
basis of the ‘residence’ of the taxpayer or on the basis of the ‘source’ of the income, 
or both. If the taxpayers’ country of residence imposes income tax on a ‘worldwide 
basis’ then all income derived by the taxpayer, including both domestic and foreign 
income, will be taxed in the home country of the taxpayer. The country of the source 
of the income may also impose income tax; however, that is not the case with most 
tax havens and OFCs. The rationale for taxing resident taxpayers on their worldwide 
income is discussed below. The issue of whether a ‘worldwide system’ is better than 
a ‘territorial system’ for the taxation of foreign income is examined in detail in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. A territorial system requires resident taxpayers to only pay 
income tax on income derived within the territory. This system endorses a ‘source’ 
basis for the imposition of income tax.  
 
According to Professor Avi-Yonah, ‘the current international tax regime is a flawed 
miracle’.1 He makes the following statement, which provides an excellent summary 
of the situation facing all nations in the taxation of international income: 
 
It is a miracle because taxes are the last topic on which one would expect sovereign 
nations to reach a consensus. International taxation is, to some extent, a zero-sum 
game: one country’s gain is another’s loss. If income is derived by a resident of one 
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country from sources in another, and if both countries have a legitimate claim to tax 
that income and the ability to enforce that claim, then either country will lose 
revenue by agreeing to grant the other the primary right to tax that income.2 
 
A principle norm of international taxation law is that the double taxation of 
international income is harmful and should be avoided.3 The norm is that residence 
countries should allow the country of the source of the income to impose tax in 
relation to certain types of income.4 This is achieved by the residence country 
granting the taxpayer a credit for tax paid in the country of source or an exemption 
from any tax whatsoever in the country of residence.5 It is not necessary to have a 
double taxation agreement to achieve this outcome if the country of residence has 
domestic tax law that enshrines those provisions.  
 
In the classic international tax system, the country of source imposes income tax on 
income derived in their state and the country of residence will provide an exemption 
from tax on that income in the country of residence or a tax credit for tax paid in the 
country of source or, in some cases, a deduction for income tax paid in the country of 
source. Basically, the country of residence will provide an exemption from tax in the 
home country for income that has been taxed at source; a tax credit for tax paid in the 
source country; or a deduction for tax paid in the source country in order to relieve 
the taxpayer from double taxation of the same income. This is the situation that exists 
in Australia and is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
The law relating to the imposition of taxation on international transactions is part of 
the broad body of law known as ‘International Law’ or the ‘Law of Nations’ or 
‘Public International Law’. The theory and philosophy of international law is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6 in the context of whether the OECD makes 
international law when it provides guidelines or policy. It is not intended to examine 
international taxation law as being part of international law in this chapter. The 
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international tax regime is generally regarded as constituting ‘customary 
international law’, which is defined as ‘a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation’.6  
 
In a global world, people and capital are constantly moving between countries, 
including tax havens and OFCs, in order to take advantage of better economic and 
financial returns that may be offered in a particular foreign country. When 
individuals sell their labour globally or the capital that is invested globally returns 
interest income or business income, that receipt of money is potentially subject to 
tax, either in the country of source or the country of residence of the individual or 
corporation or in both countries, thereby causing the same income to be subject to 
double taxation. The issue of how to best share any tax on the income between two 
or more states has been the major concern of international tax law. If double taxation 
is to be avoided then one state must give up its right to collect tax in favour of the 
other state. This is achieved by agreement between the two states in the form of a 
‘Double Taxation Agreement’ (DTA).  
 
Most OECD member countries, including Australia, impose income tax on their 
‘residents’ on a worldwide basis whereas the US imposes income tax on a worldwide 
basis on its own US citizens. The US system is unique in that all US citizens must 
lodge an income tax return on their worldwide income, irrespective of where they 
live, as long as they wish to maintain their US citizenship.7  
 
Other countries simply impose income tax on income sourced within their territory 
irrespective of residence or citizenship, such as Hong Kong, and this system of 
taxation is known as a ‘territorial basis’ of taxation. Australia and France have a tax 
system that allows foreign source income derived by corporations to be exempt from 
further income tax in their country of residence, which is in effect a ‘territorial basis’ 
of taxation. No country uses a pure worldwide or territorial system but all systems 
currently in use share at least some features of both worldwide and territorial 
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approaches.8 The theory and benefits of imposing income tax on a worldwide or 
territorial basis is examined in detail in Chapter 5. The rationale for a government to 
choose a worldwide tax system, as opposed to a territorial system, is discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
4.2 Regulation of International Taxation – Double Taxation Agreements 
(DTAs) 
The current international law regulating the taxation of income in a foreign country 
was originally developed by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the 
League of Nations, now the United Nations. The result of this early development is 
the OECD model tax treaty.9 The League of Nations and the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) were concerned with preventing the double taxation of income 
by foreign individuals and corporations as well as finding an ‘equitable solution to 
the conflict between debtor and creditor countries’.10 Professor Wang uses the terms 
‘debtor country’ to describe the source country and ‘creditor country’ to describe the 
investor and country of residence. Each country, namely the country of source or the 
country of residence, wants the jurisdiction to impose income tax on the income 
generated. Wang states that, at the time the League of Nations and the ICC were 
examining the double taxation problem, the following four methods to solve this 
issue were suggested: 
 
1. Deduction allowed by state of residence. The state of residence deducts from the 
tax payable by its citizens the amount of income tax imposed by foreign 
governments. 
2. Exemption allowed by state of source. The state of source exempts all income 
wherever earned from taxation, leaving the taxing power to the state of residence.  
3. Adjustment of tax rates by both states. The state of source levies taxes on income 
earned there, while the state of residence levies on all income wherever earned. 
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However, by convention, specific rates are varied so that the total effective rate on 
that portion of income subject to double taxation does not exceed the higher rate. 
4. Apportionment of taxable items between both states. The whole of the taxpayer’s 
income is divided into two parts, of which one part is taxed by the state of 
domicile, and the other, by the state of origin, each applying its own rates of tax.11 
 
While all of these solutions were contemplated, none was ultimately accepted and a 
great deal of discussion was entered into by various countries. The US Government 
recognised the potential problem with double taxation by introducing legislation 
before the League of Nations attempted to formally provide a solution.  Prior to 
1918, US corporations operating in foreign countries were only allowed a deduction 
for the foreign taxes paid against their worldwide income subject to income tax in the 
US.12 In the US, the taxation of international income was developed during the 
period 1918 to 1928 with the introduction of the Revenue Act of 1918. It is useful to 
note that income tax had only just been introduced in the US, in 1913, after the 
Sixteenth Amendment took effect to allow for the Revenue Act to impose income tax 
on incomes for the first time in the US. 13 In 1921, the Revenue Act was amended to 
allow for a foreign tax credit to be given to a US citizen against their foreign income. 
The person regarded as being responsible for this approach was Thomas Sewall 
Adams, an economics professor at Yale University and adviser to the US government 
on taxation law. He advised the US Chapter of the International Chamber of 
Commerce on a solution to the double taxation problem and was credited with 
providing the concept of the ‘foreign tax credit’ to overcome this problem.14 While 
the US was one of the first countries to provide relief from double taxation by 
incorporating a tax credit mechanism into its domestic tax law, it was one of the last 
to provide relief from the ‘classical system’ of taxing corporations.15 The classical 
system imposes income tax on the corporation and income tax on the shareholder 
when a dividend is paid, thus taxing the same profit twice. Australia has had a system 
of ‘dividend imputation’ since 1986 whereby the shareholder is given a credit for tax 
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paid by the company and that credit attaches to the dividend, thus eliminating double 
taxation. The US finally introduced similar measures in 2006.  
 
The first attempt to regulate international taxation in order to prevent double taxation 
was in 1921 when the International Chamber of Commerce held a conference in 
London to discuss this issue.16 The Chamber exercised primary leadership in the 
movement against double taxation up until 1925, when the League of Nations 
appointed a panel of technical experts to study the problem.17  The Chamber 
remained active in this area primarily through their representative to the League’s 
Committee of Technical Experts.18 This led to the League of Nations holding a 
conference in 1923 and asking four economists to develop policy that could be used 
as a basis of taxation grounded on the concepts of source of income and residence of 
the taxpayer. The four economists consisted of Professor Seligman from the US, Sir 
Josiah Stamp from Great Britain, Professor Bruins from the Netherlands, and 
Professor Einaudi from Italy. Seligman was the primary architect of the report which 
developed the following principles for the taxation of international income: 
 
1. The classification and assignment of specific categories of income to source or 
residence should be determined by an objective test, ‘economic allegiance’, 
whose purpose was to weigh the various contributions made by different states to 
the production and enjoyment of income,  
2. Existing tax practices across the globe tended to underestimate the contribution of 
residence and to reflect a misguided belief in the naturalness and rightness of 
source-based taxation, and  
3. Progressive taxes on global income were fundamentally different than other taxes 
and ought to be the unique province of residence-based taxation.19 
 
The report has been criticised for a number of things. It did not provide for a tax 
credit for foreign tax paid; it allocated taxes on interest and dividend income to the 
country of residence, the recipient, and it was not in the form of a treaty that could be 
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used by nations.20 The problem of double taxation was not finally settled until the 
OECD model treaty was first issued in 1963, which limited the source country’s 
ability to collect tax on investment income.21 Developing countries, dissatisfied with 
the pro-residence focus of the OECD model, prompted the United Nations to develop 
a model treaty to promote investment in developing countries.22 This model treaty 
was first released in 1969.23 Both the OECD and the UN have revised their treaties 
over the years. The OECD and UN model double taxation treaties allow for a foreign 
tax credit or full exemption of foreign active business income; the taxation at source 
of interest income, dividend income and royalties in the form of withholding tax; and 
the concept of a permanent establishment to justify the taxation of business income at 
source. The distinction between active business income and passive investment 
income is fundamental to the taxation of international income and is discussed next. 
 
4.3 Permanent Establishment – Active and Passive Income Distinction 
Professor Avi-Yonah contends that in 1923 when the League of Nations was trying 
to resolve the problem of double taxation, it came to the conclusion that the 
following principle applied:  
 
the ultimate gaol underlying the international tax regime is that active business 
income is taxed in the country in which it originates (the source country) and passive 
income should be taxed in the country in which the recipient resides (the residence 
country). 24 
 
This can be extended to reflect that income from investments should be subject to 
some limited form of taxation in the source country but greater tax in the home 
country, namely the country of residence. The distinction between passive and active 
business income is reflected in the double tax treaties by use of the permanent 
establishment concept. The basis on which income tax is imposed on non-resident 
business taxpayers is the concept of having a ‘permanent establishment’ (PE) in that 
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country. The distinction between passive and active income by the use of a PE is a 
compromise, according to Avi-Yonah, because the threshold of what constitutes a PE 
is quite low, a single office or even a single agent with authority to conclude sales is 
generally sufficient.25 Taxation of passive income in the country of source still exists 
but at very low rates of tax. The OECD Model Income Tax Treaty recommends that 
dividends be subject to withholding rates of tax of between 5 percent and 15 percent, 
interest at 10 percent and royalties 0 percent.26 Professor Avi-Yonah holds that the 
low tax rates imposed by the source country are a compromise between the source 
countries levying some tax but at the same time acknowledging that the country of 
residence should be the primary taxing authority.27  
 
However, according to Professor Graetz, the PE concept is ‘facing new pressure 
from electronic commerce, new financial techniques, and new forms of business 
arrangements and combinations’.28 He strongly advocates a modernisation of the 
permanent concept possibly based on a threshold amount of sales, assets, labour or 
research and development within a nation.29   
 
4.3.1 Active v. passive income – exemption or credit 
Australia already provides relief from double taxation in the form of exemptions of 
certain active income; s 23AG of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 
36) for certain personal services income derived in a foreign country, s 23AH, ITAA 
36 for branch income in a foreign country, and s 23AJ, ITAA 36 exempts non-
portfolio dividend income from foreign countries. A portfolio investment differs 
from a non-portfolio investment in that a non-portfolio investment in a company is 
regarded as a being a direct and active investment in a foreign company where the 
investor holds more than 10 percent of the voting interest in that company. By way 
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of contrast, a portfolio investment is simply the holding of a range of shares in a 
number of foreign companies purely for the purpose of passive investment. 
 
It is important to note that the US does not provide an exemption for active business 
income for its resident companies and this issue has become an important 
consideration for the US government, especially as US corporations are claiming that 
they are not as competitive as other MNEs.30 Australia also provides a credit for 
foreign tax paid on foreign sourced income so again, in many instances, no more 
income tax is paid in Australia. 
 
A credit given by the home country for income tax paid in a foreign country is not as 
effective as the exemption method. Division 770 of the ITAA 97 applies from 1 July 
2008 and now refers to the foreign tax credit as a ‘foreign income tax offset’. Philip 
Bender has highlighted one of the potential defects of the new foreign tax credit 
arrangements; when active business income is repatriated to Australia that is exempt, 
it carries no imputation credits from the foreign tax that has been paid. So, while the 
income is not subject to double taxation, it is subsequently taxed in the hands of the 
Australian resident shareholders when they receive a dividend.31  
 
A company or individual should be able to operate their business or an individual 
invest their money in any foreign country and be in the same position from a taxation 
perspective as if they had conducted the business or made the investment at home. If 
they were worse off then no business would be located in a foreign country and no 
investments would be made in that country as well. This highlights the need for the 
following three factors; taxpayer equity, locational neutrality and inter-nation equity. 
These issues are examined in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4 Rationale for a Worldwide Tax System 
As a starting point, in a worldwide tax system a taxpayer pays income tax on income 
derived in their home country and anywhere else in the world. The general view of 
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countries that have adopted a worldwide system of taxation is that it ‘preserves the 
residence-country tax base more effectively than a pure territorial system’.32  The 
contention is that if ‘foreign-source income is entirely exempt from taxation, resident 
taxpayers will shift investment and income into lower-tax jurisdictions, thus eroding 
the residency-country tax base’.33 It is also considered that a worldwide system 
promotes equity more than a territorial system.34  In Chapter 2 of this thesis, the basis 
of a comprehensive tax system was examined in detail and the two main concepts of 
equity were discussed; first, the concept of horizontal equity, and second, the concept 
of vertical equity. Proponents of a worldwide system believe that it promotes both 
horizontal and vertical equity.35  With horizontal equity, all taxpayers irrespective of 
where they derive their income, either at home or abroad, will be subject to income 
tax in their country of residence. A tax credit for tax paid in a foreign country will 
ensure that a higher rate of tax is not paid by that particular taxpayer. In terms of 
vertical equity, by requiring a taxpayer to include their worldwide income it acts as a 
disincentive for that particular taxpayer to shift their income producing activities 
away from their country of residence and ensures that they pay their fair share of tax 
based on the progressive rates of tax in their country of residence. 
 
Professor Peggy Musgrave discusses the sovereign right of the nation state to tax its 
residents on their worldwide income and contends that the right is recognised in 
international law.36 Musgrave states that the right to tax the income of residents and 
non-residents is based on the following criteria: 
 
Residents are held to owe tax allegiance in return for the rights and privileges which 
they receive as residents, giving rise to what is commonly referred to as the 
‘residence principle’. Exercise of this tax sovereignty over foreign source income is 
also is necessary to achieve equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers by making 
all income, wherever earned, subject to tax, consistent with the accretion principle. 
… What is important is that the country of residence is the residual taxing authority 
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and thus has sovereignty over the total tax burden on the foreign-source income of 
its resident taxpayers.37 
 
Professor Kaufman does not ‘agree that a taxpayer’s entire income necessarily needs 
to be taxed by a single country, the residence country, in order to satisfy the equity 
criteria.38  Horizontal equity is achieved by both the country of source and the 
country of residence imposing tax on income. 
 
4.5 Other International Taxation Issues 
There are two other issues that should be raised in this chapter because they are 
relevant to the way in which international taxation impacts on nations; first, the 
formula approach to the sharing of tax revenue between nations; and second, the 
concept of ‘tax sparing’ and its implications for the home country’s tax revenue.  
 
4.5.1 Formula apportionment 
The formula apportionment system tries to apportion the income of a taxpayer 
between different countries when the taxpayer is engaged in foreign transactions. For 
example, if a company is a resident of one country, exports components to another 
country to be assembled, and then sells those finished products in a third country, 
how is the income to be apportioned between states so that income tax can be paid on 
the basis of income being sourced from the various activities? Formula 
apportionment is used in the US to apportion the income of corporations that do 
business in more than one state where state taxes apply. It is also used in 
apportioning shipping income on an international basis.39 Professor Kaufman notes 
that the Clinton Administration opposed adopting a formula apportionment system 
on the grounds that there would be difficulties in find agreement between nations as 
to a definition of income and an agreed formula for sharing revenue.40 A formula 
apportionment system would overcome some of the problems of inter-nation equity, 
but create the need for international agreement between nations and add further 
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complexity to an already complex taxation system. It would do nothing to solve the 
problems of trying to detect foreign income being generated in tax havens and OFCs. 
 
4.5.2 Tax sparing 
Tax sparing involves a country not imposing the full amount of income tax on a 
foreign investor and yet the country of residence accepting that the full amount of 
foreign tax has been paid. In effect ‘the “spared” taxes are treated as actually paid 
and credited against the taxes imposed by the capital exporting countries on that 
foreign source income’.41 The basis for the concept of tax sparing is that as the 
country of source is foregoing revenue in the form of uncollected income tax, the 
country of residence of the capital provider should not benefit by collecting more 
income tax that it would under normal circumstances. 
 
Tax sparing is the term given to a situation where one country, the host country, 
provides tax incentives for businesses to be established in their country and the home 
country gives a tax credit or exemption for income that would have been taxed at the 
normal rate in the host country, if it had not been for the existence of the tax 
incentives. For example, Country A wants to attract insurance business so instead of 
the company from Country B paying the normal rate of company tax, say 20 percent, 
it pays only 10 percent for the first 5 years. The company pays the lower rate of 
company tax but the home country provides a full exemption from further income tax 
or a tax credit at the rate of 20 percent, even though only a 10 percent rate of tax has 
been paid. In effect the ‘spared taxes’ are treated by the home country as having been 
paid. The reason why home countries agree to tax sparing arrangements are at odds 
with the inter-nation equity principles is because the home country is foregoing a 
greater share of tax revenue than it would normally be required to lose. Professor 
Kaufman argues that the existence of tax sparing arrangements reinforces the notion 
that the entitlement theory is not applicable in terms of inter-nation equity.42 
Furthermore, Professor Kaufman sees tax sparing agreements with developing 
countries as ‘indicating an acceptance of a certain degree of redistribution within the 
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international tax system’. It definitely contradicts the ability to pay and the benefit 
theorists as well as the economic allegiance approach. It is evidence of developed 
countries wanting to assist developing countries by encouraging businesses to 
expand while at the same time being prepared to accept less revenue. Peggy 
Musgrave made the following statement in relation to the attractiveness of tax 
sparing for developing countries and the investor involved in the development: 
 
Without tax sparing, it is argued, the revenue given up by the capital importing 
country is merely picked up by the treasury of the capital exporter. It is doubtful 
whether this is a well-founded argument when the fact of deferral is taken into 
consideration. … it is not wise for the capital exporting country to provide an across-
the-board tax sparing agreement. Yet foreign policy considerations are likely to 
cause it to become widely applied when once introduced in a specific case.43  
 
The main beneficiaries from tax sparing agreements are the MNEs that establish 
business operations in developing countries that provide tax incentives. From an 
equity perspective, tax sparing contradicts notions of horizontal equity and inter-
nation equity.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The movement of capital out of high taxing jurisdictions to low taxing countries is a 
major concern for OECD member states, the G20 and the EU. As Professor Avi-
Yonah states, the current system of international taxation ‘suffers from significant 
weaknesses, especially in two areas in which the development of the world economy 
has made the principles that were agreed upon in the 1920’s and 1930’s obsolete: the 
growth of internationally mobile capital markets for portfolio investment and the rise 
of integrated multi-national enterprises (MNE’s)’.44 These two issues are part of the 
main focus of this thesis. As capital becomes more mobile and MNEs engage in 
global enterprises, tax authorities throughout the world have a great deal of difficulty 
in detecting taxpayers utilising the financial and banking services offered in tax 
havens and OFCs. This situation is reinforced by many commentators on 
international taxation law.  
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Professor Avi-Yonah contends that there are two principle weaknesses of the current 
international tax regime: first, the difficulty in enforcing residence based taxation and 
second, the difficulty of allocating the income of MNEs among source 
jurisdictions.45 The first difficulty is examined in detail in Chapter 5 and also 
throughout this thesis as it is one of the reasons discussed in Chapter 10 for the likely 
survival of tax havens and OFCs. Similarly, the business operations of MNEs 
through the use of tax havens and OFCs present a major challenge to tax 
administrators throughout the world and there may be no solution to this problem. 
The work by the OECD with its harmful tax competition project and the subsequent 
cooperation shown by tax havens to enter into taxation information exchange 
agreements may result in MNEs paying more income tax in their country of 
residence. This issue is also discussed throughout this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE OECD’S ‘HARMFUL TAX 
COMPETITION’ PROJECT: IS IT INTERNATIONAL 
TAX LAW? 
5.1 Introduction 
On 13 March 2009 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) announced that Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland had agreed to 
introduce laws to allow for the exchange of information on tax evaders.1 The OECD 
has been actively trying to protect the national tax bases of its member states and this 
has now become an imperative with the global financial crisis and government 
deficits. The OECD’s harmful tax competition project has been actively pursued for 
the past twelve years and appears to be receiving worldwide acceptance.2 On this 
basis it can be strongly argued that it now has the status of ‘soft’ international law 
and appears to have all of the hallmarks of being part of the range of OECD 
initiatives that have been accepted as constituting international taxation law, such as 
the transfer pricing rules, Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules and the model 
double tax agreement, to name just a few. This chapter will contend that the harmful 
tax project has not only become part of international taxation law but, as a result, the 
major tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) have now agreed to comply 
with the OECD’s harmful tax competition project and to provide details of non-
resident taxpayers using their financial system for tax avoidance and tax evasion 
purposes. 
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There are three main questions that are raised in this chapter. First, it explores what 
international taxation law is and whether the OECD makes international law with its 
guidelines and reports, in particular, the project to eliminate harmful tax competition. 
Second, it analyses whether this is the reason why Switzerland and other tax havens 
are now prepared to comply with the OECD initiative on harmful tax competition 
and to enter into agreements to exchange information on the banking practices of 
non-resident individuals and multi-national enterprises (MNEs). If this is the case, 
the paper examines the implications for the sovereignty of those nations and the 
economic impact of not being able to attract mobile capital and provide financial and 
banking services to non-residents. The third question examined in this chapter is 
whether it is desirable for the OECD to make soft law in the first place or for soft law 
to be part of international taxation law. In order to answer these issues, the chapter is 
divided into six parts. Part one discusses the current problem facing the OECD 
member countries as a result of the global financial crisis and the need to ensure that 
their tax base is not eroded by tax havens. In part two, the chapter provides a detailed 
analysis of the OECD’s harmful tax competition project, in particular, the practices 
that are considered to be harmful to the OECD member countries by tax havens and 
offshore financial centres (OFCs). The analysis will also discuss the progress to date 
of the OECD’s project and the push by the G20 nations to stem the loss of tax 
revenue as a result of tax havens providing bank secrecy to non-residents. This will 
be followed in part three with an examination of what constitutes international law, 
in particular, international taxation law. The concepts of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
international law will be discussed in detail in this context as well as the way in 
which international law becomes part of a country’s domestic law. The fourth part of 
the chapter will discuss the desirability of having soft international law as opposed to 
hard international law. The fifth part of the chapter critically reviews the current 
progress made by the OECD in convincing tax havens to follow their initiatives in 
changing their bank secrecy laws and exchanging information on taxation matters. 
This review should assist in drawing a conclusion as to whether or not the OECD’s 
harmful tax project is now part of international taxation law and the basis on which 
other countries have felt compelled to comply with that aspect of international 
taxation law, such as Austria, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Part six, the conclusion, 
seeks to provide answers to the original three questions raised by this research, 
namely, whether  the OECD makes international tax law; second, is soft international 
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law desirable; and third, if this is the case then is this the reason why many tax 
havens and OFCs are now complying with the OECD’s initiative. 
 
Since the late 1990s, the OECD has been very active in trying to identify and 
eliminate harmful tax competition. The harmful tax practices project was aimed at 
tax havens and OFCs and involved the ‘naming and shaming’ of some 36 tax havens. 
Since then a large number of tax havens have agreed with the OECD to reform their 
bank secrecy laws and to become more transparent in their dealings with other 
countries.3 To some extent, there have been threats of sanctions against tax havens if 
they did not agree to cooperate but, generally, most tax havens have accepted the 
views of the OECD. The question raised by this is whether the OECD makes ‘law’ in 
the area of taxation policy? If it does, is this ‘soft law’ and what is meant by the term 
‘soft law’? The chapter will commence with an analysis of what is ‘international law’ 
and how is it made, followed by a discussion of the distinction between soft and hard 
international law. The question of what constitutes ‘soft law’ will then be assessed 
within the framework, developed by Professor Baxter, of international norms being 
considered soft international law. Having then assessed the OECD guidelines and 
norms within the ‘Baxter’ framework, it will be possible to determine whether or not 
the OECD makes international law. Some of the OECD member countries initially 
rejected many of the norms contained in the guidelines, campaigning against harmful 
tax competition, and some commentators have gone so far as to contend that the 
campaign has failed to achieve its objectives.4 However, for the reasons which will 
be articulated in the paper, this does not appear to be the case today.   
 
Tax havens and harmful tax competition has become the concern of many nations, 
including Australia. The methods being used to combat tax havens extend beyond 
Australian domestic law and into the international legal arena. The OECD and the 
European Union (EU) have been very active in trying to find ways to limit the use of 
tax havens by their own national taxpayers. Also, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), set up by the Group of Seven Countries (G7) and located within the OECD, 
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is concentrating on the elimination of money laundering by requiring international 
cooperation from countries that maintain domestic bank secrecy laws. The methods 
used to try to obtain international cooperation and agreement between countries are 
considered to be ‘soft’ international law.5 The concept of international law taking 
two forms, ‘soft or hard’, are very important issues for the study of tax havens and 
the question of their survival. Soft international law consists of such instruments as 
OECD guidelines, agreements and resolutions. Hard international law consists of 
agreements and treaties that are subsequently transformed into national laws, such as 
the agreement between Australia and Bermuda on the sharing of information on 
taxpayers and their bank account details as well as other matters relating to tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. 
 
5.2 The OECD’s Project to Eliminate Harmful Tax Competition 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The starting point for answering the two questions raised in this chapter is to 
examine the OECD’s project to eliminate harmful tax competition. Professors Eden 
and Kudrle contend that the origins of the OECD’s harmful tax competition project 
can be ‘traced to two key actors within the OECD – the United States and the 
European Union … for different reasons.’6 First, the existence of cross-border 
financial transactions through electronic commerce via the Internet and the existence 
of tax havens and OFCs were perceived by the US Government to have the capacity 
to erode the tax base unless international cooperation could be obtained.7 Second, as 
a result of the ‘1992 single common market initiative’ and the removal of barriers the 
European Union became concerned about the effect of different tax rates between 
members, especially Ireland. Cooperation between member states became crucial to 
prevent the erosion of their tax bases.8 
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The 1998 OECD report on ‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue’ 
was the result of the OECD being asked by the OECD Ministers in May 1996 to 
‘develop measures to counter the distorting effect of harmful tax competition on 
investment and financing decisions and the consequences for national tax bases…’.9 
The report examines the effect of mobile capital, the location of financial services 
and the distortion of trade between OECD member countries and tax havens. The 
report also focuses on non-sovereign dependencies that were predominantly 
controlled by the United Kingdom.10   
 
The first report, in 1998, was followed by a progress report in 2000, a further 
progress report in 2001 and a final report in 2004. Since then, the OECD has reported 
on ‘Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field’ in 2006 and a final progress 
report in 2008. The long gestation period from the first report until significant 
progress in 2009 is reflective of the problem in achieving international consensus in 
this area when there was a lack of an immediate perceived problem for the OECD 
member states. However, the reality of the global financial crisis has resulted in the 
OECD member states recognising that the time for action had come and that pressure 
needed to be put on the recalcitrant tax havens and OFCs to enter into exchange of 
information agreements. The immediate emphasis is now on promoting a level 
playing field by all countries eliminating domestic bank secrecy laws and entering 
into agreements with other countries, especially OECD member states, for the 
exchange of information on non-residents using their financial services.  
 
5.2.2 Identification of tax havens 
The 1998 OECD report identifies two distinct jurisdictions that are considered to be a 
threat to the tax bases of the OECD member states. They are tax havens and 
countries that have harmful preferential tax regimes but are not tax havens. These 
states may or may not be a member of the OECD. However, it is of note that some 
members of the OECD contained preferential tax treatments in order to attract 
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investment capital and other financial services activities, such as Switzerland. The 
distinction between the two types of regimes noted above is discussed in paragraphs 
42 and 43 of the report.11 According to the OECD, a ‘tax haven’ is a country that 
does not need income taxes to finance their public services and offer themselves as a 
place for non-residents to escape tax in their own country of residence but the report 
acknowledges that the concept does not have a precise meaning.12 There are four 
factors used to identify tax havens contained in the report. These factors are; first, no 
or nominal taxes; second, a lack of effective exchange of information  as a result of 
having strict bank secrecy rules that prevent high taxing jurisdictions identifying 
their own resident taxpayers; third, legislation, a legal system and administrative 
practices that ensure a lack of transparency, such as favourable treatment for 
particular taxpayers or entities on tax rates or special concessions; fourth, the absence 
of any investment or business activity within the country that would counter any 
suggestion that the activity was purely tax driven.  
 
The OECD has tried to define a ‘tax haven’ for the purposes of this report as a 
jurisdiction that imposes no or only nominal taxes.13 The OECD report does qualify 
this statement by adding that ‘the concept of tax haven does not have a precise 
technical meaning’.14 However, the definition contained in the report is considered to 
be unsatisfactory because some states may impose income tax at higher than normal 
rates on some income but no tax on other forms of income.15 Professor Littlewood 
contends that the attempt by the OECD to define tax havens in a narrow way may 
allow some states to escape the imposition of sanctions because they exempt some 
income from tax but not other forms of income. He uses Hong Kong as an example 
of a state that could be considered to be both a tax haven and having a preferential 
tax regime but he downplays the fact that Hong Kong taxes its residents on a 
territorial basis and not on a worldwide basis, thus excluding from taxation income 
derived outside the territory.  
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The progress report issued by the OECD in June 2000 listed 35 countries that were 
considered to be tax havens and identified 47 potentially harmful preferential tax 
regimes in OECD member countries.16 By 2008, only three countries that were on 
the original list of 35 countries had not made a commitment to the OECD to provide 
an effective exchange of information. Those three countries comprised Liechtenstein, 
Monaco and Andorra.17 However, as at 17 April 2009, all three countries, namely 
Liechtenstein, Monaco and Andorra had pledged to enter into exchange of 
information agreements which would result in the OECD having achieved 
cooperation from all of the original countries named on the ‘black list’ in the 2000 
progress report.18 
 
5.2.3 What are the features of harmful preferential tax regimes? 
The report outlines four key factors which assist in identifying harmful preferential 
tax regimes. These are; first, the country imposes a low or zero effective tax rate on 
the relevant income, similar to a tax haven; second, the tax regime is ‘ring fenced’ in 
that residents of that state do not have access to tax concessions which are only 
offered to foreign investors or businesses; third, there is a lack of transparency; and 
fourth, there is a lack of effective exchange of information on investments and bank 
accounts operated by non-residents. The report goes on to discuss other factors which 
may also assist in identifying a harmful preferential tax regime. Those factors can be 
summarised as follows; first, an artificial definition of the tax base which may allow 
some non-resident investors or businesses to obtain certain exemptions from tax or 
tax concessions that are not offered to similar residents and non-residents; second, a 
failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; third, foreign source 
income exempt from residence country tax as is the case with a territorial system; 
fourth, negotiable tax rate or tax base; fifth, secrecy provisions relating to bank 
account details or the allowing bearer shares; and sixth, the existence of a wide 
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network of taxation treaties between countries which may allow for abuse through 
treaty shopping.19    
 
The OECD claims that preferential tax regimes harmed ‘global welfare’ but this 
claim is not justified by the OECD in their report.20 This issue was analysed by 
Littlewood and he concluded that the theory was not supported by evidence, 
particularly in the area of preferential tax regimes. He contends that the only 
beneficiaries will be the G7 countries’ treasuries and that some developing countries 
will lose investment capital if they comply with the OECD.21 
 
5.2.4 Recommended measures to counteract harmful tax practices 
There are a range of measures that are discussed in the report to try to counter 
harmful tax practices. These measures are directed at both tax havens and OECD 
member countries and non-member countries that have harmful preferential tax 
regimes. The recommendations are divided into three categories; the first focusing on 
domestic legislation to make it more effective; second, to review tax treaties that may 
facilitate tax avoidance or evasion through treaty shopping and to make the exchange 
of information provisions in the treaties more effective; and third, to push non-OECD 
member nations to accept the recommendations and guidelines of the harmful tax 
practices project. In effect, this third category involves promoting the OECD’s 
project so that it eventually becomes a part of the ‘soft’ international tax law. 
 
The first category of measures relates to the need for a country to have specific 
domestic legislation and practices that will counter harmful tax practices. There are 
seven specific areas which have been selected; first, the need to have tax laws 
embodying the Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFC) rules; and second, the 
Foreign Investment Fund (FIF) rules. Most OECD members have these rules and 
they are discussed in detail later in this paper. The third recommendation concerns 
the need to restrict the ‘exemption of foreign income’ laws to only ‘active business 
income’ in situations where the foreign sourced income has not been advantaged by 
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harmful tax competition in that particular country. The fourth recommendation 
relates to the need to have laws that permit the exchange of information with other 
countries on non-residents engaged in financial transactions similar to Article 26 of 
the OECD Model Double Tax Agreement.22 The need to have in place the 
administrative practice of issuing tax rulings to taxpayers so that the tax authority is 
given advanced notice is the fifth recommendation. The need for all countries to 
adopt the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines that are based on an ‘arm’s length 
principle’, published in 1995, is the six recommendation. The last main 
recommendation is that countries ensure that access to banking information is 
available to other countries so that foreign tax authorities have the ability to collect 
information on their own residents engaged in financial activities. This 
recommendation ties in with the OECD’s project to ‘improve access to bank 
information for tax purposes’, which was subsequently published two years later.23  
 
The remaining two categories of recommendations, namely those concerning tax 
treaties and those relating to the need to intensify international cooperation, also 
contain a number of specific recommendations. In particular, the recommendations 
relating to tax treaties concern the need to ensure that the treaty provisions are not 
being used to benefit harmful tax practices, such as treaty shopping by MNEs. The 
OECD was also concerned that domestic anti-abuse measures did not conflict with 
provisions of the OECD Model Double Tax Agreement (DTA) and that work would 
be undertaken to review the model DTA. Of concern was the existence of DTAs with 
tax havens and the OECD recommended that those existing agreements be 
terminated and no new agreements be entered into with tax havens. Recommendation 
13 focuses on the need to have adequately trained tax administrators to undertake 
international audits on taxpayers involved in CFCs, FIFs and transfer pricing 
activities. Recommendation 14 focuses on extra-territorial enforcement of tax claims 
by other countries and the need to provide assistance in collecting the taxes. This 
particular recommendation could be misinterpreted as the OECD wanting other 
countries, such as tax havens or OFCs, to help collect taxes for OECD member 
states. The third category of recommendations only contains one specific 
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recommendation, recommendation 15, which recommends the establishment of a 
‘forum’ on harmful tax practices to monitor the implementation of the major 
recommendations and prepare a list of jurisdictions that constitute tax havens. That 
list was subsequently published in the 2000 report. 
 
5.2.5 Review of progress  
The 2000 report, entitled ‘Towards Global Tax Co-Operation: Progress in Identifying 
and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices’, was notable for publishing a list of 35 
jurisdiction satisfying the criteria of being a ‘tax haven’ and a list of 47 potentially 
harmful tax regimes found in OECD member countries.24 The report emphasised the 
need for collective action against tax havens and suggested new measures, such as 
the imposition of withholding taxes on payments to tax havens and withholding 
‘non-essential economic assistance’.25 This may have been a concern for many of the 
small Pacific tax havens but not necessarily a concern for Monaco, a wealthy tax 
haven.26  
 
Subsequently, two more reports followed; the 2001 progress report entitled ‘The 
OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report’ and the 2004 
progress report entitled ‘The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 
Progress Report’. The 2001 progress report emphasised the need for tax havens to 
ensure that their tax systems were transparent and that they provided an effective 
exchange of information system.27 This would appear to be the start of the approach 
taken by the OECD in the following years; the need for an effective arrangement to 
exchange information on non-residents using the banking and financial systems in 
the tax havens. This need for information on non-residents using tax havens is a 
major requirement for any country using a worldwide system of taxation and is at the 
heart of the Australian ‘Operation Wickenby’ in trying to detect Australians using 
tax havens. It is also at the core of the OECD’s project.28 The 2004 report was more 
optimistic than the earlier report in that all OECD member states had either 
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eliminated any harmful tax regimes or they had been found not to have been harmful 
in the first place. Similarly, the OECD reported progress in securing exchange of 
information agreements with a number of tax havens or commitments to enter into 
agreements to exchange information.29  
 
The OECD has been successful in convincing Vanuatu, Samoa and Niue to enter into 
an agreement to exchange information on foreign investors using their offshore 
financial services. The countries entered into the agreements to exchange information 
on civil tax matters by 31 December 2005.30 On the 24 July 2007, the OECD 
announced that Liberia was removed from the list of ‘Unco-operative Tax Havens’ 
following its ‘commitment to improve transparency and establish effective exchange 
of information in tax matters’.31 Since then, there have been many agreements 
between OECD member countries and non-member countries that have improved 
access to bank information, including four entered into by Australia with Finland, 
France, New Zealand and Norway.32 On 13 March 2009, the OECD announced that 
Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland had agreed to introduce laws to allow for the 
exchange of information on tax evaders prior to the G20 meeting.33 At the G20 
meeting in the United Kingdom, tax havens and OFCs were the prime focus of 
attention and the Finance Ministers agreed to ‘take action against non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, including tax havens that failed to implement international standards of 
transparency and exchange of banking information for tax purposes’.34  
 
The United States of America has also been very active in trying to prevent money 
flowing to tax havens and to recoup lost tax revenue on foreign bank accounts. 
According to Senator Carl Levin, the loss in revenue is estimated at USD 100 billion 
every year and this has been the impetus for the Senator to try to stop this activity. 
He introduced the ‘Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act’ Bill to Congress as a means to 
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combat tax evasion through tax havens.35  The US government has taken action 
against the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) to disclose the names of 52,000 US 
citizens with bank accounts suspected of hiding USD 15 billion and at the same time 
UBS has paid USD 780 million as a penalty for promoting tax evasion.36 The US 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is encouraging US citizens with more than USD 
10,000 in offshore bank accounts to voluntarily disclose any income that has not 
been declared.37  They had until 23 September 2009 to make the voluntary disclosure 
or face civil or criminal penalties.38 Prior to the global financial crisis, the US and the 
UK were reluctant to see tax haven activities diminished as they believed they played 
a valuable role in the liberalisation of international capital flows and this capital 
eventually found its way to London or New York.39 The Bush Administration was 
critical of the OECDs project to eliminate tax competition due to a combination of 
being ideologically opposed to the European welfare states and their high rates of 
taxation and critical of the threat posed by the OECD’s project to the sovereignty of 
tax havens.40 However, this is not the current situation in the US today. 
 
The question that is raised by the success of the OECD is whether or not the ‘harmful 
tax competition project’ has now become part of international law and this is the 
reason for tax havens and OFCs to comply with the OECD and to exchange 
information on non-residents. This then leads to the next main question to be 
answered in this chapter; what is international law? 
 
5.3 What is International Law? 
International ‘law’ is not made by an international parliament; the International Court 
of Justice has no compulsory jurisdiction over all countries; and, there is no body 
able to sanction any breach of international law, such as an international police force. 
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Clearly, in the absence of these characteristics, international law does not fit within 
the ‘Positivist theory’ of law. 
 
Professor Hart, in his book the ‘Concept of Law’, questions whether or not 
international law was really ‘law’. He makes the following comment on the concept 
of international law: 
 
For, though it is consistent with the usage of the last 150 years to use the expression 
‘law’ here, the absence of an international legislature, courts with compulsory 
jurisdiction, and centrally organised sanctions have inspired misgivings, at any rate 
in the breasts of legal theorists. The absence of these institutions means that the rules 
for states resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary 
rules of obligation, which, when we find it among societies of individuals, we are 
accustomed to contrast with a developed legal system. It is indeed arguable, as we 
shall show, that international law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and 
adjudication which provide for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of 
recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and providing general criteria for the 
identification of its rules. These differences are indeed striking and the question ‘Is 
international law really law?’ can hardly be put aside.41 
 
However, Hart does accept the fact that international law did exist, even in the 
absence of the ‘rule of recognition’, because sovereign states did observe rules that 
were binding on each other and this was enough to constitute a valid legal system.42 
 
5.3.1 Legal positivism 
There are a number of theories of law but the legal positivist theory, developed by 
Professor HLA Hart and Professor Hans Kelsen, is arguably the most appropriate for 
examining the creation of international law in the international tax arena. In brief, 
legal positivism holds that laws were ‘posited’, that is, created by people and 
sovereign states; not a supreme being or nature as is the case with the ‘natural theory’ 
of law. Law is created by people based on actions, not morality, and law is described 
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‘as it is and not as it should be’ similar to pure science.43 In other words, a legal 
positivist view of what is ‘law’ is the ‘black letter’ law or law as is made by 
parliament and the courts as, arguably, is the situation in Australia. 
 
Kelsen developed the concept of a ‘legal norm’ and the ‘hierarchy of norms’ to 
illustrate how his theory of law was developed.44 The ‘legal norm’ is similar to a rule 
that somebody ought to act or behave in a prescribed way or to behave in a certain 
way without any moral or ethical connotations.45 The concept of what is a ‘norm’ 
according to Kelsen is discussed in detail in Part four of this paper. What, then, was 
Kelsen’s view of international law? In the words of Hughes, Kelsen argued that 
‘national and international law are not only of the same essential nature but must, 
indeed, be viewed as one, unified system, not as a collection of coexisting systems.’46   
 
In light of the above legal positivist views of Hart and Kelsen and their theory of law, 
and, in particular, that international law is ‘law’, the next step is to examine the 
sources of international law in order to assess if such things as the OECD guidelines 
and norms are to be considered as a source of international law. 
 
5.3.2 The ‘soft and hard law’ distinction  
In order to properly assess international law, it is necessary to examine the 
distinction between ‘hard’ international law and ‘soft’ international law. According 
to August,47 the sources or evidences of international law are what international 
tribunals rely on in determining the content of international law. The best example of 
this is found in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1), which 
states that: 
 
the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
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(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, expressly recognised by 
the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, treaties and conventions and Customary 
law.’  
 
The Statute would appear to be setting out a hierarchy of the sources of international 
law. According to August, in practice, the International Court of Justice and other 
tribunals turn first to treaties. This is appropriate because treaties are clear-cut 
statements of the rules the court should apply.48 
 
In the preamble to the ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969’ it is stated 
that the States party to the convention: 
 
recognises the ever-increasing importance of treaties as a source of international 
law… Affirming that disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes, 
should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law’.49  
 
As a result of this convention there is now a tendency to view all treaties as ‘hard 
law’, especially if they are covered by this Convention. Article 26 of the Convention 
provides that the maxim, ‘pacta sunt servanda’ must be observed by States that are a 
party to the convention, namely that ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. 
   
If treaties are regarded as being a primary source of international law then general 
principles that are recognised by States should be considered a secondary source of 
international law. As Eric Lauterpacht contends, the source of international law is 
forever changing: 
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We know that international law consists of, on the one hand, treaties and, on the 
other, custom. Treaties represent the express agreement of States. We know that 
treaties are not unchangeable and that in many cases they have been revised by 
subsequent agreement … Apart from treaties we have customary international law – 
law that binds all States, old and new alike … This customary international law is an 
expression of the practice of States which have generally been accepted as law. This 
dependence on State practise is both the source and the reflection of the legal 
relevance of divergence from the normal … Where there is a repeated divergence – a 
divergence is either widely accepted or, at any rate, is not widely disapproved of, 
then that deviation itself tends to become the norm and, therefore, the law.50 
 
Where, then, does ‘soft law’ fit into this hierarchy of the sources of law? It has been 
suggested by many writers on international law, with the advent of international 
organisations such as the OECD, the International Chamber of Commerce and the 
World Trade Organisation issuing policies and guidelines on international 
commercial matters, that, at best, these statements can only be considered to be ‘soft’ 
law. According to Professor Alston ‘soft’ law can be defined as follows: 
 
Soft law standards are those contained in non-binding statements such as 
declarations, guidelines, and codes of conduct or recommendations. They include a 
wide range of OECD, World Health Organisation, and International 
Telecommunications Union instruments as well as better known standards such as 
the UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which are widely 
considered to have become part of customary law.51 
 
Hartmut Hillgenberg, when discussing the question of whether or not the UN 
General Assembly can create law beyond their contributory role in the formation of 
customary international law, according to Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, comes to the following conclusion: 
 
If, therefore we extend the notion of soft law to such resolution [of the General 
Assembly] we would come to the same conclusions as for soft law in general, i.e. 
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that international law in its present state does not attribute soft law to the status of a 
source of law.’ 52     
 
If the OECD makes soft law only, what then is the status of their guidelines, norms 
and recommendations? Should tax havens and offshore financial centres take any 
notice of what the OECD is trying to achieve by encouraging member countries and 
non-member countries to reform their bank secrecy laws and become more 
transparent in their dealings with other countries? After all, these instruments of soft 
law are, by definition, non-binding on the parties. Therefore, why should tax havens 
have any concern about the OECD’s project to eliminate harmful tax competition? 
 
One way in which these questions may be answered is to critically analyse the 
approach taken by Professor Baxter in his contention that ‘legal norms occupy a 
place in international law, even though they do not create rights or duties’.53 This 
theory of what constitutes ‘soft’ international law is discussed below. 
 
5.3.3 The ‘Professor Baxter’ theory of ‘norms’ as soft international law 
In order to fully comprehend the ‘Baxter Theory of Norms’, it is necessary to start 
with a brief discussion of what is meant by the concept of  a ‘norm’ in the context of 
international law. Professor Hans Kelsen developed a ‘Pure Theory of Law’ 
predicated on the concept of the hierarchy of norms, that is, rules or principles 
created by the Parliament or Judiciary, which, in turn, creates lesser norms involved 
in the enforcement and sanctions imposed on a person for not complying with the 
law or the higher norms. Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’ excludes the ‘practices and 
mores of the society whose political organisation has duly constituted that law’.54 In 
other words, Kelsen rejected a natural law approach, instead choosing to look at law 
from a scientific perspective, which views things from an objective point of view. In 
this case, religious and moral views are not taken into account in determining what 
law is and how it should affect behaviour, instead, adopting a legal positivist view of 
law. As stated by William Ebenstein, Kelsen believed that ‘a revival of metaphysics 
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and natural law doctrines [were] obstacles to an ideology-free science of the law. 
Stressing the outspoken anti-ideological tendency of the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen 
calls the theory a radical realistic theory of law, that is, a theory of legal 
positivism’.55 If legal norms consist of rules and legal principles that are concerned 
about the way in which people or nations should be dealt with if the norm has not 
been complied with, then how does this fit with the theory of norms as soft law? 
 
Taking this theory and applying it to the international arena, it can be seen that norms 
play an important part in providing soft law and that the OECD is arguably a major 
provider of this type of soft law. In the words of Michael Webb: 
 
A distinctive feature of the OECD is that its primary impact comes through efforts to 
develop and promote international norms. It rarely develops binding agreements and 
has very few powers of enforcement. Instead, it works largely by defining standards 
of appropriate behaviour for states which seek to identify themselves as modern, 
liberal, market-friendly and efficient and uses monitoring procedures and peer 
review processes to socialize member states into accepting and institutionalizing 
OECD-recommended practices. The status of OECD agreements as norms does not 
mean they are weak; even powerful states generally try to behave in accordance with 
these norms… 56 
 
Professor R. R. Baxter contends that ‘rules of international law exists and create 
obligations even though they may not be enforceable by sanctions’. He goes on to 
assert that ‘legal norms occupy a place in international law’. Professor Baxter makes 
the following assertions about ‘soft’ norms contained in a written form as having a 
legal impact: 
 
1. If some form of written norm has been consented to by States involved, the 
future course of discussion, negotiation, and even agreement will not be the 
same in the absence of the norm. 
2. Once a matter has become the subject of such a norm, the matter can no 
longer be asserted to be one within the reserved domain or domestic 
jurisdiction of the State. 
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3. The norm will establish new standards of relevance for the negotiations 
between the parties. Certain arguments will be ruled out. 
4. The norm will establish the legal framework within which the dispute about 
its application may be resolved. It will establish presumptions, indicate the 
prevailing trend of opinion, provide a guiding principle which may have a 
certain inherent appeal for the parties, and channel negotiation and 
settlement into legal and orderly paths.57 
 
How then can these principles be applied to guidelines, norms and policies developed 
by the OECD? If the project to eliminate harmful tax competition is used as the 
example and applied to the above four principles, then it can be seen that Professor 
Baxter is arguably correct in his assertion about legal norms becoming soft 
international law.  
 
In relation to point one of Baxter’s assertions, all OECD member countries, 
including Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland, have adopted the policies to try to 
eliminate harmful tax competition and to encourage tax havens to reform their bank 
secrecy laws and become more transparent in their financial dealings. As a result of 
adopting these norms, future developments in this area have been continuing and 
developing in new directions, such as the new anti-money laundering laws developed 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that also have been adopted by most of 
the OECD member countries. Moreover, the OECD has been actively trying to 
encourage non-member countries to work towards a ‘level playing field’ and agree to 
exchange information on non-residents using their banking and financial systems.58 
In relation to point two, the OECD campaign has been extended to non-OECD 
member countries, such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM) countries, including Bermuda, and a number of offshore financial 
centres, such as Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man, where exchange of 
information agreements are now in place.59 
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In relation to point three, a number of member and non-member countries, including 
Switzerland, have agreed to exchange information on taxation matters that involve 
criminal conduct, such as tax evasion or tax fraud. This development has taken the 
OECD’s project against harmful tax competition into a specific area of trying to 
eliminate criminal activity involving taxation offences and not just ‘fishing for 
information’ exercises on non-resident investors. 
 
In relation to point four, it can be seen that, from its beginnings in the 1990s until 
today, the OECD’s campaign has definitely focused the attention of the member and 
non-member countries and has involved a number of tax havens and offshore 
financial centres in trying to eliminate criminal conduct involving taxation, whether 
it be tax fraud, tax evasion or money laundering, and progress has definitely been 
made by the OECD in this respect.   
 
The approach taken by Professor Baxter is supported by Professor Alison Christians 
in her recent publication where she argues that the OECD’s initiative on harmful tax 
competition ‘creates a strong degree of obligation among member and non-member 
states alike’ and that it should be considered to be ‘soft law’.60 Professor Christians 
examined the OECD’s project to eliminate harmful tax competition in terms of its 
impact as international taxation law and uses the OECD’s initiative as an example of 
how ‘soft’ law evolves.61 Professor Christians argues that the OECD guidelines 
developed into ‘international tax norms defining appropriate international tax 
practices.’62 As evidence of this, the guidelines have been adopted not only by the 
majority of the OECD member states but also by many tax havens in the Caribbean 
and Pacific and, by 2002, 28 of the original 35 countries listed by the OECD as 
having harmful tax practices had agreed to exchange information on tax evasion by 
non-resident bank account holders.63  
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Professor Christians contends that the OECD’s project on harmful tax competition 
could not be considered to be customary international tax law due to the fact that it 
had not obtained widespread acceptance among non-member countries and, in 
particular, that Switzerland and Luxembourg had objected to the project from the 
start. However, given the recent compliance by Switzerland, Austria and 
Luxembourg, and the general level of compliance by tax havens and OFC prior to the 
G20 meeting in London, it could be argued that this particular OECD project has 
now become more than ‘soft law’ and has the status of customary law.  
 
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah examines the status of international tax law as being 
part of international law and argues that the CFC rules are part of customary 
international law due to their wide-spread acceptance by 23 countries, including 
Australia.64 Similarly, Professor Avi-Yonah contends that the transfer pricing rules 
based on the ‘arm’s length standard’ are also part of customary international law.65 
From a review of the above two highly respected commentators in the field of 
international taxation law, it is possible to argue that the OECD makes soft law and 
customary law in the international taxation environment. 
 
5.3.4 A Monist or dualist approach to international law 
Is an international agreement part of the national law once it is signed on behalf of 
the state and then incorporated into the domestic law or does it only become part of 
the national law once it has been ‘transformed’ into the domestic law? The ‘Monist’ 
approach holds that international law is part of the municipal law of a nation and not 
a separate source of law. The theory also holds that international law is superior to 
the municipal law. The theory was championed by Professor Hans Kelsen who 
contended that both legal systems developed from the same universal norm.66 The 
‘Dualist’ approach holds that international law and municipal law are two separate 
legal orders existing independently of each other.67 As such, nations are not obligated 
to follow international law until that law has become part of the nation’s domestic 
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law. This fundamental concept is based on the notion of state ‘sovereignty’ in that 
the nation must consent to the international law becoming part of the municipal law 
before it takes effect within the state.68  
 
5.3.5 International law as part of the national law 
There are two ways in which international law can become part of a state’s national 
law; either due to the ‘operation of incorporation’, a monist approach, or by 
‘transformation’, a dualist approach. In Australia, international agreements only 
become part of the Australian domestic law once the Australian Parliament has 
‘transformed’ the international law into Australian law. There is no automatic 
incorporation of international law into Australian domestic law.69 This means that 
Australia has a ‘dualist’ approach to international law. This principle was reinforced 
by the High Court in the case of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah 
Hin Teoh70 where Mason CJ and Deane J made the following statement in their joint 
judgment: 
 
It is well established that the provisions of an international treaty to which Australia 
is a party do not form part of Australian law unless those provisions have been 
validly incorporated into our municipal law by statute. This principle has its 
foundation in the proposition that in our constitutional system the making and 
ratification of treaties fall within the province of the Executive in the exercise of its 
prerogative power whereas the making and alteration of the law fall within the 
province of Parliament, not the Executive. So, a treaty which has not been 
incorporated into our municipal law cannot operate as a direct source of individual 
rights and obligations under that law.71  
 
If tax havens have adopted a dualist approach and require international law to be 
incorporated into their national law then many of the international guidelines and 
agreements on the exchange of information will not become binding on the tax haven 
until the law becomes part of the national law. Switzerland recently entered into an 
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agreement with the OECD to exchange information on non-resident bank account 
holders and to legislate to allow their banks to disclose account information.72 
However, according to Peter Wilson, ‘Switzerland will take perhaps six years to 
negotiate and legislate for the agreements and the banks will use that time to find 
new structures and perhaps new bases.’73 This comment illustrates that Switzerland 
adopts a dualist approach to international law and will need to transform the 
‘exchange of information agreements’ into national statutory law before the 
international tax law will take effect in their country. 
 
On the opposite side of the equation, the ‘theory of incorporation’ follows the monist 
approach and holds that international law is part of a nation’s law and that 
international law has priority. This approach is based on a ‘natural theory’ of law and 
is found in the role of human rights law based on morality. Some tax havens may 
adopt the theory of incorporation. Two European Union (EU) member countries, 
France and The Netherlands, adopt a monist approach to the incorporation of 
international with EU laws as they are automatically part of their domestic law.74 The 
United Kingdom must recognise the supremacy of EU law over national law due to 
the UK Parliament passing an implementing act, namely the European Communities 
Act 1972.75 All other EU member countries have a dualist approach and EU law is 
not automatically incorporated into their own domestic law.76 It is of interest to note 
that the European Community Treaty specifically prohibits the European Community 
(EC) from introducing measures relating to taxation provisions, Article 157.3.77 
 
5.3.6 The OECD and its role in the international environment 
In order to appreciate the role and purpose of the OECD, it is necessary to briefly 
discuss the history and rationale for the existence of the organisation. The OECD 
was established in 1961 and is located in Paris France. The forerunner of the OECD 
was the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which was 
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formed to administer American and Canadian aid under the Marshall Plan for 
reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Since it took over from the OEEC in 
1961, the OECD’s vocation has been to build strong economies in its member 
countries, improve efficiency, hone market systems, expand free trade and contribute 
to development in industrialised, as well as developing, countries.78  
 
It was subsequently transformed in 1961 into the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development with trans-Atlantic, and then global, reach. Today, the 
OECD has 30 member countries with plans to ‘invite Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia 
and Slovenia to open discussions for membership of the Organisation and offered 
enhanced engagement, with a view to possible membership, to Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia and South Africa’.79 There are now more than 70 developing and transition 
economies that are engaged in a working relationships with the OECD.    
 
The official website of the OECD80 lists the following objectives of its policies as:  
 
• to achieve sustainable economic growth and employment and rising 
standards of living in member countries while maintaining financial 
stability, so contributing to the development of the world economy, 
• to assist sound economic expansion in member countries and other countries 
in the process of economic development,  
• to contribute to growth in world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
basis. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, the OECD believes that it has been instrumental 
in: 
 
promoting good governance at all levels of government and corporate activity; 
ensuring transparency and fairness in tax systems and competition rules; fighting 
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corruption and money-laundering and promoting high ethical standards; and 
supporting accountability and encouraging citizen-participation in policy-making.81 
 
The OECD lists a number of initiatives as evidence of its achievements over the past 
40 years. Some of those are the OECD Model Tax Convention; the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention; the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; and the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, to name just a few. These 
initiatives have been adopted to a large extent by the Australian Government and 
transformed into Australian domestic law. 
 
5.3.7 Examples of OECD guidelines becoming tax law in Australia 
The best way to illustrate the process by which OECD norms become part of the 
Australian domestic law is to examine some of the OECD policies and norms that 
have found their way into the Australian domestic tax law. The following examples 
clearly illustrate the fact that the OECD has had a major impact on taxation law in 
Australia through its influence as a maker of soft international law. These initiatives 
have become part of the domestic law through the doctrine of ‘transformation’. This 
means that in order to give effect to the OECD guidelines, the Australian domestic 
law has to be amended in order to transform those policies into the existing taxation 
law. In the case of Australia, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) or the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) or other Commonwealth or State legislation 
is amended to incorporate the OECD initiatives.  
 
The OECD Model Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) 
With the development of global business activities there was a need to prevent a 
profit made in a foreign country, the source of the income, being subsequently taxed 
again in the home country, being the country of residence of the taxpayer. From as 
early as 1921, the League of Nations started to develop an international agreement to 
eliminate double taxation and the first model agreement was drawn up in 1928. The 
OEEC, the forerunner to the OECD, then continued to refine the model agreement 
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until 1963 when the first OECD model agreement was widely accepted by 69 
member countries.82 
 
The OECD model double taxation agreement (DTA) for the elimination of double 
taxation has been used by member and non-member countries for many years in their 
international taxation dealings. In Australia, double tax agreements are based on the 
OECD model and are given the force of law as part of the Australian domestic law 
by being passed by the Commonwealth of Australia Parliament and then being 
included as a schedule to the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth). This is 
the way in which double tax agreements become part of the Australian domestic law. 
The model agreement is clearly part of the ‘soft’ international law developed by the 
OECD as it has been widely accepted in the international community.  
 
The double tax agreements have two main objectives; first, they are designed to 
prevent double taxation of the same profit; and second, they are also designed to 
prevent fiscal evasion by requiring the treaty countries to share information on 
taxpayers. This also amounts to assistance in the collection of taxes for the other 
contracting state. Article 26 of the Model DTA contains the ‘Exchange of 
Information’ obligation between the two states. It is this provision that is being 
examined by the OECD for revision with a view to strengthening the goals of the 
harmful tax competition project.83  
 
However, not all countries have accepted the model agreement without some 
reservations. The situation in Switzerland and the UK in relation to the exchange of 
information article provides an example of how the ‘soft’ law has not been 
unreservedly accepted by that country, which is in essence the form that ‘soft’ law 
takes. According to Professor Christians, ‘soft law is sometimes praised for its 
flexible, bottom-up, which may allow states to adapt to their diverse circumstances 
and lower the cost of contracting between states’.84  For example, Switzerland has an 
express reservation on the exchange of information contained in their DTAs with 
other countries but the more startling example comes from the United Kingdom 
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DTA.85 According to Hartman, the Commentary to the Model Tax Convention, 
Article 26, explains that: 
 
The United Kingdom takes the view that the Article imposes no obligation on it to 
carry out enquiries on behalf of a contracting state in cases where no liability to 
United Kingdom tax is at issue, since to carry out such enquiries would be contrary 
to its laws and administrative practice. 86 
 
Taxpayer Charter 
In 1990 when the OECD’s Committee of Fiscal Affairs conducted a survey of the 
member countries to determine whether or not they had a charter on taxpayers’ 
rights, they found that most countries had no explicit document but most had rights 
and obligations contained in their existing tax system.87 Since then most member 
countries have introduced a charter on taxpayers’ rights. The original justification for 
the introduction of a charter of rights can be summed up in the following statement 
from the OECD report: 
 
Many countries are seeking to improve the service provided to the taxpayer, in part 
because modern tax systems require increased co-operation from the taxpayer if they 
are to operate efficiently and also as a result of changing attitudes towards the role of 
tax administration vis-à-vis the taxpayer. This co-operation is more likely to be 
forthcoming if there is mutual trust between the taxpayer and the administration and 
if the taxpayers’ rights are clearly set out and protected.88 
 
As a result of this policy from the OECD most member countries have introduced a 
‘charter of taxpayer rights’ in one form or another. According to Professor Duncan 
Bentley, Australia was able to examine the existing taxpayer charters from Canada, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom before formulating its own charter.89 While 
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the Australian Taxpayers’ Charter is not part of the black letter law, its introduction 
is a further example of how the OECD has been able to develop norms which are 
subsequently adopted by member countries.90 
 
Transfer pricing rules 
In 1979, the OECD provided a report on ‘Transfer Pricing and Multinational 
Enterprises’ and a subsequent report in 1984 suggesting a range of methods that 
could be used to control the pricing of goods and services between multi-national 
enterprises that are not dealing at ‘arm’s length’. In the early 1980s, Australia 
adopted many of these suggestions by introducing provisions in the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), namely Division 13 of Part III. Basically, the provisions 
were designed to prevent multi-national enterprises from dealing in goods and 
services between their own businesses by manipulating the price at which the goods 
or services are sold or purchased by subsidiaries in other countries. Without some 
form of control, this would mean that a greater profit could be derived in a low tax 
jurisdiction and a small profit in a high tax jurisdiction. The key issue was to ensure 
that the parties acted as if they were dealing at arm’s length and not as related parties. 
In order to prevent any manipulation of prices, a number of methods were introduced 
to try to safeguard against any possible abuse. The Australian Taxation Office takes 
into account prices charged for goods or services between independent parties 
operating in similar markets in order to determine what the arm’s length price should 
be. 
 
The OECD is very active in the area of transfer pricing and is a major developer of 
norms to be used by member countries to price goods and services not sold at arm’s 
length. The 1995 OECD Report on Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrators was a high-water-mark in providing a 
comprehensive guide as to the principles that should be applied in the area of transfer 
pricing. This report has been widely accepted by member countries and is an 
example of soft law. As stated earlier in this paper, Professor Avi-Yonah argues that 
the transfer pricing guidelines may have the status of being part of customary 
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international law.91  Very clearly, the OECD has been actively involved in 
developing soft law in the area of transfer pricing and has a major impact on 
Australian taxation law as a result. However, it is interesting to note that the US was 
the first country to introduce measures to prevent corporate tax avoidance in the 
1960s by introducing regulations on transfer pricing, thin capitalisation92 and 
Controlled Foreign Corporation rules. The OECD and other countries replicated the 
US initiatives at a later time.93  
 
CFC, FIF and Transferor Trust Rules 
Once again the OECD has been very active in providing guidelines and norms for 
member countries for the taxing of income derived by resident taxpayers in low tax 
countries and offshore financial centres where the investment activity is held in a 
company, investment fund or foreign trust. The Controlled Foreign Corporation 
(CFC) and Foreign Investment Fund (FIF) rules were introduced in Australia from 1 
July 1990 with the introduction of the Taxation Law Amendment (Foreign Income) 
Act 1990 (Cth). The CFC rules originated in the US in 1937 and, according to 
Professor Avi-Yonah, have arguably become part of customary international law.94 
Basically, the rules are designed to impose income tax on passive and highly mobile 
income derived from foreign corporations or foreign investments in low taxing 
countries that is not repatriated to the Australian taxpayer. The rules then attribute 
income to the Australian taxpayer. The transferor trust rules operate in a similar way 
to attribute income derived by a non-resident trust to Australian taxpayers. The 
difficulty with applying these provisions to Australian resident taxpayers is being 
able to locate the foreign company, foreign investments or non-resident trust. The 
rules are being reviewed and new legislation may be forthcoming within the next 
year in an attempt to simplify the existing rules. The OECD recommends the use of 
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these rules to remedy the harmful effects of tax competition from tax havens and to 
prevent the erosion of the tax base in member countries.95 
 
Non-deduction for bribes of foreign officials 
The OECD has been very active in its campaign to deny taxpayers in member 
countries the ability to claim a tax deduction for bribes paid to foreign officials. From 
1 July 2000, s 26-52, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) denies the deductibility 
of bribes paid to foreign officials unless it is regarded as a ‘facilitation’ payment. A 
facilitation payment is defined as a ‘routine government action of a minor nature’.96 
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 1990, it is 
stated that the main reason for the amendment to the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 is that the OECD has strongly recommended that member countries deny the 
deduction. The OECD Council made the recommendation on 27 May 1994 that all 
member countries implement measures to deter and prevent the bribery of foreign 
public officials as it creates economic and trade distortions. On 15 February 1999, 
the criminal law was amended in Australia to make the payment of bribes to foreign 
officials a criminal offence in certain circumstances. This is a clear example of where 
policies and norms were developed by the OECD and then implemented by member 
countries. The soft law made by the OECD eventually became hard domestic law in 
Australia through the transformation of the soft law into domestic law. 
 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
(AML/CTF Act) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
The ‘Financial Action Task Force’ (FATF) is concentrating on the elimination of 
money laundering by requiring international co-operation from countries that 
maintain bank secrecy laws. As a result of the FATF report on non-cooperative 
countries and the twenty five criteria promulgated in its report, Australia 
implemented its own anti-money laundering legislation, known as the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth). The FATF ‘twenty 
five criteria’ were used to determine what countries were being non-cooperative in 
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its fight against money laundering and these were based on the original ‘forty 
recommendations’ developed by FATF in 1990 and subsequently revised and 
reduced in number in 1996. According to Hartman, ‘these recommendations are said 
to “have been established as the International standard for effective money-
laundering measures”’.97    
 
The AML/CTF Act was implemented in two tranches; the first tranche was enacted 
by Parliament in 2007 and the second tranche was intended to apply two years later, 
namely 2009. The law was designed to be implemented over a 24 months period to 
allow businesses to meet their obligations. The first tranche ‘covers the financial and 
gambling sectors, bullion dealers and lawyers/accountants, but only to the extent that 
they provide financial services in direct competition with the financial sector’.98 The 
Replacement Explanatory Memorandum99 to the AML/CTF Bill states that the 
‘reforms are a major step in bringing Australia into line with international best 
practice to deter money laundering and terrorism financing that includes standards 
set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’100 and hence the reason for its 
proposed enactment.  
 
The existing law was not considered by the Australian Government to be adequate, 
especially with the increase in non-face to face transactions through electronic 
transfers. Instead, the AML/CTF Act adopts a ‘risk based approach’ to identifying 
customers that may be engaged in money laundering or terrorism financing and will 
apply to a very wide range of businesses, not just cash dealers. The use of tax havens 
and schemes devised by lawyers and accountants is now part of the focus of the new 
law and will be comprehensively dealt with in the second tranche of law.  
 
What then is the status of the FATF recommendations and why were they of such 
influence as to cause the Australian Government to implement new statutory law? 
Could it be said that the twenty five criteria or the original forty recommendations 
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have the status of soft international law and, as such, require compliance by member 
and non-member countries? Hartman contends that the twenty five criteria may 
‘constitute a new norm of customary law’.101 Hartman does accept the view that the 
original forty recommendations have become soft law and, as such, should be 
binding on all countries.102 He makes the following observation:  
 
[A] more viable argument is that the Forty Recommendations have become binding 
customary law and that the 25 Criteria are enforceable indirectly, insofar as they 
reflect the obligations of the Forty. Without going into an exhaustive analysis of the 
customary value of the Forty Recommendations, several strong foundations upon 
which such a claim might rest can be identified. Although in 1993 Bruce Zagaris 
described the Forty Recommendations as soft law, he went on to say that “although 
soft laws are not immediately binding, they are usually precursors to hard law”. 
Since then, the International acceptance that the Forty Recommendations enjoy has 
broadened substantially. … over one hundred countries have committed to the 
implementation of the Forty Recommendations. Some have even agreed to mutual 
evaluation to assess their progress in the implementation. All of these factors are 
evidence that there is an obligation to comply with the Forty Recommendations.103      
 
One of the main reasons why the FATF campaign against money laundering has 
been widely accepted is that it involves criminal conduct and most countries do not 
wish to be seen as making it easy for criminals to conduct business within their 
jurisdiction. The FATF campaign is an excellent example of soft international law 
developing into a binding form of hard international law.  
 
It would appear that Australia, like many other OECD member countries, is happy to 
adopt in full many of the policies and norms developed by the OECD, especially 
where these soft international laws directly assist in the member country being able 
to collect more revenue or safeguard existing revenue. In fact, in many of the above 
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situations, the norms, which start their life as ‘soft’ international law, become part of 
the domestic law through the doctrine of transformation.  
 
5.4 Is Soft Law Desirable? 
The preceding discussion of the role of the OECD and its influence in international 
taxation law raises the question as to whether or not soft law, as a source of 
international tax law, is desirable. There are two schools of thought; one that soft law 
is redundant and fulfils no useful purpose;104 and, the second school of thought that 
soft law is not only desirable but it can also lead to hard law due to its flexibility.105 
Before answering the question it is necessary to examine both sides of the argument. 
 
5.4.1 The undesirability of soft law    
One of the main opponents of soft law as a concept is Jan Klabbers who contends 
that soft law fulfils no useful function and, in practice, is hard to distinguish from 
hard law.106  The distinction he draws is between hard law and no law at all. He goes 
so far as to argue that not only does soft law serve no identifiable purpose but that it 
is actually a bad thing.107 Klabbers holds that soft law allows for political and moral 
values and administrative power to become part of the law and this is the very reason 
to abandon the concept in the first place. The following statement by Klabbers 
illustrates this point:  
 
Law, in other words, must have a simplifying rigor over it: the simplicity of the law, 
knowing only categories of legal or illegal, in force or not in force, binding or not 
binding, makes it possible to survive in this complex world. It is the simplifying 
rigor of the law, the way in which it can translate complexity into something we can 
handle, which makes law such a useful tool. … the term ‘soft law’, the very notion 
itself, undermines this blissful simplicity … .108 
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Soft law is perceived by Klabbers to be a threat to the Rule of Law109 by allowing 
political and moral concerns to become part of the law, whereas the law should be 
autonomous from those concerns.110 However, while he may arguably be correct in 
his view of the concept of law from a legal positivist perspective, in reality, soft law 
is found in both the international taxation law and the domestic taxation law of 
Australia and other countries, as discussed below.   
 
5.4.2 The benefits of soft law 
One of the benefits of the existence of soft law in the European Union context is that 
it is credited with promoting tax harmonisation in the area of reducing harmful tax 
competition and transfer pricing regimes.111 The Code of Conduct on Business 
Taxation is the best known example of EC soft law in the tax field.112  This is 
particularly important as pursuant to Article 94 of the European Community Treaty, 
a unanimous vote of all members is required before the adoption of a community-
wide tax provision is permitted due to the fact that all states retain competence in the 
tax field.113 Soft law measures have achieved what hard law could not and, although 
not legally binding, must be seen as being desirable in the absence of a treaty or 
legislation. A proponent of the use of soft law in the area of domestic taxation is 
Professor Duncan Bentley. While he does not directly state that soft law is desirable, 
he does illustrate the benefits of soft law in the administration of taxation by the tax 
authorities.114 He contends that the existence of soft law, in the form of tax rulings 
and the Taxpayers’ Charter, provide benefits to taxpayers in the form of certainty and 
trust that can only be achieved through soft law and it is in this area of tax 
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administration where the strength in soft law lies.115 This is particularly the case 
where taxpayers self-assess and the legal system is based on the common law as 
opposed to a civil law system.116  
 
Professor Christians reiterates the fact that soft law is ‘praised for its flexible, 
bottom-up approach which may allow states to adapt to their diverse circumstances 
and lower the cost of contracting between states’.117 It is the precursor to something 
more definitive in international tax law. This appears to be a common attribute of 
soft law, particularly if it subsequently leads to hard law in the form of a treaty or 
agreement. 
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
Is soft law desirable? The answer is yes but with reservations. It is desirable from an 
international perspective because organisations such as the OECD, the EU and the 
UN play an important role in convincing nations to adopt tax practices that, arguably, 
are for the benefit of many other nations. The example discussed in this paper, the 
OECD’s harmful tax competition project, is evidence of soft law becoming widely 
accepted and being transformed into hard law through the introduction of exchange 
of information agreements between tax havens and OECD member states and other 
non-member states. If it was not for the existence of the OECD in its policy role in 
formulating guidelines and recommendations in the taxation law area, many nations 
would not have the benefit of the OECD initiatives, such as the Model DTA, the 
transfer pricing regime, the CFC and FIF rules and the Taxpayers’ Charter, as 
discussed earlier in this paper. From a domestic perspective, Australian taxpayers 
have the benefit of the Rulings system and the Taxpayers’ Charter, which, arguably, 
assist taxpayers in their dealings with the ATO, especially as the ruling is binding on 
the ATO.  
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The only reservation that must be placed on the desirability of soft law in the taxation 
environment is that, while the law is not being made by elected representatives 
sitting in a parliament, the primacy of the Rule of Law must be maintained. Provided 
the OECD and the domestic tax administrators in various countries are subject to 
sufficient international and domestic controls over their development and 
implementation of soft law that is imposed on taxpayers, then the existence of soft 
law is not only desirable but, arguably, should be encouraged. 
 
5.5 The OECD’s Project against Harmful Tax Competition: Are Tax Havens 
Complying because it is Law? 
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has highlighted the fact that there are at least two 
opposing views on the success of the OECD’s harmful tax competition project.118 On 
the one hand, J.C. Sharman contended that the OECD project had failed, as at 2006, 
at the time when his book was published.119 On the other hand, Professor James 
contended that the OECD project had been so successful that the Caribbean tax 
havens had consented to exchange information and to reform their bank secrecy 
laws.120 In fact, with Switzerland, Luxembourg and Austria now agreeing to 
exchange information, the OECD’s project could be viewed as having achieved an 
outstanding result. 
 
J.C. Sharman was convinced that the OECD’s harmful tax competition project had 
not succeeded and made the following statement to that effect: 
 
By 2002, not only had the OECD failed to convince tax havens of the error of their 
ways, but it had also failed to convince key sectors of the international audience of 
the wisdom and justice of its arguments relative to those of its opponents. 121  
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Professor James concluded that within four years from the launch of the OECD’s 
harmful tax competition project, fourteen of the fifteen Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM) countries had agreed to cooperate with the OECD. 
Barbados, the fifteenth CARICOM country, had already agreed to cooperate with the 
OECD on an earlier occasion.122  
 
Professor Avi-Yonah contends that the OECD project has been a success but that 
more work still needs to be done.123 Professor Avi-Yonah recommends that if all 
OECD member countries and non-OECD countries strengthened their CFC rules and 
eliminated the opportunity for MNEs to defer taxation, then tax havens would not be 
attractive to corporations. In terms of individuals, he recommends imposing a 
refundable withholding tax of up to 35% on payments made to non-cooperating tax 
havens or non-treaty countries and insisting on exchange of information 
agreements.124 Investment capital is rarely invested in a tax haven and it flows from 
the tax haven to the main economies, such as the US and the United Kingdom. In 
fact there is a strong view that the United Kingdom, in particular, encouraged the 
British overseas territories, such as Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man and the certain 
Caribbean countries, to attract mobile capital because it eventually flowed to London 
to be invested and to increase growth in the financial services sector.125 If the OECD 
has been successful with its project and it has now become law, what then of the tax 
intermediaries and the people engaged in providing financial and banking services in 
tax havens and OFCs? 
 
There are two consequences of the OECD’s initiative in eliminating tax competition 
that need to be discussed; first, all nations should have the right to determine their 
own tax law and should not be subject to pressure from other states; and second,  if 
foreign capital ceases to flow to these tax havens then who is going to be responsible 
for the social cost flowing from unemployment and a lowering of the standard of 
living for the people currently employed in providing financial and banking services 
in those countries? The following discussion of those two issues highlights the fact 
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that countries now complying with the OECD must have an overwhelming sense of 
obligation to the current international taxation law that they are prepared to sacrifice 
the notion of national sovereignty and face economic hardship as a result of reducing 
financial and banking activity within their state.  
 
5.5.1 Threat to the sovereignty of the tax haven   
The United Nations recognises the importance of the equality of the sovereignty of 
its members, irrespective of their size and importance.126 Professor Ring contends 
that the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ has changed ‘over the centuries and across 
contexts’.127 At a minimum, a sovereign state is expected to have three elements; 
‘territory, people and a government’.128 Tax havens have these three elements and 
exert control over their territory and people as well as exhibiting external 
independence from other states.129 Professor Ring discusses the fact that very few 
states can assert that they are truly sovereign. It is suggested that the US may possess 
the attributes of a sovereign nation and that all others are semi-sovereign due to their 
dependence on larger economic and political systems in the international 
environment for their maintenance.130 On this basis, Australia could be considered to 
be a semi-sovereign nation due to the dependence on the larger economic and 
political states providing markets for its commodities as well as military protection. 
Clearly, the governments of tax havens need mobile capital to be deposited into their 
banks and financial institutions and MNEs to establish a presence in their country in 
order to provide for the welfare of their own people within their own territory. 
 
The role of the OECD seeking to force tax havens to collect income tax on behalf of 
the developed countries is of concern for the sovereignty of those nations. According 
to Peter-Szerenyi, the sovereignty of tax havens is being severely impaired by the 
actions of the OECD. As the author contends: 
                                               
126
 Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter , ‘The organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members,’ 
127
 Diane Ring, ‘What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State’, (2008-
2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 155, 160. 
128
 Ibid, 160. 
129
 Ibid. 
130
 Ibid, 161 and footnote 15. 
125 
Many of the tax havens are small, poor countries that rely heavily on their financial 
service. They lack natural resources, capital, and labour, and are significantly 
disadvantaged compared to industrialized nations in their ability to contribute to the 
global economy. … Most listed tax havens do not have the choice of ignoring the 
OECD’s demands. This shows again that the harmful tax competition project is, in 
fact, interfering with the sovereignty of small or developing jurisdictions.131  
 
By way of contrast, national sovereignty is an important issue for member countries 
of the European Union in relation to taxation law. Cerioni contends that the 
‘principle of subsidiarity’ supports the argument that taxation policy is a matter for 
the sovereign state, and that states can compete with each other in setting rates of 
income tax within the European Community.132 In the European Council, in 
accordance with ‘Article 95(2) of the European Commission Treaty, no decision in  
tax matters can be taken unless all Member States agree to a specific measure. It is 
always the Member States that go it alone or act in concert … not Brussels.’ 133 
 
The importance of fiscal sovereignty to every nation is reinforced by the following 
observation by Michael Webb: 
 
Another important norm that helped to shape the OECD project was that of fiscal 
sovereignty. Taxation is viewed as closer to the core of sovereignty than almost any 
other kind of economic policy, and this made states reluctant to consider 
international measures similar to those that are commonplace in sectors like trade. 
Sovereignty also mattered in the debate with the tax havens, who were able to argue 
that the plan to tell them what kinds of tax systems were inappropriate … was a 
violation of their sovereignty. The fact that the OECD appeared unwilling to 
override the fiscal sovereignty of its own tax havens – Switzerland and Luxembourg 
– opened the OECD up to the additional charge of applying a double standard.134  
 
                                               
131
 Peter-Szerenyi, above n 30, 10 and 13. 
132
 Luca Cerioni, Harmful Tax Competition Revisited: Why not a Purely Legal Perspective under EC Law, (2005) 
July, European Taxation, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 267, 268.   
133
 Wolfgang Schon, ‘Tax Competition in Europe – The National Perspective’, (2002) December, European 
Taxation, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 490, 491. 
134
 Webb, above n 4, 820. 
126 
Given that Switzerland, Luxembourg and Austria, the three remaining OECD 
member states that originally refused to comply with the harmful tax competition 
project, have now agreed to exchange information on non-residents using their 
financial and banking system, would add further weight to the fact that national 
sovereignty can be surrendered in these circumstances. This situation is consistent 
with the concept referred to as the ‘Hobbes paradox’, in that Thomas Hobbes argued 
that giving up state rights in exchange for mutual benefits may even strengthen a 
state rather than weaken its sovereignty.135  It further illustrates the fact that the 
OECD’s initiative on harmful tax competition has arguably become part of the 
international law.  
 
It would appear that many tax havens and OFCs are prepared to enter into exchange 
of information agreements which will ultimately make it very difficult for non-
resident individuals and MNEs to be able to hide their capital in offshore bank 
accounts in the future. While tax havens have not agreed to impose income tax in 
situations where they have not imposed tax in the past, the fact that they are prepared 
to surrender their one main competitive advantage, that of maintaining bank secrecy 
laws, is evidence of the success of the OECD project to eliminate harmful tax 
competition and a lessening of those nation’s claim to sovereignty. It will be 
interesting to follow the progress of tax havens and OFCs in complying with the 
OECD’s initiatives and their impact on the future of those nations.   
 
5.5.2 Economic consequences  
It is important to recognise that tax havens and OFCs rely on revenue from their 
financial services and banking activities to create employment and wealth for their 
nation. According to Greg Brabec, banking revenue in Switzerland makes up nearly 
11 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.136 If, as a result of agreeing to 
exchange information on the names of bank account holders, this level of revenue is 
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threatened or declines, then the Swiss Government may have second thoughts on the 
economic merits of complying with the OECD’s ‘soft law’. As an illustration of how 
tax havens have been used by MNEs, tax havens account for more than 50 percent of 
world trade, although they only account for three percent of the world’s gross 
domestic product.137  
 
The OECD, in its eagerness to eliminate harmful tax competition and to target tax 
havens, even suggested imposing trade sanctions against the sovereign states or 
terminating existing treaties in order to promote compliance with its 
recommendations.138  It is difficult to see how the OECD could in fact impose 
economic sanctions on tax havens and this illustrates the fact that the OECD had 
difficulty in enforcing its recommendations contained in its harmful tax competition 
project. However, such action would possibly constitute a breach of international law 
on at least two fronts. As Hartman states, ‘a unilateral termination of a treaty would 
breach Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and trade 
obstacles would violate obligations to the World Trade Organisation’.139  
 
One of the dangers of driving small tax havens to give up their role in attracting 
mobile capital is that they end up becoming failed states. This means that they need 
to rely on foreign aid in order to survive and are susceptible to other international 
influences. If aid is not forthcoming then the social upheaval becomes exacerbated. 
This was the conclusion drawn by J. C. Sharman when discussing the consequences 
for Pacific tax havens being required to introduce regulations to overcome bank 
secrecy laws and to make their tax system more transparent.140 Those tax havens 
which could not meet the standards of regulation required by the OECD were 
‘excluded from global markets’ and subsequently became reliant on foreign aid.141  A 
similar situation has emerged with the tax havens of the Caribbean region. According 
to Vaughan James, the ‘Barbadian offshore sector employed approximately two 
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thousand people and provided about one third of government revenue’ and without 
the financial services industry the country could find itself facing increased criminal 
activity and corruption.142 James concluded with the strong statement that the OECD 
had ‘robbed the CARICOM states of their gold – their sovereign right to determine 
tax and economic policies.’ 143 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In relation to the first main question raised in this chapter, whether the OECD makes 
soft law, it is contended that the OECD does make soft international law and the 
norms made by the OECD are, in the main, accepted by the member countries and 
even non-member countries as being part of the international tax law. The OECD’s 
harmful tax competition project is an example of recommendations and norms 
becoming soft international law. This view is supported by Professors Avi-Yonah 
and Christians. There are other examples of where the OECD norms have had an 
influential  impact on tax law in Australia, such as the Model DTA, CFC rules, FIF 
rules, transfer pricing policies and anti-money laundering laws, which are evidence 
of the OECD’s role as a maker of soft and even hard international tax law.  
 
In relation to the second main question raised in this chapter, that if the OECD makes 
soft law is this the reason why tax havens have agreed to comply with the 
recommendations, it is contended that because OECD’s initiative is soft law, many 
countries are now complying with the requirements of entering into exchange of 
information agreements and repealing their bank secrecy laws. The fact that virtually 
all tax havens and OFCs have agreed to share information with other countries, 
especially the OECD member states and in consideration are willing to give up part 
of their national sovereignty and their economic wellbeing, must suggest that the 
OECD’s harmful tax competition project has taken effect as soft international law. 
 
The Swiss government has entered into an agreement with the US to share 
information on potential tax evaders that are US citizens. In exchange for this 
agreement, the US will drop the civil case against the UBS in which they were being 
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asked to provide information on 52,000 clients. Instead, UBS will pay the US 
government USD 780 million and provide the names of 250 clients.144 However, 
because Switzerland requires international law to be incorporated into its domestic 
law, the Swiss Parliament must agree with the reform of its banking laws, otherwise 
a referendum of the nation if 50,000 signatures are collected.145 The Swiss 
Government will not permit other countries to undermine the confidentiality of its 
financial institutions by allowing unspecified ‘trawling’ for names by foreign tax 
administrations.146 The historical basis for the Swiss bank secrecy laws are based on 
saving lives rather than facilitating tax evasion. The Swiss Federal Banking Act was 
enacted in 1934 to protect foreign customers by ensuring that their bank details were 
kept confidential. The law was established to counter the Nazi Government in 
Germany, which at that time imposed a death penalty on German citizens who did 
not report assets held in a foreign bank. In order to protect the German customers, no 
information could be provided to a foreign agency by the Swiss bank.147 
 
In relation to the third question raised in this chapter, whether soft law is desirable, it 
is contended that it is desirable as an innovative and flexible source of law, 
particularly in the international environment. The OECD, the EU and the UN all play 
a vital role in generating policies, guidelines and recommendations for the benefit of 
nations. At the domestic level, soft law has now become part of the way in which tax 
laws are administered, provided there is trust and fairness between the taxpayer and 
the administrator. The only reservation is that soft law should not become so 
dominant in any legal system that it threatens the Rule of Law. 
 
It will be interesting to see if, in the future, all countries that have committed to enter 
into agreements to exchange information do in fact pass the requisite domestic laws 
to put this aspect of international law into effect. In terms of this paper, it can be 
argued that the OECD has been successful in making soft international law and for 
that law to be complied with by tax havens and OFCs. There are some commentators 
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that believe that this commitment by tax havens will ultimately fail to translate into 
hard law. For example, the following statement from the Australian newspaper may 
be correct, only time will tell:  
 
The fact that Switzerland ‘led a rush of offers to exchange information with other 
governments’ before the G 20 meeting March 2009, does not mean that Switzerland 
will not be a major repository of finance from tax avoidance. According to Murphy, 
the ‘agreements to exchange information are useless; the secrecy will be completely 
intact’.148 
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CHAPTER 6 SHOULD INTERNATIONAL INCOME 
OF AN AUSTRALIAN RESIDENT BE TAXED ON A 
WORLDWIDE OR TERRITORIAL BASIS? 
6.1 Introduction 
Many countries impose income tax on the worldwide income of their residents or 
citizens. This is the case in Australia where ‘Australian residents for tax purposes’ 
must pay income tax on their worldwide income including statutory income such as 
capital gains and dividends. If the government of a country adopts a ‘worldwide’ 
basis for imposing income tax on its residents then the existence of tax havens and 
offshore financial centres becomes an important issue because income from passive 
investments may not be disclosed and, subsequently, taxed in Australia. The 
Australian Government has recently funded ‘Operation Wickenby’ in an attempt to 
detect Australians using tax havens and reinforcing the integrity of a worldwide 
taxation system. On the other hand, in 2007, the Australian Government introduced 
an important change to the existing income tax law that was very favourable for 
‘temporary residents’ working in Australia. This new law adopts a ‘territorial basis’ 
for the imposition of income tax on temporary residents. From 1 April 2006, New 
Zealand has exempted from taxation certain types of foreign income for new 
migrants and returning New Zealanders for a period of 49 months. This chapter will 
start with a discussion of the philosophical basis for Australia having adopted a 
‘worldwide’ system of taxation as opposed to a ‘territorial system’ and then critically 
examine the problems with collecting income tax on foreign sourced income 
generated by Australian residents. The chapter will then draw a conclusion as to the 
merits of Australia adopting a territorial system for taxing foreign income and 
whether or not the worldwide system should be abandoned altogether. 
 
As capital and labour become more mobile in a globalised world, the ability of a 
government to tax income generated in a foreign country becomes one of the most 
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important challenges of the twenty-first century.1 Similarly, with the growth in 
technology and electronic commerce as well as the general effects of globalisation, it 
will be difficult for countries to collect taxes.2  It is not intended in this chapter to 
examine in detail the methods being used by international organisations, such as the 
OECD, and various countries to try to control the loss to revenue as a result of 
individuals and multi-national enterprises (MNEs) using tax havens and offshore 
financial centres (OFCs). That is examined in detail in Chapter 9 of the thesis. 
Instead, this chapter will discuss the effectiveness of the Australian government in 
trying to impose income tax on the foreign sourced income of Australian residents. 
The main question to be answered in this paper is whether or not it would be more 
equitable, efficient and with fewer complexities to simply impose income tax on 
income derived within Australia by Australian residents. In other words, should 
Australia adopt a pure territorial system for taxing foreign income or continue with 
the current arrangements? It should also be noted that no country uses a pure system 
of either worldwide or territorial taxation.3 Indeed, some commentators in this area 
of law have advocated the need to describe a worldwide system with deferral for 
foreign sourced active business income as a ‘hybrid worldwide’ system and a 
territorial system that taxes some worldwide income as a ‘hybrid exemption 
system’.4 On this basis of classification, Australia has a hybrid worldwide system. 
Moreover, the taxation treatment of ‘temporary residents’, as discussed in detail later 
in this paper, adopts a territorial system for that particular group of Australian 
taxpayers.  
 
The chapter has been divided into five parts. The first part will look at the 
philosophical framework for taxing international income and, in particular, the 
sharing of tax revenue between nations. The second part of the chapter will examine 
the advantages and disadvantages of a worldwide tax system using the criteria of 
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equity, efficiency and simplicity to assess the current performance of the Australian 
taxation arrangements. This examination will include the problems of tax arbitrage 
and its impact on horizontal equity, capital export neutrality (CEN) and the need for 
anti-deferral measures, such as the CFC and FIF rules, which add layers of 
complexity to the tax law. One of the main problems with having a worldwide 
taxation system is that unless one country gives up its right to tax the income derived 
in the source country or the country of residence, the taxpayer will face double 
taxation of the same profit; first, in the country of source and second, in the country 
of residence. In order to overcome this problem, countries have entered into double 
taxation agreements (DTAs) whereby foreign income is either exempt from further 
taxation in the country of residence or a tax credit is given for tax paid in the country 
of source by the country of residence. Either way, these measures and the DTAs have 
further added to the level of complexity that exists in the tax law for the country of 
residence. This is particularly important when reviewing the concept of ‘efficiency’ 
in the taxation system and the need to balance equity considerations with the need for 
efficiency. 
 
The third part of the chapter will examine the rationale for adopting a territorial 
system and the advantages and disadvantages will be assessed within the framework 
of equity, efficiency and simplicity. Issues that will be examined will include 
horizontal equity concerns, the concept of capital import neutrality (CIN) and the 
ability to have simpler tax laws as a result of not taxing foreign sourced income. 
However, if Australia changed to a territorial system, the revenue base may be 
further eroded as high-net-worth investors and multi-national enterprises (MNEs) 
move their capital and businesses to low taxing jurisdictions. There would still need 
to be a distinction between active or passive income in the same way as it is currently 
dealt with in Australia.5 This area of tax law could not be simplified and would need 
to be enforced even under a territorial tax system. This distinction between passive 
and active income will be examined in detail in this part of the paper. 
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The fourth part of the chapter will examine measures that have been adopted in 
Australia and New Zealand to try to attract capital and labour. In Australia, the 
government provides tax concessions for temporary residents and in New Zealand 
new migrants and returning New Zealanders have been provided with similar tax 
concessions on foreign income. In 2007, the Australian Government introduced an 
important change to the existing income tax law that was very favourable for 
temporary residents working and living in Australia. The statutory law is contained 
in Division 768 of the ITAA 97 and adopts a ‘territorial basis’ for the imposition of 
income tax on temporary residents. This means that the temporary resident only pays 
income tax on income sourced in Australia and their foreign income is not subject to 
tax in Australia when it is remitted. In New Zealand, new migrants and returning 
New Zealanders are provided with a temporary exemption from New Zealand 
income tax on some of their foreign income. The New Zealand concession lasts for 
49 months from the date that the exemption is first claimed by the new migrant or 
returning New Zealander.6  Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that 
Australia is now a confirmed ‘tax haven’ as a result of these changes.7  
 
The United Kingdom, Singapore and Japan have already introduced taxation laws to 
provide tax concessions for ‘temporary residents’, so Australia and New Zealand are 
now trying to catch up with other countries that are competing for foreign investment 
and foreign labour.8 Under the new law, a temporary resident will only be liable to 
income tax on their Australian sourced employment or services income and not their 
worldwide income even though they live and work in Australia and may not be a 
resident of any other country for income tax purposes. This means that income 
generated from non-Australian sources, including capital gains, may not be subject to 
income tax anywhere, especially if they take advantage of a tax haven in which to 
hold their investments. There are no tax implications in Australia if the temporary 
resident remits all of their foreign source income to Australia for their use while 
living in Australia. This is a classic ‘territorial’ system of taxation of international 
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income. The introduction of these statutory measures would indicate that the 
Australian and New Zealand governments are prepared to adopt a territorial basis of 
not taxing foreign sourced income, as part of that taxpayer’s worldwide income, in 
those circumstances. Can it be inferred from these examples that a territorial system 
could be introduced in Australia? 
 
The fifth part of the chapter will provide a conclusion based on the analysis of 
worldwide and territorial systems of taxation as to what changes, if any, should be 
made to Australian tax law. From this examination, it may be possible to conclude 
that a territorial system for taxing foreign income provides the most efficient form of 
taxation and that the worldwide system should be abandoned. However, equity 
considerations may be threatened by changing to a territorial system and this may 
prove to be a good reason to keep the tax law as it is. 
 
6.1.1 Philosophical framework for taxing international income  
Prior to examining the specific attributes of a worldwide or territorial system for the 
taxation of international income, it is important to review the theory behind why 
countries have chosen one method of taxing international income over the other. The 
three recognised criteria, to be used as a framework for assessing the effects of the 
tax system on taxpayers, are the need for equity, efficiency and simplicity. These 
principles are based on the Adam Smith9 model of taxation but are now regarded as 
the ‘recognised cannons’ of taxation.10 These principles of taxation were also 
recognised as being fundamental to the review of the Australian Tax System by the 
Asprey Committee 11 and have since been used as a framework for the review of the 
Australian ‘tax and transfer system’ currently being conducted by the Australian 
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Government.12  This framework will be used to assess the merits of taxing foreign 
income on a worldwide basis or a territorial basis. Fundamental to this analysis are 
the concepts of taxing international income at the ‘source’ of the income in the host 
country or in the country of the ‘residence’ of the taxpayer, the home country. It 
should be remembered that all countries tax income that has been derived ‘within the 
geographic borders of the country levying the tax’, namely the source of the 
income.13 In other words, income generated within any country will be subject to 
income tax even if derived by non-residents. However, in terms of describing an 
international tax system, the levying of income tax is based on taxation at the source 
of the income or on the basis of the residence of the taxpayer. Taxation at source is at 
the foundation of a territorial system of international taxation, whereas taxation of 
international income based on the residence of the taxpayer is at the foundation of a 
worldwide system of taxation. However, in reality ‘no country uses a pure worldwide 
or territorial system’.14 The existence of the exemption of foreign active income from 
further taxation in Australia or the foreign tax credit for tax paid in the source 
country are aspects of a ‘territorial’ tax system.15 These aspects of international 
taxation are explained in detail later in the paper.  
 
Professor Peggy Musgrave discusses the sovereign right of the nation state to tax its 
residents on their worldwide income and contends that the right is recognised in 
international law.16 Musgrave states that the right to tax the income of residents and 
non-residents is based on the following criteria: 
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Residents are held to owe tax allegiance in return for the rights and privileges which 
they receive as residents, giving rise to what is commonly referred to as the 
‘residence principle’. Exercise of this tax sovereignty over foreign source income is 
also necessary to achieve equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers by making all 
income, wherever earned, subject to tax, consistent with the accretion principle. … 
What is important is that the country of residence is the residual taxing authority and 
thus has sovereignty over the total tax burden on the foreign-source income of its 
resident taxpayers.17 
 
Professor Kaufman does not ‘agree that a taxpayer’s entire income necessarily needs 
to be taxed by a single country – the residence country’.18 According to Professor 
Kaufman, traditional international tax theory holds that a worldwide tax system 
based on residency and citizenship is grounded on the ‘ability-to-pay theory’ and 
source taxation, a territorial system, is based on a ‘benefit theory’.19 Therefore, 
individual taxpayers with equal incomes should pay the same amount of tax no 
matter where the income is derived.20 The benefit theory holds that a non-resident 
should contribute to the host country’s cost of government by being subject to tax at 
the source of the income.21 However, Kaufman rejects this view and contends that 
the ‘ability to pay’ and ‘benefit theory’ cannot explain the structure of the present 
international income tax system’.22 Horizontal and vertical equity is a national tax 
matter concerning taxpayers of the home country. The equitable sharing of taxes 
either based on source or residence is an international matter. As Kaufman states, 
‘equity in international taxation is an international matter’.23 Kaufman rejects the 
view that ‘fairness in the international tax system necessitates the adoption of a 
worldwide tax base and that benefit theory underlies source taxation’.24  
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Inter-nation equity in international taxation is concerned about the sharing of tax 
revenue. If the host country imposes tax on income generated within its borders then 
the country of residence, by providing a credit for tax paid or an exemption from 
further tax on the income, is foregoing revenue that it could have collected. 
Similarly, the host country may impose higher or lower taxes than those imposed in 
the home country on the resident taxpayer.25 It is this sharing of revenue on an 
equitable basis that is the foundation of international tax law. The justification for the 
imposition of taxes based on the ability to pay principle grounded in a worldwide 
system or the benefit theory grounded in a territorial system is what Professor 
Kaufman argues is not correct, and that economic allegiance theory should be 
considered as a basis for inter-nation equity. In 1923, when the economic experts 
appointed by the  League of Nations attempted to resolve the problem of sharing 
international taxation between two or more countries in order to eliminate double 
taxation, they considered the ‘economic allegiance’ theory for the sharing of taxes.26  
 
According to Professor Kaufman, the League’s economic experts considered 
economic allegiance to be the foundation of a nation’s competence in taxation and 
provides the following quotation to illustrate the point: 
 
A part of the total sum paid according to the ability of a person ought to reach the 
competing authorities according to his economic interest under each authority. The 
ideal solution is that the individual should be taxed only once, and that liability 
should be divided among the tax districts according to his relative interests in each.27 
 
Professor Kaufman concludes that there are three instances where the current 
international tax system provides evidence that the economic allegiance theory is at 
the foundation of the way in which nations share the tax revenue from international 
transactions. The following statement illustrates this point: 
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The first is the present international consensus on residence as the criterion for 
determining which country is the home country; the essence of residence is 
economic contacts between the country and the individual. The second is the 
universality of source taxation despite the condemnation of income taxes based on 
benefit theory. Today’s systems of source taxation are not founded on benefit theory, 
if indeed they ever were. Source taxation finds its justification in the economic 
connection between the source country and the income arising within its borders. 
Finally, although quite far from the original understanding of economic allegiance, 
the foreign tax credit and exemption from tax for foreign source income are 
consistent with a view that the economic connection between the host country and 
the income arising there gives the host country its own interest in international 
income.28  
 
It would appear that any discussion on inter-nation equity in international taxation is 
quite distinct from equity considerations at the national level. Commentators are 
divided over what is the correct philosophical basis for the sharing of tax revenue 
between the competing states. Philosophically, worldwide taxation was grounded on 
a theory of ability to pay and territorial taxation was grounded on a benefit theory. 
Professor Kaufman argues that an economic allegiance theory should be considered 
as the basis for inter-nation equity and the justification for the sharing of revenue 
based on a worldwide system and a territorial or source based system. 
 
There are two other issues that should be raised in this part of the paper because they 
are relevant to the way in which international taxation impacts on nations; first, the 
formula approach to the sharing of tax revenue between nations; and second, the 
concept of ‘tax sparing’ and its implications for the home country’s tax revenue.  
 
6.1.2 Formula apportionment 
The formula apportionment system tries to apportion the income of a taxpayer 
between different countries when the taxpayer is engaged in foreign transactions. For 
example, if a company is a resident of one country, exports components to another 
country to be assembled, and then sells those finished products in a third country, 
how is the income to be apportioned between states so that income tax can be paid on 
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the basis of income being sourced from the various activities? Formula 
apportionment is used in the US to apportion the income of corporations that do 
business in more than one state where state taxes apply. It is also used in 
apportioning shipping income on an international basis.29 Professor Kaufman notes 
that the Clinton Administration opposed adopting a formula apportionment system 
on the grounds that there would be difficulties in finding agreement between nations 
as to a definition of income and an agreed formula for sharing revenue.30 A formula 
apportionment system would overcome some of the problems of inter-nation equity 
but create the need for international agreement between nations and add further 
complexity to an already complex taxation system. It would do nothing to solve the 
problems of trying to detect foreign income being generated in tax havens and OFCs. 
 
6.1.3 Tax sparing 
Tax sparing is the term given to a situation where one country, the host country, 
provides tax incentives for businesses to be established in their country and the home 
country gives a tax credit or exemption for income that would have been taxed at the 
normal rate in the host country, if it had not been for the existence of the tax 
incentives. For example, Country A wants to attract insurance business so instead of 
the company from Country B paying the normal rate of company tax, say 20 percent, 
it pays only 10 percent for the first 5 years. The company pays the lower rate of 
company tax but the home country provides a full exemption from further income tax 
or a tax credit at the rate of 20 percent, even though only a 10 percent rate of tax has 
been paid. In effect the ‘spared taxes’ are treated by the home country as having been 
paid. The reason why home countries agree to tax sparing arrangements are at odds 
with the inter-nation equity principles because the home country is foregoing a 
greater share of tax revenue than it would normally be required to lose. Professor 
Kaufman argues that the existence of tax sparing arrangements reinforces the notion 
that the entitlement theory is not applicable in terms of inter-nation equity.31 
Kaufman sees tax sparing agreements with developing countries as ‘indicating an 
acceptance of a certain degree of redistribution within the international tax system’. 
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It definitely contradicts the ability to pay, and the benefit theorists, as well as the 
economic allegiance approach. It is evidence of developed countries wanting to assist 
developing countries by encouraging businesses to expand while at the same time 
being prepared to accept less revenue. Peggy Musgrave made the following 
statement in relation to the attractiveness of tax sparing for developing countries and 
the investor involved in the development: 
 
Without tax sparing, it is argued, the revenue given up by the capital importing 
country is merely picked up by the treasury of the capital exporter. It is doubtful 
whether this is a well-founded argument when the fact of deferral is taken into 
consideration. … it is not wise for the capital exporting country to provide an across-
the-board tax sparing agreement. Yet foreign policy considerations are likely to 
cause it to become widely applied when once introduced in a specific case.32  
 
The main beneficiaries from tax sparing agreements are the MNEs that establish 
business operations in developing countries that provide tax incentives. From an 
equity perspective, tax sparing contradicts notions of horizontal equity and inter-
nation equity.   
 
6.2 Worldwide System - Residence Taxation 
Australia has adopted a worldwide system for the taxation of foreign income but 
provides an exemption from income tax in Australia, for some active income that has 
been subject to income tax at source, and a credit against income tax to be paid in 
Australia, for income tax paid in the source country for passive income. In effect, this 
is a mixture of a worldwide and territorial system of taxation which prevents the 
double taxation of the income, first in the source country and then again in the 
country of residence of the taxpayer. The use of DTAs to prevent this problem is 
discussed in detail below. Australian residents pay income tax on their foreign 
ordinary income as well as their statutory income, which includes capital gains. The 
taxing sections of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), (ITAA 97) are s 6-5 
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and s 6-10.33 The provisions relating to statutory income derived by residents and 
non-residents are very similar to the sections relating to ordinary income.34  
 
6.2.1 Equity – vertical, horizontal and inter-nation 
Put simply, the concept of equity holds that the rich pay more in tax than the poor, 
vertical equity, and, those on the same income pay the same amount in tax, 
horizontal equity. Over the past centuries, different forms of taxation have been 
imposed on different sources of income and wealth, at different rates and, in some 
cases, at higher rates for the wealthy than for the poor. One of the main aims of a tax 
system is to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor, hence the concept of 
vertical equity. If tax is imposed at the same rate on the rich and poor alike, then it is 
considered to be contrary to vertical equity because it impacts on the poor to a 
greater extent than the rich. Therefore, it can be seen that a progressive rate system is 
crucial in achieving vertical equity, namely, that different rates of tax are imposed on 
different amounts of income. The Australian tax system adopts a progressive rate 
system for income tax and views vertical equity as being important for redistributive 
purposes.35 The concept of equity in taxation is based on the perceived need to have 
taxpayers contributing to revenue based on their ‘ability to pay’, as enunciated by 
Adam Smith or, as expanded by J.S. Mill, the ‘equal sacrifice principle’. Those with 
more income should pay more and those with less should pay less. The best advocate 
of vertical and horizontal equity is Professor Richard Musgrave. Musgrave states that 
Adam Smith ‘can be seen as an ability-to-pay theorist’ and with a mix of benefit 
components’.36 In other words, Smith viewed the payment of taxes as being in 
proportion to the benefits being obtained from the state. According to Musgrave, J.S. 
Mill then: 
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separated the analysis of tax equity from the expenditure side of the budget … Mill 
then translated equal ability into equal sacrifice terms. Fairness, according to Mill, 
required tax differentials which impose equal absolute sacrifice across unequal 
incomes.37  
 
In terms of a worldwide tax system, vertical equity requires all taxpayers in Australia 
to pay income tax at different rates based on their total income and their ‘ability to 
pay’ in a progressive rate system. Unless foreign sourced income is included in 
assessable income, at least two inequitable consequences would follow; first, the 
burden of tax would fall on those taxpayers unable to move capital offshore; and 
second, there would be an even greater incentive to earn foreign sourced income. 
This is one of the main reasons why a worldwide system is seen as being better than 
a territorial system because, with a territorial system, foreign sourced income is not 
subject to income tax in the home state. What then is the situation with horizontal 
equity under a worldwide system? Horizontal equity requires all taxpayers earning 
the same level of income to pay the same amount of income tax. Richard and Peggy 
Musgrave contend that horizontal equity is linked to vertical equity. The following 
statement by Richard Musgrave sums up the position perfectly: 
 
The call for equity in taxation is generally taken to include a rule of horizontal equity 
(HE), requiring equal treatment of equals, and one of vertical equity (VE), calling 
for an appropriate differentiation among unequals. HE appears non-controversial. 
Not only does it offer protection against arbitrary discrimination but it also reflects 
the basic principle of equal worth. The Unites States Constitution provides for ‘equal 
protection under the law’.38 
 
Richard Musgrave acknowledges that ‘vertical equity … is inherently controversial. 
An appropriate pattern of differentiation must be chosen but people will disagree on 
its shape’.39 He goes on to hold that ‘horizontal equity appears non-controversial’. 
This view is endorsed by Henry Simons, of the Haig-Simons definition of income, 
who states that ‘it is generally agreed that taxes should bear similarly upon all people 
                                               
37
 Ibid, 115.  
38
 Ibid, 113. 
39
 Ibid. 
144 
in similar circumstances’.40 Proponents of a worldwide tax system contend that 
horizontal equity is safeguarded under that system because all taxpayers must include 
foreign income in their taxable income, based on their residency, and pay the same 
rate of tax on that income.41 As well, horizontal equity is further enhanced because a 
system of foreign tax credits or exemptions ensures that the taxpayer does not pay 
more tax in their country of residence just because they include foreign sourced 
income.  
 
The issue of the source country imposing taxes on income generated by non-
residents raises the concept of inter-nation equity. The country of source and the 
country of residence must agree on the share of taxes each country will claim. The 
source country is entitled to tax the income of the non-resident ‘in line with the 
benefits provided by government services in generating that income’.42 On this basis, 
the source country imposes a withholding tax on interest, dividends or royalties paid 
to a non-resident on their income from passive activities. An interesting example of 
differences with withholding tax rates is found in the exemption provided by the US, 
UK and Australia with interest withholding tax for payments from Australia to banks 
in the UK and the US.43 Income from business activity is taxed at source on the basis 
of the non-resident having a ‘permanent establishment’ in that country and the 
income is subject to the higher rates of tax than the withholding tax rates. The 
standard of inter-nation equity is a responsibility of the source country whereas 
taxpayer equity is a responsibility of the residence country.44  
 
6.2.2 Efficiency 
The concept of capital neutrality is fundamental to having an international tax system 
that is efficient. The concept of ‘neutrality’ holds that the tax law should have no 
effect on behaviour and, in this situation, in relation to the choice of location where 
capital is to be invested. In order to achieve efficiency in international taxation, two 
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types of neutrality are regarded as being crucial to that goal, capital export neutrality 
(CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN).45 Under an efficient international tax 
system, CEN requires the taxpayer to be neutral about domestic or foreign 
investment because both should provide the same pre-tax rate of return. As Professor 
Graetz states, ‘economists regard CEN as essential for worldwide economic 
efficiency, because the location of investments will be unaffected by capital income 
taxes’.46 For CEN to work, the country of source should not impose any source-based 
taxes, only the country of residence. The CEN concept has been adjusted in practice 
to allow for source based taxes but with a credit for those taxes being given in the 
country of residence.47 
 
This is similar to the current situation in Australia and many other OECD member 
countries that allow a credit for tax paid by their residents in the source country. It is 
usually passive income that is subject to a form of withholding tax at source and a 
credit given for those taxes that have been paid.48   
 
The other kind of neutrality is CIN, which ‘requires that all investments in a given 
country pay the same marginal rate of income taxation regardless of the residence of 
the investor’.49 According to Professor Graetz, ‘if CIN holds, all savers, regardless of 
their residence, receive the same after-tax returns’.50 CIN is said to support taxation 
only by the source country, with the country of residence exempting foreign source 
income from further taxation.51 This is the situation with active or business income 
being generated by an Australian resident in a foreign country with a full exemption 
being given for the income that has been subject to income tax at a comparable rate 
in the foreign country.52 However, it should be remembered that the US does not 
provide an exemption for active income generated by its own residents in a foreign 
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country that has been subject to income tax at source. The current situation is aptly 
summarised by the following passage by Professor Graetz: 
 
Thus, policy discussion of international income tax policy is now dominated by a 
simple matrix, where capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality generally 
constitute the normative universe. Implementing these policies requires respectively, 
worldwide taxation with a foreign tax credit or ‘territorial’ taxation with foreign 
earnings exempt from tax. In theory, CEN gives the prime claim to tax international 
income to the country of residence and CIN awards that right to the country of 
source.53  
 
Professor Graetz then states that it is ‘impossible to achieve CEN and CIN 
simultaneously in the absence of either a worldwide government or identical income 
tax bases and rates in all nations’.54 This means that governments must either choose 
a worldwide or territorial system for the taxation of foreign income in order to 
achieve efficiency in the tax system. Professor Graetz uses the following three 
principles to illustrate the ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between residence and sourced 
based taxation of income: 
 
Principle 1: People should pay equal taxes on their income regardless of the country 
that is the source of that income. In particular U.S. taxpayers should be treated 
equally regardless of the source of their income. 
Principle 2: All investments in the United States should face the same burden 
regardless of whether a U.S. person or foreign person makes the investment. In other 
words, U.S. and foreign-owned investments and businesses should be treated 
equally. 
Principle 3: Sovereign countries should be free to set their own tax rates and to vary 
them as their domestic economic situations demand. 
 
The essential difficulty is that the first two principles can hold simultaneously only 
when capital income is taxed at the same rate in all countries. This requires identical 
tax systems, including identical tax rates, tax bases and choices between source-and 
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residence-based taxation. That has never happened, and it never will. Moreover, 
there would be no way to keep such a system in place without violating Principle 3.55 
 
These principles outline the problem facing any government in trying to achieve 
equity in an international taxation system and, at the same time, trying to achieve 
efficiency. Both a residence and sourced based system have difficulty in achieving 
efficiency when most countries have different rates of income tax. The simple 
answer in deciding on the most efficient system to use is to adopt the system used in 
Australia; a hybrid system with a mixture of a worldwide and territorial system that 
allows for a credit for foreign taxes paid and an exemption from further income tax 
on the resident taxpayer for active income. In recent years many countries have 
adopted a hybrid exemption system and more than half of the OECD member 
countries have adopted such a system.56 
 
6.2.3 Permanent establishment – active v. passive income 
Professor Avi-Yonah contends that in 1923 when the League of Nations was trying 
to resolve the problem of double taxation, it came to the conclusion that the ultimate 
goal underlying the international tax regime is that active business income is taxed in 
the source country in which it originates and that passive income should be taxed in 
the country in which the recipient resides. 57 
 
This can be extended to reflect that income from investments should be subject to 
some limited form of taxation in the source country but greater tax in the home 
country, namely the country of residence. The distinction between passive and active 
business income is reflected in the double tax treaties by use of the permanent 
establishment concept. The basis on which income tax is imposed on non-resident 
business taxpayers is the concept of having a ‘permanent establishment’ (PE) in that 
country. The distinction between passive and active income by the use of a PE is a 
compromise, according to Professor Avi-Yonah, because the threshold of what 
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constitutes a PE is quite low; a single office, or even a single agent with authority to 
conclude sales, is generally sufficient.58 Taxation of passive income in the country of 
source still exists but at very low rates of tax. The OECD Model Income Tax Treaty 
recommends that dividends be subject to withholding rates of tax of between 5 
percent and 15 percent, interest at 10 percent and royalties 0 percent.59 Professor 
Avi-Yonah holds that the low tax rates imposed by the source country are a 
compromise between the source country’s levying some tax but at the same time 
acknowledging that the country of residence should be the primary taxing 
authority.60 
 
However, according to Professor Graetz, the PE concept is ‘facing new pressure 
from electronic commerce, new financial techniques, and new forms of business 
arrangements and combinations’.61 He strongly advocates a modernisation of the 
permanent concept, possibly based on a threshold amount of sales, assets, labour or 
research and development within a nation.62 The threat of reduced tax revenue from 
e-commerce was discussed by Professor Cheung when examining the challenges 
facing Hong Kong with its territorial tax system.63 Because Hong Kong only taxes 
income based on its geography, e-commerce threatens future tax revenue to a far 
greater extent than a tax system based on the residence of the taxpayer.64  
 
6.2.4 Active v. passive income – exemption or credit 
Australia already provides relief from double taxation in the form of exemptions of 
certain active income; s 23AG65 for limited situations where personal services 
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income is derived in a foreign country; s 23AH for branch income derived in certain 
foreign countries; and, s 23AJ exempts non-portfolio dividend income paid by a 
foreign company. It is important to note that the US does not provide an exemption 
for active business income for its resident companies and this issue has become an 
important consideration for the US government, especially as US corporations are 
claiming that they are not as competitive as other MNEs.66 If these exemptions 
already apply, why try to impose income tax on worldwide income and be concerned 
with tax havens? Australia also provides a credit for foreign tax paid on passive 
foreign sourced income so, again in many instances, no more income tax is paid in 
Australia. 
 
A credit given by the home country for income tax paid in a foreign country is not as 
effective as the exemption method. Division 770 of the ITAA 97 applies from 1 July 
2008 and now refers to the foreign tax credit as a ‘foreign income tax offset’. Philip 
Bender has highlighted one of the potential defects of the new foreign tax credit 
arrangements. When active business income is repatriated to Australia that is exempt, 
it carries no imputation credits from the foreign tax that has been paid. So, while the 
income is not subject to double taxation, it is subsequently taxed in the hands of the 
Australian resident shareholders when they receive a dividend.67  The solution may 
be to only impose income tax on a territorial basis and not be concerned with income 
derived in foreign countries. Or, the Australian government could adopt a derived 
and remitted system where only income remitted back to Australia is subject to 
income tax but this may act as a disincentive to repatriate profits to the home 
country. 
 
6.2.5 Anti-deferral measures - the Accruals System – the CFC, FIF and 
Transferor-Trust Provisions 
In 1991, Australia introduced anti-tax deferral legislation to impose income tax on 
Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFCs) and Foreign Investment Funds (FIFs) by 
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‘attributing’ to Australian taxpayers income perceived to have been generated in a 
tax haven or low taxing country. At the same time, the government introduced 
measures to prevent foreign trusts and foreign beneficiaries being used to avoid 
income tax in Australia. Those anti-avoidance and anti-deferral rules of taxation law 
have not worked well. As Professor Burns states, the ‘legislation enacting these 
regimes is among the most detailed and complex tax legislation in Australia. … It is 
argued that the design does not adequately take account of the nature of the global 
economy today.’68 If Australia adopted a territorial basis of taxation then these anti-
avoidance provisions would not be required, resulting in a reduction of complexity in 
the existing taxation law. The issue of the severe complexity of the Australian 
taxation law69 and the urgent need for reform has been discussed above and the fact 
that one way in which complexity can be resolved is to adopt a territorial basis of 
taxation. Under a territorial system, there is no need to have CFC, FIF and transferor-
trust provisions, as foreign sourced income would not be subject to income tax in the 
home country. 
 
The third criterion for determining an appropriate tax system is whether or not the 
laws and rules are simple to apply and administer and to be understood by taxpayers, 
both resident and non-resident.  
 
6.2.6 Simplicity 
According to Fleming et al, territorial systems are not simple but are simpler than a 
worldwide system.70 Other commentators have also expressed the view that a 
territorial system is less complex that a worldwide system, due largely to the anti-
avoidance and anti-deferral measures contained in such a system.71 One simple way 
in which the existing taxation system in Australia could be made less complex would 
be to introduce a territorial basis of taxation.  
 
                                               
68
 Lee Burns, ‘Harmonization of the Anti-Deferral Regimes’ (2007) July/August Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 269. 
69
 David Wallis, ‘The Tax Complexity Crisis’, (2006) 35 Australian Tax Review, 274. 
70
 Fleming, above n 4, 39. 
71
 Joint Committee on Taxation, above n 14, 5. 
151 
A complex system is perceived to lead to tax evasion and tax avoidance because of 
the wealthy being able to obtain advice on how to take advantage of the complexities 
in the law.72 The current review of the Australian tax system has noted that the 
income tax law contained in the various statutes is now 5,743 pages, up from 526 
pages in 1975 when the ‘Asprey’73 report on the review of the tax system was 
produced.74 The Business Council of Australia and the Corporate Tax Association 
released a report in 2007 on measures to reduce compliance costs on business and 
found that those businesses had to deal with 21 Australian Government taxes, 33 
State taxes and 2 Local Government taxes. It was noted that this was more than twice 
the number of taxes effecting businesses in the United Kingdom.75 There are two 
issues that require examination under this heading; first, the actual cost of collecting 
taxes and the resources from both the public and private sectors that are involved in 
this process; and second, the implications for society when the law becomes 
extremely complex to understand and be applied by taxpayers which may lead to an 
erosion of the ‘rule of law’.  
 
6.2.7 The practical problems of detecting income in a tax haven 
The Australian Government has recently funded ‘Operation Wickenby’, a multi-
agency task force investigating tax avoidance and tax evasion involving the use of 
offshore entities. The task force comprises the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). The 
budget for a five year period is around $300 million and the Commissioner of 
Taxation estimates that the revenue recovered will be over $300 million.76 According 
to the ATO, Project ‘Wickenby’ investigations have so far also resulted in: 
 23 criminal investigations  
 28 people charged on indictable offences  
 249 completed tax audits (and a further 352 underway)  
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 $207.16 million in tax liabilities raised  
 $79.06 million in tax collected (as well as $70.7 million in improved 
compliance by people reviewed under Project Wickenby)  
 $75.7 million worth of assets restrained. 
A further two individuals have pleaded guilty to tax fraud and money laundering 
charges in relation to Vanuatu based schemes.77 
 
If the ATO has not recovered in excess of $420 million within the eight year period 
then the question will be asked, why go to this trouble and expense when the cost of 
recovery of income tax exceeds the amount of income tax actually recovered? The 
simple solution is to only impose income tax on income derived from sources in 
Australia by Australian residents and impose income tax on foreign income remitted 
to Australia by Australian residents. In addition, many countries, including Australia, 
are facing the problem of ‘international tax arbitrage’. International tax arbitrage has 
been described by Professor Rosenzweig as arising when:   
 
[a] taxpayer can structure a transaction so as to technically comply with the laws of 
two or more jurisdictions while at the same time reducing their total worldwide tax 
liability as compared with what the taxpayer would have paid if only one jurisdiction 
had exercised its taxing authority.78 
 
This is similar to situations that arise with countries that impose income tax on a 
territorial basis where a structure is used to derive income in another jurisdiction by 
artificial means so that it is not construed to have been derived in the home country.  
As a result of the fact that it is very difficult for the ATO to ascertain the existence of 
income being generated by Australian taxpayers in a tax haven or OFC, should the 
Australian Government therefore consider the merits of adopting the ‘territorial 
approach’ to the imposition of income tax on the foreign sourced income of 
Australian residents?79  
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6.3 Territorial System - Source Taxation 
Under a ‘territorial system’ of taxation, income tax is only imposed on income 
derived within the territory and this system is known as a pure ‘territorial system’ of 
taxation. Hong Kong is one of the few remaining countries with a territorial system 
and is the best example so will be used throughout this section of the paper to 
illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of a territorial system of taxation. Up 
until 1 January 2001, South Africa also used a source based system of income tax but 
changed to a worldwide system.80 The Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel stated 
that a sourced based system was out of line with international practices and permitted 
tax avoidance by allowing income to be structured as ‘foreign sourced’ and that this 
was one of the main reasons for changing to a worldwide system.81  Other countries, 
including Singapore82 and Malaysia, have a hybrid territorial system which only 
imposes income tax on income that is sourced in their country and some categories 
of remitted foreign source income. This is commonly referred to as a ‘derived and 
remittance’ basis of a territorial system. Moreover, Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada had a territorial system of taxation up until the first few decades of the 
twentieth century due to the fact that the tax law was based on statutory law 
developed in the UK and applied in the colonies.83 
 
One of the major criticisms of those advocating a territorial system is that if a 
country that was currently using a worldwide system changed to a territorial system, 
then businesses and investment would move to a low or no tax country. There would 
be a flight of capital and business activity and, with it, employment and technology. 
A worldwide system is seen as protecting the residence country’s tax base more 
effectively than a territorial system.84 On the other hand, a territorial system would 
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make MNEs, currently a resident of say Australia, more competitive in a global 
environment because they would not need to worry about paying income tax on their 
foreign sourced income in situations where there is no exemption, either because it is 
passive income or the source country is not a listed country with comparable tax 
rates. This is more important for companies resident in the US where there is no 
exemption system, only a tax credit for foreign paid taxes.85 Professor Green claims 
that ‘sourced based taxation is difficult to justify on theoretical grounds’.86 Green 
makes this statement on the basis that it is hard to reconcile with an ‘ability to pay 
theory’ and the cost to government. Presumably he means that ability to pay and the 
benefits theory cannot be reconciled. There is no argument with that finding but the 
Professor Kaufman approach, as discussed above, based on the economic allegiance 
theory, may provide a solution. Professor Green then suggests that in order to prevent 
income shifting by MNEs and tax competition, an international acceptance of a 
worldwide system would be the best solution.87 Fleming et al do not advocate the 
adoption of a territorial system in the US but suggest ways to remedy the defects in 
the US worldwide system.88  
 
6.3.1 Equity – vertical and horizontal 
The major impact on equity within a territorial system is that taxpayers only pay 
income tax on their income generated within their own country of residence and their 
foreign income is not subject to income tax, other than taxes imposed by the source 
country such as withholding tax on passive income or normal taxes on active 
business income on the basis of having a permanent establishment (PE). This means 
that the concept of horizontal equity has no meaning because not all taxpayers 
deriving the same income pay the same amount of income tax. Similarly, the 
imposition of progressive rates of tax does not achieve a distributional effect because 
some taxpayers are only paying tax on a portion of their total income, namely, 
income derived in their home country. From an equity perspective, a territorial 
system fails to achieve either horizontal or vertical equity. The same reasoning 
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applies when applying a fairness test of ‘ability to pay’ because income derived out 
of the territory is not taken into account. This is why a territorial system is based on a 
‘benefits rule’, in that the non-resident of the source country is levied on their source 
income on the basis that they have derived benefits from the host country.89 Kaufman 
contends that source taxation, a territorial system, is out of favour with commentators 
because the ‘ability-to-pay’ theory has supplanted the ‘benefit’ theory.90 This 
statement is reinforced by Michael Littlewood when commenting on the Hong Kong 
taxation system. He contends that the tax system is inherently inequitable due to the 
rampant tax avoidance and evasion91 but with the poorest two-thirds of the workforce 
exempt from tax altogether, it is not necessary to try to ‘achieve equity among this 
part of the workforce’.92  In terms of the remaining third of taxpayers, Littlewood is 
of the view that the inequality is considerable given the fact that, under the Hong 
Kong tax system, no income tax is paid on interest, offshore income and employee 
perquisites, such as employer provided housing and motor vehicles.93 However, 
according to Littlewood, people do not complain about the inequality due to the very 
low rates of tax, namely 16 per cent.94 However, given the extent of the poverty and 
deplorable living conditions for a substantial part of the population in Hong Kong,95 
the tax system is, arguably, failing to achieve vertical and horizontal equity by not 
collecting sufficient revenue from those with the ability to pay and providing the 
requisite level of welfare.  
 
In conclusion, a territorial system, as illustrated by the example of Hong Kong, 
clearly proves that a worldwide system satisfies vertical and horizontal equity better 
than a territorial system. 
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6.3.2 Efficiency 
It is in the area of efficiency that a territorial system has substantial advantages over 
a worldwide system. A territorial system ‘treats all investment within a particular 
country, the source country, the same, regardless of the residence of the investor’.96 
This efficiency norm is referred to capital import neutrality (CIN), which is seen as 
favouring competitiveness between MNEs. In other words, source countries with a 
territorial system are indifferent as to the tax rates that apply in the capital importing 
country because that income will not be taxed in the source country. The investment 
decision is neutral from the perspective of the taxpayer in a territorial system and the 
government of that state. If the tax rates in the capital importing nation are lower 
than the home country, then the taxpayer obtains the benefit. However, if the capital 
is imported to a low taxing country and the taxpayer is a resident of a country with a 
worldwide system, then the taxpayer obtains no advantage in taxation with their own 
home country. In the case of US MNEs, they claim that they are at a competitive 
disadvantage because they are not able to claim an exemption from tax from their 
home country, merely a credit for tax paid at source. However, Australian MNEs do 
obtain the benefit of an exemption for active business income and non-portfolio 
dividends in some cases so they are not disadvantaged. In the situation with 
Australian MNEs exporting capital, they would hold that CIN is a measure of 
efficiency when investing in foreign countries because the home country provides an 
exemption or credit for tax paid. The Australian MNE is able to obtain the efficiency 
advantages because of the exemption from tax on active income that has the result of 
placing the MNE in the same position as that of an MNE in a territorial system home 
country.  
 
Professor McDaniel disagrees with the contention that, from an efficiency 
perspective, tax planning by lawyers and accountants is wasteful and that, under a 
worldwide system, the tax planning is more complex and, hence, more wasteful. His 
view is that sophisticated and complex tax planning to reduce the burden of tax 
would not change if the MNEs operated in a territorial system. He contends that the 
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US tax culture is such that just as much effort would be exerted in reducing the tax 
burden in the US.97  
 
6.3.3 Simplicity 
A territorial system is seen as being less complex than a worldwide system because it 
does not need the anti-deferral regimes or the tax credit provisions which are ‘two of 
the most complex features of a worldwide system’.98 This contention has been totally 
rejected by Professor Paul McDaniel and he argues that the complexity in a 
worldwide system should also be present in a territorial system.99 He contends that 
source of income rules, transfer pricing rules and the use of tax havens all impact on 
the complexity of taxation laws in a territorial tax system to the same extent as they 
do in a worldwide system.100 It could be claimed that, from an administrative 
perspective, a territorial system would not require vast amounts or money to be spent 
on trying to detect foreign income being derived by its residents and trying to obtain 
the cooperation of many nations in exchanging information about foreign investors. 
The perfect example of the resources required in tracking foreign investments by 
high-net-worth individuals or the activities of MNEs engaging in transfer pricing or 
profit shifting through interposed entities can be found in Australia with ‘Operation 
Wickenby’. However, tax avoidance and tax evasion is a problem for tax 
administrators in a territorial system in the same way it is in a worldwide system. 
 
6.3.4 Tax avoidance and tax evasion 
Using Hong Kong as the example of a pure territorial system, it is evident that tax 
avoidance and tax evasion occurs because income can be structured as being derived 
from a ‘foreign source’ and not from within the territory. In Hong Kong, the Inland 
Revenue Ordinance contains an anti-avoidance rule which is based on the Australian 
and New Zealand rules.101 However, according to Michael Littlewood, the Hong 
Kong approach is unique as the law has also adopted the ‘Ramsay Principle’ as 
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enunciated by the House of Lords in that case.102 The Ramsay Principle is an 
approach to statutory interpretation based on the concept of ‘fiscal nullity’.103 In 
other words, transactions are entered into between parties where there is no 
commercial business effect other than to achieve an avoidance of tax. However, 
Hong Kong appears to have rarely used its few anti-avoidance rules in the same way 
as Australia and New Zealand have done and, as Littlewood states, the lack of the 
number of specific and general anti-avoidance rules has reduced the complexity of 
the tax law in that country.104 The tax authorities in Singapore are facing the prospect 
of greater tax avoidance and tax evasion as a result of increasing their Goods and 
Services Tax to a rate of 7 percent, up from 3 percent. Halkyard and Phua contend 
that this increase will see a greater rise in the use of cash within the black 
economy.105  
 
6.3.5 Examples of territorial systems - Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong  
In Singapore, the basis of levying income tax on the residents of Singapore is only on 
income derived in Singapore or income remitted to Singapore. The Income Tax Act 
(Cap 134) section 10(1) states that ‘[i] income tax shall … be payable at the rate or 
rates specified … for each year of assessment upon the income of any person 
accruing in or derived from Singapore or received in Singapore from outside 
Singapore in respect of - (a) gains or profits from business … (b) gains or profits 
from employment; (c) dividends, interest or discounts …’.  
 
In Malaysia, the imposition of income tax on residents of Malaysia is similar to 
Singapore. The Income Tax Act 1967 (Act 53), section 3 states that ‘… a tax to be 
known as income tax shall be charged each year of assessment upon the income of 
any person accruing in or derived from Malaysia or received in Malaysia from 
outside Malaysia’. The Malaysian statute, Schedule 6, Part 1 contains a list of 
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income which is exempt from income tax. The list specifically exempts the ‘income 
of any person … derived from sources outside Malaysia and received in Malaysia’.  
 
In Hong Kong, the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Chapter 112) imposes tax, under a 
scheduler system,106 on rental income from property, section 5; on salaries from 
employment, section 8; and on business profits, section 14. In all of the three 
separate taxes, the key wording in the sections is that tax shall only be charged on 
property, salaries and profits ‘situated in; arising in or derived from Hong Kong’. 
This means that there is no general tax on income but, rather, a tax on three different 
kinds of income from specific activities.107  The definition of ‘profits arising in or 
derived from Hong Kong’ is defined, pursuant to section 2, as ‘for the purposes of 
Part IV shall, … include all profits from business transacted in Hong Kong, whether 
directly or through an agent’. The issue of determining the extent to which a profit 
‘has arisen or is derived from Hong Kong’ has created a unique situation under the 
Hong Kong territorial tax system. Littlewood discusses this issue in detail and the 
fact that the current judicial interpretation of the statutory law is that a Hong Kong 
business must show that they have a branch, similar to a PE, in another jurisdiction 
or they fall within a ‘rare case’ principle before the income can be said to have 
originated outside Hong Kong.108   
 
These three states do not need to have elaborate bureaucracies in place to try to 
ascertain the income of their residents that are derived in other countries, such as tax 
havens. Moreover, the statutory law is contained in legislation that is a fraction of the 
size of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Acts, 1936 and 1997. However, these 
countries do have anti-avoidance rules but they do not have complex anti-deferral 
provisions similar to the CFC and FIF provisions used by Australia and other OECD 
member countries that tax on a worldwide basis.   
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6.4 Developments in Attracting Capital and Labour in Australia and New 
Zealand 
This part of the paper discusses two examples of relatively new changes to the 
taxation law in both Australia and New Zealand, which adopt a ‘territorial basis’ of 
taxation for certain taxpayers living in either country. These two examples are 
included in this paper because they do support the overall contention that Australia 
could adopt a territorial system of taxation, as is the case with temporary residents in 
Australia or new migrants or returning New Zealand citizens to New Zealand. 
 
6.4.1 Taxation of temporary residents in Australia 
Two very important changes to the existing income tax law, that have very 
favourable implications for non-residents working in Australia or investing in 
Australia, have been introduced by the government. Some commentators have gone 
so far as to suggest that Australia is now a confirmed ‘tax haven’ as a result of these 
changes.109 The UK, Singapore and Japan have already introduced taxation laws to 
provide tax concessions for ‘temporary residents’, so Australia is now trying to catch 
up with other countries that are competing for foreign investment and foreign 
labour.110 
 
The first change relates to ‘temporary residents’ that have temporary visas for work 
purposes and how that impacts on their non-Australian sourced income. Under the 
law, a temporary resident will only be liable to income tax on their Australian 
sourced employment or services income and not their worldwide income, even 
though they live and work in Australia and may not be a resident of any other 
country for income tax purposes. This means that income generated from non-
Australian sources, including capital gains, may not be subject to income tax 
anywhere, especially if they take advantage of a tax haven to hold their foreign 
capital and investments. There are no tax implications in Australia if the temporary 
resident remits all of the foreign source income to Australia for their use while living 
in Australia.  
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The second change in the tax law relates to non-residents and the narrowing of the 
range of assets that will be subject to income tax under the capital gains tax regime. 
The new law only imposes income tax on capital gains made from real property or 
other assets being used in a business being conducted through a permanent 
establishment in Australia. The term ‘permanent establishment’111 takes its meaning 
from s 23AH, ITAA 36 where a Double Tax Agreement applies or, if no DTA, then 
the definition under s 6(1), ITAA 36.112 The definition of a permanent establishment 
referred to in s 23AH is the definition contained in the DTA which is based on the 
OECD Model. The definition in s 6(1), ITAA 36 is broader and more descriptive 
than the definition contained in the DTA. 
 
6.4.2 Temporary residents – no income tax on foreign source income 
The law took effect from 1 July 2006 and is contained in Division 768, ITAA 97. 
Section 768-900 provides that ‘this Subdivision modifies the general tax rules for 
people in Australia who are temporary residents, whether Australian residents or 
foreign residents’. Generally, foreign income derived by temporary residents is non-
assessable non-exempt income and capital gains and losses they make are also 
disregarded for CGT purposes. There are some exceptions for employment-related 
income and capital gains on shares and rights acquired under employee share 
schemes. Temporary residents are also partly relieved of record-keeping obligations 
in relation to the controlled foreign company and foreign investment fund rules. 
Interest paid by temporary residents is not subject to withholding tax and may be 
non-assessable non-exempt income for a foreign resident. 
 
Section 768-910 prescribes the way in which income derived by a non-resident is 
treated for income tax purposes. The following income is non-assessable non-exempt 
income (NANE):  
(a) the ordinary income you derive directly or indirectly from a source other than 
an Australian source if you are a temporary resident when you derive it;  
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(b) your statutory income (other than a net capital gain) from a source other than 
an Australian source if you are a temporary resident when you derive it.  
This subsection has effect subject to subsections (3) and (5). 
 
Section 768-915 provides that certain capital gains and capital losses of temporary 
resident are to be disregarded. Section 768-915 states that ‘a capital gain or capital 
loss you make from a CGT event is disregarded if:  
(a) you are a temporary resident when, or immediately before, the CGT event 
happens; and  
(b) you would not make a capital gain or loss from the CGT event if you were a 
foreign resident when, or immediately before, the CGT event happens.’ 
 
6.4.3 Who is a temporary resident? 
The major question is who is a ‘temporary resident’ for the purposes of obtaining this 
tax concession? Section 995-1, ITAA 97 provides the definition of a ‘temporary 
resident’. ‘A person is a temporary resident if:  
(a) They hold a temporary visa granted under the Migration Act 1958; and  
(b) They are not an Australian resident within the meaning of the Social Security 
Act 1991; and  
(c) Their spouse is not an Australian resident within the meaning of the Social 
Security Act 1991.  
However, they are not a temporary resident if they have been an Australian resident 
(within the meaning of this Act), and any of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are not 
satisfied, at any time after the commencement of this definition. The tests in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) are applied to ensure that holders of temporary visas who 
nonetheless have a significant connection with Australia are not treated as temporary 
residents for the purposes of this Act. 
 
This definition would therefore exclude any Australian citizen returning to Australia 
after having worked in a foreign country for a considerable length of time. This tax 
concession differs from the New Zealand tax concession in that New Zealand 
provides an incentive for New Zealand citizens to return to New Zealand if they have 
been away for more than 15 years. It is a missed opportunity for the government of 
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Australia to provide an incentive for Australian citizens to return to Australia and to 
be able to bring their wealth and experience without paying income tax on their 
foreign earnings. If the former Australian resident had considerable wealth from 
foreign investments, then they would not be able to take advantage of these 
provisions to avoid income tax on those investments, namely their worldwide 
income. However, ‘temporary residents’ are treated more like non-residents and the 
new tax concessions impose no income tax on foreign sourced income. This applies 
even if they have a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) or a foreign investment 
fund (FIF). The country that misses out on tax revenue is the home country of the 
temporary resident because all of their investments can be located in a tax haven 
where no income tax is paid. 
 
6.4.4 Non-resident investors - no income tax on capital gains 
The Taxation Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No.4) Act 2006 introduced new 
measures to overcome disincentives for foreign investors to invest in a range of non-
real-property investments. The old law, as contained in s 136-25, ITAA 97, states 
that non-resident owners of assets that have the ‘necessary connection’ with 
Australia will be subject to income tax on their capital gain, statutory income 
pursuant to s 6-10, ITAA 97. Under the old law, s 136-25 provided that ‘an asset has 
the necessary connection with Australia’ in the nine categories of CGT assets.113 The 
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new provisions provide a definition of assets having the ‘necessary connection with 
Australia’ and, instead of nine categories, the law simply uses the concept of ‘taxable 
Australian property’. The Explanatory Memorandum states that the new law will 
narrow the range of assets that a foreign resident will be subject to income tax on 
their capital gain.114 Basically, only an interest in Australian real property, namely 
land and fixtures such as buildings and mining and quarrying interests that are not 
considered to be real property, and business assets of a ‘permanent establishment’,  
will be considered to have the necessary connection with Australia, s 885-15, ITAA 
97. The law also provides elaborate tests to be used to prevent a non-resident investor 
using an interposed entity to hold real property and avoid income tax on any capital 
gain.  
 
6.4.5 Australia as a ‘tax haven’ 
A temporary resident living in Australia, and being regarded as a non-resident in 
their home country, can generate income from their foreign investments in any 
country, including a tax haven, and pay no income tax on that income. Similarly, any 
capital gain generated through investment in Australian shares will not be included in 
the temporary resident’s assessable income in Australia and effectively not taxed 
anywhere in the world. This situation fits within the classic definition of a ‘tax 
haven’ in that there are no or low effective tax rates being imposed on the temporary 
resident and, in the case of capital gains on non-real property investments, the non-
resident. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
8. A share or security in a company that you received as consideration for your disposal of another CGT asset to 
the company and: 
(a)  you chose to obtain a roll-over under Division 122 (roll-over of assets by an individual or partnership to a 
company) or Subdivision 126-B (roll-over of assets within certain company groups) because of the disposal; 
and 
(b)  either you were a foreign resident just before the disposal, or you were a trustee of a trust that was not a 
resident trust for CGT purposes for the income year in which the disposal happened, 
9.  A share, option, right or similar interest in a company or a unit, option, right or similar interest in a trust you 
acquire where: 
(a)  you choose a scrip for scrip roll-over under Subdivision 124-M for your acquisition of the interest; and 
(b)  your original interest had the necessary connection with Australia; and 
(c)  you are a foreign resident at the time you acquire it; and 
 CGT purposes, at that time. 
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The OECD115 has expressed concerns with its member countries having harmful 
preferential tax practices in order to attract investment and other ‘financial and 
geographically mobile activities’.116 One specific area that the OECD is concerned 
about is when a country ‘ring fences’ its own residents from taking advantage of 
taxation benefits that are only offered to foreign investors that are non-residents. The 
law in Australia which provides tax concessions for temporary residents and non-
residents is not available to ordinary residents of Australia. They are being excluded 
from these benefits by a ‘ring fence’ and so, by definition, Australia is a tax haven 
according to the OECD guidelines.117  
 
The OECD contends that regimes that engage in ‘ring fencing’118 have a harmful 
effect on foreign tax bases. If the temporary resident of Australia is a non-resident of, 
say, the United Kingdom, then any capital gain generated from an investment in a 
third country, such as Vanuatu, will not be subject to income tax anywhere in the 
world. It is expressly excluded in Australia, not subject to income tax in the United 
Kingdom and not subject to income tax in the source country. For example, a 
temporary resident can generate income on investments in, say, Vanuatu and pay no 
income tax on their world-wide income in Vanuatu, the United Kingdom or 
Australia.   
 
Australia is now an attractive place to live as a temporary resident. According to 
Szekely, ‘the tax law changes will not only attract the super rich but should assist in 
attracting the super talented’.119 Large investment funds can be left in a tax haven 
and the income or capital gains generated will not be taxed in Australia and not in the 
temporary resident’s home country. The temporary resident can even invest in, say, 
shares or units in a unit trust in Australia and not pay income tax on the capital gain 
generated from those assets in Australia, as the new CGT rules for non-residents 
would apply as well. It would appear that the Australian Government is keen to 
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attract very wealthy individuals from around the world to live in Australia as 
‘temporary residents’ and bring their wealth with them. It will be interesting to see if 
the OECD has any comment to make about these very attractive tax concessions and 
whether or not it generates a tax war between other countries all trying to compete 
for wealthy individuals.  
 
6.4.6 New Zealand and the exemption for transitional residents120 
The government of New Zealand was concerned about alleviating the extra tax costs 
for skilled labour working for the first time in New Zealand or New Zealanders who 
were returning after being away for more than ten years.121 As an incentive for new 
migrants to settle in New Zealand, or for New Zealanders to return to New Zealand, 
certain foreign income is exempt from taxation in New Zealand. Returning New 
Zealanders must have not been a tax resident at any time during the past ten years 
prior to their arrival in New Zealand. The exemption from New Zealand tax on 
foreign income is for a period of four years or up to 49 months. The type of income 
that is exempt includes CFC and FIF income that would have been attributed under 
the New Zealand rules, income from foreign trusts, foreign dividends, foreign 
interest or royalties derived offshore, foreign rental income, income from 
employment performed overseas before coming to New Zealand, such as bonus 
payments, gains on the sale of real property derived offshore and, offshore business 
income that is not related to the performance of services.  
 
6.5 Threats to the Tax Base 
It may not matter whether a country has a worldwide or territorial system for taxing 
the income of its residents, as MNEs are able to take advantage of lower taxes in 
other countries by locating operations in different jurisdictions. Portfolio or passive 
capital and foreign direct investment by MNEs are increasing in their mobility. 
MNEs will continue to become larger and more powerful and their revenue sources 
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and operations will lack any ‘true residence’.122 Professor Avi-Yonah discusses the 
US trend towards a territorial system as the result of MNEs moving their head offices 
to low tax jurisdictions and the way in which those jurisdictions are lessening the 
impact of their CFC rules.123 Professor Avi-Yonah illustrates this point by showing 
that a third of the foreign profits of US-based multi-nationals are in countries with an 
effective tax rate of less than 10 percent. In 2003, when the data was gathered, those 
countries were the Netherlands, Ireland and Bermuda. Avi-Yonah contends that the 
CFC rules and similar anti-deferral regimes need to be adopted and enforced by all 
OECD member states. However, he accepts that if MNEs are prepared to 
reincorporate in non-OECD countries, then the OECD will need to do more to 
protect the corporate tax base.124 This may be harder to do in practice as the current 
project to eliminate harmful tax competition has demonstrated.  
 
The current situation with the flows of capital from one country to another is 
illustrated by the following example given by Professor Graetz: 
 
Luxemburg, for example, supplies almost as much direct investment to the United 
States as France and Canada, and the size of direct investment from the United 
States to Bermuda and Panama surely is not justified by economic considerations 
alone.125      
 
Many commentators in this area of international taxation have pointed out the fact 
that the traditional tax base will continue to be eroded as capital, in the form of 
portfolio investment or direct investment, is moved to low taxing countries. The 
global economic crisis may add to this problem as investors chase better after-tax 
returns on their investments. 
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 David Noren, ‘Commentary: The U.S. National Interest in International Tax Policy’, (2001) Tax Law Review 
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 Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘Back to the Future? The Potential Revival of Territoriality’, (2008) 88 Working Paper, 
University of Michigan Law School, 6. 
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 Ibid, 13. 
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 Graetz, above n 45, 261 and 267. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
In answer to the main question raised in this paper, whether Australia should adopt a 
territorial basis for taxing international income and abandon the worldwide system, it 
is contended that, based on the available research in this area of taxation law, the 
current system that exists in Australia is perfectly adequate from the perspective of 
the three main criteria for assessing a tax system, namely equity, efficiency and 
simplicity. From the various views examined above, a territorial system of taxation is 
inherently inequitable from both a vertical and horizontal perspective. Based on the 
example of Hong Kong, Michael Littlewood provides an excellent overview of the 
existence of inequity in the current system. However, Hong Kong is unique and the 
fact that the taxpayers do not complain may just be indicative of the beneficial 
effects of having very low tax rates.  
 
There is no evidence from the above analysis that a territorial system is more 
efficient than a worldwide system. Many of the commentators in this area are 
examining efficiency from the perspective of the US system where the only benefit 
for US MNEs is with a credit for foreign taxes that have been paid. This encourages 
the deferral of profit from being repatriated to the US whereas, a credit and 
exemption system, similar to that used in Australia and elsewhere, would arguably be 
better for US companies competing internationally.   
 
In terms of simplicity, the argument that a territorial system is simpler than a 
worldwide system is not conclusive. A territorial system still needs to have robust 
anti-avoidance rules, transfer pricing rules and laws that clearly distinguish between 
income sourced within the state and sourced in a foreign jurisdiction. The example of 
Hong Kong used in this paper also illustrates the government’s need to rely on anti-
avoidance rules to safeguard revenue.  
 
Australia does adopt both a worldwide and territorial system for the taxation of 
international income. Active business income, non-portfolio dividends and certain 
foreign employment income is exempt from taxation in Australia under the 
exemption mechanism. In other words, this type of income is not taxed on a 
worldwide basis. Passive income from investments is not subject to double taxation 
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due to the existence of the credit mechanism that operates in Australia. Given this 
current situation, the only reason why the Australian Government would consider 
changing from a worldwide system to a pure territorial system is that, in the global 
environment, it is becoming very difficult to tax the income from mobile capital 
unless all nations cooperate on the disclosure of information on investments by non-
residents in the host country. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the 
OECD measures in relation to ‘harmful tax competition’ and exchange of 
information agreements. It also raises questions about the effectiveness of ‘Operation 
Wickenby’ in Australia and the estimated income tax to be recovered. However, on 
balance there are strong arguments to leave the current hybrid worldwide system in 
place because it already incorporates many aspects of a territorial system, as 
discussed above. 
 
The fact that the Australian and New Zealand governments introduced measures to 
put temporary residents and new migrants in a position where their foreign sourced 
income was not taxed in their home country can be explained as the two countries 
merely trying to compete globally for mobile capital and labour. It is contended that 
these measures should not be seen as a sign that a territorial system should replace 
the existing worldwide systems in, at least, Australia. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAX 
AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION HAS BECOME 
BLURRED IN AUSTRALIA: WHY HAS IT 
HAPPENED? 
7.1 Introduction 
The Australian statutory law, as well as the common law, recognises the important 
distinction between taxpayers engaging in conduct that constitutes tax avoidance and 
conduct that constitutes tax evasion. However, for some time, the Australian 
Government has ignored the difference between the two concepts when it comes to 
Australians using tax havens and being investigated as part of ‘Project Wickenby’.1 
For example, the law to deter the promotion of tax schemes, Division 290, of the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ignores the distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion and deals with ‘tax exploitation schemes’ instead. The 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
(AML/CTF Act) is another example of the blurring of the distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion because it allows government agencies to detect 
Australian taxpayers using tax havens by requiring their accountants, lawyers and 
financial advisers to report ‘suspicious transactions’ that involve the transfer of 
money between tax havens and Australia. These two examples of statutory law are 
clear examples of the Australian Government deliberately labelling all attempts to 
minimise income tax through the use of tax havens and offshore financial centres 
(OFCs) as tax evasion and, therefore, a criminal act. There have been examples 
quoted in the press where the Australian Crime Commission, conducting 
investigations as part of ‘Project Wickenby’, have gained access to Swiss bank 
                                               
1
 ‘Operation or Project Wickenby’ is the name given to a joint operation involving the Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) investigating the use of tax havens by Australian taxpayers in what is alleged as criminal 
activity. 
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records on the basis that the Australian taxpayer has been involved in suspected tax 
fraud when this was not the case.2  If tax minimisation can be held to constitute a 
criminal act, then tax havens and OFCs can be encouraged to disclose bank account 
details of Australian taxpayers in that country. Is this one of the main reasons why 
the Australian Government is ignoring the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion in order to detect money held in tax havens? This chapter will examine the 
distinction between the two concepts and try to provide an answer for the approach 
being taken by the government.  
 
Professor Justin Dabner contended that the OECD’s campaign against ‘harmful tax 
competition’ was trying to ‘criminalise tax avoidance’ by attempting to group tax 
evasion and tax fraud with legitimate tax avoidance in order to achieve their outcome 
of deterring tax competition between countries, especially tax havens.3 For example, 
the law to deter the promotion of tax schemes, Division 290, Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 (Cth), ignores the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion and deals instead with ‘tax exploitation schemes’. The Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act) is 
another example of the blurring of the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion and this will be examined in detail later in the paper. It is contended that the 
Australian Government, the OECD4 and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)5 
are deliberately labelling all attempts to legally minimise income tax through the use 
of tax havens and offshore financial centres (OFCs) as tax evasion and, therefore, a 
criminal act.  
 
If all tax minimisation activity amounts to a criminal act then tax havens and the 
OFCs can be encouraged to disclose information on foreign investments in their 
country and justify breaching their own bank secrecy laws. All banks have strict laws 
                                               
2
 Drummond, Mathew, ‘Wickenby blunder taints tax inquiry’, Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 22 March 
2007, 1. 
3
 Dabner, Justin, ‘An update on the OECD’s harmful tax practices project’, (2004) 40 CCH Tax Week, 4. 
4
 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, An Emerging Global Issue, (1998). 
5
 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is located within the OECD in Paris but was established to actively 
prevent money laundering. 
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that govern their ability to disclose information about their customers.6 However, in 
the case of criminal activity, information can be provided to foreign government 
agencies.7 Tax evasion constitutes the crime of fraud which, in turn, amounts to the 
act of ‘defrauding of the Commonwealth’. Hence, utilising the services of an OFC or 
a tax haven may also constitute the crime of money laundering. This would appear to 
be the reason why the Australian Government needs to blur the distinction between 
tax avoidance and tax evasion and, therefore, to be able to obtain banking details 
from other countries on the basis that all tax minimisation activity amounts to 
criminal conduct, irrespective of whether it is ‘tax avoidance’ or ‘tax evasion’. 
 
The research commences with a discussion on the distinction between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion in Australia and then critically examines the current approach of the 
Australian Government to ignore the difference between the two concepts. It is 
argued in this chapter that there has been a deliberate move by the Australian 
Government to treat tax avoidance as amounting to tax evasion and to ignore the 
legal distinction between the two activities. 
 
7.2 The Australian Approach to ‘Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion’ 
It is generally acknowledged that tax evasion constitutes an act outside the law 
whereas tax avoidance is considered an act within the law. This basic principle of 
taxation law is supported by the definitions of tax avoidance and tax evasion 
contained in ‘The Taxation Review Committee’ Report, Australia 1975, which is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Asprey Committee Report’.8 According to I. G. 
Wallschutzky,9 the following definitions are based on those used in the ‘Carter 
                                               
6
 It is not intended to discuss the law relating to the relationship between a bank and its customer other than to 
emphasise that both statutory law and common law provides strict codes of conduct in relation to the 
confidentiality of bank details. An excellent discussion of the importance of bank secrecy and the laws that try 
to ensure that customer information is kept confidential can be found in the OECD document, ‘Improving 
Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes’, (2000) OECD, 19. 
7
 OECD, ‘Financial centres become more transparent, but information exchange remains a problem for some’, 29 
September 2008. The OECD acknowledged that in 78 of the 83 OECD and non-OECD economies, they now 
provide banking information in relation to requests involving criminal tax matters. Accessed <www.oecd.org> 
on 7 November 2008.  
8
 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘The Taxation Review Committee’, Australia 1975. The report can be found at the 
University of Sydney Library, at 17 November 2008. <http://purl.library.usyd.edu.au/setis/id/p00087>. 
9
 IG Wallschutzky, ‘Towards a Definition of the Term “Tax Avoidance”’, (1985) 14 Australian Tax Review 48, 
52. 
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Commission’ Report10 and the definitions contained in the UK ‘Radcliffe 
Commission’.11 
 
The phrase ‘tax evasion’ describes an act in contravention of the law whereby a 
person who derives a taxable income either pays no tax or pays less tax than he 
would otherwise be bound to pay. Tax evasion includes the failure to make a return 
of taxable income or the failure to disclose in a return the true amount of income 
derived. …‘tax avoidance’, on the other hand, usually connotes an act within the law 
whereby income, which would otherwise be taxed at a rate applicable to the taxpayer 
who but for that act would have derived it is distributed to another person or between 
a number of other persons who do not provide a bona fide and fully adequate 
consideration; in the result the total tax payable in respect of that income is less than 
it would have been had no part of the income had been distributed and the whole 
been taxed as the income of that taxpayer.12 
 
The definitions of ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax avoidance’, as quoted above, are no 
different from the definitions used in both Canada and the UK. According to I.G. 
Wallschutzky, ‘the [two types] of tax avoidance are within the law and are therefore 
different from instances of evasion which are outside the law’.13 Not all 
commentators believe that the distinction is always clear. Professor Logue contends 
that the distinction is ‘notoriously fuzzy’, but reinforces the fact that tax evasion 
usually involves an ‘element of intentionality on the part of the taxpayer’.14 An 
example of this is provided by Professor Logue with a wealthy individual hiding 
income in a foreign bank account in a manner that is clearly not allowed by US tax 
law. In that case, the taxpayer is clearly a tax evader.15 Logue then suggests that tax 
                                               
10
 The Royal Commission on Taxation, Canada 1966, commonly referred to as the ‘Carter Commission’. 
11
 The Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income, 1955, commonly referred to as the ‘Radcliffe 
Commission’. 
12
 KW Asprey and Ross Parsons, ‘Taxation Review Committee’, 1975, University of Sydney Library 2001, 
Chapter 11- Income Splitting, Paragraph 11.1, 215. 
13
 Wallschutzky, n 9, 55. The reference to the two types of avoidance contained in the Asprey Committee’s 
Report are referring to types of tax avoidance intended to be covered by the legislature and those types of 
avoidance which are not covered by the legislature. 
14
 Kyle D Logue, ‘Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance’, (2005-2006) 25 Virginia Tax Review, 
339, 353. 
15
 Ibid, 354. 
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avoidance could be simply defined as ‘arranging your affairs to minimise your taxes 
in a manner that is consistent with the law’.16  
 
If the law relating to the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance was that 
simple, and it is contended in this paper that it should be that simple, then the 
government has no basis for treating tax minimisation and tax avoidance as 
constituting tax evasion, and, thus, a criminal activity. The next step in this 
examination of the area of taxation law is to review the current statutory law in 
Australia. 
 
7.2.1 Statutory law approach 
In Australia, the anti-avoidance measures are contained in a number of ‘General 
Anti-avoidance Rules’ (GAARs). According to Professor Evans, these GAARs  are 
found in Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 36), Section 
67 of the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) and Division 165 of the 
New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).17 Professor Evans 
discusses the ‘shotgun and sniper’ approach to the specific statutory anti-avoidance 
provisions (SAARs) aimed at tax avoidance, such as section 26-54 of the ITAA 97 
relating to tax deductions incurred in criminal activities and section 86-10 of the 
ITAA 97 relating to preventing the alienation of personal services income through 
companies, partnerships or trusts.18 Evans contends that, in Australia, there is a 
‘reliance on GAARs, SAARs and the promoter penalty regime, all bounded together 
in a carefully crafted risk management strategy’.19 The tax scheme promoter penalty 
regime will be critically examined later in this paper as an example of the blurring of 
the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance. However, it is important to 
note that the promoter penalty regime is seen as a major weapon being used by the 
government to combat tax avoidance in Australia. Similarly, the concept of a ‘risk 
based’ approach to managing tax avoidance will be discussed later in the paper under 
                                               
16
 Ibid, 355. 
17
 C Evans, ‘The Battle Continues: Recent Australian Experience with Statutory Avoidance and Disclosure 
Rules’, in Judith Freeman (ed), Beyond Boundaries: Developing Approaches to Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk 
Management (2008) 37, 38. 
18
 Ibid, 42. 
19
 Ibid, 46. 
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the heading of ‘other approaches to tax avoidance’, as many countries are using this 
system to try to overcome tax minimisation through abusive tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation schemes. 
 
The statutory law does not provide a definition of what constitutes ‘tax evasion’ or 
‘tax avoidance’. A definition of tax avoidance is found in s 82KH(1) of the ITAA 36 
but, as Ian Wallschutzky states, it is only relevant for the sub-division in which it 
appears.20 In fact, the GAAR provisions contained in Part IVA, of the ITAA 36, do 
not provide a definition of what constitutes tax avoidance. At best, the provisions 
exhaustively define what a ‘tax benefit’ is pursuant to s 177C(1). There is no mention 
of what might be considered to be acceptable tax avoidance or what is regarded as 
abusive tax avoidance. The GAAR provisions do not make any distinction at all. In 
the context of the Commissioner of Taxation being empowered to amend a 
taxpayer’s assessment of taxation, s 170(1) of the ITAA 36 provides that, in the case 
of avoidance of tax due to fraud or evasion, there is no limit on the time in which the 
assessment can be amended. In the case of tax avoidance, the time limit is now four 
years from the date of the original assessment for the Commissioner to amend the 
assessment.21 The section does not attempt to provide any type of definition of tax 
avoidance or tax evasion. In order to obtain an explanation of the type of activity that 
constitutes tax evasion or tax avoidance, it is necessary to look to the common law in 
order to see how the courts in Australia have interpreted this area of the statutory 
law. 
 
7.2.2 The common law approach 
The common law in Australia is regarded as being settled on the distinction between 
‘tax avoidance and tax evasion’. In the case of R v Mears, 22 the NSW Court of 
Criminal Appeal, when considering an appeal against the severity of a sentence for 
an action pursuant to s 86A, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), conspiracy to defraud the 
Commonwealth, Gleeson CJ made the following statement on the distinction 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion: 
                                               
20
 Wallschutzky, above n 9, 49. 
21
 Section 170(1) Item 5 for tax evasion and Item 4 for tax avoidance. 
22
 (1997) 37 ATR 321. 
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Although on occasion it suits people for argumentative purposes to blur the 
difference, or pretend that there is no difference, between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, the difference between the two is simple and clear. Tax avoidance involves 
using or attempting to use lawful means to reduce tax obligations. Tax evasion 
involves using unlawful means to escape payment of tax. Tax avoidance is lawful 
and tax evasion is unlawful. Although some people may feel entitled to disregard the 
difference, no lawyer can treat it as unimportant or irrelevant. It is sometimes said 
that the difference is difficult to recognise in practice. I would suggest that in most 
cases there is a simple test that can be applied. If the parties to a scheme believe that 
its possibility of success is entirely dependent upon the authorities never finding out 
the true facts, it is likely to be a scheme of tax evasion, not tax avoidance.23   
 
If the former Chief Justice of the High Court, Gleason CJ, believes that the 
distinction is so important for lawyers and the courts, then why has the government 
been prepared to overlook this important distinction? A further example of the court 
considering the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is found in Denver 
Chemical Manufacturing Co v DCT (NSW). The judgment of Dixon J provides an 
excellent description of the conduct required to constitute tax evasion by a taxpayer.  
 
I think it is unwise to attempt to define the word ‘evasion’. The context of s 210(2) 
[now s 170(1), ITAA 36] shows that it means more than avoid and also more than a 
mere withholding of information or the furnishing of misleading information. It is 
probably safe to say that some blameworthy act or omission on the part of the 
taxpayer or those for whom he is responsible is contemplated. An intention to 
withhold information lest the Commissioner should consider the taxpayer liable to a 
greater extent than the taxpayer is prepared to concede, is conduct which if the result 
is to avoid tax would justify finding evasion.  
 
In the present case the Board concluded that the appellant intentionally omitted the 
income from the return and that there was no credible explanation before them why 
he did so. They thought that the conduct of the taxpayer answered the description of 
an avoidance of tax by evasion.24 
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 Ibid, 323. 
24
 (1949) 79 CLR 296, per Dixon J, 313. 
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Dixon J agreed with the earlier finding of the NSW Court of Appeal in that the 
actions of the Appellant amounted to tax evasion. However, it should also be noted 
that the actions which might be regarded as constituting tax evasion and tax 
avoidance can arise in more situations than those involving the withholding of 
information or the provision of misleading information. Dealing in cash, as part of 
the ‘black economy’,25 to avoid paying tax on income is more than withholding 
information but still constitutes tax evasion. 
 
In the recent case of Kajewski v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,26 the 
Commissioner of Taxation alleged tax avoidance through fraud and evasion. The 
taxpayer argued that the alleged fraud and evasion resulted from actions taken by 
their tax agent and that they were not aware of the situation that gave rise to the 
allegation. Section 170(2)(a), ITAA 36 [now s 170(1)] provides the Commissioner 
with the power to issue an amended assessment at any time if the avoidance of tax is 
due to fraud or evasion. The taxpayer also contended that ‘even if their original 
assessments were affected by fraud or evasion within s 170(2)(a), it was not fraud or 
evasion in which they personally engaged and that s 170(2)(a) did not therefore 
empower the Commissioner to issue the amended assessments in October 1999’.27 
Drummond J made the following comment on the distinction between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion: 
 
There will be "an avoidance of tax" within this provision where, without any active 
or passive fault on the part of the taxpayer, less tax has been paid than ought to have 
been paid. See, eg, Australasian Jam Company Proprietary Limited v FCT (1953) 88 
CLR 23 at 34; 10 ATD 217 at 222. Fraud within s 170(2)(a) involves something in 
the nature of fraud at common law, i.e., the making of a statement to the 
Commissioner relevant to the taxpayer's liability to tax which the maker believes to 
be false or is recklessly careless whether it be true or false.28  
 
                                               
25
 The term ‘black economy’ is commonly used in Australia to denote business conducted in cash in order to 
avoid any evidence of the receipt of income so as to avoid the payment of income tax or the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) constitutes tax evasion. 
26
 (2003) 52 ATR 455. 
27
 Ibid, 483. 
28
 Ibid, 484. 
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Drummond J also quoted from the judgment by Dixon J in Denver Chemical 
Manufacturing Company v Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) and 
confirmed that His Honour’s analysis was the most appropriate in determining the 
type of conduct that amounted to fraud or evasion on the part of a taxpayer. From the 
above limited examination of the common law, it can be seen that tax evasion can be 
clearly distinguished from tax avoidance and that tax evasion involves the taxpayer 
being engaged in conduct outside the law with an intention to not pay the required 
amount of tax by fraud or reckless behaviour. If the courts in Australia have no 
difficulty in distinguishing between tax evasion and tax avoidance, what then is the 
approach of other countries to this issue?   
 
7.2.3 Other approaches to tax avoidance 
One of the main criticisms of having a GAAR is that the legislature has a particular 
view of the type of conduct that may constitute tax avoidance on the part of the 
taxpayer. However, the judiciary does not always interpret and apply the law in the 
same way as was intended by Parliament.29 Tim Edgar explores this dilemma in his 
paper and strongly contends that it ‘is hopeless to leave it to the judiciary to articulate 
a behavioural prohibition that is neither under-inclusive nor over-inclusive in its 
identification of prohibited transactions’.30 He advocates the design of a GAAR by 
reference to a ‘business-purpose test’ with emphasis on the different concepts of the 
economic substance associated with the categories of tax avoidance behaviour, such 
as tax evasion, acceptable tax avoidance and abusive tax avoidance.31 By way of 
illustration, Edgar states that the Canadian GAAR has, at its core, a distinction 
between ‘acceptable’ and ‘abusive’ tax avoidance and this is seen by some 
commentators as providing an ‘overly-broad category of acceptable tax avoidance 
and … an under-inclusive category of abusive tax avoidance’.32 Acceptable tax 
avoidance is sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘tax mitigation’ or ‘tax 
minimisation’ whereas abusive tax avoidance is seen as involving schemes that are 
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 Tim Edgar, ‘Building a Better GAAR’, (2007-2008) 27 Virginia Tax Review 833, 837. 
30
 Ibid, 837. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid, 878, 879 and Graeme Cooper, ‘An Optimal or Comprehensive Income Tax?’ (1993-1994) 22 Federal 
Law Review 414.  
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‘contrived’ or ‘artificial’.33 The Australian GAAR does not provide that level of 
distinction and it is then left to the judiciary to determine those differences.  
 
It could be argued that, with the deliberate blurring of the distinction between tax 
evasion and tax avoidance in Australia, the Canadian approach may be seen as a 
desirable way of maintaining a distinction between acceptable tax avoidance and 
abusive tax avoidance. Acceptable tax avoidance is clearly seen to be within the law, 
whereas abusive tax avoidance, which may be outside the law, is properly treated as 
being similar to tax evasion. 
 
Furthermore, the OECD in its ‘Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries’, has 
introduced the ‘notion of aggressive tax planning into the international tax lexicon’34 
and draws a distinction between acceptable tax avoidance, such as tax mitigation and 
minimisation, and aggressive tax planning involving sham transactions. The OECD 
study looks at the supply side of aggressive tax planning solutions, being provided by 
tax intermediaries such as accounting and law firms, and the taxpayers, representing 
the demand side of the tax minimisation products.35 Aggressive tax planning is 
defined as: 
 
planning involving a tax position that is tenable but has unintended and unexpected 
tax revenue consequences, and taking a tax position that is favourable to the 
taxpayer without openly disclosing that there is uncertainty whether significant 
matters in the tax return accord with the law.36  
 
It is contended that ‘the test of whether tax planning is “acceptable” should be what 
the legislation says as interpreted by the courts, and not what the tax authorities 
suppose it was intended to say’.37 This issue is highlighted in Part V under the 
heading of ‘Implications for the Rule of Law’. The approach taken by the OECD in 
                                               
33
 Ibid, 878 and JB McCombs, ‘An Historical Review and Analysis of Early United States Tax Policy 
Scholarship: Definition of Income and Progressive Rates’, (1989-1990) 64 St. John’s Law Review, 471, 475. 
34
 Judith Freedman, Geoffrey Loomer and John Vella, ‘Alternative Approaches to Tax Risk and Tax Avoidance: 
Analysis of a Face-to-Face Corporate Survey’, (2008) Working Paper 08/14, Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation, 2. 
35
 OECD, ‘Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries’, (2008) OECD, 5. 
36
 Ibid, 10. 
37
 Freedman et al, above n 34, 3. 
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their study into ‘tax intermediaries’ adds further weight to the argument that the 
current approach to tax mitigation and tax evasion in Australia, and internationally, is 
threatening the fundamental principle of the importance of the ‘rule of law’ in all 
legal systems throughout the world.   
 
It is obvious that tax intermediaries have always created a problem for organisations, 
such as the OECD, and many countries with the promotion of tax havens and OFCs 
as a means of reducing the effect of taxation on multi-national corporations and high 
net worth individuals. As discussed below in this paper, the OECD has been 
deliberately blurring tax evasion and tax avoidance but this current study  by the 
OECD would appear to put all activities used to mitigate tax within the category of 
‘abusive tax avoidance’ and unlawful conduct and, therefore, amount to criminal tax 
activity. The OECD approach can be seen as another attempt to criminalise tax 
avoidance by creating an artificial distinction between tax mitigation, on the one 
hand, and aggressive tax planning, on the other hand, while, all the time, ignoring the 
clear cut distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance that has existed in the 
law of many of the OECD member countries based on the Anglo-US legal system.  
 
One of the features of the OECD study into tax intermediaries is the discussion of the 
need for effective risk management by the tax authorities and the OECD sees that as 
an important method to prevent tax avoidance by intermediaries. In fact, Australia 
and the UK38  have already adopted a risk-based approach to try to combat tax 
avoidance. As Anita Paddock and Chris Oates state, ‘[o]ne of the main drivers in the 
ATOs risk-profiling process is the perceived willingness of the corporate to use 
marketed tax mitigation in its tax planning programme’.39 If tax authorities engaged 
in cooperative discussions with corporations and high net worth individuals as part of 
a risk management program to encourage disclosure of tax mitigation arrangements, 
then there may not be a need to rely on the legislature, and the courts, to prevent tax 
avoidance after the event. In turn, this may alleviate the need to engage in the tactic 
of declaring all forms of tax minimisation as constituting criminal activity. 
                                               
38
 The ‘Varney Review’ in the UK had advocated a risk-based approach to managing the tax risk associated with 
tax avoidance and large corporations. See the paper by Freeman, Judith et al, above n 34 for a discussion on 
this issue.  
39
 Anita Paddock and Chris Oates, ‘Corporate tax self-assessment lessons from down under’, (2003) 14 
International Tax Review 28, 29. 
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7.3 The International Approach to the Distinction between ‘Tax Avoidance and 
Tax Evasion’ 
International bodies such as the OECD, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
and the Economic Union (EU) have been actively involved in trying to limit harmful 
tax competition by tax havens and OFCs.  By grouping tax avoidance and tax 
evasion as constituting one and the same activity, the international bodies, such as 
the OECD, the FATF and the EU, are able to make the presumption that any 
financial activity using an OFC or a tax haven must be tax evasion and, therefore, of 
a criminal nature. Branson QC 40 makes the observation that the OECD, in its 
crusade against ‘harmful tax competition’, has ‘not sought to draw any clear or 
marked difference between evasion and avoidance and in every relevant respect they 
have been treated as one homogenous subject’. 
 
The OECD report on harmful tax competition, paragraphs 53 and 54, 41 do not 
attempt to clearly distinguish between tax avoidance and tax evasion when 
discussing the need for tax havens to become more transparent and to exchange 
information. In paragraph 53, the OECD makes the following comment: 
 
[B]ecause non-transparent administrative practices as well as an inability or 
unwillingness to provide information not only allow investors to avoid their taxes 
but also facilitate illegal activities, such as tax evasion and money laundering, these 
factors are particularly troublesome.42 
 
In paragraph 54, the OECD then states that progress has been made in accessing 
information from tax havens through the entering of ‘mutual legal assistance treaties’ 
in criminal matters, such as criminal tax fraud. According to Peter-Szerenyi, the issue 
of the exchange of information and transparency should only relate to criminal tax 
matters: 
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 CC Branson, ‘The international exchange of information on tax matters and the rights of taxpayers’, (2004) 33 
Australian Taxation Review 71, 77. 
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 OECD, n 4. 
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182 
The lack of exchange of information and transparency facilitates only illegal 
activity, not tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is legal, whether the home country knows 
about it or not. Thus, the tax authorities of the home country do not need any 
information for the correct and timely application of its own tax law. The lack of the 
two criteria (exchange of information and transparency) in connection with tax 
avoidance is a problem merely because it makes it difficult for the home country to 
detect and prevent the use of foreign tax regimes – in other words, to enact laws 
aimed at combating offshore investments (e.g. CFC rules), Paragraphs 70 and 114.43 
 
In the OECD report44 on improving access to bank information, it was stated that 
where ‘some countries rely heavily on a self-assessment system to administer their 
taxation laws … wilful failure of a taxpayer accurately to report income will 
generally be considered a criminal action.’45 In terms of requiring other countries to 
cooperate in providing access to information, the OECD Report goes on to make the 
following observation: 
 
With respect to assistance provided to other countries in criminal investigations 
(including criminal tax investigations), some countries generally apply the principle 
of ‘double incrimination’. That is, before assistance can be provided to a requesting 
country, it must be established that the conduct being investigated would constitute a 
crime under the laws of the requested country if it occurred in the requested country. 
In the tax area, application of this principle will not generally be an impediment to 
exchange of information for criminal purposes where the definitions of tax crimes 
are similar. However, where the definitions of tax crimes in the requesting and 
requested countries are markedly different, it may be impossible in many cases for 
the requesting country to obtain information that is vital to a criminal investigation.46 
 
In most tax havens, tax avoidance is not a crime because, as a result of those 
countries not imposing any form of income tax, there is no tax to avoid. However, 
the non-payment of income tax by an Australian resident taxpayer on income derived 
in an offshore bank account can be construed as constituting the act of ‘money 
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laundering’ in Australia because the proceeds are from a criminal act, namely tax 
evasion. In the tax havens that have introduced anti-money laundering legislation, tax 
related criminal activities would constitute a crime under their domestic law, 
particularly if the requesting country was able to argue that tax avoidance, in any 
form, was a crime and the subsequent laundering of the money through a tax haven 
constituting the crime of money laundering. For example, the Cook Islands 
introduced the Money Laundering Prevention Act in 2000 and amended its Crimes 
Act in order to introduce law based on the FATF forty recommendations which are 
similar to the anti-money laundering law in Australia.47 In that situation, the 
appropriate banking information about the Australian taxpayer may be supplied by 
the requested country. This is one of the main reasons why the new AML/CTF Act 
has been introduced by the Australian Government. 
 
The OECD has been successful in convincing Vanuatu, Samoa and Niue to enter into 
an agreement to exchange information on foreign investors using their offshore 
financial services. The countries entered into the agreements to exchange information 
on civil tax matters by 31 December 2005.48 Since that time, the OECD has been 
able to convince a further 83 OECD and non-OECD countries to enter into ‘Double 
Tax Conventions’ for the exchange of banking information.49 In the same OECD 
announcement, it is noted that Belgium has agreed to exchange banking information 
with the US in relation to civil and criminal tax maters. This raises the issue of the 
need for countries such as Australia to not only develop relationships with other 
countries in order to enter into an agreement for the exchange of banking 
information, but also the need to classify tax maters as constituting a civil or criminal 
offence under the domestic law. It is not sufficient to merely classify all types of tax 
minimisation as constituting abusive tax avoidance and tax evasion on the basis that 
the investments are held in a tax haven. 
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When the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Alexander Downer was 
asked about his attitude to Vanuatu being a ‘tax haven’ and Australians using 
Vanuatu to avoid income tax, his answer was as follows: 
 
Well, I’m in favour of low tax and countries have got to make themselves as 
competitive as they possibly can in a competitive world, but what has worried us in 
the past has been on the issue particularly of money laundering. And the Vanuatu 
Government and Vanuatu Parliament has now legislated against money laundering 
and introduced this anti-money laundering legislation. We see that as a very good 
step forward but obviously it’s going to be a challenge to implement the provisions 
of the legislation and we’re happy to help the Government of Vanuatu in that 
respect.50 
 
This comment from the former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs would appear 
to condone Vanuatu as engaging in tax competition but, at the same time, taking 
measures to combat money laundering. It would be assumed that the Vanuatu law is 
designed to combat illegal tax evasion and not legitimate tax avoidance or 
minimisation. For the OECD or the Australian Government to impose sanctions as a 
result of tax avoidance in, say, Australia, while it is not contrary to the law in 
Vanuatu, would, in fact, be a breach of international law.51 To threaten another 
sovereign nation with sanctions or to terminate existing treaties just because they will 
not exchange banking information, that may or may not be of a criminal nature, is 
potentially a breach of obligations to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or a 
breach of Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.52 According 
to Benjamin Hartman, there is ‘no necessary connection between low taxes and tax 
evasion … therefore, no basis to claims that offering low taxes facilitates crimes’.53 
He makes this claim on the basis that the tax havens are under no obligation to 
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comply with the directives issued by the OECD or FATF and non-compliance is not 
sufficient grounds to impose sanctions under international law.54 
 
The introduction of the, so-called, USA Patriot Act55 has not dramatically reduced 
the use of Caribbean tax havens by citizens of the US.56 OECD and EU member 
countries still compete in trying to attract capital by reducing income tax rates. There 
is no ‘level playing field’57 in the world today and Australia has joined in the tax 
competition to attract wealthy individuals while ‘ring fencing’58 its own residents 
through the recently introduced tax law that applies to ‘temporary residents’.59 It will 
be interesting to see if the AML/CTF Act introduced into Australia will have a 
dramatic effect on tax havens. As Eden and Kudrle put it, ‘the jury is still out on 
whether the OECD’s attempt to name and shame tax havens as renegade states will 
be successful’.60 The same situation can be said of the following legislative attempts 
being introduced in Australia to prevent tax minimisation through OFCs and tax 
havens. 
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7.4 An Example of Blurring: The Law to ‘Deter the Promotion of Tax 
Schemes’  
The Australian Government introduced the law to deter the promotion of tax 
schemes, with effect from 6 April 2006. The provisions are designed to complement 
the GAAR.61  This law has the potential to deter the promotion of tax schemes, such 
as those that involve the use of tax havens and OFCs, but it appears that it has 
deliberately ignored the difference between tax evasion, a criminal offence, and tax 
avoidance or tax mitigation, legal activity. 
 
7.4.1 The law used to deter the promotion of tax schemes 
The statutory provisions62 consist of three main parts; first, the imposition of ‘civil 
penalties’ on ‘promoters’ of ‘tax exploitation schemes’ ; second, ‘injunctions granted 
by the Federal Court’ to restrain an entity from engaging in promoting schemes; and 
third, ‘voluntary undertakings’ given by an entity not to continue promoting 
schemes. 
 
Section 290-5 states that the objects of this Division are: 
(a) to deter the promotion of tax avoidance schemes and tax evasion schemes; and 
(b) to deter the implementation of schemes that have been promoted on the basis of 
conformity with a product ruling in a way that is materially different from that 
described in the product ruling. 
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum, the government advises that the measures are 
designed to deter the promotion of tax avoidance and evasion schemes, collectively 
referred to as ‘tax exploitation schemes’, and to deter the implementation of schemes 
that have been promoted on the basis of a product ruling being provided by the ATO 
but the actual scheme is materially different from what was disclosed in the ruling.63 
The government justifies the new law from an economic and social perspective on 
the basis that, by making the promoter of tax schemes at risk of financial loss in the 
same way that the investor is at risk, then this will deter the marketing of schemes 
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and provide investors with protection from bad investments and, therefore, 
encourage more legitimate and productive investments.64 The promoter would be 
required to pay an amount of money, equivalent to the amount of tax, interest and 
penalties that is required to be paid by the taxpayer, as a result of having entered into 
the scheme in the first place, if the scheme is found to have constituted tax avoidance 
or tax evasion. The money to be paid by the promoter is in the form of a civil penalty 
that can be imposed by the Federal Court up to a maximum of $550,000 for 
individuals or $2.75 million for a body corporate, and twice the consideration 
received as payment for selling the scheme. 
 
The objective of providing investor protection is a very positive move on the part of 
the government but it is also designed to support Part IVA, the tax avoidance 
measures, because of a perceived weakness in the current provisions. This issue was 
discussed by McCormack and Anderson on the basis that Part IVA may not extend to 
promoters of tax schemes in order for them to be penalised under those provisions.65 
It would be usual for a promoter to obtain a fee or profit from the underlying scheme 
rather than a tax benefit. The only way to penalise the promoter was to introduce the 
‘promoter penalty’ regime. The ATO have recently released their practice statement, 
PS LA 2008/8, to provide guidance to their staff as to the application of the law to 
situations involving the promotion of tax schemes and, in particular, the role of the 
‘promoter penalty review panel’ that is responsible for administering the law.  
 
7.4.2 Civil penalties, promoter and tax exploitation schemes 
This area of the law gives rise to most of the perceived problems that may confront 
accountants, tax lawyers and financial advisers providing taxation advice to their 
clients. The concept of imposing a ‘civil penalty’ is similar to the range of remedies 
available to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission in situations where 
it may be difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to satisfy a burden of proof ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ (as is the case in criminal proceedings) but it may be possible to 
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satisfy a burden of proof of ‘balance of probabilities’ under civil proceedings. While 
it may be good law to impose civil penalties on those involved in insider trading or 
breaching director’s duties, it may not be the case with taxation law where there is a 
reasonable argument that the conduct is within the law and does not amount to tax 
avoidance. This area of taxation law is still very vague and penalties may be imposed 
before a court has had an opportunity to rule on the legitimacy of the tax scheme. 
This situation could arise as it can take many years before a dispute as to whether or 
not a tax arrangement constitutes tax avoidance or tax evasion is determined by the 
High Court but, in the meantime, the promoter has been required to pay civil 
penalties. 
 
What is meant by the term ‘promoter’?  Section 290-60 provides the meaning of 
promoter as: 
(1) An entity is a promoter of a tax exploitation scheme if: 
(a) the entity markets the scheme or otherwise encourages the growth 
of the scheme or interest in it; and 
(b) the entity or an associate of the entity receives (directly or 
indirectly) consideration in respect of that marketing or encouragement; 
and 
(c) having regard to all relevant matters, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the entity has had a substantial role in respect of that marketing or 
encouragement. 
(2) However, an entity is not a promoter of a tax exploitation scheme merely 
because the entity provides advice about the scheme. 
(3) An employee is not to be taken to have had a substantial role in respect of 
that marketing or encouragement merely because the employee distributes 
information or material prepared by another entity. 
 
What would be the situation for accountants, tax lawyers and financial advisers in a 
situation where their clients would like to utilise the services of an OFC in, say, 
Singapore, in order to invest their savings more effectively? Simply locating 
investments in an OFC such as Singapore66 does not amount to tax avoidance or tax 
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evasion and most accountants and taxation advisers would still believe that such an 
arrangement was legal. If the accountant or tax adviser in Australia provided advice 
or received a payment from the offshore finance centre, does this make them a 
promoter? Clearly it can be seen that merely giving advice does not make that person 
or entity a promoter but what is the situation if they received a commission related to 
the amount of money invested with the financial institution in Singapore or 
encouraged their clients to enter into the arrangement; would they be caught by 
section 290-60 and possibly face civil penalties?  
 
One major criticism of the promoter penalty provisions contained in Division 290 is 
that while the Explanatory Memorandum does try to clarify what is a ‘promoter’, 
section 290-60 fails in its attempt to provide any detailed clarification as to the extent 
of the conduct required to be held to be a ‘promoter’. For example, in the 
Explanatory Memorandum, the promoter needs to have a ‘substantial role’ in the 
promotion of the tax exploitation scheme and not merely provide advice. The 
concept of what is a ‘substantial role’ is, to some extent, discussed in the Explanatory 
Memorandum but only mentioned once in s 290-60(1)(c), as seen above.67 The 
subsection 290-60(3) merely states that having a ‘substantial role’ requires more than 
the ‘marketing or encouragement through the distribution of information or material 
prepared by another entity’. It would have been very helpful if the section had 
provided greater guidance on this point so that accountants and advisers would be 
able to gain a greater understanding of their legal position when a client asks them 
for advice on investing money in, say, Singapore. The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 
(Cth), sections 15AA and 15AB, does provide for the judiciary to interpret 
provisions of the act by taking into account the objectives and the purpose of the 
government in enacting the  ‘promoter penalty regime’, and section 15AB also 
allows the court to take into account extraneous materials, such as the Explanatory 
Memorandum.  
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The adviser may not be liable to the civil penalties if it can be shown that the 
arrangement was not a ‘tax exploitation scheme’, Section 290-65. In summary, the 
section provides the following meaning of tax exploitation scheme: 
A scheme is a tax exploitation scheme if: 
(1) the scheme was implemented with the sole or dominant purpose of that 
entity or another entity obtaining a scheme benefit from the scheme; 
(2) if the scheme has been implemented and it is not reasonably arguable that 
the scheme benefit is available at law or would be available at law; 
 
This then leads to the question, what is meant by the term ‘reasonably arguable’? The 
statutory provision covering this area of law is found in Schedule 1, s 284-15, of the 
TAA 53 in relation to the imposition of penalties for a shortfall in the payment of tax. 
The concept of what constitutes a ‘reasonably arguable’ position was considered 
judicially by the Federal Court in Prebble v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.68 
 
7.4.3 When is a matter ‘reasonably arguable’, Section 284-15 
Section 284-15 (1) states that ‘a matter is ‘reasonably arguable’ if it would be 
concluded in the circumstances, having regard to relevant authorities, that what is 
argued for is about as likely to be correct as incorrect, or is more likely to be correct 
than incorrect’.  
 
Section 284-15 (2) states that to the extent that a matter involves an assumption 
about the way in which the Commissioner will exercise a discretion, the matter is 
only ‘reasonably arguable’ if, had the Commissioner exercised the discretion in the 
way assumed, a court would be about as likely as not to decide that the exercise of 
the discretion was in accordance with law.  
 
In Prebble v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, the taxpayer, Dr Prebble was denied 
a deduction for a contribution made to a non-complying superannuation fund. 
However, even though the deduction had been denied, Cooper J held that, as a result 
of advance opinions and rulings having being issued by the ATO to other taxpayers 
in earlier years, it was ‘reasonably arguable’ for him to take that position in preparing 
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his tax return and, therefore, no understatement penalties should be imposed.69 It 
would be very difficult to predict whether this case and the existence of s 284-15 will 
provide comfort for advisers engaged in encouraging clients to implement a 
marketed tax mitigation arrangement. It would be comforting for advisers to think 
that the Federal Court would find that they have not contravened Division 290, of the 
TAA 53, on the basis of a reasonably arguable position but, with all litigation, it is 
not possible to predict the outcome and they could be facing civil penalties as a 
promoter of a tax exploitation scheme. 
 
7.4.4 No distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance: overseas 
experience 
It is very disappointing that the new law does not differentiate between tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. The new law simply lumps the two distinct activities into one, 
namely a ‘tax exploitation scheme’, and ignores the fact that tax evasion is an illegal 
activity and prosecuted under the criminal law, whereas tax avoidance is legal but 
may be struck down by the courts under Part IVA. The law does not even consider 
making a distinction between acceptable tax avoidance and abusive tax avoidance, 
which appears to be the trend in other countries, as discussed above. The two 
activities, tax avoidance and tax evasion are clearly different and it illustrates the fact 
that the government is content to blur the distinction. In the US, New Zealand and 
Canada, with their equivalent promoter penalty regimes, the distinction has been 
considered and given appropriate weight and the penalties imposed on promoters of 
tax shelter schemes are significantly less than those being considered in Australia.  
 
According to McCormack and Anderson,70 Australia is not the first country to 
introduce a civil penalty regime to deter promoters of tax exploitation schemes. 
McCormack and Anderson discuss the situation in three countries, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the US and the measures that have been introduced to deter the 
promotion of tax schemes. In New Zealand, the government introduced measures 
designed to encourage the use of tax rulings issued by the Inland Revenue 
Department so that the government can be alerted to new arrangements, in case the 
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law has to be changed to prevent a loss of revenue. The term ‘arrangement’ is very 
broadly defined to include ‘any contract, agreement, plan or understanding’.71  The 
Australian equivalent, a ‘tax exploitation scheme’, has at its core the requirement that 
the entity has the ‘sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a scheme benefit’. In New 
Zealand, the law requires the tax arrangement to be offered, sold or promoted to at 
least ten or more people in New Zealand before it is considered a scheme that is 
caught under the statutory provisions.72 The penalty that can be imposed is the 
amount of income tax shortfall from all participants in the arrangement. The New 
Zealand experience is similar to the Australian situation in that both governments are 
keen to see tax rulings obtained before tax planning arrangements are widely 
marketed to taxpayers. However, trying to obtain a private ruling in Australia 
requires time and money, which runs counter to the whole concept of having a tax 
system based on self-assessment. 
 
In Canada, the law to deter tax schemes was introduced on 29 June 2000 and was 
designed to catch schemes that ‘do not work and result in unwarranted claims for 
deductions’.73 According to McCormack and Anderson, the Canadian approach takes 
a narrow interpretation of the law so that the principles of ‘self-assessment’ are not 
undermined, in that all taxpayers are entitled to prepare their tax returns on the basis 
that they are correct in assessing their income and deductions, and that their position 
has merit, in the absence of any misleading or criminal conduct.74 The penalties in 
Canada are significantly less than those in Australia, namely the greater of $1,000 
and 100 per cent of the gross revenue gained from selling the tax shelter 
arrangement.  
 
In the US, tax shelter promoters are required to register their scheme with the Inland 
Revenue Service. The penalties are the greater of $1,000 and 20 per cent of the gross 
income derived from the arrangement. However, the IRS Internal Revenue Manual, 
Part 20, states that ‘a tax adviser would not be subject to the penalty for suggesting 
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an aggressive but supportable filing position to a client even though that position was 
later rejected by the courts and even though the client was subjected to the 
substantial understatement penalty’.75  
 
There is genuine concern that some taxation advisers may be caught by the law even 
when providing advice to their clients on marketed tax mitigation arrangements. 
There is a fine line between tax planning and tax avoidance but, in both cases, there 
is no criminal conduct on the part of the adviser or taxpayer. It does not appear that 
the government considered the experience in Canada and the US and, in particular, 
the penalty provisions before enacting the new law.  
 
One of the main concerns with the law is that many innovative lending and financial 
arrangements may not be promoted simply because the originators of the plans are 
hesitant to release the products for fear of being subject to very onerous civil 
penalties. Also of major concern is that the self-assessment system may be severely 
undermined as a result of taxation advisers being too frightened to be seen as 
‘promoters of tax exploitation schemes’ when preparing their clients’ tax returns and 
offering taxation advice. The government may well have taken a ‘sledge hammer’ 
approach to a perceived problem, dressed it up as investor protection, but may have 
caused many taxpayers and accounting and law firms to be too frightened to take a 
position that may be considered to be well within the law but, may subsequently, be 
regarded as tax avoidance and then be branded as unscrupulous tax scheme 
‘promoters’. In a situation where an accountant or lawyer is asked by their client to 
provide advice and to use their professional network to establish an investment fund 
with an offshore bank in, say, Singapore, what should they do? They will not be held 
to be engaging in the conduct of being a tax scheme promoter if the structure is not 
marketed to other clients of the firm or other professional practices. However, if that 
client fails to include any foreign income in their tax return each year, is the tax 
adviser then held to be a tax scheme promoter and guilty of a criminal offence? The 
tax adviser would be very wise to have extensive evidence that their client was made 
aware of their obligations to declare all foreign income and that criminal sanctions 
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could be imposed, similar to those imposed on Glenn Wheatley,76 and potentially 
other taxpayers targeted by ‘Operation Wickenby’.  
 
7.5 A Further Example of Blurring:  The AML/CTF Act 
The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
(AML/CTF Act)77 was introduced to overcome the inadequacies of the existing law 
relating to the reporting of cash transactions and to require professional accounting, 
legal and financial advisory firms to report suspect transactions. The law has been 
implemented over a 24 months period to allow businesses to meet their obligations.78 
The first tranche has ‘covered the financial and gambling sectors, bullion dealers and 
lawyers/accountants, but only to the extent that they provide financial services in 
direct competition with the financial sector’.79 The second tranche then applied to 
real estate agents as well as accountants/lawyers carrying out certain transactions, 
such as setting up a company in a foreign country. This means that accountants and 
lawyers will, from 12 December 2008, be required to report their clients if engaged 
in suspicious transactions, such as transmitting money to a tax haven or OFC. On the 
face of it, such conduct would appear to constitute the act of money-laundering 
because the proceeds of that conduct would constitute the proceeds of a crime; in this 
case, the crime being tax related. Even if the client was engaged in legitimate tax 
planning activity, the transfer of funds to a tax haven would need to be reported to 
the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).  
 
The Replacement Explanatory Memorandum80 to the AML/CTF Bill states that the 
‘reforms are a major step in bringing Australia into line with international best 
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practice to deter money laundering and terrorism financing that includes standards 
set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’81 and, hence, the reason for its 
proposed enactment. Prior to the AML/CTF Act, under the Financial Transactions 
Reports Act 1988 (Cth) cash dealers were required to report suspect transactions 
involving $10,000 or more in cash or international funds transfers and the opening of 
bank accounts in Australia. The statutory law in existence prior to 2006 was not 
considered by the government to be adequate, especially with the increase in non-
face to face transactions through electronic transfers. Instead, the AML/CTF Act 
adopts a ‘risk based approach’ to identifying customers that may be engaged in 
money laundering or terrorism financing and applies to a very wide range of 
businesses, not just cash dealers. The use of tax havens and schemes devised by 
lawyers and accountants is now part of the focus of the new law and will be 
comprehensively dealt with in the second tranche of law.  
 
7.5.1 What is ‘money laundering’? 
Much is made of the conduct known as ‘money laundering’ but very little attention is 
paid to defining exactly what are the essential ingredients in the act of engaging in 
‘money laundering’. In the ‘Issues Paper 1, Financial Services Sector’, released as 
part of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department paper on the Anti-Money 
Laundering Reform, an attempt was made to describe ‘What is money laundering?’82 
‘The goal of most criminals is to generate a profit. To enjoy their ill-gotten gains, 
criminals commonly seek to disguise the illegal source of those profits. Money 
laundering is the processing of criminal profits to disguise their illegal origin.’ 
 
In the Australian Law Reform Commission Report 8783 on the Proceeds of Crime 
and, in particular, Part 7, Laundering of Property and Money, the report attempts to 
define money laundering as follows: 
 
The definitions of money laundering most frequently used in domestic legislative 
provisions is derived from that used in the 1988 United Nations Convention against 
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Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 84 which provides that 
money laundering is: 
• the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from any indictable offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person, who is 
involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal 
consequences of his or her actions or  
• the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an indictable offence or offences or from an act of 
participation in such an offence or offences. 85  
 
Similarly, in the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, money laundering is defined as follows: 
 
a. the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, 
for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or 
of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate 
offence to evade the legal consequences of his actions;  
b. the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is proceeds. 86  
 
This means that tax evasion, which constitutes the criminal offence of ‘defrauding 
the Commonwealth’ which is in the Commonwealth Criminal Code,87 could amount 
to money laundering if an OFC or a tax haven was used to disguise or conceal 
income from investments that were not subsequently declared in the Australian 
taxpayers’ tax return. The offence of money laundering is contained in Part 10.2, 
Division 400 of the Criminal Code. The Replacement Explanatory Memorandum to 
the AML/CTF Bill provides the following estimate of the extent of the financial 
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problem faced by the government in terms of money that is being laundered every 
year and not being subject to income tax in Australia: 
 
The size of the money laundering problem cannot be accurately quantified but, in a 
research project funded by AUSTRAC and drawing on a wide range of financial and 
other data relating to 1994, it was estimated that in that year `a range of between $1, 
000 million and $4,500 million would appear to be a sensible interpretation of the 
information provided in these sets of estimates, with perhaps some confidence that 
the most likely figure is around $3,500 million, since this figure lies within all three 
estimate ranges'.88  
 
7.5.2 Designated services – lawyers, accountants and financial advisers 
The concept of requiring businesses engaged in providing ‘designated services’ to 
report suspect customers and obtaining proof of identification are the key measures 
being used by the law to detect suspicious matters. The definition of ‘designated 
services’ is so broad that it will cover all businesses which provide trade credit, 
including all consumer credit transactions. There is also no limit on the money being 
paid for a designated service, except a $1000 limit for stored value cards.  
 
The Act generally requires a business to ‘identify’ new customers before providing a 
service. Circumstances in which a customer can be identified after the service has 
been provided are if the prior identification would disrupt the ordinary course of 
business, the service is specified in the AML/CFT Rules, and: 
- It is not provided face-to-face; or 
- It consists of acquiring or disposing of a security or derivative on 
behalf of a customer; or 
- It consists of issuing or undertaking liability as the insurer under a life 
policy or a sinking fund policy. 
- In some circumstances, the provision of certain low-risk services will 
not require client identification. 
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 J Walker, Estimates Of The Extent of Money Laundering In And Through Australia, AUSTRAC September 
1995, 39. This report is also referred to in the Replacement Explanatory Memorandum to the AML/CTF Bill at 
page 12 to justify the introduction of the law.  
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The AML/CTF Rules are made by AUSTRAC pursuant to powers provided by s 229 
of the AML/CTF Act and, to date, a number of rules have been made.89  
 
Lawyers, accountants and financial advisers are only under an obligation to report 
suspicious matters when providing ‘designated services’. Section 6 of the Act 
contains two tables; the first lists 63 designated services of a financial services nature 
with specific reference to Australian Financial Services License holders (Items 62 
and 63 refer to buying and selling bullion). The second table refers to gambling 
services. Therefore, lawyers, accountants and financial advisers are a reporting entity 
to the extent that they provide designated services. 
 
For example, lawyers acquiring or disposing of securities on behalf of clients, 
creating and dealing with promissory notes, bills of exchange and arranging safe 
deposit box facilities are providing a designated service. Preparing a will is not a 
designated service. However, the purchase of real property and the provision of 
mortgage finance or international transfer of funds is a designated service because 
the transfer of real property and mortgage arrangements can be used to launder 
money.90 Similarly, the creation of a trust or company structure to be used to move 
funds offshore or on shore will be a designated service. The following services are 
not regarded as being ‘designated services’: 
 Preparation of a tax return is not a designated service. 
 Providing advice on what are securities and derivatives. 
 Establishing a superannuation fund and then advising on the investment of 
the funds. 
 Advising on life insurance or a sinking fund insurance policy. 
 
The main thrust of the AML/CTF Act is to require businesses which provide 
designated financial services to have a process to identify their customers. 
Professional advisers are referred to as ‘gatekeepers’ in the Explanatory 
Memorandum because of those people involved in money laundering using the 
services of professionals to launder the money. The government has recognised that 
                                               
89For more details see  AUSTRAC, <www.austrac.gov.au/aml_ctf_rules.html>, at 21 November 2008 
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 Attorney-General’s Department, AML/CTF Bill, Issues Paper 5 – Legal Practitioners – Accountants – 
Company and Trust Service Providers, 5.  
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criminals use sophisticated structures, such as trusts, companies and managed 
investment schemes, to launder money. However, what happens when an existing 
client seeks advice from their lawyer or accountant about establishing an investment 
fund in, say, Singapore, because they want to diversify their investments? Would 
their accountant or lawyer have to report this activity or be in breach of their 
obligations under the AML/CTF compliance requirements, or do they make the 
judgment that the activity is legal and does not amount to money laundering? The 
simple answer is that they must report those transactions to AUSTRAC or face 
serious consequences.  
 
The AML/CTF Act requires professional practices, whether they are engaged in 
accounting, legal or financial planning services, to not only formally identify their 
clients but also to report their activities, that may be suspicious in terms of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, to AUSTRAC. As was mentioned above, the 
government is aware that these types of professional practices provide services to 
those people engaged in money laundering and they want to identify those involved 
so that they can be prosecuted. Unfortunately, taxpayers engaged in tax planning 
activities may be caught by this new law as it makes no distinction between tax 
evasion, tax avoidance or tax planning. Clearly, the government would like to see all 
tax minimisation activity categorised as constituting a criminal offence and then the 
taxpayer can be prosecuted under the Commonwealth Criminal Code for money 
laundering. 
 
7.5.3 International implications of the law 
Designated services are not subject to the new law unless the service is provided in 
Australia through a ‘permanent establishment’ of a Foreign Service provider or the 
service is provided by an Australian resident or a resident subsidiary company 
through a permanent establishment in a foreign country. Will this law result in 
Australians obtaining financial and taxation advice from a non-Australian provider in 
a location outside Australia? This may well be the case and the government will be in 
an even more difficult situation in trying to detect Australian taxpayers engaged in 
tax planning activities in tax havens and OFCs. Similarly, will Australians be 
reluctant to obtain tax planning advice in Australia, even if not engaged in money 
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laundering but legal tax mitigation using a tax haven or OFC? In particular, what 
effect will this law have on Australians using tax havens for legal purposes? Given 
that Australian banks, Australian accounting firms and Australian law firms have 
offices in tax havens in the Asia-Pacific region, their services are subject to the  
AML/CTF Act where they are operating through a permanent establishment in that 
country. These questions will not be answered for a number of years and should 
provide a fertile area for future research. Indeed, as Eden and Kudrle have noted in 
their research as to the future of tax havens in light of initiatives by the OECD and 
now Australia, with the proposed anti-money laundering legislation, at this stage, no 
research has been undertaken into the role of the multi-national enterprises and 
international tax and accounting firms located in tax havens.91   
 
7.6 Implications for the ‘Rule of Law’ 
One of the major implications of the government treating all activity to minimise 
taxation, either by tax avoidance or tax evasion, as constituting criminal activity, is 
that it threatens the ‘rule of law’ by ignoring clear distinctions within the established 
taxation law of Australia on this point and provides the ATO with powers that 
potentially infringe the rights of taxpayers. More importantly, by confusing the issue 
of what constitutes acceptable tax mitigation activity with unacceptable tax 
avoidance, the rule of law is put at risk by the inherent complexity of the current law. 
 
The ‘Rule of Law’ is a principle contained in the English legal system and, as 
enunciated by Professor Dicey, holds that all men are equal under the law except the 
Crown.92 It can also be expressed as the notion ‘that the people and the government 
should obey the law and be ruled by it’ but the legal concept of the ‘rule of law’ is 
not readily definable.93 What is important, in this context, is the fact that there is a 
‘strong correlation between economic growth and a strong rule of law…’.94  In other 
words, a country that ensures that all of its citizens and the government obey the law 
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will have a strong and vibrant economy. If that is the case, then the law must be easy 
to understand and administered fairly, and the doctrine of separation of powers 
should also operate effectively. Parliament, consisting of the elected representatives, 
makes the law, the Executive administers the law and, the Judiciary resolves any 
disputes arising from interpreting the law. In the context of a deliberate blurring of 
the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion, the rule of law has relevance 
because of how the existing law is to be made and interpreted by Parliament, the 
Executive and administrators, and the Judiciary. Professor Walker is of the opinion 
that the rule of law is being eroded due to the number of wide discretions, especially 
in relation to tax avoidance, Part IVA, and provides the following statement to that 
effect: 
 
The ultimate grant of discretionary power is, of course, Part IVA, enacted in 1981 
and to which the rest of the Act is subject. Australia has placed more reliance on the 
GAAR than any other Western democracy, and Part IVA’s supporters argue that it 
may strengthen the rule of law by increasing compliance with tax legislation. The 
problem, however, is that it seeks to encourage compliance by means that 
compromise the rule of law, for example by depending on discretion and opinion.95 
 
Professor Walker contends that there is far too much discretion given to both the 
ATO and the courts in determining what constitutes tax avoidance. He quotes 
extensively from Professor Jeffrey Waincymer in that ‘this approach offends against 
the separation of powers doctrine and the requirement that the laws be made by 
parliament not bureaucrats’.96  
 
One of the key issues that Professor Walker has identified as being conducive to an 
erosion of the rule of law is found in the ATO’s ruling system where, in ‘perhaps 90 
percent of cases these materials are consistent with enacted law, but in the remainder 
the ATO is effectively making its own rules’.97 In 1992, when the ruling system was 
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being introduced into Parliament by the Minister assisting the Treasurer, it was stated 
that ‘the ruling system was touted as promoting certainty for taxpayers and thereby 
reduce their risk and opportunity cost’.98 However, a recent example of where an 
ATO ruling, TR 1999/5 was in conflict with the case law is found in the Federal 
Court decision in Essenbourne Pty Ltd v FCT.99  The ruling was subsequently 
withdrawn on 27 June 2007 after the Commissioner of Taxation had publicly 
disagreed with the decision of Kiefel J through an ATO Media release100 and the 
Commissioner had brought three more cases before the Federal Court in an attempt 
to obtain a Federal Court decision in line with its public ruling, TR 1999/5. In the 
end, all of the Federal Court decisions101 held that there was no fringe benefit in the 
situation involving employee benefit trusts and non-complying superannuation funds. 
The major issue threatening the ‘rule of law’ in this situation was that the 
Commissioner of Taxation was adopting the position of the Parliament and the 
Judiciary in making new taxation law in relation to the fringe benefits tax. The stance 
taken by the ATO went far beyond what is required to administer the taxation law 
and would have added to the confusion facing tax professionals, business and 
individual taxpayers.  
 
Professor Walker provides a number of examples of situations where the discretion 
provided to the Commissioner of Taxation has led to the ATO adopting the role of 
law maker and, as such, threatening the rule of law.102 One example that has serious 
implications for tax administration is the bonus arrangement that auditors are being 
paid for every extra dollar of revenue collected. As Professor Walker states, ‘the 
practice of remunerating tax officers according to the amount of revenue they collect 
recalls the 18th century tax-farming abuses that helped trigger the French 
Revolution’.103  
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7.7 Conclusion 
The distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion, that has been firmly 
established in the Australian common law, is still of great importance when dealing 
with taxation issues domestically. However, it would appear that the Australian 
Government is determined to ignore the distinction between tax avoidance, a legal 
activity, and tax evasion, a criminal activity, when it comes to Australian taxpayers 
engaging in tax planning in a tax haven or through the use of an OFC. The 
government has recognised that many tax schemes involved the use of tax havens 
and appear to have designed a set of laws to deter the promotion of tax schemes that 
make no distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Similarly, in relation to 
the law to detect and eliminate money laundering, once again, the government 
appears to have deliberately blurred the difference between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. The AML/CTF Act would appear to designate that all measures to reduce 
and minimise income tax through the use of tax havens constitutes criminal activity 
and, therefore, justifies the tax haven in breaching its bank secrecy laws. The fact 
that the rights of the taxpayer may be adversely affected and the taxpayer wrongly 
being accused of criminal activity is of no concern for the government when trying to 
maximise government revenue.  
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CHAPTER 8 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
AGREEMENTS WITH TAX HAVENS: HOW WILL 
THIS AFFECT THE RIGHTS OF NON-RESIDENT 
TAXPAYERS AND INVESTORS? 
8.1 Introduction 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) appears to 
have been successful in convincing tax havens and countries with strict bank secrecy 
laws to exchange information on non-resident taxpayers, investors and businesses 
using their financial services. The OECD announced that representatives of over 100 
governments met in Mexico on 1 September 2009 to discuss the next steps in 
improving transparency and exchange of banking information. While this situation 
may be good for tax administrators in the pursuit of their goal of maximising the 
collection of tax revenue, the main question that is examined in this chapter is where 
does it leave the non-resident taxpayer and foreign investor in terms of their right to 
privacy and the right to maintain the confidentiality of their financial and banking 
details? The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has statutory powers that provide an 
extensive right to access information about a taxpayer’s dealings, both within 
Australia and overseas. ‘Operation Wickenby’, a joint operation between the ATO, 
the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police and a number of 
government agencies are trying to detect Australian taxpayer’s operating foreign 
bank accounts and evading income tax through the use of tax havens.1 Some of the 
methods being used by the taskforce to obtain information about taxpayers is 
examined in this Chapter. Currently the Australian taxpayer has some rights to 
protect their privacy or to keep confidential their financial affairs, in certain 
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situations. One of the major concerns about the tax information exchange agreements 
is that tax authorities may be able to access information about their resident 
taxpayers without restriction and without the taxpayer or investor being given the 
right to intervene or be consulted. This chapter will commence with an examination 
of the existing rights of the taxpayer, both domestically and internationally, as well 
as the powers of the ATO. The chapter will then assess whether the OECD’s ‘model 
tax information exchange agreements’ will reduce the rights that the taxpayer 
currently possesses.  
 
The OECD and the European Union (EU) are anxious to end the movement of 
capital to low or no tax jurisdictions that have strong bank secrecy laws. The 
OECD’s harmful tax competition project has been successful in convincing tax 
havens and OFCs to exchange bank details with OECD member states by way of bi-
lateral agreements. The OECD’s harmful tax competition project as well as the 
recent actions by the G20 is examined in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The 
OECD can claim to have had success with the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) states of the Caribbean and, more recently with the assistance 
of the G20 nations, success with the European countries with strong bank secrecy 
laws. It would appear that with the agreement by Switzerland, Austria and 
Luxembourg, the days of tax havens not being prepared to exchange information on 
non-resident taxpayers are coming to an end. The G20 Ministers at the London 
conference announced that ‘the era of banking secrecy is over’.2 The harmful tax 
competition initiative generated by the OECD has been viewed as the destruction of 
privacy by requiring these sovereign states to breach confidentiality by disclosing 
bank account information.3   
 
The second and third parts of the chapter will discuss the rights to privacy that 
existing taxpayers have, both from a domestic perspective and an international 
perspective. The fourth part of the chapter will examine the likely impact the OECD 
initiated tax information exchange agreements will have on the rights of privacy and 
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confidentiality of non-resident taxpayers and investors operating in the international 
arena.  
 
The Australian Commissioner of Taxation has appealed to tax agents in Australia to 
‘dob’4 in tax scheme promoters and clients with undeclared overseas income. This 
statement was made as part of the offensive by the ATO against tax havens which 
receive up to $5.3 billion a year from Australia.5 The ATO encourages the public to 
report suspected tax cheats either by telephone or through the Internet. However, tax 
agents now have a separate line to report suspect action of other tax agents or even 
their own clients.6 If this approach was to be accepted by tax agents in Australia, 
what are the implications for both the taxpayers and the tax adviser and accountants? 
It is contended in this chapter that tax advisers and accountants owe a fiduciary duty 
to their clients who require them to maintain the confidentiality of their financial 
information. However, should they place their clients first or do they have a higher 
duty to the community and, in turn, the ATO, which requires them to report the 
conduct of their client if their client’s activities will result in not paying the correct 
amount of tax.  
 
By way of contrast, the Internal Revenue Service in the US pays a reward to tax 
informers and has been doing this since 1867.7 More recently, the Bush 
Administration introduced the Tax Relief and Health Care Act 2006 which amended 
the previous informant reward program and introduced a ‘whistleblower’ program 
with rewards up to 30 percent of the tax, penalties and interest collected.8 As a 
countervailing measure, US State parliaments have specifically enacted laws making 
it a crime for accountants and lawyers to disclose confidential information about 
their clients in relation to taxation matters.9 Accountants and lawyers in Australia 
                                               
4
 The term ‘dob’ is Australian slang for to report or to inform someone in authority about a persons’ behaviour. 
5
 Fleur Anderson, ‘ATO urges tax agents to dob in cheats’, Australian Financial Review Sydney, 9 October 2007, 
1. 
6
 However, according to Justin Dabner this may have been put on hold as a result of opposition from the 
accounting profession. See Justin Dabner, ‘An update on the OECD’s harmful tax practices project’, (2004) 40 
CCH Tax Week, 76. 
7
 Kneave Riggall, ‘Should Tax Informants Be Paid? The Law and Economics of a Government Monopsony’, 
(2008-2009) 28 Virginia Tax Review 237, 239. 
8
 Ibid, 241. 
9
 Ibid, 274. 
207 
have a similar duty to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of their clients’ 
details. It is contended that, in most cases, these duties are based on the fiduciary 
relationship they have with their client. 
 
There are established mechanisms that enable tax administrators in one country to 
obtain financial information about the business and investment activities of their own 
taxpayers in another country. This is achieved through a Double Taxation Agreement 
(DTA). One of the main purposes of a DTA is to provide the contracting states with 
the right of the home state to obtain financial and banking information about their 
residents engaged in business or investment activities within the territory of the other 
contracting state. Therefore, within countries with DTAs, the taxpayer has always 
been liable to have their foreign financial information disclosed to the tax 
administration in their home state. However, one of the main features of tax havens 
is that they have not actively entered into DTAs with other countries for this very 
reason. DTAs are discussed in detail below.  
 
It should also be noted that tax havens and OFCs generate substantial income from 
the provision of banking, financial, legal and accounting services. In effect, the tax 
avoidance and tax evasion industry provides the income for tax havens and OFCs to 
survive and prosper and, in many cases this is the main generator of the country’s 
revenue. It is understandable that tax havens have strong bank secrecy laws and an 
incentive to maintain the privacy of their non-resident taxpayers. 
 
8.2 The Rights of the Taxpayer - The Australian Position 
Australia has a ‘self-assessment’ system of taxation in that all income tax returns, as 
well as Fringe Benefit Tax returns and Business Activity Statements, are accepted at 
face value and are not subject to immediate scrutiny. This means that the 
Commissioner of Taxation has certain powers to check the veracity of claims by 
taxpayers.10 Every year, the ATO collects financial information about its citizens, 
including interest earned on bank deposits, the receipt of dividends, employment 
information, including income tax paid under the ‘pay-as-you-go withholding system 
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208 
(PAYGW), the sale of shares and real property, the purchase of motor vehicles and 
boats over a certain monetary limit and, a whole range of transactions that involve 
money derived in Australia or overseas. The main method used by the ATO to track 
these transactions is through the need for all taxpayers to have a Tax File Number 
(TFN). The penalty for not having a TFN is that tax is withheld at source at the rate 
of 46.5 percent.11 For business taxpayers, the requirement is to have an Australian 
Business Number (ABN), a TFN, registration for Goods and Services Tax (GST), if 
sales are over a defined amount,12 the lodgement of a Business Activity Statement 
(BAS) monthly, quarterly or yearly,13 with the result that the ATO has a very good 
indication of the financial position of each business deriving income in Australia 
before a tax return is lodged each year. There is very little that the ATO does not 
know about the finances of the individual and, with developments in exchanging 
information between Australia and other countries, even foreign finances will be part 
of the vast amount of information gathered by the ATO each year. Even when 
visiting accountants or lawyers stay in Australia, their client lists, which may be 
contained on a data file within the laptop computer, can be seized by the police and 
used in the prosecution of Australian taxpayers.14  
 
The crucial issue with the collection of taxes and administering the tax law is to 
balance the rights of the taxpayer with maximising the collection of revenue. From 
the perspective of the tax administrator, the ATO, the Australian taxpayer has a 
number of basic rights that are encapsulated in the ‘Taxpayers’ Charter’. The charter 
was first introduced in Australia on 4 July 1997 and was the result of a parliamentary 
inquiry into the administration of the tax system.15  
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8.2.1 The Taxpayers’ Charter 
The Charter outlines the relationship the ATO seeks with the community and is 
stated to be one of mutual trust and respect. To this end, the Charter sets out the 
following:  
 taxpayers' rights under the law;  
 the service and other standards taxpayers' can expect from the ATO;  
 what taxpayers can do if they are dissatisfied with the ATO's decisions, 
actions or service, or if they wish to complain; and  
 taxpayers' important tax obligations.  
 
The Charter contains two specific rights relating to privacy and confidentiality. At 
point 5, the ATO assures taxpayers that they respect their privacy and assure 
taxpayers that they are collecting the information in a fair and lawful way that is not 
unreasonably intrusive and, furthermore, will advise the taxpayer of the reason why 
the information is being collected, especially from third parties, and the purpose to 
which the information will be used. The information will only be shared with another 
person or organisation if it is authorised by the law. The ATO is also bound by the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Privacy Commissioner can investigate a complaint 
by the taxpayer. 
 
At point 6, the ATO assures taxpayers that all information collected will be kept 
confidential unless the disclosure is authorised by the law. However, the Charter has 
not been given legislative force and, as such, does not provide taxpayers with any 
legal basis in which to bring an action against the ATO based on a breach of their 
obligations. At best, it provides some comfort and a legitimate expectation that the 
ATO will act with some level of professionalism in their dealings with the taxpayer. 
The concept of what is meant by the taxpayer having a ‘legitimate expectation’ that 
the ATO will adhere to the Charter is discussed by Margaret McLennan16 and 
clarified in the judgment of Deane J in Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs (Haoucher) (1990) 169 CLR 648. The opinion expressed by Deane J 
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can be summarised as where statutory power is being exercised, a person has a 
legitimate expectation that they will be treated with procedural fairness.  
 
The notion of a ‘legitimate expectation’ which gives rise to a prima facie entitlement 
to procedural fairness or natural justice in the exercise of statutory power or authority 
is well established in the law of this country. 17 
 
Margaret McLennan discusses the impact the Charter has on the ATO and their duty 
to treat taxpayers in a fair and reasonable manner.18 McLennan acknowledges the 
extension of administrative law into the revenue area by virtue of the introduction of 
a Charter and the expectations of taxpayers in their dealings with the ATO.19 
 
The Charter sets out five main obligations of the taxpayer and they are described as 
follows: 
 Honesty - taxpayers are required to provide complete and accurate 
information in preparing returns and ruling requests.  
 Record keeping - taxpayers are required to keep the records required by law 
to support the positions taken in relation to their taxation affairs. Generally, 
records must be kept in English for a period of 5 years.  
 Reasonable care - the Charter states that taxpayers are required to take 
reasonable care to fulfil their taxation obligations. Assistance may be 
obtained from the ATO.  
 Timely lodgement - documents required to be lodged by the taxation 
legislation are required to be lodged by the dates specified in the legislation. 
Where an extension is required, taxpayers should contact the ATO.  
 Prompt payment - taxpayers are obliged to ensure that taxes and other 
amounts due are paid by the due date. Taxpayers experiencing payment 
difficulties should contact the ATO to discuss the possibility of obtaining an 
extension of time to pay.  
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The ‘right to privacy’ and ‘breach of confidentiality’ are used in this Chapter in a 
general sense to explain that taxpayers have an expectation that their private affairs 
will not be unlawfully disclosed to the public. The Charter, as discussed above, 
provides taxpayers with an expectation that the ATO will not unlawfully disclose 
their financial details.  
 
One main issue that is at odds with the right of the taxpayer to privacy and is 
contrary to the concept of mutual trust and respect, as contained in the Taxpayer’s 
Charter, is the ease by which information about a taxpayer can be obtained from third 
parties.20 Taxpayers are not given notice of the ATO’s intention to obtain 
information from third parties and third parties are placed in a position where they 
could potentially infringe their legal obligations under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) by 
not informing the taxpayer of the situation and not obtaining their consent. However, 
in relation to criminal matters the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) has powers 
under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
and the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) to obtain information about 
suspected criminals from third parties subject to the Privacy Act 1988. Tang argues 
that taxpayers should have the right to contest the release of information in what has 
been described as a ‘reverse-FOI procedure’.21 This approach is in line with the 
Australian Law Reform Commission report on privacy in advocating that all personal 
information should be kept confidential and that a person affected by disclosure of 
that information by a third party should be subject to objection by the person so 
affected.22 However, the ATO would contend that, in order to effectively collect 
revenue in some cases, the taxpayer should not receive advance notice. This is the 
situation when documents are obtained from a third party pursuant to a notice under s 
263, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 36) or a warrant to seize 
documents from a third party. These mechanisms for obtaining information by the 
ATO are discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
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 Tang, above n 10, 27. 
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 Ibid, 26. 
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8.2.2 Duty of confidentiality 
It is not proposed to discuss the equitable breach of confidence action in detail or to 
examine the concept of information as ‘property’ in the context of an analysis of the 
rights of taxpayers. It is well established in the common law that trade secrets and 
commercial intellectual property are protected by equity.23 Similarly, certain private 
and public organisations are governed by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) in order to 
protect confidential information. This issue was discussed in some detail by Tang 
and the fact that organisations breach their legal obligation to maintain the privacy of 
information of individuals when served with notices under s 263 or s 264, ITAA 
36.24 The protection of the public revenue is paramount and rights provided by the 
Privacy legislation are secondary. The coercive powers under s 263 and s 264 
provide access powers beyond those provided to the police. The police require a 
search warrant to access information for criminal proceedings but they are not 
required by the ATO when the revenue is being threatened.25 However, the focus of 
this section is to examine what protection the law provides to a taxpayer in their 
confidential dealings with their tax adviser. In particular, how comfortable can a 
taxpayer be in maintaining the confidential nature of their financial details, including 
arrangements that may involve investments in tax havens and OFCs with their tax 
adviser, given that the Commissioner of Taxation would like that same tax adviser to 
report their client’s activities to the ATO? The legal action for breach of confidence 
has, according to P.D. Finn, only matured in recent decades into a rule that ‘those 
who receive information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it’.26  
 
It is established law that certain people or institutions have a duty to keep 
information confidential.27 This duty is based on trade secrets, the existence of a 
special relationship, such as lawyer and their client, accountant and their client or a 
director and the company.28 If a tax adviser or accountant were to take notice of the 
Commissioner of Taxation’s advice and report their clients that have foreign 
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undeclared income, then they would breach their duty of confidentiality. If the 
adviser and client are in a fiduciary relationship, then the taxpayer can take legal 
action on the basis of the special relationship. However, if that special relationship 
does not exist, the taxpayer must then rely on the common law to provide the basis 
for legal action for breach of confidence. The concept of fiduciary duties is based on 
a duty of ‘loyalty’.29 According to Dal Pont and Chalmers, the duties are 
‘proscriptive’ in that the person owing their client a fiduciary duty must ensure that 
they comply with the ‘no conflict’ duty and the ‘no profit’ duty. 30  
 
8.2.3 Fiduciary relationship 
It is contended in this chapter that accountants, tax agents and tax advisers are in a 
fiduciary relationship with their clients, the taxpayer and as such owe their client 
certain fiduciary duties.31 Moreover, it is equally contended that bookkeepers 
engaged in preparing Business Activity Statements (BAS) are also in a fiduciary 
relationship with their clients and owe them particular fiduciary duties. 
 
In the High Court case of Hospital Products Limited v Unites States Surgical 
Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, Mason J made the following observation about the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship: 
 
The accepted fiduciary relationships are sometimes referred to as relationships of 
trust and confidence or confidential relations (cf. Phipps v. Boardman [1966] UKHL 
2; (1967) 2 AC 46, at p 127), viz., trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, 
solicitor and client, employee and employer, director and company, and partners. 
The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to 
act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power 
or discretion which will affect the interests of that other  person in a legal or practical 
sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary 
a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that 
other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his  position. 
The expressions ‘for’, ‘on behalf of" and ‘in the interests of’ signify that the 
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fiduciary acts in a "representative" character in the exercise of his responsibility, to 
adopt an expression used by the Court of Appeal.  
 
It is partly because the fiduciary's exercise of the power or discretion can adversely 
affect the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed, and because the latter is 
at the mercy of the former, that the fiduciary comes under a duty to exercise his 
power or discretion in the interests of the person to whom it is owed. See generally, 
Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1975) 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 1, 
at pp.4-8.32 
 
In the case of Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165, Kirby J 
examined in detail the tests to be used in determining the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship.33 Applying the tests as enunciated by Kirby J, it can be strenuously 
argued that an accountant, registered tax agent, tax adviser and registered bookkeeper 
stand in a fiduciary relationship with their client. As such, the duty to maintain the 
privacy and confidentiality of their clients’ personal financial details is of paramount 
importance. If they fail to uphold this duty, then they should face the prospect of 
being sued for damages and, if the code of conduct for the professional body requires 
a duty of confidentiality, be investigated and sanctioned by the appropriate 
professional body for misconduct. 
 
8.2.4 Right to privacy 
A right to privacy is not as well established in the law as is the duty of 
confidentiality.34 Traditionally, privacy has been protected through the equitable 
doctrine of ‘breach of confidence’.35 However, as a result of the High Court decision 
in the case of ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, the door has 
been left open to introduce a common law action at some time in the future. 36 Since 
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this decision there have been two lower court decisions that have held that a cause of 
action for breach of privacy exists in the Australian common law.37  
 
In the UK, the Court of Appeal in the case of Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2002] WLR 992 
recognised that a right of privacy had developed in the law.38  The Court also 
recognised the influence that Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had on the equitable doctrine of breach 
of confidence.39 
 
The main problem with relying on using the breach of confidence action to either 
prevent a tax adviser disclosing information or suing for damages is that it requires 
the existence of a special relationship. This does not exist if the disclosure of 
information is made by a third party, as was the case in the ABC v Lenah Game 
Meats case. For example, what if an employee of the tax adviser disclosed 
information about the taxpayer to the ATO and then left the employment? The 
taxpayer has no special relationship to the former employee, only to the tax adviser. 
It is contended in this chapter that, in order for the Australian law to provide 
protection for taxpayers, there needs to be in existence a strong legal safeguard 
against unauthorised disclosure. Much has been written on this area of law especially 
in relation to non-disclosure restrictions contained in employment contracts and their 
effectiveness in protecting confidential information.40 However, it is not intended to 
examine this aspect in this Chapter. 
 
8.2.5 Information gathering powers of the ATO 
Sections 263 and 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 36) 
provide the ATO with coercive power to obtain information from the taxpayer and 
third parties. Section 263 allows the Commissioner or his delegate to enter buildings 
and take copies of documents, records and data stored on computers, provided it is 
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undertaken for the purpose of administering the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 or 
1997. Section 264 requires the recipient of the notice, being either the taxpayer or a 
third party, to provide information to the Commissioner. Both sections are 
reproduced below together with s 8C of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) 
(TAA) which makes it an offence to refuse to comply with the notices. A taxpayer 
served with a notice pursuant to s 263 or s 264 has the right to claim legal 
professional privilege to maintain the confidentiality of certain documents.41 The 
privilege against self-incrimination is abrogated by virtue of s 8C,42  as discussed 
below. In fact, failure to comply with either a s 263 or s 264 notice is a strict liability 
offence, s 8C, TAA.  The implications for claiming legal professional privilege or the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and the way in which taxation law takes 
precedence over the rights of the taxpayer, are discussed below. 
 
Section 263 - Access to books, etc   
 
(1) The Commissioner, or any officer authorized by him in that behalf, shall at all 
times have full and free access to all buildings, places, books, documents and 
other papers for any of the purposes of this Act, and for that purpose may make 
extracts from or copies of any such books, documents or papers. 
(2) An officer is not entitled to enter or remain on or in any building or place under 
this section if, on being requested by the occupier of the building or place for 
proof of authority, the officer does not produce an authority in writing signed 
by the Commissioner stating that the officer is authorised to exercise powers 
under this section. 
(3) The occupier of a building or place entered or proposed to be entered by the 
Commissioner, or by an officer, under subsection (1) shall provide the 
Commissioner or the officer with all reasonable facilities and assistance for the 
effective exercise of powers under this section. 
Penalty: 30 penalty units. 
 
Section 264 - Commissioner to obtain information and evidence  
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(1) The Commissioner may by notice in writing require any person, whether a 
taxpayer or not, including any officer employed in or in connexion with any 
department of a Government or by any public authority: 
(a) to furnish him with such information as he may require; and 
(b) to attend and give evidence before him or before any officer authorized by 
him in that behalf concerning his or any other person's income or 
assessment, and may require him to produce all books, documents and 
other papers whatever in his custody or under his control relating thereto. 
(2) The Commissioner may require the information or evidence to be given on oath 
or affirmation and either verbally or in writing, and for that purpose he or the 
officer so authorized by him may administer an oath or affirmation. 
(3) The regulations may prescribe scales of expenses to be allowed to persons 
required under this section to attend. 
 
Under these coercive powers, a taxpayer does not have the ability to remain silent or 
the ability to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. If a taxpayer fails to 
comply with either a s 263 or s 264 notice, they face prosecution under s 8C of the 
TAA. Section 8C is reproduced below as follows: 
 
Section 8C - Failure to comply with requirements under taxation law  
(1) A person who refuses or fails, when and as required under or pursuant to 
a taxation law to do so - 
(a) to furnish an approved form or any information to the Commissioner or 
another person; or 
(aa) to give information to the Commissioner in the manner in which it is 
required under a taxation law to be given; or 
(b) to lodge an instrument with the Commissioner or another person for 
assessment; or 
(c) (Repealed by Act 101 of 2006) 
(d) to notify the Commissioner or another person of a matter or thing; or 
(e) to produce a book, paper, record or other document to the Commissioner 
or another person; or 
(f) to attend before the Commissioner or another person; or 
(g) to apply for registration or cancellation of registration under the A New 
Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ; or 
(h) to comply with a requirement under subsection 45A(2) of the Product 
Grants and  Benefits Administration Act 2000 ; or 
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(i) to comply with subsection 82-10F(4) of the Income Tax (Transitional 
Provisions)  Act 1997 ; 
  - is guilty of an offence. 
(1A) An offence under subsection (1) is an offence of absolute liability. For 
"absolute liability", see section 6.2 of the Criminal Code.  
(1B) Subsection (1) does not apply to the extent that the person is not capable of 
complying with the relevant paragraph. A defendant bears an evidential burden 
in relation to the matters in subsection (1B), see subsection 13.3(3) of the 
Criminal Code.  
 
As a result of the ATO’s coercive powers pursuant to s 263 and s 264, together with 
s 8C of the TAA, where does that leave the Australian taxpayer in respect of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to claim legal professional privilege 
to protect certain documents and communications from disclosure? Both of these 
rights will be examined in detail below. 
 
8.2.6 Privilege against self-incrimination 
The privilege against self-incrimination is different from the common law right to 
remain silent. The right to remain silent simply means that a person, in the absence of 
some legal compulsion to answer questions from persons in a position of authority, is 
free to remain silent and do nothing without fear of having an adverse inference 
drawn at any subsequent proceeding.43 The privilege against self-incrimination only 
arises where a person is compelled to answer questions or provide documents, as is 
the situation with s 263 and s 264, ITAA 36 and s 8C, TAA. The privilege is also 
contained in s 128 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Cth). 
 
The case of Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v De Vonk (1995) 31 ATR 481, 
concerned the issue of a s 264 notice while the taxpayer, De Vonk, had been indicted 
for a criminal offence relating to a dishonest representation to the ATO and 
conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth. The taxpayer was prepared to comply 
with the notice once the criminal proceeding had been completed but, in the 
meantime, argued that he had the right not to answer questions on the grounds that 
answers to those questions would tend to incriminate him. He further argued that the 
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issue of the s 264 notice was an abuse of power by the ATO. In the joint judgment of 
Hill and Lindgren JJ, the following passage provides an excellent summary of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and its limited use in taxation matters: 
It is the genius of the common law that it gave rise to judge-made rules protecting 
the citizen  in response to perceived abuses of fundamental rights and freedoms. One 
such rule was the right of the individual to remain silent in circumstances where his 
or her testimony might tend to incriminate. As McHugh J points out in 
Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 
477, the so-called privilege against self-incrimination arose in the 17th century as a 
result of dissatisfaction with the practices of the Council of Star Chamber and the 
Court of High Commission (see at CLR 543-4). Certainly by the end of the reign of 
Charles II it was accepted that an accused person might refuse to answer a question 
which might tend to incriminate him.  
 
Those critical of the modern ability of the common law to protect the rights of 
individuals who seek now to espouse the entrenchment of a Bill of Rights into the 
Constitution, point to the concomitant and alleged weakness of the common law, 
namely, that it is subject to any rights which may be found expressly or by 
implication in a written constitution, subject to the overriding supremacy of 
Parliament. Thus, it remains open at any time for Parliament to legislate common 
law rights out of existence. While it is accepted that fundamental common law rights 
may be abrogated by Parliament, the courts will not lightly presume that Parliament 
intended so to do. 
 
The principles to be applied have been enunciated in a series of decisions in the High 
Court commencing with Mortimer v Brown (1971) 122 CLR 493 and concluding 
with Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486. In the last of those cases, Mason CJ (at 
CLR 495) said: 
 
The privilege against self-incrimination can only be abrogated by the 
manifestation of a clear legislative intention. The intention may nonetheless be 
demonstrated by reference to express words or necessary implication ... But the 
privilege is not lightly abrogated, and the phrase "necessary implication" 
imports a high degree of certainty as to legislative intention. 
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… It may be noted at this point that it has now been established as the law in 
Australia that the privilege against self-incrimination is not confined to judicial 
proceedings. Rather, it has been held to apply to administrative proceedings so 
as to afford a defence to the failure to answer questions, unless otherwise 
statutorily abrogated: Pyneboard at CLR 341 and Sorby at CLR 309.44 
 
In terms of whether a taxpayer has the right to refuse to comply with the s 264 notice 
on the grounds of self-incrimination, Hill and Lindgren JJ concluded that, as a result 
of s 8C being inserted into the TAA in 1984, the privilege against self-incrimination 
had been abrogated. The following passage sets out their reasoning: 
 
In these circumstances we are of the view expressed in Stergis v FCT  (9189) 20 
ATR 591; 89 ATC 4442 that the context of the legislation combined with the terms 
of ss 8C and 8D lead to the conclusion that the privilege has been abrogated. Clearly 
it is of the utmost importance that a taxpayer disclose to the Commissioner all 
sources of income. Failure so to do would constitute an offence. If the argument 
were to prevail that the privilege against self-incrimination was intended to be 
retained in tax matters, it would be impossible for the Commissioner to interrogate a 
taxpayer about sources of income since any question put on that subject might tend 
to incriminate the taxpayer by showing that the taxpayer had not complied with the 
initial obligation to return all sources of income. Such an argument would totally 
stultify the collection of income tax.45  
 
In view of the finding of the majority of the Full Bench of the Federal Court in the 
De Vonk case, the privilege against self-incrimination provides no safeguard for a 
taxpayer facing a s 264 notice due to the effect of s 8C of the TAA. However, Hill 
and Lindgren JJ did find that an examination under a s 264 notice could amount to a 
contempt of court and an interference in the administration of criminal justice. The 
following passage from the judgment highlights the risk that a s 264 notice may be 
invalidated where criminal or civil proceedings are underway, or a real possibility, in 
the future: 
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Even if s 264 of the Act required questions to be answered, notwithstanding that so 
to do would otherwise constitute a contempt of court, it would not follow that the 
fact that questions so asked might tend to interfere with the administration of justice 
would be an irrelevant consideration in the Commissioner's deciding whether to 
interrogate or to put particular questions. Even were contempt not to excuse the 
failure to answer questions put under s 264 of the Act, failure to take into account 
the possibility that a compulsory interrogation might interfere with the course of 
justice could invalidate the giving of a notice under s 264 or the exercise of power 
under it. In such circumstances, there is much to be said for the approach adopted by 
Wilcox J of requiring the conduct of the interrogation to be deferred pending the 
conclusion of the criminal proceedings.46 
 
The only benefit a taxpayer has in relation to the privilege against self-incrimination 
is that a s 264 notice should not be used to obtain information in any pending or 
subsequent criminal prosecution; otherwise, the conduct by the ATO may be 
construed as interfering with the administration of justice. However, Lisa West 
contends that any evidence gathered under a s 264 notice for audit purposes could be 
used as evidence if a prosecution is launched but it may be excluded by a court on 
grounds of unfairness.47  West does concede that s 263 and s 264 notices should not 
be used for the dominant purpose of gathering information for criminal purposes. 
This view is supported by the decision of Hill and Lindgren JJ in the De Vonk case as 
stated above.48 
 
8.2.7 Legal professional privilege  
If the Commissioner of Taxation serves a notice pursuant to s 263 or s 264, ITAA 36 
the only means available to an Australian taxpayer to prevent access by the ATO to 
certain documents and advice is to claim legal professional privilege. That privilege 
will prevent the disclosure of written communication between the taxpayer and their 
lawyer relating to certain legal advice and legal services in some instances. There are 
exceptions to this privilege and they are discussed below. 
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The concept underlying the justification for upholding legal professional privilege is 
explained by Professor Ligertwood 49 as the right of all citizens to obtain legal 
advice, which is at the core of the rule of law and protection of human rights. It is 
especially important as a bulwark against tyranny and oppression.50 If citizens are to 
fully understand their rights, they must be encouraged to communicate with lawyers 
through open and frank discussions and this can only be achieved if the 
communications are protected from disclosure.51 Legal professional privilege is 
described as a ‘substantive right which applies to prevent any compulsory access to 
client-lawyer communications’.52   
 
The concept of legal professional privilege has been recognised by the Evidence Act 
1995 (Cth) as providing two privileges; an advice privilege (s 118) and a litigation 
privilege (s 119). The sections provide for the written communications between a 
legal adviser and their client to be kept confidential provided the communication was 
made or the written advice was prepared for the ‘dominant purpose’ of the lawyer in 
providing that advice. The sections are reproduced as follows: 
 
Section 118 - Legal advice:  
Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing 
the evidence would result in disclosure of:  
(a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or  
(b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for 
the client; or  
(c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) 
prepared by the client, lawyer or another person;  
- for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing 
legal advice to the client.  
Section 119 – Litigation: 
Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing 
the evidence would result in disclosure of:  
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(a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or 
between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; 
or  
(b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that 
was prepared;  
- for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal 
services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding 
before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in 
which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.  
 
The specific provisions of the Commonwealth Evidence Act have been reproduced 
above, but all states have similar provisions in their own Evidence Acts, commonly 
known as the ‘uniform Evidence Act’.  
 
The common law approach to legal professional privilege had adopted a ‘sole 
purpose’ test as being the test to be used to determine whether the communication 
between the lawyer and client should be protected from disclosure, but this view was 
changed by the High Court decision in the case of Esso Australia Resources Limited 
v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. The High Court finally resolved 
this issue and the majority found in favour of a ‘dominant purpose’ test similar to the 
statutory requirements. The main concern of the High Court was that, in a large 
company with in-house lawyers, many documents were capable of having the 
privilege attached to them when that may not have been the original intent of the 
legal advice in the first place. The sole purpose test was seen as being too rigid and 
absolute and that a more practical application was required.53  
 
The judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ provides an excellent 
summary of the basis of the existence of legal professional privilege and the practical 
issues to be considered in its application:   
 
Legal professional privilege (or client legal privilege) protects the confidentiality of 
certain communications made in connection with giving or obtaining legal advice or 
the provision of legal services, including representation in proceedings in a court. In 
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the ordinary course of events, citizens engage in many confidential communications, 
including communications with professional advisers, which are not protected from 
compulsory disclosure. The rationale of the privilege has been explained in a number 
of cases, including Baker v Campbell, and Grant v Downs itself. The privilege exists 
to serve the public interest in the administration of justice by encouraging full and 
frank disclosure by clients to their lawyers.54 
 
The majority of the High Court, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ, 
held that the correct test is the dominant purpose test, which is the common law test 
for claiming legal professional privilege.55  
 
8.2.8 Tax advisers and professional privilege 
In June 2005, the New Zealand Government introduced statutory law to extend the 
professional privilege to tax advisers.56 The US had extended the privilege to tax 
advisers from as early as 1998.57 Keith Kendall contends that there is a logical 
argument to extend the privilege to tax advisers in Australia on the basis that 
registered tax agents are given a statutory right to provide advice on tax law and that 
many tax agents are not lawyers.58 Section 251L(1), ITAA 36 provides a penalty for 
the provision of advice on taxation law unless a registered tax agent or a barrister or 
solicitor. This view, namely that the privilege should be extended to registered tax 
agents and their clients,  is supported by the ATO in their ‘Access and Information 
Gathering Manual, Chapter 7 – Guidelines to Accessing Professional Accounting 
Advisors’ Papers’. The manual is used by ATO staff but it is available to the public 
through the ATO website. While the ATO acknowledges the practical effect of 
providing a privilege from disclosure of certain source documents, there is no 
legislative or common law justification for this approach. According to Kendall, the 
existence of these guidelines has created a legitimate expectation of the 
confidentiality of certain documents between a tax adviser and their client and this 
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has been supported in two Federal Court decisions.59 Kendall is in favour of 
extending the privilege to non-lawyer tax advisers on the basis of their need to be 
registered tax agents before they can provide advice. The fact that both the US and 
New Zealand have extended the privilege, coupled with the fact that the ATO 
recognises the role played by accountants in the taxation process, should be reason 
enough for the privilege to be extended in Australia. This view is also supported by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission as discussed in their report titled ‘Privilege 
in Perspective: Client Legal Privilege in Federal Investigations’.60 It would appear 
that it is only a matter of time before the privilege will be extended to tax advisers in 
Australia.61 
 
8.2.9 Exceptions to the privilege – crime and fraud 
The legal professional privilege to protect written communication between a lawyer 
and their client is lost when the documents relate to an activity involving a crime or 
fraud. The privilege is also lost if the client of the lawyer waives their right to claim 
protection under the privilege. Both of these exceptions will be examined as they 
relate to the rights of taxpayers and the ATO.   
 
In the case of Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal 
Police (2001) 48 ATR 650, North J held that the crime and fraud exception 
prevented the legal professional privilege being used to protect certain documents 
between the lawyer and client from being disclosed to the Australian Federal Police 
even though the alleged fraud was committed by a third party.  
 
While this exception to the application of legal professional privilege may be sound 
law, what then is the situation where the third party, as in this case, is eventually 
found not to be guilty of the serious crime of defrauding the Commonwealth, but the 
claim for protecting the confidentiality of the documents had not been granted some 
years earlier on the basis of the fraud exception? From the perspective of the 
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taxpayer and their right to maintain the confidentiality of certain written 
communications, the basis on which this exception has been applied would tend to 
suggest that the tax administrator has been granted an unfair advantage. This view is 
supported by Vincent Morfuni when he contends that the extension of the exemption 
of the privilege to third parties contradicts the widely held view that legal 
professional privilege is a fundamental right and he hopes that an appellate court will 
restore the exception to its traditional boundary.62 Morfuni63 advocates the 
restoration of the view taken by Deane J in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 
161 CLR 475 where he stated that: 
 
Its efficacy as a bulwark against tyranny and oppression depends upon the 
confidence of the community that it will in fact be enforced. That being so, it is not 
to be sacrificed, even to promote the search for justice or truth in the individual case 
or matter and extends to protect a citizen from compulsory disclosure of protected 
communications or materials to any court or to any tribunal or person with authority 
to require the giving of information or the production of documents or other 
materials.64 
 
8.2.10 Exception to the privilege - waiver  
The privilege belongs to the client and not to the lawyer providing the advice.65 
Therefore, unless the client expressly claims the privilege, there is a presumption that 
it has been waived.66 However, if the documents are already in the possession of the 
lawyer, it is assumed that the privilege exists unless waived by the client.67 In this 
situation, the lawyer needs to be in a position where they can contact their client for 
specific instructions on claiming the privilege. Section 122 of the Evidence Act 1995 
(Cth), the uniform evidence legislation, provides for the waiver of the privilege along 
the lines of the common law waiver.  
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In the case of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 51 
ATR 593, the issue of whether the privilege was waived in a situation where written 
legal advice prepared by ABL was provided to a firm of accountants, PW for further 
analysis. In the Federal Court of Australia, Kenny J held that the client had not 
waived privilege in a situation where documents were provided to a firm of 
accountants. He made the following finding: 
 
The Commissioner also submits that the privilege which attached or may have 
attached to some documents (including written advices given by ABL to Pratt 
Holdings …) was waived by Pratt Holdings when it disclosed the communications to 
PW. …  
 
Mr O'Halloran also gave evidence that, from time to time after PW's retainer by Pratt 
Holdings, Pratt Holdings obtained advice from ABL concerning drafts of documents 
prepared by PW. It follows from this that a question of waiver may arise in relation to 
legal advice from ABL communicated by Pratt Holdings to PW in the course of 
instructing PW and discussing the work being done by PW for Pratt Holdings. The 
Commissioner apparently submits that, whilst this advice was initially privileged, 
privilege over these communications was also waived when Pratt Holdings disclosed 
their contents to PW.  
 
In response to the Commissioner's submissions on waiver, Pratt Holdings conceded that Mr 
O'Halloran's disclosures to PW were voluntary. Counsel for Pratt Holdings submitted, 
however, that this voluntary disclosure did not constitute waiver.  
 
As Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ observed in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 
CLR 1 (Mann v Carnell) at 13:  
 
At common law, a person who would otherwise be entitled to the benefit of legal 
professional privilege may waive the privilege. ... Legal professional privilege exists 
to protect the confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client. It is the 
client who is entitled to the benefit of such confidentiality, and who may relinquish 
that entitlement. It is inconsistency between the conduct of the client and maintenance 
of the confidentiality which effects a waiver of the privilege. ...  
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Waiver may be express or implied. Disputes as to implied waiver usually arise from 
the need to decide whether particular conduct is inconsistent with the maintenance of 
the confidentiality which the privilege is intended to protect. When an affirmative 
answer is given to such a question, it is sometimes said that waiver is "imputed by 
operation of law". This means that the law recognises the inconsistency and 
determines its consequences, even though such consequences may not reflect the 
subjective intention of the party who has lost the privilege. ... What brings about the 
waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary informed by 
considerations of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and 
maintenance of the confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness operating 
at large.  
 
In the first place, the legal advice given by ABL to Pratt Holdings attracted advice 
privilege. Pratt Holdings did not necessarily waive the privilege when it disclosed that 
advice voluntarily to PW (see Mann v Carnell at 14). Whether Pratt Holdings has, in 
fact, waived the privilege by such disclosure depends upon whether the disclosure to 
PW was inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality. In the circumstances of 
the case, I do not think it was. First, the purpose of the privilege is to protect the 
confidentiality of the legal advice received by Pratt Holdings from its solicitors. There 
is nothing inconsistent with that purpose in Pratt Holdings conveying the contents of 
the advice to PW, in order that PW provide an accounting analysis that would enable 
Pratt Holdings' solicitors to advise Pratt Holdings further on the matters of concern, 
upon the basis that PW would maintain the confidentiality of the legal advice: cf Mann 
v Carnell at 35 per McHugh J dissenting. It follows that I would uphold Pratt 
Holdings' claim of advice privilege in respect of document 35.68 
 
This decision is important because many taxpayers provide their accountants with 
copies of legal advice so that tax returns can be prepared on the basis of the legal 
advice provided. In such situations, that legal advice retains the protection of the 
privilege and it would therefore not be available to the ATO. This would also apply 
to foreign legal advice provided to an Australian accountant for similar purposes. 
 
8.2.11 Spousal privilege 
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According to Professor Ligertwood, the common law sought to protect the institution 
of marriage by forbidding spouses from testifying for or against each other in civil or 
criminal cases.69 Unfortunately, the common law has been overruled by specific 
statutory provisions at the state and federal level which makes the spouse a 
competent and compellable witness. The statutory law generally makes the spouse a 
compellable witness for the defence but the spouse can be exempted from being 
compelled to give evidence for the prosecution by the judge if the relationship may 
be harmed.70 The case of Stoddart v Boulton [2009] FCA 1108 provides an excellent 
example of where the statutory law has overruled the common law in relation to the 
marital privilege. Mrs Stoddard did not wish to give evidence against her husband 
but, in order for her to succeed in claiming the privilege, she had to prove that the 
common law privilege or immunity against spousal incrimination has not been 
abrogated by the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth), s 30. 
 
Section 30 of the Act provides that: 
(1) A person served, as prescribed, with a summons to appear as a witness at an 
examination before an examiner shall not: 
(a) fail to attend as required by the summons; or 
(b) fail to attend from day to day unless excused, or released from further 
attendance, by the examiner. 
Failure to answer questions etc. 
(2) A person appearing as a witness at an examination before an examiner 
shall not: 
(a) when required pursuant to section 28 either to take an oath or make an 
affirmation—refuse or fail to comply with the requirement; 
(b) refuse or fail to answer a question that he or she is required to answer by 
the examiner; or 
(c) refuse or fail to produce a document or thing that he or she was required to 
produce by a summons under this Act served on him or her as prescribed. 
 
The following statement from Reeves J provides an excellent summary of the 
position on spousal privilege in Australia and the supremacy of the Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth): 
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… whether spousal privilege is derived from self-incrimination privilege, or is a 
separate and distinct type of privilege based, as Ms Martin submits, on the unity of 
the family, the ultimate  purpose of both is to prevent the husband (in this case) being 
incriminated. If this is so, it would be perverse, in my view, for the legislature to 
abrogate the husband’s privilege against self-incrimination in s 30 of the Act, such 
that he must answer and thereby incriminate himself directly by his own words, and 
yet, to keep in place his wife’s privilege not to incriminate him (not herself) 
indirectly by her words. Furthermore, as Mr Cooke QC pointed out, it would be 
somewhat surprising if the ends of marital and family harmony were to be  given a 
higher level of protection under the Act, than the perseveration of personal liberty. 
 
For these reasons, I conclude that s 30 of the Act has abrogated spousal privilege by 
necessary  implication.71 
 
The consequences of this decision are that in taxation matters that constitute a crime 
such as tax evasion, a spouse is compellable as a witness against their husband or 
wife even if it affects the marital relationship. The statutory provision overrules the 
privilege given to a spouse not to be compelled to testify against their wife or 
husband.  
 
8.2.12 Banker – customer relationship 
A resident taxpayer and foreign taxpayer should be confident that their financial 
details will not be disclosed by their bank. However, is this still the situation today? 
The common law duty of confidence or secrecy72 that a bank owes to its customers 
was established in the case of Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of 
England Ltd [1924] 1 KB 461.73 The following summary of the duty of secrecy is 
provided by Professor Weerasooria: 
 
The bank’s duty of confidentiality extends to all information and transactions that go 
through the account including securities and guarantees, if any. It extends beyond 
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the state of the customer’s account; that is, whether there is a debit or credit balance 
and the amount of the balance. It extends to information obtained from sources other 
than the customer’s actual account, if the occasion upon which the information was 
obtained arose out of the banking relations of the bank and its customer. For 
example, information obtained with a view to assisting the bank in conducting the 
customer’s business or in coming to decisions as to the bank’s treatment of its 
customer, would be covered by this duty of secrecy.74 
 
The English Court of Appeal established a number of principles qualifying the 
Bank’s duty of confidence in relation to a customer’s banking details.75 In the 
following circumstances the bank is justified in disclosing the customer’s details: 
- Disclosure under compulsion of law. A bank is not above the law and if 
required under a specific statutory provision to disclose information about 
a customer then this must be done. This covers ATO action pursuant to a 
s 263 or s 264 notice. These sections have been examined in detail above 
in the context of legal professional privilege. The role of the bank, when 
faced with a s 263 or s 264 notice, is discussed in detail below. 
- Disclosure that is in the public interest. There are no cases on this issue 
but it would cover the right of the banker to disclose secrets in a time of 
war or terrorist activity. It may extend to the bank voluntarily disclosing 
information of serious fraud or crime.76 
- Disclosure that is in the interest of the bank. In the case of Sunderland v 
Barclays Bank Ltd (1938) 5 Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers 163, the 
bank manager advised the husband of the plaintiff that cheques had been 
drawn by the plaintiff in favour of bookmakers when the plaintiff 
requested the manager to speak to her husband. The disclosure by the 
bank was required, even though the plaintiff’s confidentiality was 
breached, due to the husband requiring an explanation.77 
- Disclosure that is made with the express or implied consent of the 
customer. Customers may require the bank to disclose account 
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information to third parties where a bank reference is required or a 
guarantee is being given.78 
 
There are two situations where s 263 and s 264 notices were served on banks seeking 
information about certain customers, and the role of the bank in providing that 
information to the ATO created a concern for the bank in performing their duty to 
their customer. The first case highlighted the fact that the banker-customer duty of 
secrecy is overridden by statutory requirements to disclose customer information. In 
the case of Smorgon v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 9 ATR 483, the 
High Court of Australia held that the ANZ Bank must allow the ATO access to 
documents contained in a safe deposit box belonging to their customer and it did not 
matter that the ATO was on a ‘fishing’ expedition because they had no idea of what 
information or documents might be found in the safe deposit boxes. The following 
extract from Gibbs ACJ provides an excellent statement of the law in this respect: 
 
It is true that a bank to whom a notice is given in circumstances such as the present 
may be placed in a position of considerable difficulty. In many cases the bank will 
have no knowledge as to what is contained in a safe deposit locker; it may not know 
whether it contains any documents or whether any documents that it does contain 
relate to the income or assessment of the person concerned. If the bank causes the 
locker to be opened, and finds inside it a locked box or sealed envelope, it has no 
right to open the box or the envelope to see what it contains. If a bank which is 
required to produce the documents contained in a safe deposit locker does produce 
the contents of the locker, and it is found that they are not documents which relate to 
the income or assessment of the person named in the notice, the bank may be liable 
to the depositor for breach of contract. On the other hand, if the bank fails to produce 
the contents of the locker, and they are found to be documents which do relate to the 
income or assessment of the person named, it may be liable for a breach of s 224 
[now s 8C TAA].  
 
The apparent intention of the Parliament is that the Commissioner is entitled to have 
produced any books and documents that relate to the taxpayer's income or 
assessment, even if he does not know what those books and documents may reveal. 
A document may be required to be produced only if it in fact relates to the income or 
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assessment of the person in question but, if it is of that description, that is enough. In 
other words the Commissioner is entitled to make what was described as a "roving 
enquiry" into the income or assessment of a particular taxpayer and for that purpose 
to have produced such documents as relate to that income or assessment.79  
 
It would appear from the above decision that, possibly, the pendulum has swung too 
far in favour of the Commissioner in terms of obtaining information pursuant to s 
264, ITAA 36. As is discussed later in part 4 of this Chapter under the heading of 
‘exchange of information agreements’, tax administrators are not permitted to engage 
in ‘fishing expeditions’ when seeking information about their own residents’ 
financial dealings from a contracting country but, in terms of obtaining information 
from a bank in Australia, a ‘fishing expedition’ is permitted. 
 
In the case of Citibank v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 ATR 292, a 
bank was placed in a difficult situation of not being in a position to claim legal 
professional privilege over documents being seized by the ATO pursuant to a s 263 
notice. The ATO entered Citibank’s premises looking for documents relating to a 
preference share arrangement but copied other documents relating to tax 
minimisation. The bank’s employees were not given an opportunity to claim legal 
professional privilege before the copies were taken by the ATO. The Full Bench of 
the Federal Court, per Bowen CJ, Fisher and French JJ, held that Citibank should 
have had an opportunity to claim privilege on behalf of their customers before copies 
of documents were taken and that the ATO needed to adopt guidelines in order to 
prevent this from happening in a similar situation in the future.80 One of the major 
issues that a non-resident taxpayer must face is that documents could be seized from 
a bank in, say, a tax haven and the bank does not have an opportunity to claim the 
privilege on behalf of their customer before copies are taken by the tax authority, 
similar to the issue raised in the Citibank case. 
 
One of the arguments in favour of using s 263 or s 264 notices is that they are 
quicker to obtain because they do not require the consent of a judicial officer, as is 
the case with obtaining a search warrant. However, in some situations, a search 
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warrant is used particularly when criminal activity is suspected and evidence needs 
to be collected for a prosecution. In that case a s 263 or s 264 notice is not 
appropriate.  
 
8.2.13 Search warrants  
The use of a search warrant clearly violates the privacy of the individual and, 
therefore, there must be checks on the powers of the police. The justification for the 
warrant system is that it represents a control device by requiring a judicial officer, the 
person who issues the warrant, being convinced of the reasonableness of both the 
suspicion of the police and the proposed investigative action in order to provide some 
protection for the individual.81  
 
The case of Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission [2006] FCA 819 concerned a 
challenge to a search warrant pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) on the basis 
that the warrant was unlawful, and of no effect, and that the seizure of the laptop 
computer and other material was unlawful. The applicant was Philip Egglishaw, a 
banker from Switzerland, who, while staying in a hotel in Australia, had his laptop 
computer seized under a search warrant. The laptop computer contained a list of 
Australian clients using the services of Strachans bank, a bank controlled by 
Egglishaw and situated in Switzerland. As a result of the personal records of the 
Australian clients using the tax haven bank being disclosed to the Australian 
authorities, Egglishaw, the applicant, challenged the validity of the search warrant in 
an attempt to protect his clients from the pending disclosure. 
 
Sundberg J held that the Australian Crime Commission had discharged their burden 
of proof that their actions were lawful by obtaining a search warrant and that the 
applicant had the burden of showing that the warrant and actions of the officers 
executing the warrant was unlawful. Egglishaw was unable to convince the court that 
the obtaining of information that was contained in the laptop computer was unlawful. 
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8.2.14 Summons to appear – Australian Crime Commission Amendment Act 2007 
(Cth) 
Philip Egglishaw was compelled to provide evidence to the Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC) pursuant to s 28 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 
(Cth) (ACC Act). From this, the ACC learnt that Egglishaw’s bank, Strachans, 
administers various companies, trusts and bank accounts based in foreign countries 
on behalf of, and for the benefit of, a number of Australian residents and their 
families. The ACC believed that the services provided by Strachans enabled 
Australian residents to accumulate substantial assets overseas in companies and 
trusts hidden behind an impenetrable veil of incorporation; create misleading 
documents which assist in defrauding the Commonwealth of Australia; and access 
their funds administered by Strachans from anywhere in the world by the use of debit 
or credit cards linked to bank accounts opened and operated for them by Strachans 
outside Australia, including at Corner Banca, SA in Lugarno, Switzerland. Based on 
the information obtained from Egglishaw, the ACC commenced criminal 
investigations into suspected fraud and money laundering by a number of Australian 
residents who have utilised the services provided by Strachans and Corner Banca. 
 
Philip Egglishaw challenged the validity of the summons to appear, s 28, and the 
notice to produce documents, s 29. The matter came before Besanko J of the Federal 
Court and is reported in Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission [2009] FCA 
1027, (2009) 71 ATR 570. Egglishaw failed on all grounds to have the proceedings 
by the ACC declared invalid.  
 
The ATO have the ability to obtain information from any taxpayer or tax adviser that 
is suspected of being involved in a criminal activity by way of a search warrant or 
compelling that person to attend and give evidence or produce documents pursuant to 
the ACC Act. The fact that the tax adviser is from another country makes no 
difference to the exercise of these powers. It was, arguably, unfortunate for the 
Australian clients that their details were contained in a laptop computer and the 
information was subsequently used by the ATO. However, from the perspective of 
the ATO, it was fortunate because many details about Australian resident taxpayers 
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were uncovered that has resulted in numerous prosecutions and the recovery of tax 
by the ‘Wickenby taskforce’. 
 
8.2.15 Freedom of information  
Taxpayers have a legal right to access information held by the ATO pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). However, there are a number of exemptions 
contained in ss 36, 37, 38, 40 and 42 that may prevent the taxpayer from being able 
to access all relevant information. Obviously, if the ATO has obtained legal advice 
from the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) then legal professional privilege 
would apply. Similarly, if the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) provides legal 
advice to the ATO then the documents are privileged. This was the finding of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in the case of Re Collie and Deputy 
Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 35 ATR 1204. However, not only can the ATO 
claim an exemption from disclosing information but it can frustrate the process by 
charging for the retrieval of documents and, in some cases, can amount to tens of 
thousands of dollars.82 As Reynah Tang states, the taxpayer is precluded from being 
able to recoup the costs of complying with any ATO demands to provide 
information.83  
 
8.2.16 Human rights to protect taxpayers 
The United Kingdom (UK) adopted the European Convention on Human Rights in 
1953 but it was not until 1998 that the UK Parliament brought into existence 
statutory law to incorporate the Charter with the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK). 84 The effect of the European convention was to guarantee a number of 
basic human rights by allowing the individual to complain about the behaviour of 
their own government. 85 Lee contends that there are three main principles for the 
operation of the UK Human Rights Act 1998; first, any statutory interpretation must 
find a meaning that will prevent the legislation from being incompatible with the 
Convention rights; second, no court is able to strike down or disregard legislation 
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that conflicts with the Convention rights otherwise the primary or secondary 
legislation must be corrected; and third, the act requires all public authorities, 
including the Inland Revenue Service, to act in accordance with Convention rights.86  
However, Lee is of the opinion that taxpayers in the UK will have a bleak future in 
trying to use the Convention rights as a weapon against statutory provisions.87 The 
impact of human rights legislation in Australia in relation to taxation law was 
considered by Farrell as potentially providing a fertile ground for tax practitioners88 
and it has been raised by the Federal Court in the case of Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1989) 20 ATR 292. In the judgment by French J, the 
following passage illustrates the importance of the Convention on Human Rights in 
relation to the administration of tax law by the ATO: 
 
Australia is a liberal democracy with a broad tradition of at least nominal resistance 
to encroachment upon established rights and freedoms. That view is reinforced by its 
adherence  to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
relevantly provides in Art 17, inter alia, that: ‘No-one shall be subject to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. ...’ The 
nature of this society and its tradition of respect for individual freedoms, will support 
an approach to construction which requires close scrutiny and a strict reading of 
statutes which would otherwise remove or encroach upon those freedoms. But where 
the natural meaning of the words is clear, the will of the Parliament must be 
respected. 
 
Section 263 will plainly operate, in some if not all cases, to interfere with privacy 
and, in particular, that kind of privacy recognised by the rights to quiet possession of 
land and personal property which are protected by the common law relating to 
trespass. 
 
In my respectful opinion, the approach taken by his Honour did not involve the 
choice of a narrow, over a broad, construction, although it might have been seen in 
practical effect as the choice of a lesser, over a greater, encroachment on private 
rights. For, there is nothing to suggest that a specific authorisation may not reach as 
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far into the territory of private rights as the process of general authorisation. A 
judicial requirement for such authorisation involves  the imposition of a 
procedural safeguard on the exercise of the Commissioner's power. The concept of 
curially imposed procedural safeguards is not entirely novel. The rules of natural 
justice are an obvious example. In my opinion, however, it is not open to the court in 
the present case to create a new category of rules which would impose a procedural 
fetter on the exercise of this ‘wide’ statutory power in order to ensure that its 
repository gives due regard to common law rights.89 
 
In light of the above statement, it is clear that the coercive powers contained in s 263 
will not be overridden by the protections contained in the Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 
At present the State of Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory are the only 
jurisdictions in Australia that have introduced legislation to incorporate the 
Convention on Human Rights. The legislation is similar to the Convention and is 
found in the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and the 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) respectively. The most relevant section for the 
purposes of this chapter is section 13 of the Victorian Act, Privacy and reputation: 
 
A person has the right- 
(a) not to have his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully 
or arbitrarily interfered with; and 
(b) not to have his or her reputation unlawfully attacked. 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union contains a similar 
provision with Article 7, Respect for private and family life: 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.  
 
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12: 
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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.  
 
Only time will tell if taxpayers in Australia are able to utilise the benefit of human 
rights legislation or conventions in an action against the ATO to prevent the 
disclosure of financial information. What happens in Europe may be a guide as to the 
future situation in Australia. 
 
8.2.17 Australian tax agents and tax advisers – duty to society 
A tax adviser can never, without the authority of his or her client, voluntarily give 
information to the Commissioner no matter how inclined he or she may be to 
cooperate. The confidentially implied in the relationship of lawyer and client or 
accountant and client ensures this. This confidentiality is, however, overborne by s 
264.90 However, in the absence of any lawful obligation to disclose confidential and 
private information, it is submitted that a tax agent or tax adviser must not disclose 
any information belonging to their client to the ATO. The following statement by A. 
J. Myers QC on the duty owed by a tax adviser to their client provides the most 
appropriate answer to the conflict between a duty to society and a duty to the 
taxpayer: 
 
A legal adviser in the field of taxation or anything else has two main duties: to 
advise his  client to the best of his knowledge and ability, and to uphold the law. 
There is no conflict between those roles, properly understood. The adviser upholds 
the law by advising his client to the best of his knowledge and ability.91   
 
If a tax adviser is uncomfortable with the activities of their client then they should 
refrain from providing professional services to their client. If they decide to disclose 
any information to the ATO then they should expect to be sued for damages for 
breaching their duty of confidentiality, their duty to maintain the privacy of their 
clients’ information and, in most cases, breach their fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of their client. 
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8.3 The Rights of the Taxpayer – The International Position 
With the OECD being successful in having all OECD member states accepting the 
revised Article 26 of the Model Double Taxation Agreement on the exchange of 
information and more than 320 tax information exchange agreements, what, then, are 
the chances of a non-resident taxpayer being able to maintain the confidentiality of 
their banking details?  This is one of the main issues to be examined in this part of 
the chapter. The international situation is further complicated by the fact that some 
countries are willing to disclose information on banking details if the request 
involves a criminal tax matter but refuse to cooperate if it is merely a civil tax matter. 
However, the emphasis of the Australian government on categorising all forms of tax 
minimising, tax avoidance and tax evasion as constituting a criminal act is designed 
to overcome this particular reservation and to succeed in obtaining information from 
other countries. This particular issue will not be discussed in this chapter as it has 
been discussed in detail elsewhere.92  
 
8.3.1 The OECD and a level playing field 
In their recent report, ‘Tax Co-operation 2009: Towards a Level Playing Field’, the 
OECD highlighted the reason why transparency and exchange of information 
agreements were so important for the collection of revenue and the following 
statement illustrates this point: 
 
International banking has become commonplace and it is no longer extraordinary for 
taxpayers to reside in one country, hold assets in another and have them managed 
from a third location. … But regardless of why taxpayers situate their assets beyond 
the boundaries of their own residence country, the result is that tax administrations 
around the world face more and greater challenges to the proper enforcement of their 
tax laws than ever before. To meet these challenges, tax authorities must 
increasingly rely on international co-operation based on the implementation of 
international standards of transparency and effective exchange of information.93 
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The OECD’s standards for transparency and information exchange are contained in 
the progress report. The standards are supported by the European Union, the G8, the 
G20 and the UN. They require countries to have a mechanism for exchanging 
information on request; the information will relate to domestic tax matters of a civil 
and criminal nature; there will be no restriction caused by the application of the dual 
criminality principle or domestic tax interest requirement; there will be respect given 
to safeguards and limitation; strict confidentiality rules; and the availability of 
reliable information, such as ownership, identity and accounting information, and 
powers to obtain and provide such information in response to a specific request.94 
 
8.3.2 Double taxation agreements – Article 26 
Double taxation agreements (DTAs) are entered into between two nations for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion. The following 
article, relating to the exchange of information, is only relevant where there is in 
existence a DTA. Australia does not have a DTA with tax havens, although there is a 
DTA between Australia and Switzerland. However, in the case of tax havens, other 
‘exchange of information agreements’ are used to try to achieve a similar outcome. 
 
The new Article 26 for the exchange of information provides as follows:  
 
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such 
information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this 
Convention or to the administration or enforcement of the domestic laws 
concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on behalf of the 
Contracting States, or of their political subdivisions or local authorities, insofar 
as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange of 
information is not restricted by Articles 1 and 2. 
2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting State shall be 
treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic 
laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities 
(including courts and administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or 
collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, the determination of 
appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of the 
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above. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such 
purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in 
judicial decisions. 
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed so as to 
impose on a Contracting State the obligation: 
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and 
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State; 
b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the 
normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting 
State; 
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, 
commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information the 
disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy. 
4. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this 
Article, the other Contracting State shall use its information gathering measures 
to obtain the requested information, even though that other State may not need 
such information for its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the 
preceding sentence is subject to the limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case 
shall such limitations be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to 
supply information solely because it has no domestic interest in such 
information. 
5. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a 
Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because the 
information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or person 
acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates to ownership 
interests in a person. 
 
A non-resident taxpayer or foreign investor will not be involved in the exchange of 
information process and therefore not be in a position to claim legal professional 
privilege over documents or to be in a position to argue that the documents have no 
relevance to a taxation matter. According to Branson, some countries provided the 
taxpayer with notification that their financial details were being requested by another 
state except in the case of fraud.95 The following countries provided some type of 
prescribed notification to taxpayers when a request for information had been made: 
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Germany; Luxembourg; Portugal; The Netherlands; Sweden; Switzerland; and the 
United States.96 Branson discusses the possibility of providing the taxpayer with a 
right to notification, a right of consultation or a right of intervention and concludes 
with the finding that, at present, Australian taxpayers have no right to participate in 
the process whereby information is made available under the DTA. Branson 
discusses the fact that, in Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland, the 
government has introduced regulations giving rights of participation, and The 
Netherlands and Switzerland have provided laws to govern obtaining court orders to 
prevent or control the transfer of information.97 An Australian taxpayer or foreign 
investor would have no knowledge of the fact that their financial information was 
being requested from a foreign country under the DTA nor would they have the 
ability to contest the validity of such a request. Branson examines the possible 
remedies available to a taxpayer, including resorting to the various conventions on 
human rights as one possible way in which a taxpayer’s privacy may be maintained 
in the absence of rules providing a taxpayer with the right to participate in the 
information exchange process.98 
 
8.3.3 Offshore information notice - Section 264A(1)  
Section 264A took effect on 8 January 1991 and was part of the general anti-
avoidance regime.99 This notice is designed to obtain information about the affairs of 
the taxpayer that is located outside Australia. The notice can be served either on the 
taxpayer or a third party. The taxpayer has 90 days in which to comply. The 
documents or information may not be in the control or custody of the taxpayer, but a 
third party, but they still must be produced. The information or materials required to 
be produced must relate to the assessment of the taxpayer.100 If the notice has been 
served on a trustee and the trustee is not in a position to pay income tax because there 
are beneficiaries presently entitled and not under a legal disability, then the notice 
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will be invalid.101 The taxpayer liable to tax must be identified in the notice.102 This 
means that if the Commissioner is not sure about the actual taxpayer because of 
trusts being used, then a s 264A notice may not be appropriate. The taxpayer can 
refuse to provide documents and information if covered by legal professional 
privilege.   
 
As stated above, subsection 264A(22) does not have the same effect as s 263 and s 
264 in that it is not an offence if the taxpayer fails to comply with the offshore 
notice. The only sanction is that the taxpayer is unable to rely on offshore 
information or documentary evidence in contesting an assessment that would have 
been provided under the notice. However, the Commissioner may consent to allow 
the information.103  
 
8.3.4 Mutual assistance requests – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 
1987 (Cth) 
The ACC and the DPP are able to obtain information relating to criminal activities 
that is located in a foreign country under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Act 1987 (Cth). A number of treaties have been entered into by the Australian 
government and the foreign country in order to put into effect the mutual assistance 
in criminal matters. 
 
Section 5 – states that the objects of this Act are:  
(a) to regulate the provision by Australia of international assistance in 
criminal matters when a request is made by a foreign country for any of 
the following:  
(i) the taking of evidence, or the production of any document or other 
 article, for the purposes of a proceeding in the foreign country;  
(ii) the issue of a search warrant and the seizure of any thing relevant 
to a proceeding or investigation in the foreign country;  
(iii) the forfeiture or confiscation of property in respect of a foreign 
serious offence;  
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(iv) the recovery of pecuniary penalties in respect of a foreign serious 
 offence;  
(v) the restraining of dealings in property that may be forfeited or 
 confiscated, or that may be needed to satisfy pecuniary penalties 
 imposed, because of the commission of a foreign serious offence; 
and  
(b) to facilitate the provision by Australia of international assistance in 
criminal matters when a request is made by a foreign country for the 
making of arrangements for a person who is in Australia to travel to the 
foreign country to give evidence in a proceeding or to give assistance in 
relation to an investigation; and  
(c) to facilitate the obtaining by Australia of international assistance in 
criminal matters.  
 
Section 10 - Request by Australia  
(1) A request for international assistance in a criminal matter that Australia is 
authorised to make under this Act may be made only by the 
Attorney-General.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the Attorney-General on behalf of 
Australia from requesting international assistance in a criminal matter 
other than assistance of a kind that may be requested under this Act.  
 
In the case of Dunn v The Australian Crime Commission [2008] FCA 424, the 
Federal Court was asked to declare that the request sent to the Swiss authorities 
pursuant to the Mutual Assistance Act was made without authority, outside 
jurisdiction and unlawful. The request for information was undertaken as part of 
‘Operation Wickenby’ and followed on from information that had been obtained 
from the laptop computer belonging to Philip Egglishaw. Tracey J found that the 
request for information was valid. Thereafter, similar arguments were heard by 
Tracey J in the case of Strachans v Attorney-General [2008] FCA 553 and, once 
again, the request for information was held to be valid. Dunn subsequently appealed 
the decision and, in Dunn v Australian Crime Commission [2009] FCAFC 16, the 
full bench of the Federal Court, per Moore, Jessup and Gilmour JJ, dismissed the 
appeal and upheld the validity of the request for information that had been sent to the 
Swiss authorities. 
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These cases illustrate the fact that information can be successfully obtained from 
foreign countries under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and that it is 
very difficult to challenge the validity of the request.  
 
8.3.5 Legal professional privilege – foreign lawyer 
Australian taxpayer that has obtained legal advice from a lawyer in a foreign country 
is able to claim that the document is privileged. In the case of Kennedy v Wallace 
(2004) 208 ALR 424, Giles J of the Federal Court of Australia held that legal 
professional privilege is available, subject to limitations, to protect communication 
between the client and their foreign lawyer relating to advice on foreign law. Giles J 
made the following observations on how the privilege operates with foreign legal 
advice: 
 
It is easy to see how the privilege is necessary to encourage candour on the part of a 
client who confronts or anticipates litigation to vindicate or defend legal rights as the 
client may  need to disclose facts which are incriminating, discreditable or 
embarrassing in order to obtain sound advice. It is not so easy to see why a client 
who wishes to order its affairs to best advantage would need or require any 
encouragement for candour. Nor is it easy to see what corresponding public interest 
is served by preserving the secrecy of a client’s reasons for a transaction (unless the 
client chooses to lift the veil) in cases where disclosure would serve the ends of 
justice or would enable a statutory inquiry to be properly conducted.  
 
Whether or not it is, as suggested by Dawson J in Baker v Campbell at 92, now too 
late to reconsider the advice privilege in its application to communications in 
Australia, it is questionable whether there is any need to extend the principle to 
overseas legal advice. It is not obvious that such advice promotes the better 
administration of Australian justice particularly as, in relation to practitioners in 
foreign jurisdictions, Australian courts have none of the supervisory and disciplinary 
powers that provide, in their potential application to local practitioners, some 
assurance against misuse of the privilege. There is no authority binding me to extend 
the privilege in this way but refusal to do so to any extent would be controversial. I 
prefer therefore to assume for the purposes of this case that advice privilege may be 
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accorded to some foreign communications and examine whether the applicant has 
established that what occurred here is entitled to the benefit of such privilege.104 
 
Unfortunately, Kennedy was unsuccessful in claiming that the documents were 
covered by the privilege. The fact that the documents related to the laws of a tax 
haven, namely Switzerland, appeared to weaken his claim for legal professional 
privilege. The view taken by Giles J to limit the application of the privilege to 
foreign legal advice has been severely criticised. James McComish is critical of the 
claim by Giles J that in order to benefit from the privilege, ‘foreign legal advice must 
have some connection to the administration of justice or the proper functioning of the 
legal system in Australia’. 105 Mr Kennedy appealed to the Full Bench of the Federal 
Court, per Black CJ, Emmett and Allsop JJ, where, once again, he was not successful 
in upholding his claim of privilege. However, the spurious restrictions placed on 
claiming privilege in relation to foreign legal advice, as advanced by Giles J, was 
rejected by the Full Bench.  
 
While it is to the advantage of a taxpayer that they may be able to claim legal 
professional privilege when a foreign lawyer provides legal advice, what happens 
when documents are obtained under an Information Exchange Agreement with a 
foreign tax authority and the foreign taxpayer has no knowledge of the release of the 
communication in the first place and then has no opportunity to claim the privilege 
either in the foreign country or Australia? Moreover, the staff at the foreign bank 
may not be experienced enough to claim the privilege on behalf of their customer. 
 
8.4 OECD – Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, taxpayers have very little 
protection in preventing their personal financial details from being disclosed to the 
tax administrators. In Australia, the ATO has coercive powers of seizure under s 263 
and s 264 notices, search warrants and compulsory attendance before the ACC. In 
terms of information held overseas, the ATO can request the information from the 
taxpayer pursuant to s 264A; by use of the DTA; or under the Mutual Assistance Act. 
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If it is possible to access information through a range of existing legal means then 
arguably, OECD member countries do not need the additional legal instrument of 
requiring all states to enter into ‘exchange of information agreements’.  
 
In the manual on the implementation of exchange of information provisions for tax 
purposes, the OECD examines three approaches to exchanging information; first, 
‘exchange of information on request’; second, a ‘spontaneous exchange’; and third, 
an ‘automatic or routine exchange of information’.106 Article 26, as discussed above, 
only applies to the exchange of information on request. In situations where there is 
no DTA between Australia and the other state, a separate exchange of information 
agreement is entered into by the parties. The OECD advocates that states take the 
further step of agreeing to automatic or spontaneous exchanges of information. An 
automatic exchange of information requires the country of source to automatically 
report to the country of residence, information about non-residents receiving interest, 
dividends, royalties or pensions payments. The country of residence does not need to 
request the information on a specific non-resident taxpayer. The spontaneous 
exchange of information takes the process a step further and involves a foreign tax 
administrator identifying additional non-resident taxpayers involved in taxation 
arrangements and the information can be passed on to the tax administrators in the 
country of residence. Both of these activities would, arguably, contravene non-
residents’ rights of privacy and confidentiality as contained in the charter of human 
rights. However, the OECD and the G20 would like to put an end to tax havens and 
OFCs. 
 
The Australian Government has entered into a number of ‘exchange of information 
agreements’ with tax havens and in two examples, the agreement with Bermuda107 
and the agreement with Jersey, the only requirement is to exchange information on 
request. What is of interest is the fact that, in relation to the Bermuda agreement, 
reference is made to ‘serious tax evasion’ whereas, in the Jersey agreement, 
reference is made to ‘criminal tax matters’. The Australian Government has been 
actively blurring the distinction between tax avoidance, a non-criminal activity, with 
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tax evasion, a criminal activity. One of the main reasons for doing this has been to 
treat all arrangements that involve foreign bank accounts and financial arrangements 
with tax havens and OFCs as constituting a criminal tax matter, so that other 
countries are pressured into providing information on Australian taxpayers utilising 
those financial services.108 
 
From the perspective of the United States, Timothy Addison contends that Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) are of very limited benefit.109 Addison 
contends that not only does the US have to identify the taxpayer or investor to be 
investigated and information obtained from the foreign country, but that evidence 
exists to prove that the taxpayer has engaged in criminal or civil tax activities.110 The 
US must show that it is not engaged in a ‘fishing expedition’. Moreover, Addison 
states that the TIEA will not overcome the domestic bank secrecy laws of the tax 
haven and this view is supported by the evidence given by Professor Reuven Avi-
Yonah to the Senate Finance Committee on Offshore Tax Evasion, 110th 
Congress.111 Addison provides evidence to suggest that the Cayman Islands has 
continued to experience stable growth in its financial industry with the Cayman 
Islands now ranked fourth in market share for international banking behind the 
United Kingdom, United States and France.112 While this may be comforting for 
non-resident taxpayers and foreign investors using tax havens, why then did the 
Union Bank of Switzerland disclose the details of their account holders to the 
Internal Revenue Service in the US? 
 
8.4.1 The US and the Union Bank of Switzerland (USB) 
In November 2008, an official from UBS was indicted by a US federal grand jury for 
an alleged conspiracy to conceal thousands of US taxpayers’ accounts from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).113 In February 2009, UBS entered into a deferred 
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prosecution agreement on the basis that the bank paid USD 780 million and to 
provide details of about 4,500 US account holders to the IRS. The US Justice 
Department alleged that there were about 52,000 accounts of US citizens with about 
20,000 containing securities and 32,000 containing cash with a total value of USD 
14.8 billion.114 Depending upon the view taken, this may be seen as a great victory 
for the US government and the IRS. On the other hand, it must be viewed as being a 
comprehensive disregard of the rights of the account holders to expect their bank to 
maintain the confidentiality of their financial details. It is not the behaviour of a first 
world democracy.  
 
As a result of UBS providing the names of US citizens having bank accounts with 
their bank, no foreign investor or non-resident taxpayer can have any confidence that 
this situation will not be repeated around the world. It would appear that the right of 
confidentiality has come to an end as far as the US is concerned. The situation could 
just as easily be replicated in Australia. The only feature that may provide comfort 
for non-resident taxpayers and investors is that the US government did not require all 
foreign banks located in the US to disclose bank account details of their US citizens 
and nor did the US government target Switzerland as a whole.115 The agreement 
between the US and UBS did not violate the Swiss bank secrecy laws.116 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The Australian Government has provided the ATO with strong and coercive powers 
to assist them in collecting the correct amount of taxes from all taxpayers irrespective 
of where their income is derived. Safeguarding the revenue, arguably should take 
priority over the rights of the taxpayer. On the other hand, many taxpayers comply 
with the taxation laws and their right to privacy and their right to have their financial 
details kept confidential should be strenuously protected by the law. Tax advisers, 
accountants and lawyers should not be encouraged to disclose any confidential 
information to the ATO, even if that information is evidence that the taxpayer has not 
complied with the law. Some Australian taxpayers protect their assets by placing 
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their investments in tax havens and OFCs. Whatever the reason, taxpayers with 
foreign bank accounts should have the right to privacy and the maintenance of the 
confidentiality of their financial information.   
 
In the domestic environment, Australian taxpayers have very limited rights to 
maintain the privacy and confidentiality of their financial affairs. The ATO has 
strong coercive powers to obtain information pursuant to s 263 and s 264 notices and 
the only defence to prevent access to certain information by the ATO is to claim 
legal professional privilege, if appropriate. This right, which is fundamental to the 
administration of justice, has been weakened by the crime and fraud exemption. 
Australian taxpayers have no right to remain silent when confronted with a s 264 
notice. A taxpayer cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination when faced 
with a s 264 notice. Moreover, the right of a spouse not to give evidence against their 
partner is of no effect when required to appear before the ACC. The banker-customer 
duty of confidentiality has been severely weakened by the coercive powers of the 
ATO and provides no protection to a s 264 notice whereby the ATO is able to go on 
a ‘fishing expedition’ when they are unsure of what information may be available. A 
taxpayer has virtually no defence against a search warrant or a summons to appear 
before the ACC as has been demonstrated by the Egglishaw cases.   
 
On the other hand, taxpayers do have a right to obtain information under the FOI 
legislation but this is of limited use, as the above discussion has shown. Appealing to 
the convention on human rights in taxation matters in order to maintain privacy has 
not been successful to date. Taxpayers can only rely on the legal professional 
privilege in order to maintain their right to privacy over legal advice.  
 
Internationally, with the increase in the exchange of information agreements and the 
legal processes available to the ATO to access foreign financial information, s 264A, 
the non-resident taxpayer has very limited right to maintain the privacy and 
confidentiality of financial information stored in a foreign country. The new 
provision in the OECD Model DTA, Article 26, to expand the scope of the exchange 
of information together with mutual assistance requests, would suggest that the right 
to privacy for non-resident taxpayers was being severely eroded. This is especially 
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true when there is no provision to allow the taxpayer affected to have an involvement 
in the process whereby information is exchanged.   
 
In answer to the main question raised in this chapter, namely, what protection does a 
non-resident taxpayer have in maintaining their privacy in an environment where 
many countries are entering into exchange of information agreements; the answer 
appears to be none. If the exchange of information agreements can overcome bank 
secrecy laws then every non-resident taxpayer faces the risk of having their financial 
arrangements being disclosed to the tax administrators in their home country. Legal 
professional privilege can still be maintained even if the legal advice has been 
provided by a foreign lawyer but the problem appears to be in how and when is the 
privilege claimed. Unless the non-resident taxpayer is notified of the request for 
information, how can they claim the privilege? The main way in which some form of 
protection can be provided is to allow the taxpayer some right to participate in the 
exchange process similar to the protection offered to taxpayers when information is 
being exchanged under Article 26 of the DTA. The US, Germany, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Netherlands provide taxpayers with the 
right of consultation or intervention in the exchange process. This would ensure that 
legal documents could be excluded under the legal privilege. The charter of human 
rights may provide some safeguard for non-resident taxpayers and investors in 
protecting their right to privacy of financial information, but to date this has not been 
of assistance in taxation matters. 
 
Arguably, there is a need for a balance between maximising the collection of tax 
revenue and administering the law by the ATO and ensuring taxpayers have a right 
to privacy. Given the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the enormous 
deficits most countries now have as a result of paying for stimulus packages to 
prevent a recession, tax authorities will be trying very hard to collect tax on foreign 
investments held in tax havens and OFCs. 
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CHAPTER 9 WILL TAX HAVENS SURVIVE IN THE 
NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ENVIRONMENT? 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter of the thesis provides an answer to the main research question; will tax 
havens survive in the new international legal environment? The question 
encompasses more than just the issue of whether or not tax havens and OFCs will 
continue to operate as financial centres attracting mobile capital from individuals and 
Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) due to the fact that they have low or no taxes at 
all. Two other important considerations which are fundamental to the future of tax 
havens are whether these nations will, first, amend their bank secrecy laws and, 
second, enter into Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) so that non-
resident taxpayers and MNEs will be deterred from locating capital in those tax 
havens with the intent to minimise the impact of taxation in their home country. It is 
still far too early in the development of international taxation law in this area to 
predict the likely effect TIEAs and the pressure from the G20 and the OECD for tax 
havens and OFCs to amend their bank secrecy laws for both issues to be determined 
one way or the other. These two areas of taxation law should be the subject for future 
research in order to arrive at a reasonably definitive conclusion.  
 
The OECD member states, the G20 nations and the EU would like their resident 
taxpayers to pay all of their taxes in their home country and to not hide their assets in 
tax havens. Virtually all OECD member countries impose income tax on their 
resident’s worldwide income including income derived in tax havens. If tax havens 
ceased to exist then, arguably, this problem would be solved. If tax havens 
introduced measures whereby non-residents were likely to have their financial details 
reported to their home country then they may be deterred from investing capital in 
those states.  
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The major concern of OECD member states, the EU and the G20 is that, as a result 
of the ‘global financial crisis’, most developed countries incurred debt in order to 
stimulate their economies, as is the case in Australia, the US and the UK, to name 
just a few. The debt incurred by these countries has to be repaid and tax revenue is 
the likely source of funds to be used to repay the debt. Tax havens and OFCs are 
seen as being part of the problem and part of the solution, especially if lost tax 
revenue can be recovered and the future use of tax havens curtailed. Tax havens and 
OFCs have been viewed by the G20 and the OECD as being part of the reason for the 
global financial crisis. This view is totally rejected by Geoffrey Loomer and Giorgia 
Maffini from the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, in that improving 
financial regulation of banks and investment institutions has little to do with 
enforcement of tax.1 
 
There is no dispute with the fact that tax havens and OFCs have prevented developed 
countries from collecting tax revenue that should have been paid by taxpayers in 
their country of residence. The fact that large amounts of tax revenue have been lost 
as a result of the involvement of tax havens and OFCs has been documented by a 
number of countries and organisations over many years.2  In the US for the 2008 
year, it had been estimated that tax havens would cost the tax revenue USD 100 
billion and, for the past decade, tax havens have cost the tax revenue USD 1.027 
trillion.3 Addison discusses the outcome of a report, released in August 2006, 
prepared by the ‘US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs’ in which the Senate found that tax havens and OFCs held more than USD 11 
trillion of high-net-worth individuals’ assets worldwide.4  Addison provides the 
following quote from US Senator Carl Levin to illustrate the problem the US has 
with tax havens: 
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With a USD 345 billion annual tax gap and a USD 248 billion deficit, we cannot 
tolerate a USD 100 billion drain on our Treasury each year from offshore tax 
abuses.5 
 
Addison contends that information exchange agreements between the US and tax 
havens will be of no effect unless the IRS undertakes more audits of high net worth 
individuals in the US. He states that ‘The Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations’ found that high net worth individuals considered to have more than 
USD 1 million or more in assets, currently hold USD 11 trillion in offshore 
accounts.6  In 2007, only 9.25 percent of those taxpayers had their returns audited 
whereas the IRS only audited 2.26 percent of taxpayers with income between USD 
200,000 and USD 1 million.7 There were an estimated 9.3 million individuals with a 
net worth of USD 1 million living in the United States as at the middle of 2007.8 In 
Australia, the ATO undertook a similar exercise in trying to ensure compliance with 
the taxation law by Australia’s wealthiest people.9 The Commissioner of Taxation 
explained in the guide that the ATO had identified about 1,200 wealthy Australians 
with net worth of more than AUD 30 million and they wanted to ensure compliance 
by that group.10 The guide states that since the ‘High Wealth Individuals Taskforce’ 
had been established in 1996, the ATO had collected an additional AUD 1.766 
billion and had disallowed AUD 934 million in revenue losses and AUD 777 million 
in capital losses.11   
 
The problem of lost tax revenue is not just confined to the US. Addison provides 
evidence that, worldwide, tax havens account for a loss of tax revenue of over USD 
255 billion each year.12 To add to the situation, it is estimated that 15 percent of the 
world’s states are tax havens and half of the world trade passes through them 
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although they only account for 3 per cent of the world’s GDP.13 Tax havens attract 
mobile capital through the use of their banking system and financial services. 
However, the capital is then invested in the major financial centres such as the US or 
the United Kingdom. As discussed below, Australia is a beneficiary of capital 
flowing from tax havens. Professor Avi-Yonah reinforces this statement by noting 
that funds cannot remain in tax havens and be productive; they must be reinvested in 
the prosperous and stable economies of the world.14  
 
Current developments in international taxation law has been focused very heavily on 
the outcome of the OECD’s ‘harmful tax competition project’ and the movement 
towards requiring all tax havens and OFCs to enter into TIEAs and to repeal their 
bank secrecy laws. However, the role played by tax intermediaries, such as tax 
accountants and lawyers, banks and financial institutions and tax scheme promoters 
in supporting tax havens and OFCs in attracting mobile capital, is also discussed in 
this chapter as these tax intermediaries have a major role to play in the future of tax 
havens. It would appear that they have a major stake in tax havens and OFCs 
surviving and continuing to offer financial services to non-resident investors and 
MNEs. An attempt will be made to provide an answer to the question of whether tax 
scheme promoters and tax intermediaries will still have a role to play in international 
tax minimisation given the apparent success of the OECD in its project to eliminate 
harmful tax competition.  
 
There is also the issue of what will happen to tax havens and OFCs if they are not 
used by non-resident investors and MNEs? If tax havens cease to provide these 
services, what happens to the people employed in the banks and providing 
professional financial advice? Does this means that the wealthy nations then have to 
start providing foreign aid to those states? This issue is also discussed briefly in the 
chapter. 
 
9.1.1 The contradictory approach to tax havens by Australia 
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The Australian government receives certain benefits from the existence of tax havens 
and OFCs. For example, historically, more money flows from tax havens into 
Australia than flows out to tax havens. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) states 
that the flow of Australian dollars out to tax havens amounted to AUD 5.3 billion in 
the period 2005 – 2006. However, the flow of money from tax havens to Australia 
was AUD 8.4 billion in the same period.15 According to a report in ‘The Age 
Newspaper’, which referred to figures from the ATO, for the 2007-2008 period, 
AUD 16 billion flowed to tax havens but AUD 29 billion flowed back to Australia 
from tax havens. If tax havens cease to exist then Australia would probably not 
attract a similar level of foreign investment from mobile capital looking for a safe 
haven to invest in, such as Australia.16  
 
Similarly, with the tax concession offered to Australian ‘temporary residents’, in that 
they do not pay income tax on income derived outside Australia, capital flows into 
the country from tax havens and OFCs.17 This was the policy intention of the 
Australian Government when it introduced these tax laws in order to attract foreign 
investment by wealthy individuals who may wish to live in Australia. The fact that 
the temporary resident may have their wealth invested in a tax haven free of income 
tax is of no consequence to the Australian Government. This is similar to the 
situation of the ‘non-domiciliary’ living in the UK, where they are only subject to a 
‘territorial’ system of taxation, or the returning New Zealand citizen or new migrant 
to New Zealand, who also only pays income tax on income derived within the 
territory. However, this means that Australian residents for tax purposes are ‘ring 
fenced’18 from being able to take advantage of similar tax benefits.  
 
A further example of the ring fencing of resident taxpayers is found in the tax law 
relating to the non-resident investor and the non-payment of income tax on capital 
gains generated on the sale of shares and other financial products. Only real property, 
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such as land and fixtures or an interest in a land rich company, attracts income tax on 
a capital gain by a foreign investor. The policy reasoning behind this tax law is to 
make it attractive for foreign investors to invest in Australian equities and collective 
investment products. The best example of this particular aspect of Australian tax law 
working in favour of foreign investors was with the recent sale of the Myer stores by 
a private equity consortium, TPG Myer. The equity consortium sold its shares to the 
public and generated a profit of AUD 1.58 billion on which no income tax has been 
paid, as yet.19 The proceeds from the sale were channelled through tax havens back 
to the original investors. The ATO was trying to initially stop the money leaving 
Australia and, when they were too late, contemplated bringing an action to recover 
income tax, provided they can apply provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 that will, arguably, impose income tax on the basis that the gain was on 
‘revenue account’ and not on ‘capital account’. One of the main implications flowing 
from the ATO’s activity is that it may very well deter future private equity 
investment in Australia, which is contrary to the wishes of the Australian 
government.20 
 
Furthermore, the Australian Future Fund, a sovereign wealth fund belonging to the 
Australian Government, comprising AUD 64 billion, is invested through asset 
managers located in the Cayman Islands.21 The Minister for Finance and 
Deregulation, The Honourable Lindsay Tanner, justified this practice on the basis 
that the Cayman Islands was changing and that it was negotiating a TIEA with 
Australia and, ‘given the structure of the industry and complexity of international 
law, this is common practice’.22  
 
In effect, the Australian Government is happy for tax havens to continue providing 
financial and investment services when their continued existence serves the interests 
of governments. The government is also happy for foreign investment to flow into 
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Australia from tax havens and OFCs. On the other hand, the ATO is actively trying 
to detect and deter the use of tax havens by resident taxpayers for tax avoidance and 
tax evasion purposes. 
 
9.1.2 The hypocrisy of the United States approach to tax havens 
Marshall Langer contends that Manhattan and London are the locations of two of the 
most important tax havens in the world by aggressively and openly attracting wealth 
from all corners of the world.23 The reasons given for this statement are the tax 
concessions that are available to foreign investors. US banks are not required to 
withhold tax before crediting interest payments to non-US residents on their 
investments.24 Langer reports that, in 1975, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimated that over USD 3.1 billion in interest had been paid to foreign persons on 
over USD 36 billion of bank deposits; today, this figure would be much higher.25 
This has been the situation for over 80 years and the banks have no obligation to 
report these transactions to the IRS unless the account holder is a resident of the US 
or a Canadian resident taxpayer.26 Interest on government bonds, notes and treasury 
bills is free of withholding tax but may be subject to reporting to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).27  
 
The State of Delaware has been one of the most popular places for the incorporation 
of a company. For example, over 40 percent of New York Stock-Exchange listed 
companies and over 50 percent of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in 
Delaware.28 The reason for the popularity of Delaware as a place of incorporation of 
a company is found in the fact that it has very favourable tax, trust and corporations 
laws.29 A single director limited liability company can be incorporated and, provided 
it has no US sourced income, it is not subject to US income tax and it does not need 
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to file a tax return.30 For all intents and purposes it is a US registered company with 
the perception that it pays tax in the US.31 In Australia, for instance, the law requires 
a company that has been registered in Australia to pay income tax on its worldwide 
income, even if the source of the income is outside Australia.  
 
Companies incorporated in the State of Delaware have similar tax advantages to any 
company incorporated in a tax haven or OFC, and yet, the US Government has not 
indicated any intention to remove the attractive benefits associated with a Delaware 
company. Similarly, the US tax system ‘ring fences’ its own taxpayers from the 
benefits of no income tax on bank deposits and bonds, while attracting mobile capital 
from outside the US.  
 
9.1.3 The case of New Zealand as a ‘tax haven’ 
New Zealand does not have taxation law requiring resident and non-resident 
taxpayers to pay income tax on capital gains, unlike Australia, its nearest neighbour. 
New Zealand also facilitates a flow through structure for foreign investors through 
the use of ‘offshore trusts’.32 Trusts that are established in New Zealand with non-
resident beneficiaries and a non-resident settler are not liable to be taxed in New 
Zealand on income earned anywhere else in the world. In fact, the Inland Revenue 
Department of New Zealand does not obtain any information about these trusts 
because they do not need to pay tax. Professor Sawyer states that when, in 2006, the 
Australian Government exerted pressure on New Zealand to reveal whether any 
Australian citizens were settlors of these trusts, the response by the Inland Revenue 
Department was that these types of trusts are not reviewed by the department.33  
Professor Sawyer contends that New Zealand shows no signs of moving away from 
maintaining an absence of tax on capital gains and removing the tax benefits of its 
offshore trust regime.34 It is for these reasons that New Zealand could be considered 
to have some of the characteristics of a tax haven, namely lack of transparency. 
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9.2 The Reasons Why Tax Havens Will Survive 
There are a number of reasons why tax havens and OFCs will continue to operate as 
financial centres with low or no tax on income. Some of the reasons have been 
discussed above but the following discussion provides additional evidence that tax 
havens have a place in the global financial environment and provide important 
benefits to governments, MNEs and individuals.  
 
9.2.1 Lawful use of tax havens 
The Australian Commissioner of Taxation has stated that not all financial 
transactions involving a tax haven will amount to unlawful activity. The following 
statement is contained in the ATO publication on ‘tax havens and tax 
administration’: 
 
People across all taxpaying groups in the Australian tax system are becoming 
increasingly involved in international business and investment. Most dealings with 
tax havens are within the law. Some tax havens, including those that have large 
value dealings with Australian taxpayers, have developed particular niche markets. 
Others are highly regarded as offshore financial centres. Tax havens are particularly 
attractive to international businesses involved in portfolio management, such as 
insurance companies, self-insurers, hedge and mutual funds and offshore investment 
funds, because they have low or no taxes. These international businesses require 
access to the huge international foreign exchange markets and 24-hour-a-day 
management. For example, the Cayman Islands is a major financial and captive 
insurance centre with significant flow-through transactions for equity and hedge 
funds. Jersey and Guernsey have major regulated financial services industries, and 
many international banks are represented in these jurisdictions. 
 
Some multi-national companies have their head office functions in tax havens. 
Australian subsidiaries of overseas multi-national companies may need to transact 
with tax haven companies that are part of their multi-national structure. 
Governments may also transact with tax havens to provide foreign aid programs in 
those countries. 
 
Individual dealings I am not concerned about 
262 
It is not illegal to deal with a tax haven, provided taxpayers comply with the relevant 
tax laws of both jurisdictions. For example, an individual may accumulate savings in 
a bank account in a tax haven while working overseas as a non-resident. When the 
individual becomes an Australian resident, they need to declare the interest on their 
account each year to meet their Australian tax obligations. I am generally not 
concerned about the following: 
 expenditure on tourism – travel and accommodation  
 genuine gifts or inheritances from family resident in tax havens (where the 
source of the funds has no connection to Australian residents)  
 earnings from overseas employment that are exempt from tax in Australia 
(although accumulating earnings offshore without declaring the interest in 
Australia would be a concern)  
 former residents returning to Australia and bringing back savings accumulated 
while working overseas  
 transferring assets and capital to Australia on migration to Australia, and  
 investing in property or real estate in a tax haven (where rental or other gains 
are appropriately taxed in Australia).35 
 
There are other valid reasons why tax havens are important and should be preserved. 
Daniel Mitchell strongly contends that tax havens offer a safe haven for people 
subject to persecution on the basis of religious belief, political leanings, ethnic origin, 
and sexual preferences to be able to place some of their wealth beyond the control of 
the government or government agencies in their home state.36  Mitchell provides 
examples of a Middle Eastern Jew, who is wealthy and likely to face persecution, 
and Christians living in some 13 countries likely to be oppressed or persecuted in 31 
nations. He provides an example of a family living in Zimbabwe who place money in 
a tax haven in order to protect the wealth of the family because of the persecution 
and the economic problems devaluing the currency. Similarly, ethnic Chinese are 
persecuted in Indonesia and the Philippines and so place money in banks in 
Singapore. Mitchell also uses the example of a homosexual living in Saudi Arabia 
who is constantly facing prosecution and needs to use a tax haven to protect their 
                                               
35
 Australian Taxation Office, above n 15, 11. 
36
 Daniel Mitchell, ‘The Moral Case for Tax Havens’, (2006) Occasional Paper 24, The Liberal Institute of the 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 19. 
263 
wealth. He states that there are 84 nations that have laws that target homosexuals.37 
The key to maintaining tax havens in order to protect wealth is the expectation that 
their financial information will be kept private. Privacy and confidentiality of 
personal financial information is of paramount importance for individuals facing 
issues discussed above and bank secrecy laws are vital in order to achieve this 
objective. The need for privacy and confidentiality of financial information is 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter of the thesis. 
 
9.2.2 Insurance companies and captive insurance companies  
The Commissioner of Taxation has stated above that one of the main lawful uses of 
tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands, is for the location of captive insurance 
companies.38 The deductibility of insurance premiums paid to ‘captive’ insurance 
companies in Australia is examined by the ATO in their practice statement law 
administration, PS LA 2007/8. The following description of a captive insurance 
company is taken from the practice statement: 
 
A captive insurance entity is an insurance entity where the parent company is not 
primarily engaged in the business of insurance. It is usually formed to insure the 
risks of its parent and affiliates, but it can also be used to insure third party risks. A 
captive insurance entity can retain the risks or it can pass on the whole or a part of 
the risks. A captive insurance entity would normally operate in a similar way to 
other general insurance or reinsurance companies.39 
 
The practice statement sets out the basis on which premiums are deductible based on 
an assessment of the risk being insured, the cost of the premium, the existence of 
reinsurance and, the ability to meet any claim made by the insured. The case of W D 
& H O Wills (Australia) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 32 ATR 168 
established the precedent that insurance premiums paid to a captive insurance 
company, that was an associate of the taxpayer, was still deductible. It also 
                                               
37
 Ibid, 22 – 23. 
38
 Ibid. Captive insurance companies are insurance companies wholly owned by a large corporation to insure 
risks associated with the business. The captive insurance company then obtains reinsurance from a large 
insurer for large losses but maintains the risk itself for small losses. Many large Australian corporations and 
banks have their own captive insurance company usually located in the Caribbean or Singapore.   
39
 Australian Taxation Office, Practice Statement Law Administration PS LA 2007/8, 2. 
264 
reinforced the fact that many large companies are unable to purchase insurance to 
cover many of their risks. Their only option is to use a captive insurance company 
and locate it in an established tax haven or OFC that specialises in captive insurance 
business.  
 
Many insurance and reinsurance companies are located in tax havens, such as 
Bermuda. The reason for this is that they are able to invest their premium income 
without the cost of paying income tax on the earnings. This means that there is more 
money to be used to pay claims as a result of a catastrophe happening in the world, 
such as ‘hurricane Katrina’ in the US in August 2005. Without this tax benefit, many 
businesses would not be able to operate because they would not be in a position to 
acquire the required insurance cover for their particular business activity. This was 
the situation in the US in the mid-1980s when US businesses were unable to obtain 
liability insurance cover.40 Caroline McDonald discusses the future of insurance 
companies domiciled in Bermuda that are facing the prospect of tax changes to be 
made by the US. She notes that, at this stage, all companies have stayed but are able 
to quickly move to Ireland or Switzerland if the US imposes taxes on the business.41  
 
Bermuda is a dominant player in the insurance business in that it has 35 percent of 
the insurance industry worldwide and 65 percent of the reinsurance industry 
worldwide.42 Half of all risks insured are of US origin and one third of all risks are 
European.43 About 60 percent of all policies sold in Bermuda are for property 
insurance and reinsurance.44 Reinsurers take some of the risk from the original 
insurers and, by doing this, insurance companies can take on more risk, or less 
desirable risk, thus helping more customers.45 If premium income was not given 
favourable tax treatment by tax havens and OFCs then many risks facing businesses 
                                               
40
 Yelena Tsvaygenbaum, ‘A tax treaty that doesn’t tax? The unique history of the United States-Bermuda tax 
treaty and the subsequent problems facing the United States insurance industry’, (2008-2009) 15 Connecticut 
Insurance Law Journal 267, 281. 
41
 Caroline McDonald, ‘Bermuda Carriers Not Expected to Rush off the Island Despite U.S. Tax Concerns’, 
(2009) 19 October National Underwriter 22. 
42
 Tsvaygenbaum, above n 40, 279. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Ibid, 280 
265 
throughout the world would not be insured. The business would not be permitted to 
operate. The continued existence of tax havens in the insurance and reinsurance 
industry is firmly acknowledged as being of global importance. 
 
9.2.3 The role of tax intermediaries in the survival of tax havens 
Tax havens would not operate as financial centres unless they had the resources of 
accounting, legal and banking services to provide financial and investment advice 
and the ability and competence to manage the mobile capital inflows. The OECD 
conducted a study into the role that tax intermediaries have in aggressive tax 
planning for their clients.46 The OECD describes tax intermediaries as law and 
accounting firms, other tax advisors and financial institutions.47 The focus of the 
report is on the role that tax intermediaries have in the promotion of ‘unacceptable 
tax minimisation arrangements’ which are classified as ‘aggressive tax planning’.48 
There are two types of arrangements that qualify as being unacceptable and they are 
as follows: 
 Planning involving a tax position that is tenable but has unintended and 
unexpected tax revenue consequences. This involves misusing legislation to 
achieve results not foreseen by legislators. 
 Taking a position that is favourable to the taxpayer without openly disclosing 
that there is uncertainty whether significant matters in the tax return accord 
with the law. This involves taxpayers not disclosing their view on grey areas 
of the law when completing their tax return.49 
 
The report identified two main markets for aggressive tax planning by tax 
intermediaries; first, large corporations - MNEs and; second, high-net-worth 
individuals.50 The report also identifies the role played by some banks in developing 
and implementing aggressive tax planning and discusses a number of examples of 
structures used to help wealthy clients and MNEs.51 The OECD acknowledged that 
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the study team was unable to deepen its understanding of aggressive tax planning by 
banks.52 The report makes a number of recommendations as to how revenue bodies 
should use risk management tools to prioritise compliance risk.53 However, the 
revenue bodies need to improve their capability to understand the work of tax 
intermediaries based on greater commercial awareness.54  
 
The recommendations contained in the report would suggest that many revenue 
bodies are incapable of detecting the existence of tax schemes at an early stage in 
their product life due to an inability to comprehend the commercial attributes of the 
arrangement and, more importantly, lack an understanding of structured finance tax 
schemes developed by some banks. The study on the role of accountancy firms in tax 
avoidance, by Sikka and Hampton, has highlighted the fact that major accounting 
firms have expanded globally due to the ability to provide tax avoidance schemes.55 
The accounting firms would prefer to describe their activities as ‘tax planning’ or tax 
minimisation within the law.56 In fact, many large accounting and legal firms have an 
office in many tax havens and OFCs to service their clients involved in tax 
minimisation arrangements. Sikka and Hampton believe that more research needs to 
be undertaken on the role of tax intermediaries and provide the following comment 
on the future of tax avoidance and the involvement of professional advisers: 
 
The possibilities of curbing the tax avoidance industry are further complicated 
because of ‘globalisation and technological change has made it easier to avoid 
paying taxes so you have to introduce more anti-avoidance measures just to stand 
still [and] government’s attempts to raise revenues by tackling tax avoidance will 
inevitably be countered by the tax planning industry’ (Financial Times, 9 March 
2005). Indeed, anarchy of the markets only recognises financial rewards and a 
partner of a major accountancy firm has stated that ‘No matter what legislation is in 
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place, the accountants and lawyers will find a way around it. Rules are rules, but 
rules are meant to be broken’ (The Guardian, 18 march 2004).57   
 
The OECD has acknowledged the role of tax intermediaries and private banks in 
providing trustee services where the beneficial ownership of assets is obscured.58 
They also provide structures involving companies and trusts to ensure that the 
identity of the client remains anonymous.59 Their services are an integral part of the 
tax minimisation industry being conducted in tax havens and OFCs. Until such time 
as there is evidence of major accounting firms, law firms and banks moving from tax 
havens and OFCs, it can be stated with some degree of confidence that tax 
intermediaries still believe that their services will be in demand despite action to curb 
the influence of tax havens by the OECD, the G20, the EU and individual countries, 
including Australia.  
 
9.2.4 Difficulties in identifying the beneficial ownership of offshore assets – 
corporate vehicles, trusts and bearer shares 
Tax administrators have a great deal of difficulty in identifying offshore investments 
held by their own residents in a tax haven or OFC when the assets are held in a 
company with nominee or corporate directors, or in a trust. All common law 
jurisdictions have well developed laws relating to trusts and many tax havens and 
OFCs adopt the common law system. The situation is further complicated if the 
shares in a company used in the taxation scheme are bearer shares. The OECD has 
recognised the difficulty of identifying the beneficial owners and controllers in their 
report prepared by William Witherell in March 2007.60 Witherell provides the 
following summary of the problem facing taxation and anti-money laundering 
authorities when it is very difficult to identify the beneficial owner of assets held in 
tax havens and OFCs: 
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The task of identifying ultimate ownership and control of cross-border transactions 
has become more challenging with the emergence of a large variety of international 
and corporate vehicles, some of which are designed specifically to obscure the 
identity of the beneficial owners and controllers.61 
 
This report draws on earlier work undertaken by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) on the misuse of corporate vehicles.62 The report is based on the responses 
from 32 countries that completed a questionnaire relating to the types of corporate 
vehicles that were available; the types of beneficial ownership relationships; the 
source of beneficial ownership information that was available and methods used to 
obtain the information; and, examples of misuse of corporate vehicles in the 
jurisdiction.63 The report highlights the situation where a company has another 
company acting as the director, instead of a natural person, which adds a further 
layer of complication to the task of determining the beneficial owner. This situation 
is permitted in 19 of the 32 jurisdictions that responded to the survey.64 
 
The use of offshore trusts to hide assets in a tax haven assists in maintaining the 
anonymity of the non-resident taxpayer and investor. This problem has been 
highlighted by Maria Tihin when examining the difficulty the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) is experiencing in trying to combat abusive tax shelter arrangements in 
tax havens. The following statement by Tihin illustrates the problem facing taxation 
administrators: 
 
Often the degree of secrecy is so great that United States law enforcement is not able 
to detect the existence of an offshore account or entity. Even if the existence of the 
offshore entity has been brought to the attention of the United States officials, other 
problems still remain. Many offshore jurisdictions that host tax shelters impose a 
long and cumbersome process for gaining any relevant information, such as a trust’s 
grantor and beneficiary. These secrecy laws make it extremely difficult to determine 
who holds effective control of an offshore trust, as well as the details of its 
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functioning and who should be held accountable for its actions. … A taxpayer can 
create a trust that cannot be directly tied to him without further information. 65  
 
The fact that it is not only very difficult to identify a foreign trust having any 
connection with the country of residence, it is then almost impossible to find out who 
has effective control over the assets within the trust. This situation is even worse 
when the company that acts as trustee has bearer shares. The OECD provides a 
definition of what are bearer shares and a bearer debt.66 
 
Many countries permit the issuance of bearer instruments, either in the form of 
bearer shares or bearer debt. Very generally, a bearer security is one in which the 
legal rights attaching to the instrument belong to the person in physical possession of 
the instrument itself. This is distinct from a “registered” security, which requires that 
legal ownership is based not on physical possession of the instrument but on entry in 
a ledger or other record of ownership.67  
 
This means that a non-resident taxpayer can have their assets held by a company 
where the control of the company is in the hands of a shareholder that physically 
holds the shares and is not shown as the registered shareholder. This makes it 
virtually impossible for the tax administrators to determine who the real owner of the 
shares is. The OECD recommends that countries that allow for bearer shares to be 
issued to have mechanisms in place to identify the true owner of the shares or to not 
allow for a custodian to hold the shares on behalf of the true owner.68 The OECD has 
reported that there are 46 countries that still allow bearer shares to be issued but, of 
those, 41 countries have mechanisms in place to identify the owners of the shares. 
Similarly, 56 countries permit bearer debt instruments to be issued but 47 of those 
countries have mechanisms in place to identify the holder of the debt.69 
 
                                               
65
 Maria Tihin, ‘The Trouble with Tax Havens: The Need for New Legislation in Combating the Use of Offshore 
Trusts in Abusive Tax Shelters’,  (2007-2008) 41 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 417, 423. 
66
 OECD, ‘Tax Co-operation 2009: Towards a level playing field’, Paris (2009) 9. 
67
 Ibid, 24. 
68
 Ibid, 26. 
69
 Ibid. 
270 
The challenge facing taxation authorities in trying to identify their own taxpayers 
involved in offshore trusts and companies is an almost impossible challenge to win.  
The situation discussed above highlights some of the difficulties facing regulators 
with the issue of identifying beneficial ownership and, unless all countries introduce 
laws that require the beneficial owners of assets to be identified, then the problems 
will persist. If this is the case then tax havens and OFCs will continue to provide 
financial services to individuals and MNEs.  
 
9.2.5 The future of bank secrecy laws 
Any amendments to the secrecy provisions of the domestic banking laws in tax 
havens and OFCs require their national parliament to pass new laws. The simple act 
of signing a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) does not ensure that the 
national parliament of that country will either incorporate the agreement into 
domestic law or transform the agreement into domestic law. The process whereby 
international agreements become part of the domestic law can be complicated 
depending upon the legal system in the particular country. Some international 
agreements automatically become part of the domestic law through the doctrine of 
incorporation or through the doctrine of transformation.70 There is no certainty that 
all countries that have entered into TIEAs will be able to amend their bank secrecy 
laws unless their own parliaments agree to do so. 
 
For example, because Switzerland requires international law to be transformed into 
its domestic law, the Swiss Parliament must agree with the reform of its banking 
laws; otherwise, conduct a referendum of the nation if 50,000 signatures are 
collected.71 The Swiss Government will not permit other countries to undermine the 
confidentiality of its financial institutions by allowing unspecified ‘trawling’ for 
names by foreign tax administrations.72 The historical basis for the Swiss bank 
secrecy laws are based on saving lives rather than facilitating tax evasion. The Swiss 
Federal Banking Act was enacted in 1934 to protect foreign customers by ensuring 
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that their bank details were kept confidential. The law was established to counter the 
Nazi government in Germany, which, at that time, imposed a death penalty on 
German citizens who did not report assets held in a foreign bank. In order to protect 
the German customers, no information could be provided to a foreign agency by the 
Swiss bank.73 
 
Panama is now appearing as the ‘New Switzerland’ and has, according to Bryan 
Arce, arguably the strictest bank secrecy laws in the world.74 Panama does not 
impose any income tax and does not regard tax avoidance or tax evasion as a crime 
and upholds the ‘dual criminality’ principle.75 Therefore, any request by the US for 
information on purely tax related matters will generally not be honoured.76  
However, Panama does treat criminal activity seriously and it has strong anti-money 
laundering laws.77 
 
It will be interesting to see if, in the future, all countries that have committed to enter 
into TIEAs do, in fact, pass the requisite domestic laws to put this aspect of 
international law into effect. It can be argued that the OECD has been successful in 
making soft international law and for that law to be complied with by tax havens and 
OFCs.78 There are some commentators that believe that this commitment by tax 
havens will ultimately fail to translate into hard law. For example, the following 
statement from the Australian newspaper may be correct, only time will tell:  
 
The fact that Switzerland ‘led a rush of offers to exchange information with other 
governments’ before the G 20 meeting March 2009, does not mean that Switzerland 
will not be a major repository of finance from tax avoidance. According to Murphy, 
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the ‘agreements to exchange information are useless; the secrecy will be completely 
intact’.79 
 
9.3 The Reasons Why Tax Havens May Not Survive 
This part of the chapter examines a number of activities instituted by various 
governments and agencies that strongly impact on tax havens. Tax havens and OFCs 
may not survive in the future due to concerted efforts by the Australian government 
through its ‘Project Wickenby’, the will of the G20 nations, the actions of members 
of parliament in the US and, the activities of the OECD to detect tax evasion and tax 
avoidance. Professor Avi-Yonah contends that the OECD’s harmful tax project has 
been successful in that,  if the OECD had not put pressure on tax havens many more 
people would have tried to reduce their tax burden through the use of tax havens.80 A 
similar situation arises in Australia where much publicity about ‘Project Wickenby’ 
detecting Australians using tax havens to invest capital offshore and the subsequent 
criminal penalties being imposed on taxpayers has resulted in an increase in tax 
collection by the ATO. This situation is examined in detail below.   
 
9.3.1 ‘Project Wickenby’ in Australia 
The following information has been obtained from the ATO on their website 
dedicated to ‘Project Wickenby’.81 
 
In 2004, at the request of the Tax Office, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
commenced investigations into Switzerland-based tax schemes. The investigation 
exposed financial arrangements that posed a significant threat to the integrity of the 
Australian tax system. It appeared that individuals had participated in arrangements 
using offshore structures to evade and avoid tax or commit fraud against the 
Australian revenue system. Initially it was considered that tax revenue of more than 
$300 million may have been involved. In February 2006, in response to this 
information, the Australian Government provided funding of $308.8 million over 
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seven years for a whole-of-government task force. The task force, Project Wickenby, 
was set up to develop a new approach to tackling international tax fraud and evasion, 
by investigating and bringing to account those promoting and participating in such 
arrangements. This includes prosecuting those considered to have been involved in 
criminal matters associated with the arrangements. 
 
Project Wickenby is a multi-agency task force that was formally established in 
February 2006.The purpose of the task force is to protect the integrity of Australian 
financial and regulatory systems by preventing people from promoting and 
participating in the abusive use of secrecy havens. We work with Australian and 
international agencies to detect deter and address: 
• tax avoidance and evasion  
• breeches of financial laws and regulations  
• attempts to defraud the community including investors and creditors  
• money laundering, and  
• concealment of income or assets. 
 
It is important to note that Project Wickenby is tasked with the obligation to detect 
and deter tax avoidance and tax evasion. The Australian common law clearly 
distinguishes between the two activities. Tax avoidance is the activity of tax 
minimisation within the law whereas tax evasion is tax minimisation contrary to the 
law. This distinction has been discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis along 
with the reason why the government has adopted this approach.82 
 
In order for the Commissioner of Taxation to legally disclose details about taxpayers 
in Australia to other government agencies involved in trying to detect the above 
activities, new powers were required for this purpose. Section 3G, of the Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 (Cth) was introduced in order to authorise the disclosure, by 
the Commissioner of Taxation, of confidential taxation information to the Project 
Wickenby taskforce, subsection 3G(1). Extracts from the section are reproduced 
below and outline the purpose of Project Wickenby. It also makes it an offence for an 
officer involved in Project Wickenby to disclose any information obtained during 
investigations. 
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The Commissioner may disclose information acquired under a taxation law to a 
person to whom subsection (2) applies (a "Project Wickenby" officer) if: 
(a) the Commissioner is satisfied that the information is relevant to a purpose 
of the Project Wickenby taskforce; and 
(b) the disclosure occurs before 1 July 2012, or a later prescribed date. 
 
A Project Wickenby officer is any person: 
(a) who holds an office in, is employed in, or is performing services for: 
(i) an agency in the Project Wickenby taskforce; or 
(ii) an agency that is supporting the Project Wickenby taskforce; and 
(b) whose duties relate to a purpose of the Project Wickenby taskforce. 
 
Subsection 3G(3) states that the Project Wickenby taskforce agencies comprise 
the following: 
(a) the Australian Taxation Office; 
(b) the Australian Crime Commission; 
(c) the Australian Federal Police; 
(d) the Australian Securities and Investments Commission; 
(e) the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions; 
(f) a prescribed agency. 
 
Subsection 3G(4) states that the Project Wickenby taskforce supporting 
agencies comprise the following: 
(a) the Attorney-General's Department; 
(b) the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre; 
(c) the Australian Government Solicitor; 
(d) a prescribed agency. 
 
Subsection 3G(5) Purposes of Project Wickenby taskforce - The purposes of 
the Project Wickenby taskforce are to: 
(a) detect; and 
(b) deter; and 
(c) investigate; and 
(d) enforce the law relating to; 
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the promotion of or participation in arrangements (within the meaning of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 ) of an international character, or purported 
international character, that relate to one or more of these: 
(e) tax avoidance or evasion; 
(f) breaches of laws regulating financial markets and corporations; 
(g) criminal activity in the nature of fraud or obtaining benefits by deception 
(including deceiving investors or creditors); 
(h) money laundering; 
(i) concealing income or assets. 
 
(a) makes a record of the information for a purpose of the Project Wickenby 
taskforce; or 
(b) discloses the information: 
(i) to a Project Wickenby officer; and 
(ii) for a purpose of the Project Wickenby taskforce. 
 
The Assistant Treasurer, Senator the Honourable Nick Sherry made the following 
announcement about the success of Project Wickenby when opening the Wickenby 
portal on the ATO website. 
 
Up to 31 August 2009, Project Wickenby had resulted in: 
• 23 ongoing criminal investigations;  
• 46 people being charged with serious offences;  
• $440.47 million in liabilities being raised; and  
• $365.78 million in collections, including $136.71 million in cash and 
$223.15 in tax collected in subsequent years from people subject to 
Wickenby action.  
The total expenditure of Project Wickenby up to June 30 this year was $210.8 
million. 
"This means for every $1 spent on the strategy, we have brought in $2 in tax 
liabilities or $1.50 in tax collections – a great return for the Australian community," 
said the Assistant Treasurer. It is clear the carrot-and-stick approach to combating 
tax avoidance is working well ... However, with Australians sending $16 billion to 
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offshore tax havens in 2008 alone, the Rudd Government will be keeping up our 
efforts against tax evasion as the global economy moves towards recovery.83 
 
The following information about the activities of project Wickenby has been sourced 
from the ATO website: 
 
Prosecutions and judgements 
As of September 2009, 48 people have been charged with extremely serious offences 
under Project Wickenby. Seven of these are as a result of ACC investigations. Thirty 
nine people were charged as a result of investigations carried out by the AFP and 
this includes 29 people who were charged with 37 counts of money-laundering. 
There have been 3 major convictions to date. In July 2007, a Victorian resident was 
sentenced to 30 months in jail (15 months suspended), on charges of defrauding the 
Commonwealth (Crimes Act 1914), failing to advise the trustee of income 
(Bankruptcy Act 1966), and dishonestly obtaining a gain (Criminal Code). 
 
In Queensland, 2 people plead guilty to 2 counts of obtaining a financial advantage 
by deception. On 21 October 2008 they were sentenced to three years in jail, with 
four months to serve. On appeal by the Commonwealth Department of Public 
Prosecutions the sentence was increased to three years jail with nine months to 
serve. Another 102 people have been referred for prosecution for non-lodgment of 
tax returns. So far 38 of these people have been convicted. 
 
Wickenby investigations - Civil investigations - Criminal investigations - 
Australian Crime Commission investigations - Australian Federal Police - 
Overseas investigations 
Wickenby agencies are involved in civil, criminal and overseas investigations. In the 
course of Project Wickenby audits (including reviews) the Tax Office has:  
 made 48 access visits with notice  
 made 64 access visits without notice  
 issued 1557 notices to ‘furnish information’  
 issued 145 notices to ‘attend and give evidence in interviews’  
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 issued 890 notices of (tax) assessment  
 issued 6 departure prohibition orders (these orders prevent a person leaving 
the country without making provision for tax liabilities). 
 
The Australian Crime Commission (ACC), Australian Federal Police (AFP) and 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) are all undertaking 
criminal investigations as part of Project Wickenby. Investigations are often complex 
and involve a lot of time and resources from agencies. A single AFP or ACC 
investigation may involve a number of promoters and many potential participants. 
ASIC investigations can ultimately generate criminal, civil and administrative 
actions. 
 
The ACC has: 
 issued 200 notices to obtain evidence  
 issued 246 summonses  
 completed 237 examinations  
 executed 58 search warrants. 
 
The AFP has: 
 executed 259 search warrants  
 issued 83 notices under proceeds of crime provisions. 
 21 search warrants have been executed by Vanuatu police.  
 5 search warrants have been executed by New Zealand police. 
 
9.3.2 Increased voluntary compliance 
Project Wickenby interventions are improving taxpayer compliance. People who 
have been the subject of Wickenby interventions have voluntarily lodged more 
accurate tax returns and/or have lodged returns where previously they may not have 
done so. In the year 2007-2008, $223 million of revenue was collected as a result of 
this increased compliance. 
 
Further evidence of improving compliance behaviour comes from another Tax Office 
initiative – the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI). Under this 
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initiative, the Commissioner offers people the chance to disclose undeclared foreign 
income in return for low or no penalties provided they do so before they are 
contacted by the Tax Office. Since the OVDI was launched in 2007, there have been 
3,182 disclosures. The Tax Office has adjusted AUD 221 million of income from 
these disclosures and raised more than AUD 65 million in tax liabilities. 
 
At 30 September 2009, the Tax Office had collected $372 million. This figure 
includes AUD 143 million in cash collections, AUD 223 million in voluntary 
payments made as a direct result of Wickenby activity and about AUD 6 million in 
other monies recouped. This shows people are getting the message that Project 
Wickenby means business. Project Wickenby is expected to collect another AUD 
408 million in tax revenue over the life of the project. This includes AUD 234 
million in cash collections and AUD 174 million of additional revenue from 
improved compliance behaviour following intervention by the Wickenby task force. 
Will this project succeed in deterring Australian taxpayers from trying to hide assets 
in a tax haven? The simple answer is that it will be successful in preventing 
individuals that wish to continue living in Australia from trying to hide money in 
bank accounts in tax havens. 
 
It is hard to disagree with the contention made by the Commissioner of Taxation 
given the findings of Professor Avi-Yonah in relation to the OECD’s harmful tax 
competition project. The use of tax havens by taxpayers resident in Australia must be 
on the decline and no professional tax adviser or accountant would advise their client 
not to disclose income generated in a bank account in a tax haven or OFC. From this 
perspective, the level of business being conducted in tax havens must have 
dramatically reduced. However, it is unlikely that any statistics confirming this view 
will ever be made available to the public, even if collected by the government.  
 
Doubt has been raised about the true state of the success or otherwise of Project 
Wickenby. On 15 February 2010, the Australian Government announced that the 
ATO had collected AUD 465.3 million from Project Wickenby84 activity. Of this 
amount, actual tax collection was AUD 160.08 million and the balance of AUD 
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299.33 represented a ‘compliance dividend’.85  The ATO conceded that the amount 
of the ‘compliance dividend’ was determined based on an assumption that extra tax 
was collected due to behavioural change of taxpayers.86 In the newspaper article, an 
ATO Deputy Commissioner, Michael Cranston, provides the following statement as 
to why the actual collection of tax was not higher than the AUD 160.08 million: 
 
... assets were often held offshore, the entities were difficult to collect money from 
and some businesses had failed, meaning they didn’t pay their tax debts. It is not all 
about the cash coming in, it’s also about them paying future tax because of us 
unwinding their offshore concealed structures. 87 
 
Rawlings makes an interesting observation, in relation to this issue from his research 
findings, in that one interviewee stated that ‘offshore structures no longer worked for 
anyone who is born in a country and never really leaves’.88 The interviewee from 
Guernsey went on to state that locating capital in tax havens works best for ‘high 
wealth individuals that did not live in a country that imposed tax on a worldwide 
basis but are itinerant.89 For example, non-domiciled residents of the UK, temporary 
residents of Australia or, returning or new immigrants to New Zealand are all taxed 
on a territorial basis and are not liable to declare offshore income wherever it may be 
generated. Rawlings provides the following example to illustrate the way in which a 
UK non-domiciliary is able to benefit from investments in tax havens: 
 
For example, a family from the Middle East or Scandinavia may decide to move to 
London. Before arriving they will establish an offshore trust in one of the Channel 
Islands or the Isle of Man, which purchases a town-house for say 5 million pounds in 
London. The remaining assets are then invested offshore and the beneficiaries are 
sent approximately 100,000 pounds in tax free capital payments a month to meet 
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their living expenses. Because of their status as UK non-domicilaries, these 
arrangements are perfectly legal.90 
 
A similar arrangement can be put in place by a ‘temporary’ resident of Australia and 
they are able to live tax free on money repatriated to them from a tax haven or OFC. 
The arrangement is perfectly legal. From this perspective, tax havens and OFCs still 
have a future servicing the financial needs of the very wealthy that choose to live in 
countries that allow for these types of arrangements.  
 
9.3.3 The ‘US Patriot Act’ and other legislative measures 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001 (‘PATRIOT Act’) was introduced by 
President Bush as a direct result of the terrorist attack on the US on 11 September 
2001. It became law, just over a month from the terrorist attacks, on 26 October 2001 
and it passed both houses of parliament, the Congress and Senate, with no 
opposition.91 It was later discovered that many legislators either did not attempt to 
read the Bill or had time to consider the provisions.92 At that time, the perception was 
that terrorist financed their activities through tax havens and OFCs and that new laws 
were needed to detect these financing activities. The Act introduced new measures to 
increase accountability and transparency of lending arrangements and transfers of 
funds and to enhance the powers of the intelligence and police agencies in their 
surveillance and information gathering powers.93  
 
However, Scott Dowling contends that, in reality, terrorists launder their money 
through onshore financial centres, such as London, and that the Patriot Act has 
damaged offshore confidentiality.94  David Burton is also very critical of the Patriot 
Act and other measures to prevent money laundering and criminal activity due to the 
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sheer size of the volume of information being collected by the government 
agencies.95 The number of suspicious activity reports and currency transaction 
reports were approximately 12 million in 2000 and, with the introduction of the 
Patriot Act, that number has doubled.96 According to Burton, the size of the 
‘haystack’ makes it almost impossible to find the ‘needle’.97 
 
In February 2007, Senator Carl Levin, Senator Coleman and Senator Barack Obama 
(as he then was) proposed the ‘Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act’ as a legislative measure 
to combat abusive tax shelters. It was introduced into the House of Representatives at 
that time but it did not progress to becoming law. As at 1 November 2009, it still has 
not become law having been held up by a committee in the Senate. However, 
President Obama fully supports the Bill and it is expected to become law.98 The Act 
attempts to identify countries that have bank secrecy laws that prevent the exchange 
of information relating to US taxpayers and to attempt to put pressure on those 
jurisdictions to enter into TIEAs.99 However, Todero believes that the Act will not be 
successful because it fails to take into account the economic interests of tax havens 
and OFCs.100 He advocates a market solution whereby the US government pays other 
states for the tax information.101 
 
A further piece of legislation, the ‘Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act’, was 
introduced into the US Senate in October 2009 by a number of Democratic Party 
Senators, Rangel, Baucus, Neal and Kerry, and is designed to ensure greater 
compliance by US taxpayers involved in foreign companies or trusts by requiring 
disclosure of the beneficial owners.102 The Act is intended to provide the IRS with 
additional powers to require US taxpayers to provide additional details about any 
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foreign bank account and the ability to impose a 30 percent withholding on payments 
to foreign institutions unless the bank acknowledges the account’s existence and 
discloses the account ownership details.103 The Joint Committee on Taxation contend 
that the Act would prevent US individuals from evading USD 8.5 billion in US taxes 
over a ten year period.104   
 
9.3.4 AUSTRAC and the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Act 
2006 (Cth) 
The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) is a statutory 
authority that derives its power pursuant to s 209, Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2006 (Cth). AUSTRAC describes itself as having the role of 
being Australia’s financial intelligence unit through its collection and analysis of 
financial transactions that are reported to it and it passes on intelligence to 35 partner 
agencies, including the ATO and Project Wickenby.105 The AUSTRAC annual report 
for the period 2008-2009 discloses the fact that the organisation received 19.8 
million transaction reports from regulated entities which equated to an average of 
76,000 reports per business day and that this was an increase of 10 percent from the 
previous year.106 While this may be an admirable achievement, it also raises the issue 
as to how it is humanly possible to investigate all suspicious transactions. 
AUSTRAC does report that it contributed to 1,193 ATO investigations that resulted 
in tax assessments being issued for $131.18 million.107 The organisation also claims 
to have disseminated a total of 43,565 suspicious transaction reports and suspicious 
matter reports to partner agencies to assist in investigations and that this was an 
increase of 19 percent on the previous year.108 Again, the concern is that the 
organisation becomes overloaded with information so as to make it relatively 
ineffective in its operations, similar to the situation discussed above in relation to the 
position in the US.  
                                               
103
 Ibid. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Australian Transaction Reports AND Analysis Centre, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2008-2009, 
<www.austrac.gov.au> 21 December 2009. 
106
 Ibid, 3. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Ibid. 
283 
9.3.5 Sanctions by G20 nations and the OECD 
The G20 nations threatened to impose sanctions on uncooperative tax havens and 
OFCs at the conclusion of the London summit in April 2009. The G20 leaders made 
the following statement to emphasise their attitude to international tax evasion: 
 
We agree to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens. 
We stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public finances and financial 
systems. The era of bank secrecy is over. We note that the OECD has today 
published a list of countries assessed by the Global Forum against the international 
standard for exchange of tax information. 109 
 
The sanctions would include such measures as denying funding from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.110 The G20 also suggested that 
taxpayers using tax havens could expect extra audits and that businesses operating 
within tax havens could be denied tax deductions.111 
 
As yet no sanctions have been imposed on any tax haven and it would appear that the 
nations listed by the OECD as ‘not cooperating’ have very quickly entered into 
TIEAs. The key issue is bank secrecy laws and these laws have to be amended in 
order to give effect to the TIEAs. If this is achieved then sanctions may not be 
necessary in the future.  
 
9.3.6 Tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) 
The list of countries that have implemented the universally endorsed standard on the 
exchange of information is shown in Appendix A. There are no jurisdictions listed 
that have not committed to the internationally agreed tax standard. In 2009, more 
than 300 TIEAs were signed by jurisdictions identified by the OECD as ‘not 
substantially’ implementing the standard.112 The OECD has been prepared to 
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implement sanctions if necessary in order to obtain the cooperation of the nations 
contained in the list.  
 
9.4 The Economic Impact on Tax Havens 
What would happen to the economies of small island tax havens and OFCs if they 
ceased to be able to provide financial and banking services to individuals and 
MNE’s? What would happen to all of the people employed providing the financial 
services including company incorporations, trustee services and custodian services? 
For example, in 1998, Renee Lal, when commenting on the costs and benefits of 
Vanuatu being a tax haven, stated that the benefits could be listed as revenue for the 
government, local employment in the tax haven industry, transfer of skills to the 
local population, tourism and local employment in other sectors of the population.113 
In 1996, revenue from business licences and registration fees accounted for 15 
percent of the GDP of the country.114 In 1996, there were 80 offshore banks and 
2,000 registered companies.115 By 2005 the number of banks had been reduced to 
only 7.116 Sunita Bois-Singh contends that the measure adopted by Vanuatu to 
comply with the OECD requirements to exchange information and potential costs of 
entering into TIEAs has been costly to the country.117 Moreover, if beneficial 
interests with trusts are to be identified and available for disclosure to other countries 
then Vanuatu will cease to be attractive to mobile capital.118  
 
A similar situation exists with the Channel Islands that have, for many years, been 
vital for UK non-domiciliaries to keep their wealth in a tax haven whilst living in the 
UK. The Channel Islands are British dependencies and consist of Guernsey and 
Jersey. A further tax haven in the region, but not part of the Channel Islands, is the 
Isle of Man. Guernsey has relied on financial services to provide a quarter of the jobs 
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and 55 percent of the island’s income.119 There is now concern that, if as a result of 
action being taken by the OECD and the G20, many people will be unemployed. If 
tax havens ceased to be able to function as financial centres then the OECD member 
nations, as well as the IMF and World Bank, would need to consider financial aid in 
compensation for the loss of economic activity.   
 
9.5 Conclusion 
In answer to the main question raised in this thesis, whether tax havens will survive 
in the current international legal environment, the answer would appear to be in the 
affirmative given the evidence supporting their continued existence, discussed above. 
The main reason why tax havens and OFCs will survive is because there are a 
number of legitimate reasons why different nations, MNEs and individuals will 
continue to avail themselves of the financial services being offered in those 
jurisdictions. For example, individuals will always need to hold capital in a foreign 
jurisdiction for asset protection purposes and high-net-worth individuals that do not 
have a specific country of residence will invest mobile capital in tax havens. 
Temporary residents in Australia and non-domiciled residents of the UK and other 
countries will use tax havens because there is no tax consequence as they have no 
legal obligation to pay income tax in the country where they live.  
 
Multi-national enterprises will locate their captive insurance companies in certain tax 
havens and purchase other insurance policies from a company in Bermuda. Tax 
havens and OFCs perform a crucial function in providing the headquarters for the 
insurance industry. Without the benefits of low or no tax jurisdictions in which to 
invest premium income, many individuals or businesses would be unable to purchase 
insurance cover or would find the premiums beyond their financial reach. The 
beneficiaries are the public who are covered for loss or injury by insurance 
companies that exist in tax havens.  
 
MNEs will take advantage of special economic regions or countries that offer tax 
advantages, such as Ireland. Until the US takes action to amend the laws in the State 
of Delaware, MNEs will continue to incorporate foreign subsidiary companies in that 
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jurisdiction. MNEs will continue to present problems for the country of residence in 
trying to tax them on their worldwide income. The Australian model, which is widely 
used in many other nations, to exempt from income tax active business income 
generated in a comparable state, is arguably the best solution in encouraging 
Australian MNEs to be global entities. Similarly, many countries, including 
Australia, will continue to use tax havens and OFCs for the investment of their 
sovereign wealth funds for a variety of reasons, as discussed above.   
 
There is no evidence that the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ was caused by the existence 
of tax havens and that the solution to balancing national budgets in the future lies in 
having tax havens collect income tax for the developed nations with large budget 
deficits. It is interesting to note that, according to Professor Avi-Yonah, the total tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP of OECD member countries, during the period 1975 
to 2006, had increased even though tax havens and OFCs were actively competing 
for capital by offering low or no taxes on income.120 For instance, total tax revenue 
as a percentage of GDP increased from 29.4 percent in 1975 to 35.9 percent in 
2006.121 Both individual and company income tax had also increased by 1.8 percent 
and 1.7 percent respectively.122 Based on this assertion, budget deficits could be 
rectified within the next few years without taking drastic action against tax havens 
and OFCs. 
 
Australian individuals will reduce their use of tax havens and OFCs for tax 
minimisation purposes and this will be the situation in other countries, such as the 
US and the UK. As a result of ‘Project Wickenby’, the ATO strongly contends that 
many hundreds of millions of dollars will now be collected in income tax as a direct 
result of action that has been taken to detect Australian taxpayer’s that held 
investments in tax havens and did not declare foreign income. The US and other 
OECD member nations are actively taking action to detect and deter their own 
taxpayers from using the financial services in tax havens and OFCs. On the other 
hand, Professor Dale Pinto contends that tax havens and OFCs, once the domain of 
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the rich, will soon be within reach of the average taxpayer due to the Internet.123 It 
will be up to the ATO to meet this challenge and Professor Pinto urges the ATO to 
work closely with the private sector to keep up-to-date with technology in the area of 
E-commerce in order to combat tax evasion through the Internet.124 
 
In terms of the effectiveness of the OECD and its drive to have all tax havens enter 
into TIEAs, the action may not result in the demise of tax havens and OFCs as 
financial centres. Gregory Rawlings conducted research by way of interviews with 
participants involved in offshore financial services in Andorra, Australia, Guernsey, 
France, Samoa and Singapore in order to asses the effects of the OECD’s harmful tax 
competition project was having on their future prospects.125 Gregory Rawlings 
contends that the push by the OECD to amend bank secrecy laws and enter into 
exchange information agreements can be accommodated without unduly damaging 
the leading OFCs.126 He uses Singapore as an example of an OFC that has not only 
expanded its banking system to 115 commercial banks but had become a leading 
centre for private wealth management involving private banks and trust firms. The 
interviewees expressed confidence in the future of their operations, especially in light 
of the wealth being created in China.127 
 
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah contends that there are two ways in which the 
influence of tax havens may be reduced; first, by eliminating the ability of CFCs to 
defer tax; and second, for all OECD member states to impose a refundable 
withholding tax on payments to non-treaty countries while requiring real exchange of 
information by treaty countries.128 By way of contrast, Bryan Arce, in his study of 
Panama as a tax haven, reaches the conclusion that until such time as Panama signs a 
TIEA with the US, Panama’s bank secrecy laws will continue to facilitate the 
laundering of evaded US taxes.129 However, this may be the situation with many tax 
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havens and OFCs, the domestic bank secrecy laws may not be repealed and this 
means that the existence of a TIEA is irrelevant. While some countries will not agree 
to exchange information, it is difficult to see all tax havens complying with the 
OECD.
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined whether tax havens will survive in the new international 
legal environment. In order to arrive at a conclusion to this main question, four 
subsidiary research questions were examined and a number of conclusions were 
made in relation to the issues raised.  
 
10.1 Should the international income of an Australian resident be taxed on a 
worldwide or territorial basis? 
It is very difficult for any government to detect and deter resident taxpayers from 
using the financial services provided by tax havens, particularly as labour and capital 
becomes more mobile in a globalised world. This is a particular problem if the 
country of residence imposes income tax on their residents’ worldwide income. For 
example, in Australia, resident taxpayers must pay income tax on all income no 
matter where it is derived. This means that income generated in a foreign country 
must be subject to tax in Australia unless an exemption applies. Similarly, foreign tax 
paid on foreign income will result in a foreign tax credit when subject to tax in 
Australia. However, the main problem for the Australian Government is how to 
detect foreign income generated in a tax haven or OFC. Given this problem it might 
be better for Australia to only impose income tax on income generated in Australia 
and ignore foreign sourced income. In other words, should Australia adopt a 
territorial system? This would be easier and cheaper than trying to detect Australian 
taxpayers using financial services in tax havens and OFCs to hide foreign income 
from being subject to income tax in Australia.  
 
It might be more equitable, efficient and simpler to impose income tax on a country’s 
resident taxpayers on a territorial basis. As examined in Chapter 6, while a 
worldwide system like the Australian system was more complex than a territorial 
system, a pure territorial system, such as the one that exists in Hong Kong, is 
inherently inequitable. In terms of efficiency, Australia has a hybrid worldwide 
system in that foreign active business income, foreign non-portfolio dividends and 
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some foreign employment income is exempt from further income tax in Australia. 
This hybrid system ensures that MNEs are encouraged to expand and invest their 
business operations in foreign countries without being disadvantaged by higher taxes 
in their home country. 
 
Australia allows ‘temporary residents’ to be taxed only on their income generated 
within Australia and allows foreign income to be exempt. Similarly, foreign investors 
only pay income tax on capital gains generated from real property; business assets 
and shares in land rich companies situated in Australia and all other investments do 
not attract a tax on the capital gain. These two examples of Australia taxing foreign 
investors and temporary residents on a territorial basis can be explained as policy 
measures designed to maintain Australia as a competitive nation for foreign 
investment. 
 
One of the key issues facing any tax system is tax avoidance and tax evasion. Hong 
Kong, with its simpler tax system, still has complex anti-avoidance tax laws that are 
designed to ensure their resident taxpayers pay the appropriate amount of income tax. 
It would appear from the research conducted in Chapter 6 that both tax systems have 
difficulty in detecting, and deterring their taxpayers from using financial services 
located in tax havens and OFCs. In terms of the continued survival of tax havens, 
both systems, a worldwide system and a territorial system suffer from a threat to their 
tax base by tax havens. The new knowledge gained from this research would suggest 
that the option of Australia converting to a full territorial system would not have any 
beneficial effect on the collection of income tax revenue that may be located in tax 
havens or OFCs. It does not matter whether a country has a territorial system or a 
worldwide system in terms of the collection of revenue. The existence of tax havens 
and OFCs threaten the tax base of countries with either system. 
 
10.2 Second Subsidiary Research Question 
The OECD’s ‘Harmful Tax Project’: Is this international law? 
Since the early 1990s, the OECD had been trying to ‘name and shame’ tax havens 
and eliminate competitive tax practices through its ‘harmful tax competition project’. 
The OEDC wanted to achieve a ‘level playing field’ with all nations. This was to be 
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achieved by tax havens and OFCs eliminating their bank secrecy laws and by 
becoming more transparent in their dealings with other countries. The subsidiary 
research question was whether the OECD made soft international law and, if that was 
the case, had the ‘harmful tax competition project’ become part of the international 
taxation law? Moreover, if that was the situation, did this explain why many tax 
havens and OFCs were entering into tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs)?  
 
Chapter 5 examined the philosophical basis of law and, in particular, international 
law. It is generally accepted by the international legal community that the OECD, 
among a number of international organisations, makes international law through its 
guidelines and policy recommendations. The OECD’s guidelines on transfer pricing, 
the taxpayers’ charter, the non-deductibility of bribes to foreign officials and anti-
money laundering recommendations have all been accepted as having the status of 
soft international law.1 Chapter 5 focused on tax havens and OFCs in terms of their 
sovereign right to self-determine tax policy, including tax rates and the effect that the 
OECD’s initiatives in the area of tax competition were having on those independent 
sovereign nations.  
 
This thesis has shown that the OECD does make soft international law and 
international norms. These norms have taken on the status of being part of the 
international taxation law. The OECD’s harmful tax competition project is an 
example of how international norms become law and this, in part, explains the reason 
why many nations eventually embraced the OECD’s recommendations and 
transformed them into hard law by being part of that nation’s domestic law. The 
research has also shown that soft international law is on balance, desirable in a global 
legal environment and organisations, such as the OECD, are a major contributor of 
soft law. The only concern is that because soft law is not law in the legal positivist 
tradition, it has the potential to infringe the ‘rule of law’ if not administered properly, 
as has been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The research also examined the rise of 
soft law in the domestic taxation environment and the threat that this may have on 
the ‘rule of law’ in Australia.  
                                               
1
 Professor Reuven Arvi-Yonah and Professor Alison Christians have supported this contention and their findings 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
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This thesis has demonstrated that in terms of the future of tax havens in the new 
international legal environment, there is strong evidence that the OECD has been 
successful in bringing about a high level of cooperation with tax havens. The 
blacklisting of tax havens and OFCs coupled with the threat of sanctions appears to 
have produced the desired effect of promoting cooperation.  The OECD’s harmful 
tax competition project and the subsequent entering into TIEAs by tax havens may 
have a major impact on lessening the role of tax havens in the tax avoidance and tax 
evasion industry.   
 
10.3 Third Subsidiary Research Question 
Why has the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion become blurred in 
Australia? 
 
This thesis has shown that while the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion is still recognized as part of the common law in Australia, recent statutory 
laws have ignored the distinction. In Chapter 7, the AML/CTF Act was examined as 
an example of the blurring of the distinction as well as provisions relating to the ‘tax 
scheme promoter penalty’ regime. The research shows that one of the main reasons 
for this approach by the Australian government is to label any activity associated 
with a tax haven or OFC as being of a ‘criminal nature’ and therefore the details of 
any banking or financial transactions are required to be disclosed by the tax haven to 
the ATO under a variety of statutory provisions. Chapter 7 examined the concept of 
‘dual criminality’ in that tax havens could not be required to disclose banking 
information unless it could be shown by the requesting state that their citizens had 
been engaged in criminal activity such as money laundering. The activity had to 
constitute a criminal activity in both jurisdictions. This issue becomes very important 
when examining the TIEAs that Australia has entered into with tax havens and 
OFCs. In order to obtain information under these agreements the Australian taxpayer 
must be engaged in tax evasion or criminal tax matters so it is in the interest of the 
Australian Government to label all tax minimization activities as tax evasion. This 
issue is examined in more detail in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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The research also showed that this deliberate conduct by the Australian Government 
had the  potential to threaten the ‘rule of law’ by allowing the tax administrators and 
the courts to have a strong influence over what constitutes legal tax avoidance and 
tax minimisation as opposed to illegal tax evasion. The new knowledge gained from 
this research shows that an established legal concept, namely the distinction between 
tax avoidance and tax evasion has been deliberately blurred by the government for 
the purpose of  deterring taxpayers from using the banking and financial services of 
tax havens and OFCs. However, as the research has shown, this can lead to the 
erosion of the rights of the taxpayer and more importantly, the ‘rule of law’. 
 
10.4 Fourth Subsidiary Research Question 
Exchange of information agreements with tax havens: how will this affect the 
rights of non-resident taxpayers and investors? 
The thesis examined the existing powers that are held by the ATO to obtain 
information from resident taxpayers and foreign visitors to Australia. The research 
also focused on the ATO’s powers to obtain information from foreign nations. The 
new knowledge obtained from the research shows that the rights of Australian 
taxpayers to maintain the confidentiality of their financial and banking information, 
both within Australia and outside Australia, is very limited. 
 
The research shows that the primary source of protection for a taxpayer’s financial 
information from disclosure to taxation authorities is the right to claim that certain 
documents and communications are privileged because they are between the 
taxpayer and their lawyer. Moreover, the research shows that the right to claim legal 
professional privilege applies to both domestic legal advice and foreign legal advice. 
The research also shows that in some countries, such as New Zealand and the US, the 
privilege has been extended to include advice provided by the accountant and tax 
agent to their clients.  
 
In Chapter 8 of the thesis the arrangement entered into between the US government 
and the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) was examined in the context of the rights 
of bank customers to maintain the confidentiality of their financial affairs. The UBS 
disclosed the names of 4,500 US citizens having accounts with the bank. This act of 
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disclosure by the UBS to the IRS illustrated the vulnerability of taxpayers trying to 
maintain the confidentiality of their financial details.2 The research highlighted the 
fact that banks are now disclosing information to the taxation authorities that would 
once have been protected by the banker – customer relationship and recognized by 
the law. 
  
The thesis shows that with the introduction of TIEAs between tax havens and OFCs 
and OECD member nations the rights of a non-resident taxpayer to maintain the 
confidentiality of their financial affairs in a foreign country is under threat. The 
research shows that non-resident taxpayers are not in a position to know if their 
financial details are being disclosed by a foreign tax authority to the tax authority in 
their home country and even if documents are protected by legal professional 
privilege there is no way of claiming that privilege if the taxpayer is unaware that the 
documents are being disclosed. The research into the protection provided by the 
declarations on human rights and a variety of statutory provisions incorporating 
human rights was found to be of limited use in the area of taxation law. It was found 
that the Courts in the UK were reluctant to allow taxpayers to rely on the human 
rights provisions when it came to matters of taxation revenue. The research did 
indicate that while ‘fishing expeditions’ by the ATO might be allowed under 
Australian domestic law; they are not permitted under the laws of tax havens and 
OFCs. If the ATO wanted information about certain tax arrangements involving a tax 
haven then they must provide details of specific taxpayers and specific transactions 
before information is exchanged. Based on the research it is possible to draw the 
conclusion that with the introduction of TIEAs, non-resident taxpayers and MNEs 
face a greater possibility of having their financial details disclosed to the tax 
authorities in their country of residence. This directly impacts on the future of tax 
havens and OFCs because the greater the threat of disclosure, the less non-resident 
taxpayers will use tax havens to hide financial assets and income. 
 
10.5 Main Research Question 
Will tax havens survive in the new international legal environment? 
 
                                               
2
 See section 8.4.1 for details of the settlement between the IRS and UBS. 
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As a result of the new knowledge gained from the research undertaken on the 
subsidiary research questions and the main research question examined in Chapter 9, 
it is possible to make the following predictions about the survival of tax havens and 
OFCs:  
1. There are many legitimate uses for tax havens, especially in the area of 
insurance and fund management, particularly with sovereign wealth funds. 
The fact that no income tax is applied to these funds when invested confirms 
the need for the continued survival of tax havens and OFCs.   
2. The major beneficiaries of mobile capital that flows into bank accounts in tax 
havens and OFCs are the established investment centres, such as the US and 
the UK. The mobile capital that was initially deposited in the tax haven has to 
be eventually invested in substantial investments that can only be found in the 
major financial centres. Tax havens and OFCs do not have the infrastructure 
to absorb large amounts of capital. Therefore both the UK and the US have a 
vested interest in seeing the continued existence of tax havens and OFCs. It is 
clear from the research that Australia has also been a beneficiary from tax 
havens in that it receives more from tax havens in the form of foreign 
investment than the amounts that flow out to tax havens. 
3. Tax havens and OFCs may continue to thrive simply because it is still too 
difficult for the OECD member states and the G20 nations to detect their own 
resident taxpayers who use tax havens. The continued existence of bearer 
shares, nominee directors and investment trusts makes the task of finding the 
beneficial owner of investments particularly difficult. Even allowing for 
TIEAs and some amendments to the bank secrecy laws of tax havens, 
countries such as Australia are not permitted to engage in ‘fishing 
expeditions’ in an attempt to find Australian taxpayers using offshore 
banking services; they must have specific information about a particular 
taxpayer and evidence of criminal activity before information will be 
provided. 
4. Among nations competing for mobile capital there is a distinct lack of a level 
playing field with developed countries. For example, Australia encourages 
foreign investment by offering tax concessions not available to ordinary 
residents; the UK encourages non-domiciled residents the ability to use tax 
havens that are British dependencies in which to invest their money; the US 
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allows for the State of Delaware to provide a haven for corporations to 
transfer money globally as well as encouraging investment in the US without 
withholding tax being imposed; and New Zealand facilitates the flow of 
money to tax havens through their foreign investment trusts and still has not 
introduced a tax on capital gains. The extent of tax hypocrisy that was found 
to exist in the developed world provides tax havens and OFCs with more than 
sufficient ammunition to counter any actions to force them out of business by 
the OECD or the G20.   
5. The US is actively engaged in introducing new laws to try to deter and detect 
US citizens with offshore bank accounts being used to hide assets. The US 
government was able to force the Union Bank of Switzerland to disclose the 
names of 4,500 US citizens with bank accounts and Australia has, arguably, 
had some success with ‘Project Wickenby’ in terms of the effect prosecutions 
have had on deterring Australian taxpayers from hiding assets in tax havens. 
In fact the Australian government has claimed a ‘compliance dividend’ of 
nearly AUD 300 million in saved income tax as a direct result of its 
aggressive approach to tax havens. From this perspective, the research does 
show that action being taken by certain governments has had the effect of 
deterring the use of tax havens and OFCs by some taxpayers. Whether this 
will result in tax havens and OFCs ceasing to survive is unlikely given the 
results of the research that has been undertaken in this thesis. 
 
 
10.6 Areas for Future Research 
The following areas merit further research as evidence becomes available:   
 
10.6.1 The relaxation of bank secrecy laws in tax havens and OFCs and the 
agreement of the national governments to changes to the domestic laws 
The mere fact that the governments of tax havens and OFCs have entered into 
agreements to exchange tax information and amend their domestic bank secrecy laws 
does not equate to the national government obtaining agreement to amend the laws 
by their own parliament. International agreements only become part of the national 
law once transformed or incorporated into the domestic law. There is some doubt 
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that this will happen in many countries, including Switzerland. This situation 
requires ongoing monitoring and research. 
 
10.6.2 The extent to which tax havens and OFCs continue to enter into TIEAs 
and provide cooperation with contracting nations?  
All tax havens and OFCs that have been identified by the OECD have been 
threatened with sanctions if they do not cooperate by entering into TIEAs and 
amending their bank secrecy laws. This threat has been reinforced by the G20. 
However, some tax havens may have taken the attitude that it is better to enter into a 
TIEA but not to comply with the agreement or cooperate with a requesting nation for 
information on a non-resident taxpayer in the future. It will be important to see what 
level of cooperation is provided by tax havens and OFCs in order to assess the future 
of tax havens in the international environment. 
 
10.6.3 The continued presence of tax intermediaries in tax havens and OFCs. 
Tax havens and OFCs require accounting, legal and financial services to be located 
in their state in order to attract mobile capital. Many tax havens and OFCs have a 
number of foreign banks and international accounting and legal firms located within 
their country. If these tax intermediaries continue to remain in tax havens then this 
would indicate that the OECD and the G20 have not succeeded in deterring non-
resident taxpayers from investing capital in these nations or MNEs having a 
continued involvement in shifting profits into tax havens. 
 
10.6.4 The impact of taxation on MNEs: The presence and promotion of special 
economic zones to promote employment and industrial development. 
Many countries have developed special economic zones to manufacture goods that 
are on sold without any taxes being added in the home country. These zones are 
favoured by MNEs as goods can be produced for a cheaper price, being able to 
exploit cheap labour and no added taxes. Taxes are derived indirectly from taxing the 
wages of the employees. These industries are usually highly technology intensive.3 
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 Mihir Desai, C Fritz Foley and James Hines, ‘Research Spotlight: Taxation and Multinational Activity: New 
Evidence, New Interpretations’, (2006) 86(2) Survey of Current business 16, 20. 
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But, why have tax havens and OFCs been singled out when special economic zones 
flourish, arguably at the expense of lost taxes for OECD member countries?  
 
10.6.5 The concept of a ‘World Tax Organisation’ and its likely impact on tax 
havens and OFCs. 
With many MNEs becoming global entities and the lack of cooperation between 
nations on tax policy to meet the challenges of international commerce, a World Tax 
Organisation has been proposed as a solution for the future.4 It would overcome the 
problem of tax policy being implemented by way of a double taxation agreement 
(DTAs) or through other types of bi-lateral agreements such as taxation information 
exchange agreements (TIEAs). If this type of global organisation, similar to the 
OECD, was to eventuate, what impact would it have on the future of tax havens and 
OFCs?
                                               
4
 Dale Pinto and Adrian Sawyer, ‘Towards sustaining the future of taxation: Is a World Tax Organisation 
necessary and feasible in today’s globalised world?’ (2009) 24 Australian Tax Forum 179. 
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Appendix A  Countries that have implemented the universally endorsed standard 
on the exchange of information 
A progress report on the jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD global forum in 
implementing the internationally agreed tax standard1  
Progress made as at 25 February 2010 (Original Progress Report 2 April) Jurisdictions that have substantially 
implemented the internationally agreed tax standard  
Andorra  
Antigua and Barbuda  
Argentina  
Aruba  
Australia  
Austria  
Bahrain  
Barbados  
Belgium  
Bermuda  
British Virgin Islands  
Canada  
Cayman Islands  
Chile  
China2  
Cyprus  
Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Estonia  
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Gibraltar  
Greece  
Guernsey  
Hungary  
Iceland  
India  
Ireland  
Isle of Man  
Israel  
Italy  
Japan  
Jersey  
Korea  
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg  
Malaysia  
Malta  
Mauritius  
Mexico  
Monaco  
Netherlands  
Netherlands Antilles  
New Zealand  
Norway  
Poland  
Portugal  
Russian Federation Samoa  
San Marino  
Seychelles  
Singapore  
Slovak Republic  
Slovenia  
South Africa  
Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Turkey  
Turks and Caicos Islands 
United Arab Emirates  
United Kingdom  
United States  
US Virgin Islands  
Jurisdictions that have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, but have not yet substantially 
implemented  
Jurisdiction  Year of 
Commitment  
Number of 
Agreements  
Jurisdiction  Year of 
Commitment  
Number of 
Agreements  
Tax Havens3  
Anguilla  
Bahamas  
Belize  
Cook Islands  
Dominica  
Grenada  
Liberia  
Marshall Islands 
Montserrat  
2002  
2002  
2002  
2002  
2002  
2002  
2007  
2007  
2002  
(11)  
(11)  
(2)  
(11)  
(1)  
(2)  
(0)  
(1)  
(3)  
Nauru  
Niue  
Panama  
St Kitts and 
Nevis  
St Lucia  
St Vincent and 
the Grenadines  
Vanuatu  
2003  
2002  
2002  
2002  
2002  
2002  
2003  
(0)  
(0)  
(1)  
(9)  
(5)  
(8)  
(1)  
Other Financial Centres  
Brunei  
Costa Rica  
Guatemala  
2009  
2009  
2009  
(8)  
(1)  
(0)  
Philippines  
Uruguay  
2009  
2009  
(0)  
(4)  
 Jurisdictions that have not committed to the internationally agreed tax standard  
Jurisdiction  Number of Agreements  Jurisdiction  Number of Agreements  
All jurisdictions surveyed by the Global Forum have now committed to the internationally agreed tax standard 
 
 1. The internationally agreed tax standard, which was developed by the OECD in co-operation with non-OECD 
countries and which was endorsed by G20 Finance Ministers at their Berlin Meeting in 2004 and by the UN 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters at its October 2008 Meeting, requires exchange of 
information on request in all tax matters for the administration and enforcement of domestic tax law without regard to 
a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy for tax purposes. It also provides for extensive safeguards to 
protect the confidentiality of the information exchanged.  
2. Excluding the Special Administrative Regions, which have committed to implement the internationally agreed tax 
standard.  
3. These jurisdictions were identified in 2000 as meeting the tax haven criteria as described in the 1998 OECD report. 
 
